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ABSTRACT
No previous entire thesis or book has been devoted to a national study of the 1842 
strike. This thesis is the first to examine the 1842 strike in all regions of Great Britain 
significantly affected, including the Northwest, Yorkshire, the East Midlands, the 
Potteries, the Black Country, parts of Scotland, the Merthyr district of South Wales, and 
London. Chartist activists in the Ashton district deliberately launched a general strike 
for the People’s Charter in order to pre-empt a possible forced strike by the Anti-Corn 
Law League masters for repeal of the Com Laws. The aim of the strike nationally, apart 
from amongst the miners, was overwhelmingly the enactment of the People’s Charter. 
The political strike for the Charter had a coherent strategy and concept which was 
shared by the Chartist activists in all the strike regions. The strike was an attempt by 
Chartist activists in the localities, in the face of caution on the part of the national 
Chartist leadership, and after receiving news of the strike in the Manchester district, to 
implement the most important ‘ulterior measure’ of the Chartist constitutional mass 
platform agitation in order to pressure the Government and Parliament into enacting the 
Charter. It was to be a peaceable display of united public opinion which would break 
the nerve of the government without recourse to violence. The strike for the Charter was 
the highpoint, in terms of the threat posed to the state, of the Chartist mass platform 
agitation. The traditional radical critique of the corrupt aristocratic state inherited from 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century radical movements was articulated in 
the strike and was shared by the different strike regions. A working class identity was 
present in the strike among other multiple identities which included those of the people 
and nation.
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INTRODUCTION
In August 1842, the manufacturing districts of Great Britain experienced a widespread 
wave of industrial and political protest in which the demand for the enactment of the 
People’s Charter was loudly voiced. This general strike has been relatively neglected by 
historians and indeed no book or previous thesis has been devoted to a national study of 
the strike. The one book exclusively devoted to the strike, Jenkin’s The General Strike 
o f 1842, concentrates almost entirely on the Manchester district. This thesis is the first 
to examine the 1842 strike nationally and covers the strike in all regions of Great Britain 
significantly affected, including the Northwest, the West Riding of Yorkshire, the East 
Midlands, the Potteries, the Black Country, parts of Scotland, the Merthyr district of 
South Wales, and London.
In reaction to contemporary responses blaming the strike on the Chartists, the earliest 
historians of Chartism, such as Hovell and West, took an economically determinist view 
of the strike as a blind revolt against hunger and economic depression, discounting its 
political nature and instead emphasising the wage demands. Hovell and West in 
their early narrative studies of Chartism argued that the strike was simply the result of 
economic distress which was taken advantage of by the Chartists once it had broken 
out.1 This remained a commonly held view with, for example, Gash in 1979 
characterising the strike as ‘a purely economic movement of protest, though local 
Chartists often tried to exploit the situation in their own neighbourhoods once it 
developed.’ Nevertheless since the late 1970s the general historiography of Chartism 
and popular movements, represented by the writings of, for example, Dorothy 
Thompson, Stevenson, Rule and Belchem, increasingly recognised the political nature 
of the strike and the involvement of Chartist activists in organising the strike.3
This shift in the general historiography was due in a large part to the influence of
1 M. Hovell, The Chartist Movement (Manchester, 1920) 260-7; J. West, Chartism (London, 1920), 188- 
192
2 N. Gash, Aristocracy and People (London, 1979), 317
3 D. Thompson, The Chartists (London, 1984), 271-298; J. Stevenson, Popular Disturbances in England 
1700-1870 (London, 1979), 262-6; J. Rule, The Labouring Classes in Early Industrial England (London, 
1986), 331-6; J. Belchem, Industrialisation and the Working Class (Aldershot, 1990), 117-120
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Mather’s major reinterpretation of the strike movement. Mather divided the strike 
movement into four stages. Mather’s first stage lasted from 8 July to 2 August during 
which time there was a strike for redress of economic grievances in the coalfields of 
North and South Staffordshire. During Mather’s second stage, from 3 to 11 August, the 
strike was extended to new regions and occupations, especially to the Manchester 
district, but its aim remained redress of economic grievances. According to Mather 
politicisation of the strike occurred only during the third stage, and only in some 
districts, from 12 to 20 August, the time when the strike was at its geographically most 
extensive. Mather’s fourth and final stage lasted from 21 August to late September 
when most strikers returned to work and those who remained out, principally cotton 
operatives in Southeast Lancashire, remained out merely for wages rather than the 
Charter. Nevertheless while recognising the role of the Chartists in organising and 
leading the strike in the Northwest in his second stage, Mather denied that a strike for 
the Charter was intended, and argued instead that it was merely organised as a strike 
against wages reductions. He divorced the leadership from the aim of the strike, arguing 
that initial calls for the Charter before the strike were just bluff in order to frighten the 
masters out of carrying through the wage reductions, and that the aim for the Charter 
really came from the grassroots strikers not from the activists. While Mather was more 
willing to recognise that in some places the strike did become for the Charter he still 
insisted that in many places it remained for wages even during his third stage.4 Mather’s 
reinterpretation of the strike was consolidated, for the Northwest, by Sykes.5 However 
the local historiography of the strike in the different regions, including the Northwest, 
will be looked at in the relevant chapters.
When we move on to examine the strike in the Northwest we shall see that Jenkins and 
Foster viewed the strike as a prime demonstration of ‘working-class consciousness’; and 
indeed the 1842 general strike has continued to be seen as a display of class- 
consciousness, for example in Charlton’s recent textbook on Chartism.6 The existence 
or extent of class-consciousness in the 1830s and 1840s had been a subject of fierce
4 F. C. Mather, ‘The General Strike of 1842’, in R. Quinault and J. Stevenson (eds), Popular Protest and 
Public Order (London, 1974), 115-140
5 R. A. Sykes, ‘Popular Politics and Trade Unionism in Southeast Lancashire 1829-1842’ (PhD, 
Manchester, 1982), 662-723
6 M. Jenkins, The General Strike o f 1842 (London, 1980), 257; J. Foster, Class Struggle and the 
Industrial Revolution (London, 1974), 114-117; J. Charlton, The Chartists (London, 1996), 29-49
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academic debate at the time Jenkins, Foster and Mather were writing. However since 
the 1980s the extent to which Chartism was a class-conscious movement has been 
questioned by a new body of work. A number of factors contributed to this. The 
influence of post structuralism has led to dissatisfaction with totalising theories such as 
class. A more gradualist view of the industrial revolution has supposedly removed the 
economic basis for class-consciousness. The influence of Marx has declined with the 
collapse of the USSR and eastern European communist states. Those influenced by the 
‘linguistic turn’ especially Stedman Jones, Joyce and Vernon argue that class- 
consciousness cannot just be assumed from economic or social conditions. They argue 
there is no simple causal link between experience and consciousness and rather that 
identity and experience is created through language.
Stedman Jones in his essays in The Chartist Experience and Languages o f Class in 1982 
and 1983 emphasised the political, in contrast to the social, nature of Chartism. Stedman 
Jones argued that, at least in terms of the public language used by the Chartists in print, 
Chartism was only a class based movement in a limited sense. He argued that the 
Chartists, like earlier radicals, continued to view political monopoly and the state as the 
source of social evils. According to Stedman Jones there was no move to a socialist 
ideology identifying capitalist production relations and the economic system itself as the 
source of social evils. The Chartist ideology remained that of ‘the people’ against the 
aristocracy and of the productive against the idle. There was hostility to the middle 
classes but this was due to their new influence on government due to their 
enfranchisement in 1832 rather than to their role as capitalists. In practical terms the 
working classes had now become ‘the people.’ Although there was now a very close fit 
between ‘the people’ and the working classes after 1832 the Chartists’ public ideology 
remained the traditional radical ideology o f ‘Old Corruption’, that is that the aristocracy 
and their place-men had corrupted the House of Commons and lived off taxes, rather 
than a new class-based ideology. Economic unfairness was seen in terms of unfair 
exchange rather than the result of the relation to the means of production and unfair 
exchange was rooted in political monopoly. Stedman Jones argues/that they believed in 
a labour theory of value based on Paineite natural rights, that is the natural right to ones
7 G. Stedman Jones, Languages o f Class (Cambridge, 1983), 90-179; G. Stedman Jones, ‘The Language 
of Chartism’, in J. Epstein and D. Thompson (eds), The Chartist Experience (London, 1982), 3-58; P. 
Joyce, Visions o f the People (Cambridge, 1991), 1-23; P. Joyce, Democratic Subjects (Cambridge, 1994), 
1-20; J. Vernon, Re-Reading the Constitution (Cambridge, 1995), 1-21
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property, which precluded socialism. He argued that the Chartists still believed in the 
political origin of oppression even though big capitalists, as well as landowners, had 
become targets of abuse. Furthermore the Chartists had a notion of political oppression 
by the state; the state used laws such as the 1834 Poor Law to create a tyranny to 
enslave the producers, Radical ideology was the language of a class after 1832 but it 
was not itself a class language. However i t  should be no ted  th a t  
he did not deny the possibility of class-consciousness existing outside of the public 
printed language of the Chartists.8
Joyce in Visions o f the People argued that class was not the dominant identity and that 
other discourses such as that of ‘the people’ or the nation were more important. Joyce 
made the point that there were overlapping and competing discourses rather than a 
single discourse in the language of the Chartists and working classes. Joyce admitted 
with Stedman Jones that there was an overlap between class and people in 1840s when 
workers saw themselves as the true people and the notion of ‘the people’ may have 
taken on class meanings. Both Joyce and Vernon emphasised popular constitutionalism 
as the master narrative in nineteenth century England. In Democratic Subjects Joyce 
went so far as almost to deny the existence of the ‘real’ beyond language. However 
Joyce allowed for the existence of working class-consciousness as an imagined identity 
based on political exclusion after 1832 while still putting most emphasis on a 
melodramatic narrative of the people.9
Joyce suggested that because recent revisions of the Industrial Revolution have 
highlighted its gradual nature, with factory work the exception rather than the norm 
until well past 1850, there cannot have been a shared experience of job deskilling and 
loss of control over work necessary for the existence of class consciousness. In fact the 
gradualist notion of the Industrial Revolution is not unchallenged.10 However E. P. 
Thompson and those who have been influenced by him never built up their argument 
for the existence of class-consciousness simply in economic terms. Thompson, in his
8 G. Stedman Jones, Languages o f Class (Cambridge, 1983) 90-179; G. Stedman Jones, ‘The Language of 
Chartism’, in J. Epstein and D. Thompson (eds), The Chartist Experience (London, 1982), 3-58
9 P. Joyce, Visions o f the People (Cambridge, 1991), 1-23; J. Vernon, Politics and the People 
(Cambridge, 1993), 252; P. Joyce, Democratic Subjects (Cambridge, 1994), 154,161, 193
10 P. Joyce, ‘Work’, in F. M. L. Thompson (ed.), The Cambridge Social History o f Britain (Cambridge, 
1990), 131-194; P. Hudson, The Industrial Revolution (London, 1992), 215-218
essay ‘Peculiarities of the English’, viewed exploitation as social, cultural and political 
as well as economic. In The Making o f the English Working Class Thompson stressed 
that it was combined political and social oppression, crystallised by the 1832 Reform 
Act, which produced a sense of class consciousness. Thompson stressed the importance 
of ‘agency’ arguing that the working class was its own creator through political 
struggle. He did not concentrate on factory workers but rather on artisans and hand 
workers. Thompson did not argue that a homogenous working class existed but that the 
similarities between those who lived by manual labour were greater than the 
differences.11
Stedman Jones, and even more so Joyce, have been much criticised by those who 
consider Chartism to be primarily a class conscious movement and social in nature. 
Kirk and others have criticised Joyce for insisting on a Marxist definition of class- 
consciousness. Joyce argued that if one defines class in terms of culture and political 
struggle than one can find class consciousness but Joyce went on to say that if this is not 
linked to the common experience of proletariatisation and labour for wages it is really 
just political, social or cultural struggle rather than class struggle. But there is no reason 
why class must be defined in the Marxist way Joyce insists upon and rather it may be 
seen as arising from a mixture of political, social and economic oppression.12
The methodology of the linguistic turn, emphasising that experience is created through 
language, especially in the form used by Joyce in Democratic Subjects, has been much 
criticised. For example Hewitt has shown that while Joyce denies the existence of the 
‘real’ he in fact makes constant reference to the ‘real’ existing beyond language.13 In 
many ways stripped of its ‘linguistic turn’ methodology the work of Joyce and Vemon 
is a return to the older work of those such as Evans, who denied the possibility of class 
consciousness existing due to the great divisions in status among workers, and those 
such as Prothero who emphasised the popular nature of artisan ideology.14
11 E. P. Thompson, ‘The Peculiarities of the English’, The Socialist Register (1965), 311-362; E. P. 
Thompson, The Making o f the English Working Class (London, 1968), 112-114
12 N. Kirk, ‘In defence of class’, International Review o f Social History XXXII (1987) 2-48; N. Kirk, 
‘History, language, ideas and postmodernism: a materialist view’, Social History, 19, (1994), 221-240
13 M. Hewitt, The Emergence o f Stability in Industrial City: Manchester 1832-67 (London, 1996), 14
14 I. Prothero, ‘William Benbow and the Concept of the General Strike’, Past and Present, 63, (1974), 
132-170; E. J. Evans, The Forging o f the Modern State (London, 1983), 176-187
9
Kirk, Epstein and Belchem have argued that one has to look at the language of the 
Chartists in context. They argue that the radical ideology of popular constitutionalism 
and ‘the people’ had become class based or at least could be used in a class-conscious 
way. Indeed Joyce admits that the fit between the people and the working classes was 
so close in the 1830s and 1840s as to make the two more or less interchangeable at 
times. Epstein argues that popular constitutionalism was a shared discourse so it could 
have different class meanings for the working class and the middle class. The people, 
nation and the popular constitution could be shared discourses so there could be a class­
conscious working class sharing this common discourse with the middle class. Epstein 
argues that class discourse is there but it is just one among a number of discourses 
which include the people and nation. Stedman Jones had been criticised for using only 
formal language in print. Pickering has suggested that the class-consciousness could be 
displayed in visual symbols such as Feargus O’Connor wearing a suit of fustian, the 
normal clothes of working men.15 Stedman Jones’ argument that the Chartists viewed 
social ills as arising from the corrupt political system rather than from capitalist 
production are convincing. As Taylor and Hewitt have pointed out, even when Chartists 
such as P. M. McDouall and James Leach criticised the factory system or encouraged 
trade union support for Chartism, they ultimately argued that economic ills were rooted 
in the corrupt political system rather than being inherent in the economic system itself. 
They did not develop a theory of capitalist exploitation and looked for regulation from a 
fair reformed political system.16
Despite the work of Mather, and as we shall see of Jenkins and Sykes on the Northwest 
strike, the origins and aims of the strike have still not been satisfactorily explained. Why 
the strike for the Charter broke out in the Ashton area at the time it did must be re­
examined. The aims, concept and strategy of the strike nationally have never been 
discovered. Whether the aim of the strike was the enactment of the People’s Charter or 
wage improvements must be re-assessed. Likewise it has never been shown whether the 
political strike for the Charter had a coherent strategy and concept. Whether the strike 
was an attempt by Chartist activists in the localities, in the face of caution on the part of 
the national Chartist leadership, to implement the most important ‘ulterior measure’ of
15 J. Epstein, Radical Expression (Oxford, 1994), 28; P. Pickering, Chartism and the Chartists in 
Manchester and Salford (London, 1995), 159-173
16 P. Taylor, Popular Politics in Early Industrial Britain: Bolton 1825-1850 (Keele, 1995), 126-140; M. 
Hewitt, The Emergence o f Stability in Industrial City: Manchester 1832-67 (London, 1996), 206-212
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the Chartist constitutional mass platform agitation in order to pressure Parliament into 
enacting the Charter must be investigated. Whether the strike was to be a peaceable 
display of united public opinion which would break the nerve of the government 
without recourse to violence also needs to be examined. A great deal has recently been 
written on ideology in the first half of the nineteenth century and it is necessary to 
examine the ideology articulated in the strike as a contribution to this important debate.
The thesis sets out to advance our understanding of Chartism and the general strike of 
1842 by demonstrating that the strike nationally was overwhelmingly a political strike 
for the Charter and that only the miners’ strike was not firmly for the Charter. The thesis 
has been entitled ‘the strike for the People’s Charter’ in order to stress the political 
nature of the strike. The origins of the strike will be firmly secured: it will be shown that 
a section among the local Chartist activists who originated the strike in the Ashton 
district did intend that it should be a national strike for the Charter from the first and 
launched the strike in order to pre-empt a forced strike for repeal of the Com Laws. The 
importance of Chartist activists in organising the strike and making its aim be the 
Charter in all regions will be demonstrated. We will see that outside the Northwest the 
strike was organised and begun by local Chartist activists from local platforms at public 
meetings, after receiving the news of the strike for the Charter in Manchester. It took the 
form of the implementation of a general strike, the most decisive of ‘ulterior measures’ 
of the mass platform agitation, but this strategy derived from the localities following the 
failure of the national leadership to propose serious ‘ulterior measures’ at the time of the 
rejection of the second National Petition in May. The strike outside the Northwest did 
not suffer from that division in aim present, though exaggerated by some, in the 
Northwest strike. Outside the Northwest the separate input of trade societies in the 
strike was much less than in the Northwest. It will be shown that the strike did possess a 
coherent strategy and furthermore that a similar concept of the strike was shared in all 
the regions. We will see that the underlying concept of the strike was remarkably 
coherent throughout the different regions. In general the strike was seen as a peaceful, 
moral, legal and constitutional means of delivering an overwhelming display of united 
public opinion that would break the nerve of the government and presently constituted 
Parliament and leave it with no choice but to enact the Charter. The thesis sets out to 
show that the dominant ideology in all strike areas was the traditional radical ideology 
inherited from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century radical movements.
Throughout the strike the traditional radical analysis was present. The aristocracy, state 
Church, pensioners and placemen were attacked along with the ‘millocrats’ and cotton 
lords who had now joined the traditional enemies of the people. Appeal was made to the 
historical English constitution and the rights of the freebom Englishman. The working 
class or the people, the two meaning more or less the same thing, viewed social evils as 
arising from lack of political power. The Charter would guarantee fair wages by giving 
the workman, as well as the employer, a voice in the legislation and so heralding 
minimum wage laws, taxes on machinery and other reforms such as repeal of the Com 
Laws, repeal of the New Poor Law, better factory legislation and lower taxation. The 
defeat of the strike was the defeat of the Chartist mass platform by the discrediting of its 
ultimate ‘ulterior measure’. It will be shown that a working class identity was present in 
the strike among other identities, which included the people and nation.
The thesis adopts a holistic approach by covering the strike in all regions of Great 
Britain significantly affected. The main primary sources on which the thesis is based are 
the Home Office, Treasury Solicitor, Assize, Palatine of Lancaster and other papers in 
the Public Record Office; the Chartist journal The Northern Star and other radical 
newspapers; the vast mass of local newspapers for the districts affected by the strike in 
the British Library Newspaper Library; private papers stored in the British Library and 
elsewhere including the Sir Robert Peel papers and Sir James Graham papers; and 
printed primary sources including the Parliamentary Papers, State Trials, 
autobiographies and contemporary pamphlets.
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE ORIGINS OF THE STRIKE AND THE STRIKE IN THE 
NORTHWEST
The strike for the People’s Charter began in the Ashton, Stalybridge, Dukinfield and 
Hyde area near Manchester on Monday 8 August 1842 following Chartist-led public 
meetings held between 26 July and 7 August and following a turnout of Bayley 
Brothers’ cotton factory workers in Stalybridge over a wage reduction on Friday 5 
August. From the start the aim of the strike was to pressurise the government into 
enacting the People’s Charter by a forceful display of public opinion. However a second 
aim was to obtain a fair day’s wage for a fair day’s work, and there were divisions over 
these aims among the original Chartist leaders of the strike. The strike was taken by the 
Ashton and Stalybridge turnouts to Manchester on Tuesday 9 August. It was spread to 
Bolton, Rochdale, Stockport, Oldham, Bury, Preston, Blackburn, Glossop and many 
other towns ranging geographically through Southeast Lancashire, Northeast Cheshire, 
Northwest Derbyshire and North Lancashire. There was also strike activity in Carlisle 
and the surrounding industrial villages in Cumberland. The strike was spread by crowds 
marching from town to town turning out the workers in the factories and workshops and 
pulling out the plugs of the steam boilers which powered the factories to temporarily 
disable the machinery. From this drawing of the boiler plugs by the turnouts the strike 
gained its contemporary name of the ‘Plug Plot’, which emphasised the view of many 
contemporaries that the strike had been planned in advance by either the Anti-Corn Law 
League (ACLL) or the Chartists. The strike was also spread by delegate missions 
performed by six of the original leaders of the strike in the Ashton and Stalybridge area. 
Working people in many different occupations took part in the strike. These included 
not only factory operatives but also handloom weavers, skilled artisans, engineers, 
labourers and miners. Trades delegate conferences sat in Manchester from Thursday 11 
to Saturday 20 August and declared in favour of the aim of the strike being the 
enactment of the People’s Charter. During this time the strike throughout the Northwest 
was overwhelmingly for the enactment of the People’s Charter. From around Saturday 
20 August the civil and military authorities began to regain control. The return to work
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in many places began soon after 20 August, with those who remained on strike, in some 
cases up to October, merely calling for higher wages.
Contemporaries blamed the strike in the Northwest on either the ACLL or the Chartists. 
J. W. Croker, in his ‘Anti Com Law Agitation’ article in the Quarterly Review in late 
1842, written on the behalf of the government, attempted to demonstrate that the ACLL 
had provoked the strike in order to embarrass the government into repealing the Com 
Laws.1 The early historiography of the strike in the Northwest however rejected either 
the ACLL or the Chartists as the instigators of the strike. The historiography has 
concluded that the League neither instigated them nor attempted to take advantage of 
them to any significant extent. There is a consensus among historians such as Kitson 
Clark and McCord that, whilst ACLL lecturers and propaganda may have inflamed 
passions in preceding months, the strikes in fact took the League leadership in 
Manchester by surprise and they made every effort to distance themselves from the 
strikes. The early historiography of the strike also tended to discount the Charter as 
being the aim of the strike and instead tended to present the strike as a spontaneous 
revolt against hunger. Rose in his descriptive survey of events in Manchester and its 
neighbourhood viewed the strike as a problem of public order and the turnout crowds as 
‘mobs’ which required dispersing. Read, writing on Manchester Chartism, took an 
economically determinist attitude to the strike seeing it largely as a blind revolt against 
depression and discounted its political nature emphasising instead the wage demands. 
Reid, examining the strike in Stockport, also played down the political aim of the strike 
in Stockport viewing it largely as a movement for higher wages.3
A shift in the historiography of the strike in the Northwest began in the 1970s signalled 
by Mather’s article which concentrated on the strike in the Northwest. Sykes followed 
Mather’s interpretation and looked at more detail at the strike in the Southeast 
Lancashire. Sykes and Mather recognised the role of the local Chartist activists in 
organising and leading the strike in the Ashton area but denied that a strike for the
1 J. W. Croker, ‘Anti Com Law Agitation’, Quarterly Review, VLXXI (December 1842), 244-314
2 G. Kitson Clark, ‘Hunger and Politics in 1842’, Journal o f Modern History, XXV (1953), 349-373; N. 
McCord, The Anti-Corn Law League (London, 1958), 125-6
3 D. Read, ‘Manchester Chartism’, in A. Briggs (ed.), Chartist Studies (London, 1959), 54; T. D. W. and 
N. Reid, ‘The 1842 Plug Plot in Stockport’, International Review o f Social History, XXIV (1979), 55-79; 
A. G. Rose, ‘The Plug Riots of 1842 in Lancashire and Cheshire’, Transactions o f the Lancashire and 
Cheshire Antiquarian Society, LXVII (1958), 75-111
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Charter was intended; arguing instead that it was merely planned as a strike against 
wages reductions and that resolutions calling for the Charter before the strike began 
were merely bluff. Sykes and Mather believed the demand for the Charter came from 
grassroots strikers, rather than from the local Chartist activists, some days after the 
strike had actually began. Sykes also emphasised the role of the trades, many of whom 
were themselves local Chartists, in demanding that the strike should be for the Charter, 
but again some days after the strike had actually begun. Sykes and Mather felt it was 
inconceivable that the local Ashton area Chartists could really have intended to initiate a 
general and national strike for the Charter. Sykes and Mather were willing to recognise 
that in many places the strike did become for the Charter. However they still insisted 
that in many towns in the Northwest it remained for wages without providing an 
explanation for these divergences.4
Jenkins’ The General Strike o f 1842 is the only, though flawed, book devoted to the 
strike. However it deals almost solely with the Manchester district rather than with the 
strike nationally. Jenkins argued that the strike was the result of a long-standing plan by 
local Chartist activists dating back at least to the spring of 1842 if not earlier. However 
Jenkins offered no convincing evidence for this long-standing plan, was not able to 
pinpoint the specific reasons the local Chartists had for launching a general strike for the 
Charter at precisely that time, and did not recognise the division in aim among the local 
activists who started the strike. While Jenkins recognised the importance of the local 
Chartist activists in launching a strike for the Charter he presented them crudely as a 
Leninist revolutionary vanguard intent on a strike as a weapon in class warfare.5 A 
problematic area of Jenkins’ book, a study of the strike in the Manchester district from a 
Marxist/Leninist perspective, is his assumption that the strike in the Northwest was a 
display of class-consciousness. In this Jenkins was following Foster who used the 1842 
strike in Oldham along with the 1834 strike in Oldham as evidence for the existence of 
‘revolutionary’ class consciousness. Foster in Class Struggle and the Industrial 
Revolution argued that before 1834 Oldham factory workers had simply engaged in
4 F. C. Mather, ‘The General Strike of 1842’, in R. Quinault and J. Stevenson (eds), Popular Protest and 
Public Order (London, 1974), 115-140; R. A. Sykes, ‘Popular Politics and Trade Unionism in South-East 
Lancashire 1829-1842’ (PhD, Manchester, 1982), 662-723; R. Sykes, ‘Early Chartism and Trade 
Unionism in South-East Lancashire’, in J. Epstein and D. Thompson (eds), The Chartist Experience 
(London, 1982), 152-193
5 M. Jenkins, The General Strike o f1842 (London, 1980), 65-68,240-253
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sectional disputes for wages showing the existence of ‘trade union’ consciousness, but 
not of full ‘revolutionary’ class consciousness. However involvement in the general 
strike, with the political aim to help all workers, was evidence of full ‘revolutionary’ 
class-consciousness. Foster has been widely criticised, for example by Stedman Jones in 
an essay from 1975, for his unrealistic Leninist distinction of trade union consciousness 
and revolutionary class-consciousness. Foster can be criticised because the 1834 and 
1842 strikes were relatively isolated incidents and there is no evidence that the Oldham 
workers were struggling for ownership of the means of production. Sykes has shown 
that during the strike in Oldham the demand was first of all for wages and the call for 
the Charter only came later. There is also dispute over how far the strike in Oldham had 
to be enforced by people from Ashton; although this can be explained by the shock of 
the turnouts arriving before discussion, by fear of losing possible shopkeeper support if 
they went for the Charter rather than wages, and by the influence of those Ashton 
activists coming who were never committed to the strike being for the Charter. The fact 
that Foster believed that class-consciousness rapidly declined after 1850 suggests that it 
had not been particularly revolutionary in the first place. Nevertheless the 1842 general 
strike has continued to be seen as a display of class-consciousness. For example Sykes 
viewed the general strike in Lancashire as a class-conscious movement and only 
criticised Foster’s use of the term ‘revolutionary’ class-consciousness.6
Despite the attention paid to the strike in the Northwest in the historiography, a number 
of topics remain either unanswered or unexplored. The origins of the strike in the 
Ashton and Stalybridge area are still a matter of conflicting interpretations over how far 
in time plans for a strike extended, whether local activists really did hope to launch a 
fully general strike, and over whether, at the outset, they intended the aim of the strike 
to be the Charter or for wages. How far the strike was political in nature throughout the 
Northwest and why there were apparent differences in aim in different towns has 
remained unresolved. The concept and strategy of the general strike held by the strikers 
and by the National Charter Association (NCA) Conference and trades delegate 
conferences in Manchester have never been pursued. The ideology articulated in the 
strike has been curiously neglected. Jenkins assumed that the strike was an expression
6 M. Jenkins, The General Strike o f 1842 (London, 1980), 257; J. Foster, Class Struggle and the 
Industrial Revolution (London, 1974), 114-117; G. Stedman Jones, Languages o f  Class (Cambridge, 
1983), 25-76; R. A. Sykes, ‘Some Aspects of Working Class Consciousness in Oldham 1830-42’, 
Historical Journal, XXIII, 1 (1980), 167-179
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of class-consciousness but the extent to which other collective identities were 
articulated in the strike has been ignored.
Industrial and Political Background
Southeast Lancashire, Northeast Cheshire and Northwest Derbyshire were unique for 
the extent to which large-scale factory production, particularly in cotton textiles, had 
developed. In the Northwest large-scale factory production was at its most advanced. 
Factory production coexisted with still considerable numbers of handloom weavers, 
particularly in North Lancashire, and with large numbers of skilled artisans. Manchester 
was the commercial centre and had a diverse occupational structure with less than one 
half of its population employed in factories. However in out townships, such as Ashton- 
under-Lyne, the cotton industry was dominant. In 1841 out of the adult male population 
in Ashton, Oldham, Bolton, Bury, Stockport, Burnley and Preston 40% worked in the 
cotton industry, 30% worked in the artisan and skilled trades and 15% were miners or 
labourers. Spinning had long been mechanised in the cotton industry. However by 1842 
weaving was also becoming increasingly mechanised in the Northwest. This contrasts 
with the woollen and worsted industry in Yorkshire where mechanisation in weaving 
took much longer to become dominant. Southeast Lancashire, Northeast Cheshire and 
Northwest Derbyshire were also unique in the large size of cotton firms in towns such 
as Ashton, Stalybridge, Glossop and Hyde. Although small firms were also present a 
few large firms employed a vast quantity of labour. Firms tended to be smaller in 
Oldham and in North Lancashire at least outside Blackburn and Preston. The Lancashire 
cotton industry was dominated by medium and large combined spinning and weaving 
and course and fine spinning firms. Small firms with less then 150 hands predominated 
only in the weaving sector. In 1841 57% of Lancashire cotton factories employed more 
than one hundred hands and 13% employed more than four hundred hands.7 The 
Northwest experienced expansion in the size of the industrial labour force, 
mechanisation, an increase in the size of the unit of production, an increase in the 
intensity of production, and a rapid growth of industrial towns and townships. The 
factory system bought with it an increase in those who were obliged to sell their labour
7 N. Kirk, The Growth o f Working Class Reformism in Mid-Victorian England (Chicago, 1985), 38-40; A. 
Howe, The Cotton Masters (Oxford, 1984), 3-8; V. A. C. Gatrell, ‘Labour, Power and Size of Firms in the 
Lancashire Cotton Industry’, Economic History Review, XXX (1977), 98
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to earn a living. Although proletarianisation had long been making progress, with many 
hand workers long dependant on wages and not owning the material they worked on, its 
progress was quickened by the introduction of the factory system. Industrialisation had 
made particularly rapid growth in Ashton, Stalybridge and Dukinfield where the strike 
began. The principal employment in Ashton, Stalybridge and Dukinfield was cotton 
weaving and spinning and other branches of the cotton industry. In 1839 there were 33 
cotton mills in Ashton, 32 cotton mills in Stalybridge and 11 cotton mills in Dukinfield. 
In 1841 there were 7000 cotton mill workers in Ashton out of a population of 22,686, 
9000 cotton mill workers in Stalybridge out of a population of 20,000, and 5000 cotton 
mill workers in Dukenfield out of a population of 10,000. Spinning had long since been 
mechanised and by 1842 weaving was also largely done by power loom in the Ashton 
area. In Ashton in 1839 there were only 813 handloom weavers left, half of whom were 
women and children.8
In the Northwest industrialisation was accompanied by increased industrial unrest, 
which often merged with working-class political activity, and with a growth in trade 
unionism among skilled workers. Luddite activity against powerlooms had taken place 
in Lancashire in 1812/13 and again in 1826. In 1818 large-scale strikes occurred in 
Northeast Cheshire and Southeast Lancashire associated with the Philanthropic 
Hercules which was an early attempt at a general union. John Doherty set up his short 
lived Grand General Union of Operative Spinners in 1829 as a national union for 
spinners and his National Association for the Protection of Labour in 1831. 1833/4 
witnessed the mushroom growth and then collapse of the Grand National Consolidated 
Trade Union associated with Robert Owen. These attempts ended in failure and trade 
unions were always vulnerable to economic downturns. Formal unions were largely 
confined to skilled workers. However it would be wrong to concentrate solely on formal 
unions. Informal local unionism based on the work place was equally as important and 
could extend to unskilled workers and unionism, whether formal or informal, could 
survive depressions at least among skilled workers. Despite the ban on the discussion of 
politics in many trade societies there was often an overlap between the leadership of 
trade unionism and working class political movements. The industrial depression, which 
began in 1838 and intensified in late 1841 led to reductions in wages, short time
8 E. Butterworth, A Historical Account o f the Towns o f Ashton-under-Lyne, Stalybridge and Dukinfield 
(Ashton, 1842), 89, 148,176
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working and unemployment. The effect was particularly severe in the Northwest where 
industrialisation and mechanisation in cotton textiles had made its greatest impact.9 In 
this context the movement of the Manchester trades towards formal commitment to 
Chartism as the only means to maintain wages from early 1842 was of great 
significance in the strike.10
The Northwest had been a centre of popular radicalism since the 1790s. With the post­
war revival of popular radicalism in 1816, Hampden Clubs had spread throughout 
Southeast Lancashire and Northeast Cheshire. Manchester had been the starting point 
for the March of the Blanketeers and the Peterloo Massacre had taken place there in 
1819. Henry ‘Orator’ Hunt, committed to the mass platform agitation and universal 
suffrage, annual Parliaments and vote by ballot, was the great leader of this stage of 
popular radicalism in the Northwest, with journalistic support form William Cobbett.11 
The Northwest, and in particular Southeast Lancashire, figured prominently in the 
popular movements of the 1830s with a strong Reform Bill agitation, Ten-Hours 
movement, Anti-Poor Law movement, trade union movement, and Owenite presence. 
Southeast Lancashire and Northeast Cheshire had, along with the West Riding, been the 
stronghold of the Ten-Hours movement since 1833. Short-time committees with 
working class activists who were later to figure in Chartism were widespread in the 
region. With the attempt by the government to introduce the New Poor Law into the 
north from 1837 the Northwest also became a centre of the Anti-Poor Law movement. 
Feargus O’Connor established himself as a leader of Northwest working class 
movements through the Anti-Poor Law movement in association with John Fielden the 
cotton spinner of Todmorden and Joseph Raynor Stephens the preacher of Ashton. 
Despite Stephen’s stature the Tory radical element in these movements in the Northwest
9 J. Belchem, Industrialisation and the Working Class (London, 1990), 10-99; J. Rule, The Labouring 
Classes in Early Industrial England 1750-1850 (London, 1986), 255-309; J. Stevenson, Popular 
Disturbances in England (London, 1979), 229-244
10 R. Sykes, ‘Early Chartism and Trade Unionism in South-East Lancashire’, in J. Epstein and D. 
Thompson (eds), The Chartist Experience (London, 1982), 152-193
11 J. Belchem, ‘Orator ’ Hunt: Henry Hunt and English Working-Class Radicalism (Oxford, 1985), 44- 
132; W. Spater, William Cobbett, Poor Man’s Friend (Cambridge, 1982), vol. 2., 331-354
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was limited and Stephens himself was in many ways a liberal rather than Tory radical.12
In 1838 the Factory and Anti-Poor Law movements, together with support for the
persecuted trade unionists the Glasgow cotton spinners and Dorchester Labourers,
coalesced into the Chartist movement with the conviction that the First Reform Act had
failed to alleviate the grievances from which the working classes suffered and only
radical political reform enshrined in the six points of the Charter -  universal adult male
suffrage, annual Parliaments, vote by ballot, no property qualification for members,
payment of members, and equal electoral districts - would bring about a government
which would legislate fairly in the interests of the whole country rather than legislate
solely in favour of a single class whether that be the aristocracy or the capitalists, with
O’Connor emerging as the single most important national leader for the Northwest. The
Northwest, along with Yorkshire, was the great centre of early Chartism. The pressure
of public opinion and of forcible intimidation was exerted against the government
through the constitutional mass platform agitation at torch light meetings, processions,
by the electing of delegates to the first National Convention which met in London in
February 1839, and through signatures to the first National Petition calling for
Parliament to enact the People’s Charter. The ‘language of menace’ and talk of
‘peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must’ was made use of to intimidate the
government, with J. R. Stephens of the Anti-Poor Law movement doing much to create
the impression of the ‘physical force’ nature of Northwest Chartism, and O’Connor also
used the language of bluff at this stage though he was more cautious and ultimately
counselled against violence. As part of its constitutional mass platform strategy the
National Convention called on the country to support various ‘ulterior measures’ if the
National Petition was rejected by Parliament. The ‘ulterior measures’ were stepped in
importance with the supreme ‘ulterior measure’ being the ‘sacred month’ or general 
• 1strike. The idea of a general strike of all the industrious or productive people against 
the unproductive and idle had a long history. It had figured in Volney’s Ruin o f Empires 
and most recently and persuasively had been presented by William Benbow in his 
Grand National Holiday and Congress o f the Productive Classes in 1832. However
12 J. T. Ward, The Factory Movement (London, 1962), 30-185; J. Epstein, The Lion o f Freedom (London, 
1982), 32-38, 94-100; S. Weaver, John Fielden and the Politics o f Popular Radicalism (Oxford, 1987), 1- 
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13 R. G. Gammage, History o f the Chartist Movement (London, 1894), 10-160; D. Thompson, The 
Chartists (London, 1986), 57-76; J. Epstein, The Lion o f Freedom (London, 1982), 110-193
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with the rejection of the first National Petition by Parliament and the uneven support 
and lack of arms, resources or organisation throughout the country, the National 
Convention called off the ‘sacred month’. The bluff of the Chartist leaders had been 
called by the government. Arrests, trials and imprisonment of leaders and local activists 
for sedition followed, and there proved to be little enthusiasm for physical force 
initiatives in the Northwest.14
Following the collapse of Chartism in 1839 the emphasis was put on building up 
organisation. The N C A  org& fl iS&tior7 was created at a conference in 
Manchester in 1840. From 1841 the NCA organisation struck firm roots and grew 
strongly in the Northwest, aided by increased economic depression. In early 1842 
signatures flowed in from the Northwest for the second National Petition, which listed 
the New Poor Law and the inadequacy of the factory acts as grievances to be remedied 
along with the enactment of the Six Points, and a second National Convention was 
elected to meet in London for its presentation in May 1842. Manchester alone sent just 
short of 100,000 signatures to the petition.15
After the rejection of the second National Petition in May 1842 the national Chartist 
leadership had failed to propose firm ‘ulterior measures’ at the second National 
Convention which had met to oversee the presentation of the Petition. Instead they had 
merely called for a remonstrance to Parliament, a memorial to the Queen, and further 
conferences.16 The national leaders were reluctant to employ ‘forcible intimidation’ and 
the full resources of the constitutional mass platform following the defeat of 1839 and 
subsequent terms of imprisonment. This was particularly true of Feargus O’Connor 
after his release from prison in August 1841.17
At the Chartist convention in London in early May 1842 following the rejection of the 
second National Petition one of the delegates, William Beesley, a chairmaker of
14 R. G. Gammage, History o f the Chartist Movement (London, 1894), 145-160; William Benbow, Grand 
National Holiday and Congress o f the Productive Classes (London, 1832), 1-15; I. Prothero, ‘William 
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15 Northern Star, 7, 14 May 1842; R. G. Gammage, History o f the Chartist Movement (London, 1894), 
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Accrington and officer of the North Lancashire NCA district, had opposed ever 
petitioning again and thought they should now return to their constituents and calmly 
enquire of them what course they should now pursue, and on his return from the 
convention Beesley of Accrington told a meeting in Preston that the Chartists should not 
petition any longer and should take the law into their own hands if something was not 
done for them directly. As early as April James Mooney an NCA officer of Colne told a 
camp meeting at Colne that there would be a bloody revolution unless the Charter was 
quickly granted and similarly violent language was used at a Chartist camp meeting on 
Enfield Moor at the on 29 May with James Mooney, Richard Marsden the Preston 
Chartist leader, and Thomas Tattersall the Burnley Chartist leader present. Marsden told 
the meeting that the working men had been petitioning for twenty years in vain and now 
they were convinced that appeals to the enfranchised and those possessing political 
power were in vain, ‘we, therefore, tell our rulers calmly and deliberately that we can no 
longer bear the system of slow murder which they seem intent on following up. Better 
die by the sword than die by hunger; and if we are to be butchered, why not commence 
the bloody work at once.’ Feargus O’Connor was so concerned by the language used in 
public at these meetings that he went on a lecture tour of North Lancashire to try to 
moderate feelings there and in an effort to quell the violent language suggested in the 
Northern Star that League spies were behind it. The preaching of funeral sermons for 
Samuel Holberry, one of the Chartists imprisoned in 1839 who died in prison in early 
June, added to the temperature.18 By August 1842 many of the local activists were 
however far more eager for a renewal of firm ‘ulterior measures’ but no initiative was 
forthcoming from the national Chartist leadership. In the Northwest Chartism was 
growing in support after the rejection of the petition and many local activists were 
deeply unhappy with the caution of the national leadership.
Manchester, as well as being a Chartist centre, was also the centre of the ACLL 
committed to a repeal of the Com Laws. In the spring and summer of 1842 there was a 
strong feeling among many Leaguers that, in a time of prolonged depression, the 
League was losing its momentum and people where increasingly turning to suffrage 
reform whether of the Chartist or to the mainly middle class complete suffrage variety. 
The feeling among many League activists was that the public felt there was no hope of
18 Northern Star, 7, 14 May, 4,11,25 June, 2 July 1842
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relief from Parliament as presently constituted, as shown by the response by Parliament 
to Anti-Corn Law petitions and to Villers’ annual motion for enquiry into the Com 
Laws, and so the overriding public demand had become for the extension of the 
franchise.19 This anxiety on the part of the League even in its base in Manchester 
resulted in efforts to revive an Operative ACLL and even to attract support from the 
Manchester trades for the repeal of the Com Laws in the spring of 1842. However the 
working classes in general remained committed to Chartism with little support for the 
operative league and the trades in Manchester turned decisively toward Chartism rather 
than to the League. Richard Cobden, the League’s leading public figure, adopted a 
cautious attitude to combining the movement for repeal of the Com Laws with suffrage 
reform. However many Northwest Leaguers were also evincing support for Joseph 
Sturge’s Complete Suffrage movement with John Bright of Rochdale, the Manchester 
manufacturer Richard Gardner, and Archibald Prentice editor and owner of the free 
trade Manchester Times attending its inaugural conference in April. Support for the 
National Complete Suffrage Union (NCSU), founded at this conference, was strong 
among those Leaguers in Manchester who were in favour of franchise reform.20
Ashton and its neighbourhood had taken a full part in the early Chartism in the 
Northwest. The industrial out townships of the Northwest dominated by one or two 
industries, such as Ashton-under-Lyne and Stalybridge, were the great recruiting 
grounds for Chartism. Ashton was the base of J. R. Stephens and many Factory 
movement, Anti-Poor Law movement and trade activists in Ashton became prominent 
local leaders of Chartism. After the failure of 1839 and the reorganisation of Chartism 
in 1840 strong NCA localities were built up in the Ashton and Stalybridge region. By 
May 1842 Ashton had sent over 14,000 signatures to the National Petition. When in 
March 1842 wage reductions had been made by the Ashton cotton firms, local Chartist 
activists, including Richard Pilling and William Aitken, had advised against a partial 
strike against the reductions and had instead declared that if there were any more wage 
reductions they should strike for the Charter as it was the whole system which was 
responsible for their distress by class legislation and favouring the interests of the
19 N. McCord, The Anti-Corn Law League (London, 1958), 108-120
20 P. Pickering, Chartism and the Chartists in Manchester and Salford (London, 1995), 86-104; A. 
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masters rather than the men. It was a further series of wage reductions in Ashton and 
Stalybridge which was crucial for the creation of the strike for the People’s Charter.21
Origins of the Strike for the Charter
Jenkins was correct to point out the importance for the organisation of the strike of the 
meetings in late July and early August. But there is no evidence for his claim that 
there existed a Chartist plot for a strike going back many months. The speeches made at 
public meetings in Ashton, Stalybridge, Hyde, and Mottram from 26 July to 7 August, 
the speeches made at the camp meetings on Mottram Moor on Sunday 7 August the day 
before the general strike began, evidence in the Treasury Solicitor Papers and in the 
depositions in the Cheshire Assize and Palatine of Lancaster papers, and a letter from 
one of the six delegates from Ashton (who went to spread the news of the strike to 
surrounding districts) in the Northern Star strongly suggests that the local Chartist 
activists did plan to inaugurate a general strike for the Charter but that this decision was 
made only in the two weeks before the strike was initiated on Monday 8 August.
By late July 1842 the Ashton, Stalybridge and Hyde Chartist activists had come to 
believe rumours that the local ACLL manufacturers intended to make three reductions 
in wages by Christmas with the intention of driving the operatives out on strike and so 
forcing the government to open the ports to com due to the increased distress that would 
result. The announcement of reductions in wages by the ACLL manufacturers Rayners, 
Cheethams and Bayleys in July was believed by the Ashton and Stalybridge Chartist 
activists to be the preliminary to this series of three further wage reductions to force 
Com Law repeal onto the government. The speeches made at the League’s London 
conference in July bringing up the subject of stopping the mills and reports that League 
lecturers were suggesting that the League masters intended a lockout excited great 
concern during the second half of July and the first week of August. League lecturers 
especially John Finnigan and Timothy Falvey had been threatening that an outbreak was 
imminent in the Northwest in July and early August. In mid-July it was reported that the 
League lecturer James Acland had said that the League was intending a lockout to take 
place within three weeks. At the July League London conference a lockout had been
21 W. M. Bowman, England in Ashton-under-Lyne, (Ashton, 1960), 1-710; Northern Star, 12 March 1842
22 M. Jenkins, The General Strike o f1842 (London, 1980), 241-244
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advocated by the League delegate Ashdown from London. On his return to Manchester 
from the conference at the very start of August Alderman Chappell had also publicly 
declared in favour of a lockout. On 18 July a Chartist public meeting was held in 
Manchester with the Manchester NCA officer Thomas Railton in the chair. The meeting 
passed a resolution to send a memorial to Sir Robert Peel, the Prime Minster, asking for 
10,000 stand of arms to protect the peace against threatened League violence. 
According to the memorial the League mill owners ‘because they could not obtain such 
large profits from a starving people are about to resort to every means possible to excite 
the people to a breach of the peace by declaring against paying the income tax and other 
assessed taxes, by stopping supplies and also by stopping the mills.’23 In Ashton at the 
end of July, Gregory, a pawnbroker of Ashton, minor League activist and supporter of 
Charles Hindley the free-trade MP for Ashton, told James Wilcox, one of the Ashton 
NCA officers and a shopkeeper that the current abatements in wages by Rayners, 
Cheethams and Bayley Brothers were designed to get the workers to sign Anti-Corn 
Law petitions and that there would be three more abatements in wages before Christmas 
in order to throw the hands in such as state as would embarrass the government and 
leave them with no choice but to repeal the Com Laws. Gregory claimed to have heard 
this from the master in the news reading room. Similar rumours were repeated to other 
local Chartist activists 24
In response to these rumours and the announced reductions by Rayners, Cheethams and 
Bayleys the local Chartist activists organised public meetings and committee meetings 
in Ashton, Stalybridge, Dukinfield and Mottram Moor from 26 July to 7 August. The 
purpose of these meetings was in the first place to call for the rescinding of the wage 
cuts and to threaten a general strike for the Charter if they were not rescinded. The first 
meeting was held on 26 July at Thackers Foundry in Ashton with 3000 to 4000 present 
and was convened by placards which told of the reduction by Rayners. The second 
public meeting was held at the Haigh in Stalybridge on 29 July.26 Another important 
public meeting was held at Hyde on 1 August.27 The fourth meeting on the 2 August at
23 PRO HO 45/249, Memorial to Sir Robert Peel, Manchester, 18 July 1842
24 PRO TS 11/813/2677, ff. 46-9, Case against the Chartists, 1842
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Dukenfield.28 Rayners and Cheethams withdrew their notices of reductions, however
when the Bayley workers went to Bayley Brothers mill and asked for the withdrawal of
the notice of reduction on 5 August, the day the notice was to expire, the Bayley
Brothers refused and told that workers that they might ‘go play a while’. The Bayley’s
workers struck and were joined by local Chartist activists and then went on a parade and
held a meeting at the Haigh where they were addressed by Chartist speakers. They met
again on the evening at Stalybridge and were addressed by Chartist activists. The final
two meetings before the strike began were held on Mottram Moor on Sunday 7 August
with several thousand present.30 After Bayleys had implemented their reduction on 5
August the sole aim of the meetings was to organise a general strike. This culminated
with the Mottram Moor camp meetings on Sunday 7 August when local Chartist
activists declared that a general strike for the Charter would begin on Monday and
would be spread to Manchester on Tuesday. The turnouts began on the morning of 8
August, launched from a public meeting in Stalybridge with Chartist speakers, and went
to Manchester on the 9 August as planned. On the same day Chartist activists were sent
as delegates to the surrounding towns to spread the strike, supplied with money for the
^ 1
journey from local shopkeepers.
All but one of the organisers and speakers at the meetings between 26 July and 7 
August can be identified as local Chartist activists. At the meeting on 26 July at 
Thackers Foundry in Ashton, William Woodruff a cordwainer of Ashton and NCA 
locality officer was in the chair and William Aitken a schoolmaster of Ashton and NCA 
officer spoke warning the ‘cotton lords’ to stay indoors as the ‘reckoning day was 
nigh’.32 At the meeting on 29 July in Stalybridge James Fenton a shoemaker of Ashton 
who had been an active Chartist in 1839 was in the chair, Alexander Challenger a power 
loom weaver and local NCA officer, P. M. Brophy a Chartist lecturer, Thomas Storah a 
powerloom weaver of Ashton and NCA locality officer, William Stephenson a NCA 
locality officer, Richard Pilling powerloom weaver of Ashton and on the South 
Lancashire NCA committee, William Woodruff and James Milligan an Ashton NCA 
officer and power loom weaver all spoke. Pilling and Milligan proposed and seconded
28 Trial ofFeargus O ’Connor (London, 1843), 17
29 PRO TS 11/813/2677, ff. 46-9, Case against the Chartists, 1842
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resolutions. At the meeting at Hyde on 1 August George Candelet a factory operative 
of Hyde who had been a previous speaker at Chartist meetings in May 1842 was in the 
chair and Robert Wilde, a skinner of Mottram and an officer of the Hollingwood NCA 
locality, and Stephen Hirst spoke.34 At the meeting which took place in Dukenfield on 
the 2 August Pilling spoke and Albert Wolfendon, a tailor and Chartist of Ashton, 
Challenger, Stephenson and Storah were present.35 At the two meetings of Bayley’s 
hand in Stalybridge on 5 August after the turnout of the Bayley’s workers James 
Fenton, was chosen chairman, and Thomas Mahon, John Durham, all three of whom 
were Chartist shoemakers, and William Stephenson spoke.36 At the first meeting at 
Mottram Moor on Sunday 7 August William Moorhouse, the bellman and billposter of 
Hyde and a Hyde NCA locality officer was in the chair and the meeting was also 
addressed by Robert Wilde, William Stephenson, and George Candelet. At the second 
camp meeting at Mottram Moor on 7 August William Moorhouse was again in the chair 
and John Leech, a Hyde tailor and NCA locality officer, Robert Wilde, George 
Candelet, Thomas Storah, Thomas Mahon, William Stevenson, Thomas Cheetham and 
John Crossley, a tailor, spoke. Of all these speakers at the strike meetings between 26 
July and 7 August only Crossley did not have a history as a Chartist activist, but he did 
support the call for the Charter.37
The Chartist activists also formed the strike committees or committees of ‘Public 
Safety’ which met at Stalybridge, Ashton and Dukenfield to organise the strike before it 
began and then to oversee the strike once it had begun. A meeting in Ashton on about 
the 3 August appointed a ‘Committee of Public Safety’ (a term reminiscent of the 
French Revolution) with Richard Pilling as chairman. The Ashton Committee met 
repeatedly in the Chartist rooms in the Charleston throughout the turnout and was very 
active in preparing for it. Its membership was composed of the Ashton Chartists 
including Pilling, James Milligan and others. A strike committee of Chartist activists 
was formed at Stalybridge on 5 August and met daily. Its members included Thomas
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Mahon, William Stephenson, John Fairhurst and Robert Wilde.39 There were divisions 
in the committees over what the aim of the strike should be. After the strike had begun 
John Fairhurst told a public meeting at Mottram on 12 August that he had been at 
Stalybridge two or three days at the meeting of delegates, where some had been for 
making the turnout a wage question, but he had advocated making it a political 
question. Another of the delegates on the Stalybridge Committee, Robert Wilde had 
been at the committee meetings at Stalybridge and had supported the same view as 
Fairhurst for making the strike a national political question for the Charter, although 
some members of the Stalybridge Committee had advocated making it a wage
40question.
There was not therefore complete unity in aim among the activists about whether the 
general strike should be for the Charter or for wages. One section of the Chartist 
activists who initiated the strike intended to pre-empt the free-traders by starting a 
general strike for the Charter. Among this section the most prominent were William 
Moorhouse, Robert Wilde and Thomas Mahon. This section of the activists was aiming 
the strike against the Government to pre-empt a forced strike for repeal of the Com 
Laws. A second section, including most notably Richard Pilling, was concerned not so 
much with making the general strike one for the Charter but rather to make it against the 
wage reductions both because they meant hardship and also because the ACLL masters 
hoped to use the working men for the selfish purpose of gaining repeal. This original 
division in aim among the Ashton, Stalybridge and Hyde Chartist activists was to 
seriously affect the nature of the strike elsewhere in the Northwest.
The resolutions passed at the meetings up to the 5 August might leave some doubt about 
whether the call that a strike for the Charter would be made if the reductions were 
carried out was just bluff. Nevertheless this should not go unchallenged. The Chartist 
activists did believe that the League manufacturers were intending to force out their 
workers to create distress to force the government to repeal the Com Laws, and so 
although they hoped to prevent the reduction, the call for a strike for the Charter if the 
reduction was not cancelled was not necessarily just bluff as they thought it necessary to 
pre-empt a League inspired turnout by striking first for the Charter. At the meeting at
39 Trial ofFeargus O ’Connor (London, 1843), 20
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Stalybridge on 29 July a resolution was proposed declaring that the present reduction of 
wages was injurious, not only to the working men but also to the shopkeepers and to all 
other classes of the community. After this was passed unanimously a second resolution 
was proposed and passed unanimously calling for a fair day’s wage for a fair day’s 
work and further stating that a fair day’s wage could not be obtained without the Charter 
being made the law of the land.41 The call for a strike for the Charter was first made 
explicit at the meeting at Hyde on 1 August. Here the resolution was that ‘it is the 
opinion of this meeting that reductions are injurious not only to the working people, but 
to the tradesmen, shopkeepers, and to all classes of the community, except to those who 
are in receipt of pensions. And this meeting consider it the imperative duty of 
shopkeepers, manufacturers and tradesmen to assist the working people to obtain 
political equality; and that it i5 the opinion of this meeting, that the wages received at 
the present by the working men and women of this district, are insufficient to afford 
them that subsistence which producers should have; and this meeting pledges itself that 
should another reduction take place in this district, they will give over working until 
they can obtain a fair days work, and the Charter become the law of the land.’ Candelet 
from the chair told the meeting that if they determined to stand out the Charter would 
soon be obtained.42
The speeches made and resolutions passed at the two camp meetings on Mottram Moor 
on 7 August, the day before the strike began, make it clear that the aim of the strike was 
to be the gaining of the Charter among a significant section of the Chartist activists who 
organised the strike. Bayley Brothers had already decided to implement their wage 
reduction and Mahon and Stephenson of the Stalybridge Chartist strike committee had 
refused to go to see William Bayley when William Bayley had made it known that he 
wanted to see the strike committee on Sunday.43 William Moorhouse opened the first 
Mottram Moor meeting on 7 August making it clear that the strike was not a wage 
question, telling the meeting ‘My friends and fellow workmen, I am appointed chairman 
of this meeting and must inform you, we are not met here for a wage question or for a 
religious question. It is a national question...my brother Chartists from Stalybridge, 
Ashton and Hyde...will explain to you that we as Chartists are met here for a national
41 Trial ofFeargus O 'Connor (London, 1843), 17
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question.’ At the second camp meeting John Leech proposed the resolution that the 
people must quit working until the Charter become the law of the land and the way to 
obtain the Charter was a national strike. Leech denounced the masters and the 
aristocracy and criticised bad laws and bad government. He said there was no cure for it 
but the Charter. Leech told them that they would take the turnout to Manchester on 
Tuesday. William Stephenson seconded the resolution and spoke about the distress and 
the people being in actual starvation and that these evils could not be removed without 
the Charter.44 Thomas Cheetham spoke about the improvement of machinery having 
caused great distress in the nation and said the Charter was the remedy for it by a 
national strike. Thomas Mahon, John Crossley, Thomas Storah, George Candelet and 
Robert Wilde also spoke in favour of Leech’s resolution that there should be a total 
suspension of labour until the Charter become the law of the land. The resolution was 
passed unanimously by the meeting.45 Moorhouse closed the second meeting on 
Mottram Moor on 7 August by telling the people that the aim of the strike which was to 
begin next day was the enactment of the Charter ‘You people have been told the evils 
we labour under, and I am requested also to tell you that tomorrow a meeting will take 
place at Stalybridge at five o’clock in the morning when we will proceed from factory 
to factory, and all the hands that will not willingly come out we will turn them out. And 
friends, when we are out we will remain out till the Charter which is the only guarantee 
you have for your wages, becomes the law of the land. I hope to meet you all tomorrow 
morning at Stalybridge when we will all join hand in hand in this great national 
turnout.’46
Leadership by local Chartist activists speaking at the meetings which organised the 
strike and leading the strike from place to place continued in the Ashton, Stalybridge, 
Dukenfield and Hyde area during the first week of the strike and beyond until its 
defeat47 Very early in the morning on 8 August there was a meeting at Stalybridge of 
up to 14,000 people including not merely the Bayley Brothers workers, they were 
addressed by Chartist speakers Alexander Challenger, William Stephenson, James
44 PRO PL 27/11, Part 2, R. v. Albert Wolfendon and others, 1842
45 PRO ASSI 65/3, R. v. William Moorhouse and Stephen Hurst, 1842; PRO PL 27/11, Part 2, R. v. 
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Fenton, John Crossley and P. M. Brophy. After an adjournment until 9 a.m. they agreed 
to go on procession through Dukenfield and thence to Ashton to turn out the mills. 
There was also an early morning meeting at Hyde, with William Moorhouse, John 
Leech, George Candelet and William Stephenson speaking, where the people were 
requested not to return to work. The turnouts who had met at Stalybridge (one third of 
the crowd were female) then went in procession through Dukenfield, Ashton and Hurst 
carrying a red cap of liberty mounted on a pole and the mills turned out as they arrived. 
Early in the afternoon the turnouts attended a meeting in Ashton with Richard Pilling, P. 
M. Brophy and John Crossley as speakers and it was resolved that ‘the people of Ashton 
go to Oldham; and those of Stalybridge and Dukenfield to Hyde; and that the people of 
Stalybridge, Dukenfield and Hyde meet in Ashton tomorrow morning, Tuesday at seven 
o’clock.’ The Stalybridge people then went in turnout procession to Denton and Hyde 
and turned out all the mills pulling the boiler plugs and the Ashton people went to 
Oldham.48 At a meeting in Hyde early in the morning on 9 August with William 
Moorhouse, John Leech and George Candelet speaking, John Leech told the people that 
they were to go and join the Ashton people and they would go together to Manchester.49 
At the meeting in the morning on 9 August at Thackers Foundry in Ashton with 3000 
present Richard Pilling spoke and told them that they would go to Manchester and stop 
all the mills, they would have their breakfast first and then meet again later in the 
morning and go to Manchester. The turnouts met in Ashton and then went on procession 
into the centre of Manchester turning out the mills and pulling the boiler plugs and 
turning out all the workshops and every description of work there.50
Local Chartist activists also went on missions to spread the strike to towns further 
afield. On 9 August at a meeting in the Market Place in Ashton William Aitken, 
Alexander Challenger, Thomas Storah, Richard Pilling, James Taylor an NCA locality 
officer, and George Johnson who had been an active Chartist since 1839, were 
appointed to go on missions to other towns to spread the strike there. They were told to 
get other towns to agree on a set of wages which reflects the influence of those such as 
Pilling among the Ashton, Stalybridge and Hyde activists who were determined on a 
wages strike and also the fact that they were receiving financial support from the Ashton
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shopkeepers, who were prepared to support a strike for wages but not a strike for the 
Charter. It was due to the influence of some of these delegates that there was confusion 
and differences in the aim of the strike during the first week in some of the towns 
visited by the delegates. In many places where the delegates visited, the terms of the 
mission, and in the case of Richard Pilling and George Johnson their personal 
inclination, led them to concentrate on the wages aim. The Ashton shopkeepers formed 
a committee and met with the Chartist strike committee and agreed to pay the expenses 
of the delegates, but only for a strike for wages. Aitken and Challenger were to go to 
Preston and places in that district. Pilling and Storah were to go to Bolton, Accrington 
and the surrounding district. Johnson and Taylor were to go to Saddlesworth and the 
adjacent towns in Yorkshire.51
Mather and Sykes claim that the call for the Charter came from the grassroots strikers, 
rather than the local Chartist activists, some days after the strike began and that the 
Chartist local activists before the strike got underway were just bluffing when they said 
that there would be a strike for the Charter in order to frighten the masters out of 
carrying through the wage reductions. But this ignores the fact that a section among the 
local activists really did intend to launch a pre-emptive strike for the Charter from the 
start in order to pre-empt a forced strike for repeal of the Com Laws. Most of the 
activists, feeling that they had no choice but to pre-empt a forced League strike, decided 
to launch a pre-emptive strike for the Charter to unnerve the government so that it 
would bow before the pressure of public opinion and enact the Charter. Only a minority 
of the activists such as Richard Pilling, did aim the strike against the League 
manufacturers.
Despite divisions over the aim of the strike among the local leaders many of them 
declared that the strike was for the Charter at many meetings in the Ashton, Stalybridge 
and Hyde area during the first week of the strike from its commencement on 8 August. 
Mather and Sykes were incorrect to state that in the first few days of the strike the only 
demand was for wages. The hiatus which Mather and Sykes identified between 8 and 11 
August during which time they thought that the demands made were for wages rather 
than the Charter in fact has been greatly exaggerated. The call was made for the Charter
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at meetings throughout this period and the strike was aimed against the government by 
many of the activists. At the first meeting at Hyde on the morning of 8 August the day 
the strike began the Chartist speakers William Moorhouse, George Candelet, John 
Leach and William Stephenson all requested the people to be true and not to return to 
their work again until the Charter became the law of the land. At the early afternoon 
meeting in Ashton on 8 August after the Stalybridge people had helped turnout out the 
mills there John Crossley told the meeting that the Charter was the remedy.52 While the 
Stalybridge turnouts were turning out the mills in Hyde and elsewhere it was the general 
cry that all must give over working until such times as they could obtain the Charter.53 
At the meeting at Hyde the following morning on 9 August before the procession to 
Manchester the Chartist activists William Moorhouse, John Leech and George Candelet 
addressed the meeting and again told the people to remain out of work until they 
obtained the Charter.54 Once the Stalybridge and Hyde turnouts had gone to Compstall 
on 11 August William Moorhouse urged there that ‘they must stand for the Charter and 
no surrender, that if they would stand firm this time they could get it, but if they did not 
they need never try again.’55 At a meeting at Mottram Moor on the evening of 10 
August the local Chartist activist and strike leader Robert Wilde declared ‘fellow 
workmen and countrymen, we are not met here for a wage question, but upon a national 
question, and friends protection is wanted for our work and that will never be got until 
the men in power are hurled out and men put in of your own choosing, you must not 
work anymore until the Charter becomes the law of the land...’56 Thomas Mahon was 
among the turnouts from Stalybridge and Hyde who went to Glossop on 10 August and 
at a meeting at Glossop Mahon declared that the mills at Glossop must not go to work 
again until they had a fair day’s work and the Charter became the law of the land. The 
Charter was a necessary precondition for fair wages, because only once the Charter was 
in place would there be fair legislation in the interests of the majority rather than a class, 
which could include minimum wages and the placing of the workman and his employer 
in a position of legal equality. This evidence, based on speeches at the meetings, 
suggests that the strike was thus aimed from the very start against the government rather
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than the masters even when the wage demand was combined with the demand for the 
Charter.
After the strike had begun, in the Ashton area some local Chartist leaders continued to 
stress that the strike should be for the Charter and against the government rather than 
merely for wages. Many workmen there already earned the same as they did in 1840, 
and only by making it a political question could they attract many types of trades 
including those who already had high earnings. John Fairhurst speaking at Mottram 
Moor on 11 August was ‘against making the turnout a wage question, for if so it would 
be of no use to him, for the wages of his trade were the same as they had been for ten or 
eleven years.’ Similarly at the same meeting Robert Wilde exhorted the people to make 
their proceeding a national question ‘in order to secure the co-operation of all trades and 
parties...he would have no interest in making it a wage question, and standing up for 
the wages of 1840 for he was earning more wages at the present time than in 1840. He 
stated the case was the same with the block printers and others, and he argued from this 
the necessity of making it a national question, because if they did not they would lose 
the support of those parties.’ At another meeting on Mottram the next day Robert Wilde 
continued to ‘recommend the people to stand firm until they obtained their political
C O
rights they had so long been deprived of.’
Throughout the first week of the strike there was a strong sense among many of the 
activists that the Charter was obtainable in the very near future. This was something that 
had been lacking from the Chartist movement since 1838 and 1839. For example John 
Fairhurst on 11 August while speaking at a meeting at Mottram Moor ‘strongly advised 
the people to stand out for the Charter. He had thought the Charter was twenty years 
from being obtained, but now it was not twenty days off if the people would stand 
firm.’59 Combined with the eagerness for the implementation of ‘ulterior measures’ was 
the belief that the League had provoked the strike but now the working men must ensure 
that they got the Charter from the strike.
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The League and the Strike
Sir James Graham and Sir Robert Peel held the ACLL morally responsible for creating 
the atmosphere in which the strike occurred and in order to try to demonstrate the moral 
responsibility of the League arranged for J. W. Croker to publish the ‘Anti Com Law 
Agitation’ article in the Quarterly Review drawing particular attention to the many 
inflammatory speeches made by League leaders and activists in the spring and early 
summer of 1842.60 The Ashton area Chartist activists certainly believed that the 
reductions were inspired to force the government to repeal the com laws and minor 
League activists and lecturers such as Gregory seemed to have encouraged this belief. 
However there is no evidence that the Bayley brothers, far less the League leadership, 
did plan this. Whether the Ashton and Stalybridge masters were considering making 
three wage reductions before Christmas to force a strike for Com Law repeal is less 
important than the fact that this is what the local Chartist activists believed, given that 
the manufacturers never had the opportunity to launch the three stages of wage 
reductions which were to follow the current reduction. But there is no evidence that 
Cheethams, Rayners and the Bayley Brothers arranged their reductions to force a strike.
Richard Cobden and John Bright had discussed a simultaneous stoppage of the factories 
in private in March but Cobden had decided firmly against it. In March 1842 Bright had 
proposed a simultaneous closing of the works to Richard Cobden as a possible future 
course of action to solve the League’s dilemma over what move to make in the first half 
of 1842 and around the same time and earlier similar suggestions were being made to 
George Wilson, the president of the League and its organisational genius from Newall’s 
Buildings in Manchester.61 Bright suggested to Cobden on 9 March that a circular 
should be circulated calling for a meeting of all the employers in the cotton district and 
a deputation should then be sent to Peel with authority from the meeting to declare that 
‘unless the Government consent to open their trade by repealing the Com Laws they 
will at a given time close their working’ in order to ‘shake Peel either from office or 
into the Total Repeal’. In order to placate the working people the meeting would declare 
that they did not wish to keep the people from their political rights, but that the Com
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Law cause being the most pressing it must be immediately obtained, and resolutions 
would be passed declaring that the employers would have kept up wages if they could. 
At the same time a meeting of the Yorkshire woollen district should be held to do the
fjy
same thing. Cobden however was against the plan of a simultaneous stopping of the 
factories for practical reasons: firstly because he did not believe it was possible to get 
the people to unite and so would not succeed, and secondly because any successful 
attempt on the part of the League ‘would draw upon it the odium from the working class 
of throwing them overboard.’ In April Cobden was thinking of, and then dismissing, 
hopes of ‘desperados’ in the Commons to resist taxes. But finally he concluded that the 
League must employ the ‘old means of raising the moral feelings of and convincing the 
judgement of the people’ because although it might appear a slow process ‘it is the only 
means for affecting a permanent change in our policy.’64 By the end of June Cobden 
was thinking of the possibility of a ‘fiscal rebellion’ by refusal to pay taxes in 
Manchester rather than of Bright’s old suggestion of a simultaneous stoppage of the 
factories. Cobden writing from the League conference in London asked Bright on 21 
June to ascertain if there was support among committed Leaguers for carrying out the 
‘Quakers principle of stopping the supplies’. Cobden warned that ‘Villiers and others 
are constantly preaching, in private, the doctrine that the landlords will only yield to fear 
after the people have begun to bum and destroy’ however Cobden himself felt that this 
was a course which ‘no Christian or good citizen’ could look at with hopes of advantage 
and instead believed that there was a ‘more effectual way of alarming them by the moral 
resistance so often put in force by the Quakers with such success’. Cobden was sure that 
a ‘widespread and determined “fiscal rebellion” would terrify the enemy far more than 
pikes or pistols.’65 By this time any thought of a simultaneous stoppage of the factories 
by the League leadership had been dismissed.
When the strike broke out the League leaders were taken by surprise. When the turnouts 
arrived in Rochdale John Bright ‘did not think our prophecies were so near their 
fulfilment.’66 Once the strike had begun Wilson in Manchester and Cobden who was in 
communication from London were in favour of no involvement whatsoever in the
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strike. On 11 August the League Council in Manchester withdrew all its lecturers, who 
had done much to stir up discontent, until the strike was over.67 The crucial meetings of 
the League Council took place on 15 and 16 August. Bright argued that they should take 
an active course at least by issuing a strong placard blaming the government for the 
strike. However he was overruled. Wilson and the moderates on the League Council, 
Greg, Callender and Brooks, were all firmly against involving the League in the strike 
and disturbances. Cobden’s letters to Wilson which were read out to the League Council 
were decisive in ensuring that the moderates prevailed. Instead of the fierce placard 
condemning the government which Bright wanted, the League Council issued a mild 
address dissociating itself from the strike and denying the claims of the Times and other 
newspapers that the strike was a ‘League Plot’.68 Cobden in his letter to Wilson 
preceding the League Council meeting on 16 August ‘advised very strongly that they 
should be cautious and quiet just now’ and suggested to Wilson that they might put out 
an address ‘exculpating ourselves’. Cobden hoped that the meeting at the League 
Council would ‘pursue the cautious course which I have recommended’. He feared that 
the League was ‘at this moment under trial by the public for charges laid on by the 
Times, Standard and other papers.’ Nevertheless he still hoped that ‘all that is necessary 
to rise higher than ever is for us to keep aloof in Manchester from the present 
commotion’ and that the League would ‘rise superior to all if we are now quiet in 
Manchester.’69 League support for the strike did not go beyond individual acts of 
sympathy by League members such as Henry Ashworth of Bolton refusing to fulfil his 
duties as a magistrate during the strike on the pretext that such duties might involve 
ordering the shedding of blood which would be inconsistent with his Quaker principles. 
John Bright closed his mills in Rochdale immediately the turnouts arrived, though once 
he realised the aim of the strike among the Rochdale workers was the Charter he issued 
a placard advising them to return to work and join in the struggle against the Com 
Laws. A number of the free trade magistrates were initially rather supine during the 
strike until prodded into activity by the Home Office and fortified by the presence of
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more troops.70
Nevertheless Graham and Peel were justified in their belief that the League’s agitation, 
particularly in July and August, had helped create the climate which made the strike 
possible. The language used by ACLL lecturers such as J. Finnigan and T. Falvey in the 
Northwest in July and early August, the report that the League lecturer James Acland 
had said in July that the League was intending a lockout to take place within three 
weeks, the speeches made by delegates at the July ACLL London conference, especially 
by Ashdown from London calling for a lockout, and by Alderman G. R. Chappell in 
Manchester on his return from the conference, contributed considerably to the fears of 
the Ashton and Stalybridge Chartist activists provoking them to launch a pre-emptive 
strike. It was a myth of the middle-class press that Feargus O’Connor blamed the ACLL 
for the strike only after it had occurred to shift the blame from the Chartists. In fact the 
local Ashton and Stalybridge activists were blaming the League manufacturers from the 
start.71
The Course of the Strike for the Charter in the Northwest
In many ways the strike in the Northwest outside the Ashton district starting point was 
similar to the strike in Yorkshire, the Midlands, South Wales and Scotland where local 
Chartist activists organised the strike for the Charter from the local platforms. The strike 
can be seen as the implementation of the ultimate ‘ulterior measure’ of the mass 
platform agitation but this time from the local platforms by local activists rather than by 
the national leadership from the national platform. The eagerness for ‘ulterior measures’ 
of the mass platform agitation, which was not being fulfilled by the national leadership, 
helps explain the enthusiastic response to the strike for the Charter by local activists in 
many of the towns of the Northwest. However the situation was more complicated in 
the Northwest than in Yorkshire, the Midlands, South Wales and Scotland. This was 
because the turnout crowds often irrupted into the Northwest towns without prior news 
or preparation by the Chartist activists of that town. It was often Chartist activists from 
the Ashton and Stalybridge area, who came with the turnouts or as individual speakers,
70 PRO HO 48/34, Law Officers, Cases 40, 42, 43 and 44 respecting the conduct of magistrates, 
November 1842; A. G. Rose, ‘Truckling Magistrates of 1842’, Transactions o f the Lancashire and 
Cheshire Antiquarian Society, 83 (1985), 40-70
71 J. W. Croker, ‘Anti Com Law Agitation’, Quarterly Review, VLXXI (December 1842), 244-314
38
rather than their own trusted local leaders, who called on the people to strike. This helps 
explain why there was some hesitation over whether to strike in some towns and some 
confusion over what the aim of the strike was to be. For example in Stockport and 
Rochdale the irruption of the Ashton and Stalybridge turnouts caused some confusion 
and it was only when the towns’ own local Chartist activists began to take control that
• 77the strike got firmly under way. In contrast the local Chartist activists in Yorkshire, 
the Midlands, South Wales and Scotland had time to organise and launch the strike 
themselves in their own localities without outside interference.
The turnout in the Northwest was rapidly extended to towns throughout the region. The 
strike was taken to Manchester on 9 August, a crucial part of the Ashton and 
Stalybridge activists’ plan for the strike, and the turnout was rapidly taken up by the
77Manchester people. The strike had already been taken to Oldham by processions of 
Ashton and Stalybridge turnouts on 8 August though the local Oldham Chartist leaders 
were taken by surprise and advised a return to work and it was on the following day that 
the strike in Oldham got underway when the turnouts again visited and Chartist 
speakers from Ashton persuaded the Oldham people to agree to strike.74 The 
Stalybridge and Hyde turnouts went to Compstall and Glossop on 10 August.75 The 
strike was extended to Rochdale when the Ashton district turnout crowds entered in 
procession on 11 August, following a visit by delegates from Ashton on 10 August.76 
Turnout processions from the Ashton and Stalybridge area took the strike to Stockport 
on 11 August with the activists John Leech, George Candelet and Robert Lee speaking 
at a meeting there.77 Bolton went on strike from 11 August following a delegate visit by 
Pilling from Ashton the previous day. Bury struck from 11 August after a delegate visit
70
from two delegates, Aitken and Challenger, from Ashton on 10 August. Turnouts 
arrived in Middleton from Hollingwood, Oldham, Rochdale, Royton and other places 
on 11 August and began the strike there.79 The turnout began in Preston on 12 August
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after a delegate visit by Aitken and Challenger on 11 August.80 The Rochdale people 
went to Todmorden on 12 August and those mills which had not already turned out did 
so. After meetings in Rochdale and Todmorden delegates were sent to Colne, Padiham 
and Burnley and to the different towns in Yorkshire.81 The turnout started in Blackburn
50and Wigan on 15 August. Further north news of the strike for the Charter in 
Manchester encouraged turnouts of weavers and artisans in Lancaster from 17 August 
and in Carlisle and the towns surrounding Carlisle from 22 August.83
The leaders of the strike in the Northwest were local Chartist activists, Chartist activists 
from Ashton and Stalybridge who had either come with the turnout processions or on 
delegate missions, and Chartist lecturers who happened to be in the area. For example at 
Oldham the strike was led by a mixture of Oldham and Ashton Chartist activists. 
Speakers at the public meetings in Oldham from which the strike was organised and led 
between the 8 and 26 August included the local Oldham Chartist leader and shoemaker 
Samuel Yardley, together with Richard Pilling, Stephen Hurst from Ashton, and John 
Bailey officer of teetotal NCA locality from Manchester.84 Thomas Mahon and William 
Moorhouse spoke at strike meetings at Glossop on Wednesday 10 August after the 
Stalybridge and Hyde turnouts had taken the strike there.85 At Preston, Aitken and 
Challenger were present as delegates and the Preston Chartist activists Richard Marsden 
and James Williams were among those apprehend by the police for taking part in the 
crowds. At Bolton the local Chartist activist John Gillespie, a handloom weaver, was a 
prominent leader and Richard Pilling visited on a delegate mission. At Bury, Challenger 
and Aitken from Ashton visited as delegates and the local Chartist activist Henry
517Roberts, a shoemaker, led the strike. At Rochdale Chartist activists came with the 
turnout from Ashton and the local Rochdale Chartist NCA officers Thomas Livsey and 
James Ashley also spoke at meetings.88 At Stockport John Leach, George Candelet and
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Robert Lee from Ashton, John Jackson a shoemaker and Chartist from Newtown, and 
the local Oldham Chartist activist John Wright, bellman and labourer, led the strike.89
In Manchester the Ashton and Stalybridge activists, Pilling and Challenger (together 
with the Manchester activist William Dixon), had first spoken at meetings on 9 August 
after they had brought the turnout to Manchester. But local Manchester Chartist activists 
and lecturers took up the leadership of the strike. Christopher Doyle, a NCA officer and 
Chartist lecturer, Bernard McCartney, a Chartist lecturer from Liverpool, William 
Dixon, a Manchester NCA officer and Northern Star reporter, P. M. Brophy, a Chartist 
lecturer, and Daniel Donovan, an NCA officer at the Carpenters Hall locality and on the 
South Lancashire NCA committee, spoke at strike meetings on 10 August and regularly 
hereafter. However Manchester was unique in the role the Trades Delegates played in 
the organising and leading the strike. Yet, perhaps this uniqueness was more apparent 
than real, as those trades which were active in the leadership of the strike were in fact 
the trade localities of the NCA which had been joining the NCA over the previous few 
months and their members were all committed Chartists. The Chartist leadership of the 
strike in Manchester was thus continued even when the Trades Delegates took the 
dominant part. It was the mechanics, whose NCA trade locality was one of the most 
strongly committed to Chartism, and the powerloom weavers, who though not formally 
organised in a union, had been receiving help in organising from local Chartists 
throughout the past two years, who formed the initial trades conferences on 11 and 12 
August. Daniel Donovan and William Dixon, two Chartists who had been helping to 
organise the powerloom weavers over the past two years, were both present at the 
conferences of the ‘various trades and mill-hands’ on 11 and 12 August. When the 
Great Trades Delegate Conference met the following week many of the delegates 
elected from Manchester came from regular NCA localities and NCA trade localities 
including the conference chairman Alexander Hutchinson, Daniel Donovan, John 
Roberts, Thomas Whittaker, Thomas Doyle, John Connor, Samuel Pemberton, William 
Robinson, Benjamin Stott, and George Hadfield.90
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Local meetings of trades were of more importance in the strike in the Northwest towns 
than elsewhere in the country. However in the various towns outside Manchester the 
role of the trades who did meet was mainly confined to electing delegates for the 
Manchester Great Trades Delegate Conference. It was often Chartist activists who were 
elected by these trade meetings in the various towns to go to the Manchester Great 
Trades Delegate Conference as delegates, for example at Colne the Chartist activist 
James Mooney. At Oldham John Nield and Henry Hunt Whitehead, both officers of the 
Oldham NCA locality, were elected to represent the hatters and cardroom workers of 
Oldham. Henry Worthing, an officer of the Eccles NCA, was elected to go to the 
Manchester Great Trades Delegate Conference to represent the plasterers of Eccles.91
Historians have often debated whether the aim of the strike was for wages or for the 
enactment of the Charter. In fact once the strike had spread to Manchester and the 
surrounding areas until about the 20 August when the Manchester Great Trades 
Delegate Conference was forced to dissolve, the resolutions passed were 
overwhelmingly either for the Charter or for both wages and the Charter to protect 
wages. Formal resolutions in favour of the aim of the strike being the enactment of the 
Charter were passed at public meetings at, for example, Mottram Moor on 11 and 12 
August, at Preston on 12 August, at Stalybridge by the visiting Glossop turnouts on 13 
August, at Stockport on 13 August, at Rochdale by 15 August at the latest, at Lees on 
15 August, at Oldham on 16 August and of course at the metal trades and millworkers 
conferences in Manchester on 12 August. The first resolution passed by the conference 
of the ‘various trades and mill-hands’ on the morning of 12 August was that ‘we the 
delegates representing various trades of Manchester and its vicinity, with delegates from 
the various parts of Lancashire and Yorkshire, do most emphatically declare that it is 
our solemn and conscious conviction that all the evils which affect society, and which 
have prostrated the interests and energies of the great body of the producing classes 
arise solely from class legislation, and that the only remedy for the present alarming 
distress and widespread destitution, is the immediate and unmutilated adoption, and 
carrying into law, the document known as the People’s Charter.’ The second resolution 
passed was that ‘this meeting recommend the people of all trades and callings, to 
forthwith cease work, until the above document becomes the law of the land.’ The 
conference of the ‘mechanics, engineers, millwrights, moulders and smiths’ held on the
91 Manchester and Salford Advertiser, 20 August 1842; Northern Star, 1 January, 8 June 1842
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afternoon of 12 August had adopted the first resolution and in place of the second had 
called for a regional conference, although it had been reported in the local press as 
adopting both resolutions. The strikers felt they were in an unfair position as they had 
no say in legislation and only the Charter would enable them to protect their wages by 
law with for example minimum wage legislation being enacted once the Charter was 
passed.
Historians such as Mather and Reid have noted that some localities gave more 
consistent support to wages than to the Charter. There were exceptions to the 
overwhelming aim for the Charter but these can be explained without rejecting the view 
that the strike was truly a strike for the Charter. In a number of localities where there 
was a current, though normally a temporary one, for the strike to be for wages alone, it 
was often due to the temporary influence of speakers from the Ashton area who had 
started the strike and belonged to the section which was committed to a wages strike. As 
we have seen the Chartist activists from the Ashton, Stalybridge and Hyde area who 
started the strike were divided from the start about whether the strike should be for the 
Charter or to combat the ACLL manufacturers’ wage reductions. Some of those Ashton 
speakers in favour of the wage question who travelled as delegates to other areas to 
spread the strike often used their influence in favour of the wage question. The 
argument was used by some Ashton activists who had received financial support from 
the shopkeepers for their delegate mission to the surrounding towns that the middle 
classes and shopkeepers would financially support a strike for wages but not one for the 
Charter and the fear of losing the possible financial support of the shopkeepers was 
often the cause of votes at meetings for the strike to be for wages alone. Two examples 
of this are Stockport and Lees. Stockport is a particularly important case as Reid 
insisted that the strike in Stockport was a wage strike and that support in Stockport for a 
strike for the Charter was superficial. A Stockport public meeting which included local 
Chartist activists as speakers voted for the strike to be for the Charter on 13 August. But 
on 15 August when Richard Pilling was a speaker another meeting at Stockport tended 
more towards it being a wage question alone. An argument used at that meeting was 
that the shopkeepers would provide credit for a wages strike but not for a political 
strike. Richard Pilling had all along been in favour of the strike being a wage question
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unlike many of the originators of the strike. At Lees there was a vote for the strike to be 
for the Charter at a public meeting on 15 August. But delegates from the Ashton area 
were at that meeting and left telling the crowd that the shopkeepers would withdraw 
support, and the result was a vote for wages at a meeting at Lees on 16 August.93 Where 
the fear of loss of shopkeepers’ support or the influence of Ashton delegates in favour 
of the wage question, such as Pilling, was strong there tended to be temporary votes for 
the strike to be a wage question alone. Otherwise the public meetings tended to resolve 
that the strike should be for the Charter or for both the Charter and wages. It was the 
influence of that section of the Ashton and Stalybridge strikers who wanted to confine 
the strike to wages which produced the few days lag at the start of the strike noticeable 
in some though not all towns when resolutions were simply for wages on 8, 9 and 10 
August. It was after the local activists of places such as Stockport and Rochdale 
reoriented themselves after the surprise of the irruption of the turnouts and began to lead 
the strikes in their own towns that the call for the Charter became predominant.
The summer of 1842 witnessed the most severe industrial depression of the nineteenth 
century and nowhere was it more severe than in the Northwest where large-scale factory 
production was at its most advanced. But the strike for the Charter was not a blind 
reaction to depression. Rather the Chartist analysis was convincing in a period of 
depression. Social evils were seen to be the result of class legislation. The strike was to 
be a massive display of public opinion to unnerve the government and make it bow to 
public opinion by enacting the Charter. Once the Charter was enacted fair laws could be 
established including the repeal of indirect taxes, an efficient factory act, minimum 
wage levels, taxes on machinery, and the abolition of the New Poor Law. It was this 
belief in the Chartist analysis which helps explain why the strike was general in many 
Northwest towns. For example in the Rochdale area it was being said at every meeting 
that ‘the Anti-Corn Law League have caused us to make this movement, but it is our 
own fault if we do not get more than they think; we will have the Charter, and not be 
deceived by the middle classes in this question as on the Reform Bill.’94
In many towns in the Northwest the strike was general among the labouring classes for 
a week or more. The only significant groups among the labouring classes not to strike
93 Stockport Advertiser, 19 August 1842; Northern Star, 20 August 1842
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were the agricultural labourers and rail transport workers. In Manchester itself virtually 
all business was suspended between 9 and 20 August. The same was true in many of the 
outlying industrial towns such as Oldham, Rochdale, Stockport, Bury, Glossop and of 
course the Ashton, Stalybridge and Hyde district. For example at Rochdale on 11 
August, according to John Bright, ‘every description of work has stopped.’95 A wide 
range of occupational groups was involved, reflecting the overall occupational structure 
of the towns and townships in which the strike occurred. The textile workers formed the 
backbone of the strike. Those involved were not only the powerloom weavers but also 
the better-paid spinners. Auxiliary textile workers were also among the strikers. For 
example out of a sample of a group of 72 turnouts with occupations given from the 
Heywood and Bury area who were arrested after they went on procession to the 
collieries at Radcliffe there were 20 weavers (of whom 8 were definitely powerloom 
weavers), 3 spinners, 5 piecers, 1 cardroom jobber and 1 twister. Labourers were also 
well represented in the strike. However skilled artisans also took part in the strike 
including shoemakers, tailors, plasterers, mechanics, and engineers. For example in the 
sample of 72 there were three smiths, three mechanics, one wheelwright, one shoemaker 
and one dogger.96 The wide spread of trades involved in the strike, many of them 
relatively well paid, emphasises the political nature of the strike until 20 August. 
Significantly all trades apart from the cotton spinners and weavers rapidly returned to 
work after 20 August when it was clear that the Charter was not obtainable through the 
strike. As one Bolton Chartist activist declared after the strike, ‘if the strike were not for 
the Charter, what had the mechanics, mill-wrights, engineers, tailors and shoemakers to 
do with it? They had no interest in the spinners’ and weavers’ strike. We certainly
07struck for the Charter.’ Working class women, as well as men, were active participants 
in the turnout crowds throughout the Northwest. For example young women were at the 
front of the turnout procession which marched into Manchester on 9 August, and 
women were active in the turnout crowd at Preston on 13 August even collecting stones
QQ
for the crowd to throw.
The vast majority of the local and national Chartist leaders of the strike called for it to 
be a peaceful moral force action. There were a few exceptions, most notably Thomas
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Cooper at the NCA Conference, but the exceptions were insignificant. The crowds 
however were not as restrained as the majority of the local leaders called for. Elements 
of the traditional crowd action identified by E. P. Thompson and Rude were present. 
The crowds were still at a transitional stage between traditional collective actions 
involving some damage to property and fully fledged peaceful institutions." The ‘Plug 
Plot’ has often been seen as an undisciplined outbreak of Chartist violence but the 
opinion of contemporaries was that the strike was surprisingly peaceful given the fact of 
the large numbers involved and that the authorities lost control of many towns for 
periods of time. There was little violence beyond that necessary to turn out the mills. In 
the vast majority of cases the workers left work enthusiastically and willingly. In a few 
cases some personal violence was done to masters who resisted and the windows were 
broken at mills which the masters barricaded or defended with special constables. There 
were however some cases of stoning of special constables and the military. Bread and 
sometimes money were donated by shopkeepers to passing processions though it is hard 
to know how far these were given willingly. The ransack of Stockport Workhouse for 
food on 11 August by a section of the turnouts was the only serious case of the mass 
taking of food and no violence towards persons was used.100 The taking of food from 
the unjust New Poor Law ordained workhouse, may been seen as a traditional form of 
crowd action associated with the ‘moral economy’. The Mayor of Stockport’s widely 
publicised speeches at the ACLL Conference in London in July, in which he declared 
that he would not order the troops to fire on a starving people, may also have been a 
contributory factor. No deaths were caused by the strikers and those deaths that 
occurred where the result of the military firing on the unarmed people. The military 
were ordered to shoot into the crowds, with fatalities resulting, at Preston on 13 August 
and at Blackburn on 15 August. The most serious cases of violence were thus the work 
of the authorities rather than the crowds and on the face of it the actions of the crowds at 
Preston and Blackburn do not seem to have been more serious than in Manchester 
where no firing took place. At Preston the crowd had been throwing stones at the 
special constables with whom they were fighting a running battle and they then 
attempted to throw stones at the military. At Blackburn the crowd had been throwing 
stones at the military when prisoners were about to be escorted by the military in a
99 G. Rud6, The Crowd in History (New York, 1964), 195-269; E. P. Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy of 
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coach. Perhaps these two cases should be seen in the light of the talk by local Chartists 
in North Lancashire in May and June of armed rebellion which undoubtedly panicked 
the magistrates in North Lancashire.101
The Conferences in Manchester
The Manchester Great Trades Delegate Conference sat from 15 to 20 August and voted 
in favour of the aim of the strike being the Charter. The Manchester Great Trades 
Delegate Conference originated in separate conferences in Manchester of the ‘various 
trades and mill-hands’ held on 11 and 12 August and of the ‘mechanics, engineers, 
millwrights, moulders and smiths’ also held on 11 and 12 August. As we have already 
seen, the conference of the various trades and mill-hands blamed distress on class 
legislation and called for strike to be for the Charter on 12 August. The conference of 
the mechanics, engineers, millwrights, moulders and smiths on the same day affirmed 
its belief that distress was the result of class legislation which could only be remedied 
by the Charter and called for delegates to be elected throughout the region to meet on 15 
August. The conferences of the mill-hands and mechanics merged together on 13 
August to call for elections to a Great Trades Delegate Conference which was to sit on 
15 August.102 The background to the trades conferences has been examined by Sykes 
and Mather showing that it is not surprising that the trades conferences should have 
convened itself almost spontaneously as the trades in Manchester had been joining the 
NCA throughout the first half of the year.103 However they may have exaggerated the 
extent to which trade unions, as distinct from members of the same trade who were 
Chartists, were forming themselves into separate NCA localities. Two further reasons 
can be given for the convening of the trades conferences in Manchester once the strike 
had been brought there by the Ashton and Stalybridge turnouts. Firstly the mechanics 
NCA trade locality had been the most active of the trade localities to join the NCA in 
July and early August holding many meetings and lectures, so it is natural that they 
should have taken the initiative to convene the trades conference. In addition the trades
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committee attached to the Hunt Memorial Committee, which included representatives of 
the Chartist Mechanics amongst others, had planned a trades procession on 16 August 
to celebrate the Peterloo anniversary and the Hunt memorial opening. The trades 
procession was banned and the trades instead used the opportunity to set up the 
conferences. The delegates to the Manchester Great Trades Delegate Conference itself 
which met on 15 August were not elected by trade societies but rather by members of 
the same trade whether they were unionists or not and it was often Chartist activists who 
were voted as delegates. The Manchester Great Trades Delegate Conference was far 
less ‘syndicalist’ than it might appear at first sight. Rather it fitted in much more with 
McDouall’s ideas in the Chartist and Republican Journal where he saw trade support as 
essentially organisational. The courting of the trades by the NCA Executive members 
James Leach, John Campbell and P. M. McDouall was a preparation in case the ‘sacred 
month’ was ever revived. At the 1839 General Convention it was stressed that the 
‘sacred month’ would need trades support. McDouall began courting the trades in 1841 
openly stating that if there was to be another ‘sacred month’ or similar measure Chartist 
associations based on members of the same trade would be useful for organisational 
purposes. McDouall stressed that these associations should be composed of member of 
the same trade who were Chartists rather than be based on trade unions which included 
those who were not Chartists, unless of course particular unions were unanimously in 
favour of the Charter which was unlikely due to the Owenite and Anti-Corn Law 
presence in many of the trades societies.104
The concept of the strike developed at the Manchester Great Trades Delegate 
conference was overwhelmingly of a peaceful moral force move to unnerve the 
government by an irresistible display of public opinion. Once the government and 
Parliament had lost its nerve the Queen would have no choice but to appoint ministers 
who would carry the Charter through Parliament. They believed that a display of 
overwhelming unity among the working classes, would leave the government with no 
choice but to capitulate and pass the Charter. The Manchester Great Trades Delegate 
Conference aimed the strike against the government rather than against the masters. 
Once the Charter was enacted further legislation would protect the working man and his
104 McDouall’s Chartist and Republican Journal, 17, 24 April 1842; Manchester and Salford Advertiser, 
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wages. Throughout the strike the trades conferences condemned any destruction of life 
or property and insisted that the strike must remain peaceful.
The Great Trades Delegate Conference viewed the strike as a replay of the Reform Bill 
agitation even if they exaggerated the influence of the working classes in that agitation. 
The address of the merged trades conference on 13 August declared that ‘The Trades of 
Britain carried the Reform Bill. The Trades of Britain shall carry the Charter.’105 The 
Trade Delegates envisioned the strike as a peaceful legal constitutional move. For 
example their resolution of 16 August printed and placarded as an address ‘Resolved -  
that the delegates in public meeting assembled, do recommend to the various 
constituencies we represent, to adopt all legal means to carry into effect the People’s 
Charter; and further we recommend that delegates be sent through the whole country to 
endeavour to obtain the co-operation of the middle and working classes in carrying out 
the resolution of ceasing labour until the Charter becomes the law of the land.’106 By 
contrast it was the authorities who were held, in the Great Trades Delegate Conference 
address issued on the morning of 16 August drafted on the basis of Monday’s meeting, 
to have interfered ‘with the legal and recognised constitutional rights of the people...by 
placard or otherwise’ by banning and dispersing meetings and processions.107
The strike for the Charter was to be a moral force display of irresistible public opinion, 
which was to be entirely peaceful in nature. The Great Trades Delegate Conference 
described themselves as being ‘supported by the indestructible bulwark of public
opinion...We have only one course to recommend, which we know you will most
• 108 .readily adopt, namely to watch over the safety of life and property.’ The Trade
Delegates’ commitment to a peaceful moral force strike as a display of united public
opinion is evidenced in their concluding address issued on 20 August in which they
‘exceedingly regret’ and ‘had not the slightest anticipation’ of the ‘civil commotion’
that had arisen in the strike and which they felt had made the strike for the Charter
impractical for the present, but they affirmed that the ‘national cessation from labour
until the Charter becomes the law of the land and could be done ‘legally and
constitutionally’ and they would attempt it again once their organisation was sufficient
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and their resources adequate for it.109 The vast majority of the Trade Delegates insisted 
throughout in their debates that the strike must remain peaceful. A small handful argued 
that the strikers should take food to support themselves. However one was James Duffy, 
a former League lecturer who had recently turned to the Chartists and whose loyalty 
was doubtful. Another delegate argued that they would be right to take the crops from 
the hills, reminiscent of William Benbow’s plan for a ‘National Holiday’. However the 
vast majority of the conference were firmly against taking food and insisted that they 
must remain within the law. Closely linked with the concept of the strike as a peaceful 
display of overwhelming public opinion that would unnerve the government was the 
idea that labour was the source of all wealth. If labour was the source of all wealth then 
it appeared common sense to the Trade Delegates that once labour had ceased nationally 
the government and Parliament would feel they had no choice but to submit as the 
alternative would be the rapid decline of the country’s national wealth. The Trade 
Delegates thus called ‘most emphatically upon the people to discontinue the production 
or creation of wealth’ in their address on the morning of 16 August.110
The Manchester Great Trades Delegate Conference voted overwhelmingly in favour of 
the aim of the strike being the enactment of the Charter. On 15 August when the 
question was put to the vote out of 85 delegates present 59 were for making it a strike 
for the Charter, 19 to abide the decision of the meeting, and only 7 for making it merely 
a wage question.111 Historians have sometimes expressed their opinion that it was not 
clear how the aim of the strike could be both for wages and the Charter, and whether the 
strike was aimed against the masters or the against the government. However this 
vagueness was not present at the time and the Great Trades Delegate Conference were 
clear in their thinking about the aim of the strike. For the Great Trades Delegate 
Conference the strike was aimed against the government. They wanted to receive fair 
wages and a fair working day, but this was unobtainable in the current situation due to 
unfair class legislation which did not protect the working man's property, his labour. 
Only the enactment of the Charter could provide fair laws that would include minimum 
wage legislation, efficient factory acts and other reforms for social grievances. However 
the Charter could only be obtained by aiming the strike as a display of public opinion
i°9 p R O  T S  j  1/813/2677, ff. 62-7, Case against the Chartists, 1842
110 Manchester Guardian, 17 August 1842; William Benbow, Grand National Holiday and Congress o f 
the Productive Classes (London, 1832), 1-15
111 Northern Star, 20 August 1842
50
against the government to force the government to submit, and not by aiming it against 
the mill owners. This can be seen in for example the address issued on the morning of 
16 August by the Great Trades Delegate Conference, which found ‘by reference to the 
reports of the delegates...that it is the embodied opinion of the working classes, from a 
comparison of the past with the present, as a criterion to judge of the future, that no 
sufficient guarantee is afforded to the producers of wealth, but from the adoption and 
establishment of the people’s political rights.’ Similarly in their concluding address on 
20 August the Great Trades Delegate Conference found ‘that the labourer and artisan 
having, for a series of years, vainly struggled to maintain the standard of wages which 
would enable them to obtain a supply of even the commonest necessities of life, are of 
the opinion, that the repeated prostration of their efforts are to be solely attributed to 
their political disenfranchisement.. .we came to the conclusion that the only means by 
which the labouring and the producing classes of this country can be fairly remunerated, 
property protected, and themselves eventually raised from the unparalleled depths of 
degradation to which they are at present reduced, is by the legislative enactment of the 
document known as the People’s Charter.’112
But more than this, the Manchester Great Trades Delegate Conference did also see itself 
as an alternative provisional government. Parssinen was unduly dismissive of it as a 
type of anti-parliament though it was not a true anti-parliament as Parliament had been
11 o
prorogued. For example the conference described itself as ‘we the people’s delegates’ 
who were ‘prepared to watch over and guard the people’s interests, as a personification 
of the people’s will’ and as the ‘true and bona fide representatives of the people of these 
districts.’ William Benbow’s element of a congress, from the Grand National Holiday 
and Congress, was present in the conference. It might have developed to include 
delegates from other parts of the country but the conference, public meetings, and the 
strike itself were put down by force before this could develop. Working people all over 
the country in Yorkshire, the Midlands, South Wales, Scotland and London looked to 
the Manchester Great Trades Delegate Conference for leadership in the strike for the 
Charter, as did those in the Northwest region itself.114
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The NCA and Executive conference was also sitting in Manchester by prior 
arrangement to coincide with the opening by Feargus O’Connor of the Henry Hunt 
memorial on the anniversary of the Peterloo Massacre on August 16 and with a trades 
procession organised by the Hunt memorial committee which was to march through 
Manchester on the anniversary of Peterloo to attend the ceremony. The conference had 
been convened to discuss Chartist organisation and resolve disputes among the 
leadership. It was also to consider (unnamed) ‘ulterior measures’, which may possibly 
have included resurrecting the idea of a ‘sacred month’ given P. M. McDouall’s, James 
Leech’s and John Campbell’s support for trade involvement in Chartism. However there 
is no evidence that the Chartist leadership had any involvement in or knowledge of the 
strike in Ashton before it began. The NCA and Executive Conference which met on 16 
and 17 August gave an overwhelming though not completely unanimous endorsement 
of the strike for the Charter which was already underway and which the Manchester 
trades conferences had declared in favour of. In the absence of firm ulterior measures 
from the national leadership and following the initial lead from Ashton the local 
activists in the Northwest were implementing ulterior measures themselves from the 
local platforms in the form of the strike for the Charter. The national Chartist leadership 
had neglected the ulterior measures of the mass platform following the rejection of the 
second national petition in May with the national leaders unwilling to use the ‘language 
of menace’ after the failure of 1839. The national Chartist leadership had not planned 
the strike or been involved in its outbreak but it did now attempt to gain control. There 
were divisions in the NCA Conference, in particular William Hill, the editor of the 
Northern Star, and George Julian Harney, the minor national leader who in 1839 had 
stretched the language of the constitutional mass platform to the utmost, were against 
endorsing the strike for the Charter because it was not completely national, the people 
were unarmed, the authorities would undoubtedly use force to repress it and punish 
those involved, and the Chartist movement would be crippled if the strike failed.115
However a very large majority in NCA Conference was in favour of supporting the 
strike for the Charter. All four members of the Executive present, James Leach, P. M. 
McDouall, John Campbell and Jonathan Bairstow, were strongly in favour of the strike
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for the Charter. Feargus O’Connor clearly had grave doubts but went with the large 
majority in favour of the strike for the Charter. The conference attempted to provide a 
national platform for the strike for the Charter by issuing and printing an address by the 
Executive and a resolution and address by the conference giving firm support to the 
strike for the Charter.116 A large majority at the NCA and Executive Conference passed 
a resolution on 17 August enthusiastically supporting the strike. While insisting that ‘the 
Chartist body did not originate the present cessation from labour’, the NCA Conference 
delegates’ resolution went on to ‘express their deep sympathy with their constituents, 
the working men now on strike’ and confirmed that ‘we strongly approve the extension 
and continuation of their present struggle till the People’s Charter becomes a legislative 
enactment....and pledge ourselves on our return to our respective localities to give a
1 17proper direction to the People’s efforts.’ More important than divisions in the 
conference itself was Hill’s role as editor of the Northern Star. He had already cast 
damp water on the strike as a League ploy in the 13 August edition and continued this 
more strongly in the 20 August edition refusing to print the Executive address that had 
been issued in support of the strike for the Charter.118
The NCA and Executive Conference in their address ‘to the Chartist Public’ issued on 
Wednesday 17 August took the view that the strike was due to the actions of the Ashton 
and Stalybridge cotton masters in making reductions in wages in the hope of creating 
turmoil to embarrass the government into repealing the com laws. The people had been 
forced to strike, but now that the people had turned out they had aimed the strike against 
the government and for the Charter, not for the repeal of the Com Laws, but also not 
against the masters merely for a rise of wages. Thus the NCA Conference address could 
claim that ‘the People appear to have made the “strike of the League” for a repeal of the 
Com Laws, into a stand for principle and the Charter’.119 Although the strike was aimed 
against the government the gaining of the Charter from the government would also be a 
blow against the ‘millocracy’ who would have to bow to remedial legislation such as 
minimum wages laws and would no longer be able to rely on an unfair advantage from 
class legislation.
1.6 PRO PL 27/11, Part 2, R. v. James Leach and others, 1842; Trial o f Feargus O ’Connor (London, 
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The majority of those at the NCA and Executive Conference, like the majority of those 
at the Manchester Great Trades Delegate Conference, shared a concept of the strike as a 
peaceful ‘moral force’ move. However it would not be completely accurate to make a 
rigid distinction between moral and physical force. A united people peacefully 
displaying their unity of object had the ultimate sanction, though not stated by the 
conference in 1842 unlike in 1839, of using physical force if their wishes were denied. 
Nevertheless there was little use of the ‘language of menace’ and the ‘peacefully if we 
can, forcibly if we must’ stance of 1839. A very small minority at the NCA Conference 
had an openly physical force concept of the strike. Thomas Cooper, the leader of the 
Leicester Chartists, was the principal exponent of this view, talking of the Potteries men 
being prepared to fight and that being prepared to show that they would fight would be 
the only thing that would move the government. Yet even Cooper put the emphasis on 
putting up a show that they were prepared to fight rather than actually engaging in 
violence. Cooper essentially hoped to move the government by putting on a bold front 
rather than by actually fighting.120 The strike was to be completely peaceful and there 
was no place in it for any violence or damage to persons or property, the NCA 
Conference advised the strikers in its address ‘against waging warfare against 
recognised authority...we would, above all things, counsel you against the destruction 
of life and property.’121
For the Chartist leadership the strike for the Charter was a display of united opinion 
against the government, based on moral force public opinion. It was to be an 
overwhelming display of united public opinion which would unnerve the government 
and Parliament as presently constituted, and leave it with no choice in the face of a 
united hostile public opinion but to enact the People’s Charter. This can be seen in the 
address issued by the NCA Executive Committee, ‘When the universal holiday 
prevails...then of what use will bayonets be against public opinion? What tyrant can 
then live above the terrible tide of thought and energy, which is now flowing fast, under 
the guidance of man’s intellect, which is now destined by a Creator to elevate his people
120 PRO PL 27/11, Part 2, R v. James Leach and others, 1842; Trial o f  Feargus O ’Connor (London, 
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above the reach of want, the rancour of despotism, and the penalties of bondage...’122 
The unity of the people was essential if this display of peaceful moral force public 
opinion was to become powerful enough to leave the government with no choice but to 
submit and the NCA Conference stressed the importance of unity in its address, ‘We 
believe the moral strength of a united people to be sufficiently powerful, when well 
directed, to overcome all physical force that tyranny can summon to its aid...let union 
and peace be the watchword.’123
The NCA and Executive Conference felt that there was no conflict between the demand 
for higher wages, satisfaction of social grievances and hatred of the mill owners on one 
hand, and a strike for the Charter aimed against the government on the other. Labour 
was a prey both to the government through taxes and to the mill owners because 
although labour was the source of all wealth it did not receive its fair reward due to 
class legislation which gave capital an unfair advantage in exchange and distribution. 
Labour, which was the property of the working men, did not receive protection like all 
others forms of property. Thus the NCA Executive Committee address declared that 
‘labour...is not possessed of the same legal protection which is given to those lifeless 
effects.. .which labour have alone created.. .if labour has no protection, wages cannot be 
upheld nor in the slightest degree regulated, until every workman of twenty-one years of 
age, and of sane mind, is on the same political level as the employer,’124 The enactment 
of the Charter would provide a Parliament and government which would legislate in the 
interests of the majority removing laws which unfairly favoured the mill owners and 
providing a minimum wage law, efficient factory acts and other social reforms. Thus the 
NCA Executive could claim that ‘the Charter would remove by universal will, 
expressed in universal suffrage, the heavy hand of taxes which now crush the existence 
of the labourer, and cripple the efforts of commerce; that it would give cheap 
government as well as cheap food, high wages as well as low taxes, bring happiness to 
the hearthstone, plenty to the table, protection to the old, education to the young, 
permanent prosperity to the country, long-continued protective political power to
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labour, and peace, blessed peace, to exhausted humanity and the approving 
nations...’125
Class and other Collective Identities
Multiple collective identities were articulated in the strike in the Northwest of which 
class was the most important identity. Different identities present in the strike in the 
Northwest were those of class, the people or nation, and nonconformist Christianity. 
Collective identities are ‘imagined identities’. This is not to suggest that collective 
identities have no existence outside of language or that there is no material basis for 
collective identities.126 However aspects of peoples lives are prioritised through written 
and spoken language and by symbols.
The language of class or classes was present throughout the strike in the Northwest. The 
strikers, for example in the placard issued by the Blackburn trades meeting on 18 
August and in various of the addresses issued by the trades conferences which met in 
Manchester, often referred to the ‘working classes’. The plural ‘classes’ rather than the 
singular ‘class’ was normally used, and this was essentially a descriptive term, 
descriptive in the sense of occupation, meaning those who worked with their hands. 
There was no monolithic factory proletariat in existence even in the Northwest. Many 
handloom weavers still existed. In Manchester itself factory workers were a minority 
and traditional artisans abounded as Sykes has demonstrated. Nevertheless the 
Northwest strikers felt that there was a divide between the working classes and middle 
classes whether the plural was used or not. This use of horizontal classes or class 
language was in contrast to the eighteenth century language of vertical orders, degrees 
and interests identified by Briggs. The strikers felt that there was a significant difference 
between those who performed manual labour to earn their living and those who did not 
need to do so. This was not a stable or monolithic sense of class but it would be wrong 
to dismiss it as a class identity. There is no need for us to adopt the dogmatic Marxist 
definition of class which some postmodernist historians insist upon. Even Marx’s own 
distinction of ‘class in itself and ‘class for itself, that is class-consciousness, does not
125 PRO HO 45/249c, f. 218, Executive Committee placard, 17 August 1842
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need to be dogmatically adhered to in order for us to find a loose class identity present 
in the strike. In the end almost all historians use class in a descriptive way. Similarly in 
1842 the strikers in the Northwest themselves used class language in a descriptive, loose 
but nevertheless significant way. They recognised a difference between the working and 
the middle classes even if not all historians have done so.127
This working class identity articulated in the strike in the Northwest was the product of 
a combination of political, economic and social oppression. Stedman Jones and Joyce 
have placed too much emphasis on class as a political construction.128 In the strike in 
the Northwest, class was the product of economic and social oppression as well as 
political oppression. For example the Blackburn trades deprecated ‘the late conduct of 
the employers in making frequent reductions in the wages of the labouring man, thereby 
depriving him of procuring sustenance.’ The Bolton spinners complained that the 
masters had reduced their wages, forced them into unhealthy and disagreeable homes, 
charged them unreasonable rents, had meanly and disgracefully employed apprentices 
to supersede the regular journeymen, and in various ways had curtailed their wages by 
not paying up to the list that the masters had unanimously agreed to. They were further 
of the opinion that a great deal of the distress in the manufacturing districts was owing 
to the improvements in machinery, thus superseding manual labour and creating a 
redundant and burdensome population.129
The working class identity articulated in the strike in the Northwest was not necessarily 
a conflictual identity aimed against the middle classes in their economic role in contrast 
to their political role. For example addresses issued by the Blackburn trades on 18 
August, by the Bolton spinners on 15 August and by the Manchester Great Trades 
Delegate Conference on 16 August all called on the middle classes to help the working 
classes in their struggle to gain their political rights. The address of the merged trades
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conference in Manchester on 13 August pledged the conference to ‘persevere in our 
exertions until we achieve the complete enfranchisement of our brethren of the working 
and middle classes from the thraldom of Monopoly and Class legislation’. The League 
manufacturers who were held to have provoked the strike and other large manufacturers 
were strongly criticised. However these were seen as a separate element from the 
shopkeepers and small manufacturers. They were the ‘millocracy’ who had more in 
common with the aristocrats and financiers than with the lesser middle classes. Even 
where employers were criticised as in the Bolton and Blackburn trades addresses the 
blame was normally put on a temporary aberration from customary norms on the part of 
the masters, with the interests of the working men and the masters being basically the 
same. The class identity articulated in the strike in the Northwest did not involve a 
socialist analysis of society as argued for by Foster. Stedman Jones was correct that 
exploitation was located in exchange and distribution rather than in production. The 
chief economic and social demand made in the strike in the Northwest, in addition to 
the enactment of the Charter, was a ‘fair day’s wage for a fair day’s work’ and there was 
no call for the working classes to take control of the means of production. Much of the 
criticism was made in moral as much as in economic terms, the Bolton spinners 
complaining of ‘those principles of injustice and tyranny’ practised by the master thus
i ' i nproving ‘their unprincipled meanness and trickery.’
A class based ‘labour’ identity was articulated in the strike. ‘Labour’ was opposed to 
‘capital’ and the ‘tyrants’: the mill owners. This class-based ‘labour’ identity can be 
seen for example in the address issued by the NCA Conference on 17 August. This 
address argued that the strike had been intended by the League millowners to embarrass 
the government into repealing the com laws, but now the people had turned it into a 
strike to press the government to pass the Charter. Despite declaring that the strike was 
aimed against the government and for the Charter, in the address ‘ill requited labour’ 
and the ‘interests of labour’ were opposed to ‘all powerful capital..tyrants..oppressors., 
who have steeped you in poverty and accumulated vast incomes by your distress’. 
According to the address ‘Ours is a battle of labour against capital, of right against 
might, of justice against injustice, and of knowledge against bigotry and intolerance’.131
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The Executive address urged that ‘Labour must no longer be the common prey of
masters and rulers...he has been convinced that all wealth, comfort, and produce,
everything valuable, useful and elegant, have sprung from his hands and he feels that
his cottage is empty, his back thinly clad, his children breadless, himself hopeless, his
mind harassed, and his body punished, that undue riches, luxury, and gorgeous plenty
might be heaped on the palaces of the taskmasters, and flooded in the granaries of the
oppressor. Nature, God, and reason, have condemned this inequality, and in the thunder
1 '10of a people’s voice it must perish forever.’ A class based identity of conflict between 
labour and capital, blending with the idea that labour was the source of all wealth, even 
if this conflict was centred in exchange and distribution rather than in ownership of the 
means of production, was here articulated in the strike, although the remedy for 
inequality lay in labour gaining political power.
However the class identity articulated in the strike in the Northwest was also the 
product of political oppression. By the first Reform Act in 1832 the working men had 
been marked out as the disenfranchised class. The main benefit of Stedman Jones’ work 
has been to enforce the political analysis of Chartism.133 The Chartists did believe that 
social evils were due to a corrupt political system and that political reform would 
remedy it by bringing fair laws and ending class legislation, that is legislation for the 
benefit of a minority rather than for the majority. For example the Bolton spinners, after 
describing their economic and social grievances against their masters, declared their 
opinion that ‘the above evils ariseth from class legislation, and we are further of the 
opinion that misery, ignorance, poverty and crime, will continue to exist until the 
People’s Charter becomes the law of the land.’ Similarly the Blackburn trades after 
listing their economic and social grievances affirmed that ‘class legislation is the 
primary cause of most of the evils which now afflict and disorganise society.’ Likewise 
the two trades conferences which met in Manchester on 12 August passed resolutions 
declaring their conviction ‘that all the evils that afflict society, and which have 
prostrated the energies of the producing classes, arise solely from class legislation; and 
that the only remedy for the present alarming distress and widespread destitution is the
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immediate and unmutilated adoption and carrying into law the document known as the 
People’s Charter.’134
But class was not the only identity articulated in the strike in the Northwest. The 
language of ‘the people’, ‘the nation’, and the ‘productive’ was also present. Before 
1832 the people included both the middle classes and the working classes. But after the 
first Reform Act the middle classes could be considered as no longer forming part of the 
people due to their enfranchisement and their encouragement of Whig legislation such 
as the New Poor Law, Municipal Corporations Act, unsatisfactory and grudging factory 
reforms, and support of the persecution of trade unionists in the cases of the Glasgow 
cotton spinners and Dorchester labourers. However on another reading the departure of 
the middles classes from the people could be considered as more apparent than real as 
they had not gained real political power by the Reform Act. The aristocracy were still 
firmly in power. The ‘people’ was still a fluid inclusive identity which could still be 
stretched to take in the virtuous middle classes especially shop keepers and small 
masters. The strikers in the Northwest used the language of the people as much, if not 
more than, the language of class. For example the addresses of the Manchester Trade 
Delegates frequently made reference to ‘the people’. Nevertheless in the strike in the 
Northwest ‘the people’ often meant more or less the working classes. For example the 
Manchester Great Trades Delegate Conference resolved that they would consult ‘the 
middle classes generally, for the purpose of ascertaining how far they are prepared to 
assist and support the people in the struggle for the attainment of their political rights’. 
This suggests that the people does not include the middle classes and refers instead to 
the working classes.
Much use was also made of the inclusive language of ‘the nation’ and of the 
‘productive’ which could include both the working and middle classes. The masters 
could be held to belong to the ‘productive’ or ‘industrious’ classes due to the useful 
work performed in their managerial capacity. But similarly in the strike in the 
Northwest these were used to mean more or less the working classes. For example one 
of the Manchester Great Trades Delegate Conference addresses of 16 August declared
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that ‘it is the embodied opinion of the working classes...that no sufficient guarantee is 
afforded to the producers of wealth, but from the adoption and establishment of the 
people’s political rights, as a safeguard for the lives, liberties and interests of the nation 
generally.’ Here the working classes were equated with the people, the productive and 
the nation.136
The ideology of popular constitutionalism and of the rights of freebom Englishmen had 
also been much in evidence in the Northwest in speeches and addresses issued in the 
first half of 1842. For example an address produced in March 1842, five months before 
the strike, by a trades meeting in Manchester which had been instigated by the 
Operative ACLL to gain working men’s support for repeal of the Com Laws but which 
instead called for the Charter alone, made great use of the language of popular 
constitutionalism. The address complained o f ‘the devouring monster-class legislation’, 
the national debt, the standing army, and the ‘moneyocracy’ or financiers. This was a 
traditional radical ideology attacking William Cobbett’s ‘Old Corruption’. It implied a 
reduction in taxation and corruption rather than a redistribution of wealth or the 
common ownership of the means of production. The address said that the evils 
complained of were ‘for the aggrandisement of an idle, vicious, reckless, pampered 
aristocracy, and a grasping avaricious, knavish, plundering moneyocracy...very shortly 
there will be only very rich and very poor in this country.’ The opposition to aristocracy 
was again a part of the traditional radical ideology and implied a division between
117people and aristocracy not between working and middle classes. During the strike the 
language of popular constitutionalism was still used. For example the address of the 
Manchester Great Trades Delegate Conference on 16 August spoke of the ‘legal and 
recognised constitutional rights of the people.’138 However not surprisingly during the 
strike criticism was much more frequently made of the large manufacturers than of the 
aristocracy. Also in the Northwest strike the working classes differed from middle class 
radicals in why they wanted political reform. The working classes had their own 
alternative political economy or ‘moral economy’ which differed from the political 
economy of the middle classes and which as Epstein and Belchem have suggested 
marks the difference in the use of the language of popular constitutionalism by the
136 PRO TS 11/813/2677, ff. 62-7, Case against the Chartists, 1842
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middle and working classes. Most importantly, in the context of the strike, the strikers 
believed that only political power could make wage increases permanent by putting 
them on an equal legal footing with the masters with the possibility of a Parliament 
elected by universal suffrage passing, for example, minimum wage laws. The six points 
would allow further beneficial legislation, it would end the/Vew/°oorfaw, bring decent 
factory legislation to limit hours, minimum wage legislation, taxes on machinery, 
reduce indirect taxation, get rid of the rural police, and reduce the income of the Church 
of England. The Bolton spinners, for example, were of the opinion that once the six 
points were in place the distress in the manufacturing districts could be removed by 
further legislation which would include the establishment of an efficient factory ^ ct, 
restrictions on all moving power, and the colonisation of the crown lands.139
Finally a strand of Christian identity was also present in the strike in the Northwest. 
Hymns and psalms were often sung by the turnout crowds as they processed from town 
to town to unplug the boilers and turn out the workers and at the strike meetings. 
Nevertheless this religious identity was not always used in an inclusive way. Rather the 
working classes were often identified in the strike as the true Christians. For example at 
a Rochdale strike meeting on 12 August one speaker compared the working classes ‘to 
Christ, who was deserted in the day of tribulation by the rich and wealthy of this 
world.’140
Class identity was strong in the Northwest and other identities such as the people, nation 
and religion were often reducible to a working class identity. This can be linked to the 
exploitation from factory production in large sized factories the development of which 
had been more rapid in the Northwest than in any other region. Of all the strike regions 
the Northwest had the strongest factory operative presence in the strike. But even in the 
strike in the Northwest, class was not the only identity present and it was a strongly 
political identity, not simply reducible to economic position.
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Defeat of the Strike
The arrests and repeated dispersal of the Trades Delegates in Manchester forcing their 
final dissolution on 20 August was a major blow to the strike throughout the Northwest, 
and indeed nationally, and with it the hope that the Charter could be obtained quickly 
faded and the return to work soon began. The national Chartist leadership’s 
endorsement of the strike had small effect. In part it came too late and its influence was 
limited by the hostility of Hill’s editorials in the Northern Star of Saturday 20 August 
and his deliberate failure to print the Executive address although local newspapers 
printed it. The NCA and Executive Conference signally failed to convene itself into a 
National Convention. The Manchester Great Trades Delegate Conference had appeared 
to be close to fulfilling this purpose, however once the Great Trades Delegate 
Conference dispersed no elected national conference was left sitting which was a fatal 
weakness.141 Sir William Warre, the military commander of the North, and the 
Manchester stipendary magistrate had been doubtful of the legality of arresting the 
delegates much to Sir James Graham’s anger. A London magistrate was sent up to 
Manchester and the arrests of the delegates rapidly followed. Sir James Graham ensured 
that the troops were reinforced in Manchester and its area and the magistrates, now 
reassured by the actions of the Home Office and the arrival of more troops, began to act 
more firmly and declared all public assemblages illegal on the advice of the Home 
Office.142 From the start of the strike until 20 August the strike had been 
overwhelmingly either for the Charter or for the Charter and wages. However after the 
20 August most trades apart from the spinners and weavers resumed work after the clear 
defeat of the political strike for the Charter. The weavers and spinners remained out 
longer, but merely for wages, as they were affected by the wage reductions. The strike 
in Oldham lasted until 26 August when several mills including the spinners resumed 
work, the hatters had already returned on the Tuesday and a few mills had resumed 
work on Thursday.143 The Preston mills had resumed work on 15 August following the 
shooting by the military on the Saturday. On 17 August there was an attempt by a 
procession from Chorley to renew the strike in Preston. However this was defeated by
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the military at Walton Bridge.144 The Rochdale workers returned to work on 24 
August.145 In Bolton the mills resumed work on 25 August although the men gave two 
weeks notice for a purely industrial strike.146 In Stockport most trades returned soon 
after the 20 August. However the textile mills remained out purely for wages into 
September with most back by 16 September and the rest returning to work the following 
week.147 In Manchester itself most trades returned to work soon after the dispersal of the 
Manchester Great Trades Delegate Conference on 20 August, the cotton spinners and 
power looms weavers remained out merely for wages. The cotton spinners slowly 
returned to work over the following two weeks but the power loom weavers remained 
out until late September. In the Ashton and Stalybridge area the mills also remained out 
until late in September for wages with all back at work by 24 September.148
In addition to the dispersal of the Trade Delegates in Manchester, whom the rest of the 
Northwest looked to as leaders of the strike for the Charter, the authorities in the 
different towns and districts defeated the strike by the arrest of the strike leaders, by 
declaring public meetings and processions illegal, and by the use of military and special 
constables to prevent public meetings, processions and the turning out of mills. For 
example the local Oldham Chartist activist and Oldham strike leader Samuel Yardley 
was arrested on 24 August and the military and specials were on orders to prevent any 
large meetings.149 Similarly in Stockport John Wright was arrested on 19 August and 
the magistrates issued placards banning public meetings and the military and specials 
were much in evidence.150 We have already seen that the military were used to fire on 
the crowds at Preston and Blackburn the shock of which effectively destroyed the strike 
in Preston.151 The military were poured into the Northwest by train by order of the 
Home Office and Sir William Warre’s overall command was superseded by Sir Thomas 
Arbuthnot’s appointment to the command of the whole of the Northwest, West Riding
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and Midlands disturbed districts.152
In conclusion local Chartist activists in the Ashton, Stalybridge and Dukenfield area did 
plan to inaugurate a general strike for the Charter but this decision was made only in the 
two weeks before the strike was initiated on 8 August. By late July 1842 the Ashton, 
Stalybridge and Hyde Chartist activists had come to believe rumours that the local 
ACLL manufactures intended to make three reductions in wages by Christmas with the 
intention of driving the operatives out on strike and so forcing the government to open 
the ports to com due to the increased distress that would result. However there was not 
complete unity in aim among the activists about whether the general strike should be for 
the Charter or for wages. One section of the Chartist activists who initiated the strike 
intended to pre-empt the free-traders by starting a general strike for the Charter. A 
second smaller section was concerned not so much with making the general strike be for 
the Charter but rather to make it against the wage reductions both because they meant 
hardship and also because the ACLL masters hoped to use the working men for the 
selfish purpose of gaining repeal. After the rejection of the second National Petition in 
May 1842 the national Chartist leadership had failed to propose firm ‘ulterior measures’ 
and were reluctant to make use of the full potential of the constitutional mass platform 
agitation following the defeat of 1839 and subsequent terms of imprisonment. Many of 
the local activists were however far more eager for a renewal of firm ‘ulterior 
measures’. The strike can be seen as the implementation of the ultimate ‘ulterior 
measure’ of the mass platform agitation but this time from the local platforms by local 
activists rather than by the national leadership from the national platform.
In the Northwest outside the immediate Ashton neighbourhood, in some towns 
especially those more distant from the Ashton centre such as Preston and Bolton, local 
Chartist activists started the strike in much the same way as was to occur in Yorkshire, 
the Midlands, Eastern Scotland and South Wales. That was, as we shall see in later 
chapters, by local Chartist activists starting the strike from local platforms at public 
meetings, after receiving the news of the strike for the Charter in Manchester. However 
in many towns in the Northwest the turnouts swept in from the Ashton region before 
local activists had prepared the people for a strike and often before news of the strike
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had been received. In many of these cases, such as in Manchester itself, local activists 
were quickly able to organise the strike from public meetings, but in others the shock of 
the unannounced irruptions explains the initial hesitancy which greeted the strike in 
places such as Oldham and Stockport. Some of the delegates who came on missions 
from the Ashton area were in favour of the aim of the strike being limited to the wage 
demand and this helps explain the initial confusion over what the aim of the strike was 
to be in some towns.
Once the strike had spread to Manchester and the surrounding areas, until about the 20 
August when the Great Trades Delegate Conference was forced to dissolve, it was 
overwhelmingly either for the Charter or for both wages and the Charter to protect 
wages. The strikers felt they were in an unfair position as they had no say in legislation 
and only the Charter would enable them to protect their wages by law with, for 
example, minimum wage legislation being enacted once the Charter was passed. The 
Manchester Great Trades Delegate Conference and the NCA Conference which both sat 
during the strike in Manchester both conceived of the strike for the Charter as a peaceful 
moral force move to unnerve the government by an irresistible display of public 
opinion. Once the government and Parliament had lost its nerve they would have no 
choice but to carry the Charter through Parliament. They believed that a display of 
overwhelming unity among the working classes, together with the financial aid of the 
shopkeepers, would leave the government with no choice but to capitulate and pass the 
Charter. The strike was therefore clearly aimed against the government rather than 
against the masters.
Throughout the strike the traditional radical analysis was present. The aristocracy, state 
Church, pensioners and placemen were attacked along with the ‘millocrats’ and ‘cotton 
lords’ who had now joined the traditional enemies of the people. Appeal was made to 
the historical English or British constitution and the rights of the freebom Englishman. 
The working class or the people, the two often meaning more or less the same, viewed 
social evils as arising from lack of political power. Once the Charter was enacted further 
legislation would protect the working man and his wages. The Charter would guarantee 
fair wages by giving the workman as well as the employer a voice in the legislation and 
so bringing minimum wage laws, taxes on machinery and other reforms such as repeal 
of the Com Laws, repeal of the New Poor Law, better factory legislation and lower
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taxation. Multiple collective identities were articulated in the strike in the Northwest of 
which class was the most important identity. Different identities present in the strike in 
the Northwest were those of class, the people or nation, and Christianity. The working 
class identity articulated in the strike in the Northwest was the product of a combination 
of political, economic and social oppression. Of all the strike regions the Northwest had 
the strongest factory operative presence in strike. But even in the strike in the 
Northwest, class was not the only identity present and it was a strongly political identity 
not simply reducible to economic position.
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE STRIKE FOR THE CHARTER IN THE MIDLANDS
The strike for the Charter in the Northwest coincided with a miners’ industrial strike in 
the Midlands but was also the spur to other strikes for the Charter throughout the 
industrial districts of Great Britain including the Midlands. In the Midlands, which this 
chapter will cover, there were several strands. A miners’ strike over miners’ wage and 
other industrial grievances began in the Potteries district of North Staffordshire in June 
and continued in the South Staffordshire and Worcestershire Black Country and nearby 
mining districts of Shropshire and Warwickshire until the end of September. In the 
Potteries a strike for the Charter also took place and lasted one week from Monday 15 
to Monday 22 August during which time the strike was general among potters and 
miners, the two largest industrial groups of the area. However in the Potteries strike for 
the Charter the turnout processions, meetings and crowd action were confined to 
Monday 15 and Tuesday 16 August. In the Black Country, unlike the case in the 
Potteries, the strike never became for the Charter and the only occupational group to 
strike on any scale were the miners. In the East Midlands the miners of Leicestershire, 
Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire came out on strike for a few weeks over wages and 
industrial grievances. Most significantly the strike for the Charter in the Northwest was 
the spur to a strike for the Charter in the East Midlands. The strike for the Charter was 
launched in the East Midlands in Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire with 
an initial period of agitation lasting from around Monday 15 to around Thursday 18 
August followed by the strike for the Charter itself which lasted from around Friday 19 
to Monday 27 August in the industrial villages with the workers in the towns returning 
to work slightly before this. The strike was almost complete among the framework 
knitters of Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire. Among other trades, 
including factory workers, artisans and labourers, it was less general. As in other 
regions the strike for the Charter in the Midlands was organised from public meetings 
and conducted by turn out processions. However the pulling of boiler plugs was not a 
significant feature of the strike in the Midlands apart from the disabling of mine pumps.
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In the existing historiography most attention has been paid to the miners’ strike in the 
Midlands to the relative neglect of the strike for the Charter in the East Midlands. The 
strike in the Midlands is relegated in Mather’s widely adopted framework to an initial 
non-political stage of strike activity in July preceding the outbreak of the strike for the 
Charter in August. Most debate in the historiography has concentrated on the question 
of the extent to which the miners’ strike, particularly in the Black Country, was political 
in nature. Fyson, while acknowledging Chartist leadership, emphasised the economic 
aims of the strike in the Potteries, contrary to the trend of recent historiography, 
although this is largely explained by his concentration on the proceeding Potteries 
miners’ strike. Fyson also highlighted the violent nature of the Potteries strike. Golby 
emphasised the economic nature of the strike in Shropshire, but this should not be 
surprising, for this was merely a miners’ strike. Challinor demonstrated that the 
Chartists provided leadership for the miners’ strike in the Black Country as well as in 
the Potteries. Challinor, along with Bamsby, went on to emphasise the political nature 
of the Black Country miners’ strike, whereas Griffin identified the Black Country 
miners’ strike as being basically economic in aim against wage reductions though 
Chartist leadership was important for organising, sustaining and unifying the miners’ 
strike. Griffin’s case is the stronger but he has gone too far in suggesting that the miners 
became hostile to the Charter.1 Harrison and Temple Patterson portrayed the strike in 
Leicestershire as being simply a spontaneous reaction to events in Manchester and 
ignored the clear evidence that the strike for the Charter was instead carefully organised 
and launched by the local Chartist activists after news had arrived of the strike for the 
Charter in the Northwest. In Nottingham Church underestimated the potential support 
for a strike among factory workers as well as framework knitters. Epstein in his article 
on Chartist culture in Nottingham emphasised the existence of trades delegates meeting 
in Nottingham to stress links between Chartism and trade unionism. However this 
delegate meeting only took place after the Chartist activists had already organised and 
launched the strike. Griffin argued that the Leicester and Derby miners’ strike was
1 F. C. Mather, ‘The General Strike of 1842’, in R. Quinault and J. Stevenson (eds), Popular Protest and 
Public Order (London, 1974), 115-140; R. Fyson, ‘The Crisis of 1842: Chartism and the Colliers Strike, 
and the outbreak in the Potteries’, in J. Epstein and D. Thompson (eds), The Chartist Experience 
(London, 1982), 194-220; J. M. Golby, ‘Public Order and Private Unrest, A study of the 1842 Riots in 
Shropshire’, University o f Birmingham Historical Journal (1968), 157-169; R. Challinor and B. Ripley, 
The Miners' Association: A Trade Union in the age o f the Chartists (London, 1968), 1-43; G. Bamsby, 
The Working Class Movement in the Black Country 1750-1867 (Wolverhampton, 1977), 78-117; G. 
Bamsby, C. Griffin and R. Challinor, ‘Letters’, Bulletin o f the Society for the Study o f Labour History 
nos. 19, 20,22-25,27 (1969-73)
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mainly an economic strike; this appears to be on the whole correct for the East Midland 
miners but it would be unwise to infer that this economic nature extended to the whole 
strike in the East Midlands.2
The primary emphasis in the historiography on the miners’ wage strike and the brief 
outburst of violence in the Potteries, and the tendency to view the Midlands miners’ 
strike as a preliminary to the outbreak of the strike for the Charter in the Manchester 
area, has led to the strike for the People’s Charter in the East Midlands being 
marginalised and its significance undervalued. The chapter will examine the origins, 
leadership and aims of the strike in the East Midlands. Attempts to change the nature of 
the Midlands miners’ strike into a strike for the Charter will be pursued. Links between 
the strikes in the Northwest and in the Midlands will be sought. The involvement of 
middle class radicals in the Midlands strike will be inquired into. The concept of the 
general strike for the Charter in the Midlands and the ideology articulated in the 
Midlands strike will be examined. Rather than being a mere preliminary to the strike in 
Manchester or being dominated solely by a miners’ wage strike, the strike in the 
Midlands was an attempt by local leaders to implement the most important ulterior 
measure of the Chartist constitutional mass platform agitation in order to pressure 
Parliament into enacting the Charter. The Midlands shared a similar concept of the 
strike and ideology with the rest of the strike regions. This reinforces the view that the 
strike for the Charter was a well-organised national political strike rather than merely a 
series of uncoordinated outbreaks. Demonstrating the significance of the strike for the 
Charter in the Midlands furthers the argument that the 1842 strike was the highpoint of 
the Chartist movement and not a mere coda to the presentation of the 1842 National 
Petition.
Industrial and Political Background
The single largest industry in the East Midlands towns and industrial villages was
2 J. F.C. Harrison, ‘Chartism in Leicester’, in A. Briggs (ed.), Chartist Studies (London, 1959), 111-114; 
A. Temple Paterson, Radical Leicester: A History o f Leicester 1780-1850 (Leicester, 1954), 302-331; R. 
Church, Economic and Social Change in a Midland Town, Victorian Nottingham (London, 1966), 128- 
161; C. Griffin, The Leicestershire and Derbyshire Miners (Leicester, 1981), 1-172; J. Epstein, ‘Some 
Organisational and Cultural Aspects of the Chartist Movement in Nottingham’, in J. Epstein and D. 
Thompson (eds), The Chartist Experience (London, 1982), 221-268
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framework knitting. Framework knitting dominated the industrial villages of 
Nottinghamshire, Leicestershire and Derbyshire and was also the single most important 
industry in Loughborough, Leicester, Nottingham and Derby. In Nottingham in 1841 at 
least 20% of the town’s population of 53,091 people worked in the hosiery industry. 
Around 10,000 lived in the surrounding villages and here the percentage working in the 
hosiery industry was higher. There were over 20,000 knitting frames in Leicestershire 
and Leicester itself, with a population of around 50,000, contained over 4,000 knitting 
frames. Framework knitting remained unmechanised with the framework knitter 
working in his own home or, particularly in the towns, in workshops where a number of 
frames would be placed. However factory production also existed in the East Midlands 
including lace factories in Nottinghamshire and spinning factories in Leicestershire, and 
the Struts complex at Belper in Derbyshire. The framework knitters suffered low wages 
due to the over supply of labour. Other grievances included frame rents being charged 
even when work was not given out for the whole week, deductions, the arbitrary 
practices of the masters, and the widespread introduction of low quality cut ups and slop 
work. The strength of Chartism in the Midlands did come from the impoverished 
framework knitters in the towns and industrial villages. The framework knitters, in 
contrast to the factory operatives, had no chance of a better future through industrial 
change and instead hoped for improvement through legislation which could only be 
obtained once the Charter was enacted. But there was also support for Chartism from 
factory workers and artisans. Collieries were also located in Nottinghamshire, 
Derbyshire and Leicestershire although these were of less significance than those in 
Staffordshire, Warwickshire and Shropshire.3
The Potteries district was composed of the five towns of Stoke, Hanley, Burslem, 
Fenton and Longton in North Staffordshire. Pottery manufacture and mining were the 
principal industries. The Potteries had a total population of about 80,000 people of 
whom 17,442 worked in the pottery industry. The Black Country was the industrial 
district in South Staffordshire including Dudley in Worcestershire. The main townships 
were Dudley, Walsall, West Bromwich, Wednesbury, and Bilston with Wolverhampton 
as a commercial centre. The principal industries were mining, iron making where iron
3 ‘Census Occupations Abstract’, PP (1844) vol. xxvii; ‘Report of the Commissioners on the Condition of 
Framework Knitters’, PP (1845), part 1 and 2; William Felkin, Account o f the Machine Wrought Hosiery 
Trade (London, 1845), 1-50; William Felkin, History o f the Machine Wrought Hosiery Trade and Lace 
Manufactures (London, 1867), 460-70; Thomas Cooper, Life o f Thomas Cooper (London, 1872), 133-142
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was smelted from ore to produce cast or wrought iron, and iron-working such as 
nailmaking and chainmaking which were often organised on a domestic outwork basis. 
In 1841 the Black Country had a population of 226,106 and there were at least 16,700 
miners. Shropshire and Warwickshire contained mining districts around Wellington and 
north of Coventry respectively and Coventry was the centre of ribbon manufacture. 
Birmingham in Warwickshire, with a population in 1841 of 183,000, was famed for its 
small workshops for the manufacture of hardware articles, guns, and other metal goods. 
However Birmingham had a variegated occupational structure reflecting its commercial 
status as the largest city in the Midlands. Briggs has suggested that its small-scale 
workshops were productive of class co-operation though this argument has been 
criticised by Behagg.4
The Midlands had a long radical tradition among the working and middle classes. Local 
radical societies had sprung up in, for example, Birmingham and Leicester in the early 
1790s. However the loyalist reaction during the war, witnessing the riots in Birmingham 
which drove Joseph Priestly to emigrate, crippled the emerging radical societies. Before 
the end of the war Luddism took hold among the East Midlands framework knitters. 
Following the end of the war radical societies among the lower classes began to emerge 
particularly in the East Midlands. Dining this period of post war radicalism among the 
working classes the ideology of William Cobbett’s ‘Old Corruption’ and of Major John 
Cartwright’s Ancient English Constitution was supreme, and Henry Orator Hunt’s 
constitutional mass platform agitation was the accepted strategy to force the government 
to accept universal suffrage, annual Parliaments and vote by ballot. Jeremiah 
Brandreth’s failed Pentridge Rising of 1817 when labourers, framework knitters and 
artisans marched under arms intending to take Nottingham as part of a national 
revolution to unseat the government was an isolated incidence of an alternative 
insurrectionary strategy. There was a strong Reform Bill agitation in the Midlands, 
witnessing both co-operation and conflict between middle and working classes radicals. 
Of most importance was Thomas Attwood’s Birmingham Political Union which
4 ‘Census Occupations Abstract’, PP (1844) vol. xxvii; ‘First Report of the Midland Mining 
Commission’, PP (1843), XIII; Old Potter (Charles Shaw), When I  was a Child (Stoke, 1903), 1-258; G. 
C. Allen, The Industrial Development o f  Birmingham and the Black Country (London, 1929), 1-45; G. 
Bamsby, Social Conditions in the Black Country (Wolverhampton, 1980), 1-53; C. Behagg, Politics and 
Production (London, 1990), 1-19; A. Briggs, ‘The Background of the Parliamentary Reform Movement 
in Three English Cities’, Cambridge Historical Journal, X, 3 (1952), 293-317
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attempted to unite middle and working class radicals behind the Reform Bill and staged 
monster meetings in Birmingham. The trade union, Anti-Poor Law and Ten Hour 
movements all had some presence in the Midlands in the 1830s among working class 
radicals.5
The Midlands had played an active part in the first phase of Chartism. The East Midland 
towns and industrial villages were important centres of Chartist strength in 1839 and 
indeed Sir Charles Napier’s northern district military command headquarters was 
temporarily based at Nottingham. Attwood’s Birmingham Political Union had revived 
to enter the initial phase of Chartism contributing the scheme for the National Petition 
and General Convention. In 1839 the General Convention had moved to Birmingham to 
discuss ulterior measures and it was there that the Bullring Riots occurred when the 
populace clashed with metropolitan police sent down as a riot force. After the failure of 
constitutional forcible intimidation from the mass platform in 1839 and the failure of the 
uprisings in Newport and the West Riding, the first phase of Chartism had ended in 
failure. However the National Charter Association (NCA), after a slow start when 
created in 1840, had begun to take firm root in the Midlands in 1841. Chartism was at 
its zenith in the Midlands by the early summer of 1842. The NCA was particularly 
strong and active in Bilston and Dudley in the Black Country, in the Potteries at Hanley, 
Shelton, Fenton and Longton, and in the East Midlands in Loughborough, Leicester, 
Nottingham and Derby and the surrounding framework knitting villages. Chartism had 
even been extended into Shropshire at Easter 1842. Local leaders were important for 
making particular towns strongholds of the NCA organisation. These included Samuel 
Cook at Dudley, Joseph Linney at Bilston, John Richards in the Potteries, Jonathan 
Barber at Nottingham, and John Skevington at Loughborough. Leicester had a large 
enrolled membership under Thomas Cooper, though the Leicester Chartists were 
divided between Cooper’s Shakespearean Chartists and the older leader John 
Markham’s All Saints Chartists. Birmingham was divided between George White’s 
NCA Chartists and Arthur O’Neill’s ‘new move’ Christian Chartists. The East Midlands 
towns in particular had a long middle class Nonconformist radical tradition. Middle 
class free trade radicals were active in many of the Midlands towns and indeed the free
5 J. Belchem, Industrialisation and the Working Class (Aldershot, 1990), 60-104; M. I. Thomis and P. 
Holt, Threats o f Revolution in Britain, 1789-1848 (London, 1977), 1-99; E. P. Thompson, The Making o f  
the English Working Class (London, 1968), 515-733; C. Flick, The Birmingham Political Union 
(Hamden, 1978), 1-90
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trader Charles Villiers had been elected MP for Wolverhampton. In 1842 a strong 
middle class Complete Suffrage movement grew in the Midlands particularly in 
Birmingham, Nottingham and Leicester. Many of the free traders felt that the repeal 
movement was losing out to those who believed suffrage reform to be a pre-condition 
for any other reforms. Indeed a number of the delegates to the Anti-Corn Law League’s 
(ACLL) London conference in June and July 1842 had called for the suffrage to be 
agitated for along with Com Law repeal. The growing feeling that suffrage extension 
was necessary for further reform was reflected in the growth of the National Complete 
Suffrage Union (NCSU) and attempts at partial co-operation between middle class free 
trade radicals and Chartists in the Midlands in the first half of 1842.6
The Strike in the East Midlands
The strike in the East Midlands was in no way spontaneous. Rather it was carefully 
launched by the local Chartist activists in response to the news of the strike for the 
Charter in Manchester. Chartist activists proposed, built up support for, and then 
launched the strike in the East Midlands from the local platforms at seventeen public 
meetings in Nottingham, Leicester, Loughborough, Derby and Belper held between 
Monday 15 August and Friday 19 August. Six public meetings for this purpose were 
held at Nottingham on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, five at 
Leicester on Monday, Tuesday and Thursday, three at Loughborough on Monday, 
Thursday and Friday, two at Derby on Tuesday and Thursday and one at Belper on 
Friday. The Chartist activists also held private meetings to decide in advance what 
resolutions would be put to the public meetings and smaller public meetings were held 
in the outlying industrial villages. Fifteen prominent speakers at the public meetings can 
be identified, six at Nottingham, three in Loughborough, two in Leicester, four in Derby 
and Belper, and all were Chartist activists. From the earliest of these meetings from 15 
August at Nottingham, Leicester and Loughborough and from 16 August at Derby
6 A. Temple Paterson, Radical Leicester: A History o f Leicester 1780-1850 (Leicester, 1954), 275-331; R. 
Church, Economic and Social Change in a Midland Town, Victorian Nottingham (London, 1966), 128- 
161; G. Bamsby, The Working Class Movement in the Black Country 1750-1867 (Wolverhampton, 1977), 
56-116; C. Flick, The Birmingham Political Union (Hamden, 1978), 147-174; J. Epstein, The Lion o f 
Freedom (London, 1982), 138-262; D. Thompson, The Chartists (London, 1986), 11-90; N. McCord, The 
Anti-Corn Law League (London, 1968), 120-1
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resolutions were passed stating that a strike would take place starting on the Thursday 
or Friday.7
The strike in the East Midlands was organised by local Chartist activists not by trade 
societies. The strike in the East Midlands was similar in this respect to the strike in 
Yorkshire, Eastern Scotland and South Wales. The six speakers at the Nottingham 
meetings were Jonathan Barber, Thomas Clark, Benjamin Humphries ‘Commodore’ E. 
P. Mead, James Sweet and H. Smith. Jonathan Barber was a framework knitter aged 
thirty-eight and an officer of the Nottingham NCA locality. Thomas Clark, a cotton 
weaver in Stockport who had been bom in Ireland in 1821, was a Chartist lecturer and a 
strong O’Connorite who was lecturing in Nottingham.8 Benjamin Humphries was a 
framework knitter and officer of the Nottingham NCA locality. ‘Commodore’ E. P. 
Mead was a Chartist lecturer from Birmingham who was lecturing in Nottinghamshire 
at the time. James Sweet was a hairdresser and shopkeeper aged thirty-eight and 
treasurer of the NCA Democratic Chapel in Nottingham. H. Smith was a Chartist 
activist from Mansfield.9
In Leicester the two speakers at the meetings were Thomas Beedham and James Duffey. 
Thomas Beedham was a carpenter and secretary of Thomas Cooper’s Shakespearean 
Association of Leicester Chartists. James Duffey was a Chartist lecturer bom in Ireland 
in 1794, who had been imprisoned for his part in the attempted Sheffield rising of 1840 
and had been released from prison in 1841 due to ill health and was now lecturing in 
Leicestershire.10 An unnamed Chartist delegate from South Staffordshire was also an 
active speaker. In Loughborough the three speakers at the meetings were John 
Skevington, James Duffey and Charles Jarret. John Skevington was an officer of 
Loughborough NCA locality, a shopkeeper and former Primitive Methodist preacher 
bom in 1812, who had been a delegate to the 1839 Convention where he had supported
7 PRO HO 45/250, ff. 95-100, Depositions in the case of John Skevington, 20 August 1842; 
Leicestershire Mercury, 20 August 1842; Northern Star, 20 August 1842; Nottingham Mercury, 19 
August 1842; PRO HO 45/254, ff. 13-15, Mayor of Nottingham to HO, 19 August 1842; Derby Reporter, 
18 August 1842; PRO HO 45/244, ff. 34-35, Mayor of Derby to HO, 17 August 1842, ff. 42-43, 
Magistrates of Derby to HO, 19 August 1842
8 Nottingham Mercury, 19 August 1842; J. Bellamy and J. Saville (eds), Dictionary o f Labour Biography, 
vol. IV (London, 1972), 6-7; S. Roberts, Radical Politicians and Poets in Early Victorian Britain (New 
York, 1993), 89-105
9 Nottingham Mercury, 19 August 1842; J. Bellamy and J. Saville (eds), Dictionary o f Labour Biography, 
vol. IV (London, 1972), 171-3
10 Leicestershire Mercury, 20 August 1842; C. Godfrey, Chartist Lives (New York, 1987), 494-495
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the call for the ‘sacred month’.11 Charles Jarret was a framework knitter and
1 *7Loughborough Chartist activist. In South Derbyshire the four speakers at the meetings 
were John West, Enos Ford, John Moss and James Vickers. John West, a 30 year old 
Irishman, was a Chartist lecturer and silk handloom weaver of Macclesfield who had 
taken part in the Reform Bill agitation, and was lecturing in South Derbyshire in August 
1842.13 Enos Ford was secretary of the Derby Chartist Association and a joiner by trade. 
John Moss was a tailor and former secretary of the Derby Chartist Association and 
James Vickers was a bookseller and officer of the Belper Chartist Association.14
The strike in the East Midlands was unambiguously from the start a strike for the 
Charter unlike in the Black Country and Potteries. The resolutions put by the Chartist 
activists from the East Midlands platforms at the public meetings were for a strike with 
the aim of the enactment of the People’s Charter. The call for the Charter to be the aim 
of the strike did not simply come up from the grassroots as Mather and Sykes believed 
happened in Lancashire.15 These resolutions were invariably passed, often unanimously, 
at the public meetings indicating support for the Charter as the aim from the grassroots 
strikers themselves as well as from the activists. In the East Midlands only the Belper 
framework knitters and the Leicester glove hands turned out for wages a few days 
before the Chartist activists launched the main strike on the 18 and 19 August; and these 
Belper framework knitters and Leicester glove-hands explicitly changed the aim of their 
strike once the main strike for the Charter had been launched in the East Midlands.16
Local Chartist activists advocated a strike for the Charter at public meetings in 
Nottingham on 15 and 17 August; in Leicester on 17 and 18 August; and in Derby on 16 
and 18 August. An address ‘to the magistrates, gentleman and tradesman of 
Nottingham’ presented to the Nottingham magistrates on 19 August and signed by the 
Nottingham Chartist leaders explicitly stated that the strike was to be for the People’s
11 Leicestershire Mercury, 20 August 1842; J. Bellamy and J. Saville (eds), Dictionary o f Labour 
Biography, vol. I (London, 1972), 300-302
12 PRO HO 45/250, ff. 95-100, Depositions in the case of John Skevington, 20 August 1842
13 Derby Reporter, 18 August 1842; J. Bellamy and J. Saville (eds), Dictionary o f Labour Biography, vol. 
VI (London, 1984), 245-250
14 Derby Reporter, 18 August 1842; Northern Star, 12 Februaiy, 23 April 1842
15 F. C. Mather, ‘The General Strike of 1842’, in R. Quinault and J. Stevenson (eds), Popular Protest and 
Public Order (London, 1974), 115-140; R. A. Sykes, ‘Popular Politics and Trade Unionism in South-East 
Lancashire 1829-1842’ (PhD, Manchester, 1982), 662-723
16 Leicestershire Mercury, 20 August 1842
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Charter. Resolutions for a strike for the Charter were passed, often unanimously, at 
public meetings in Nottingham on 18 August; at Leicester on 17 and 18 August; in 
Loughborough on 19 August; in Derby on 16 August, and in Belper on 19 August. 
During the week the local Chartist activists in the more important of the framework- 
knitting villages including Calverton and Mansfield in Nottinghamshire and Duffield, 
Ilkeston and Heaner in Derbyshire held public meetings at which resolutions were 
passed to strike for the Charter.17
Many of these public meetings were of a relatively large size and included people from 
the surrounding industrial villages. The Chartist William Corah, in a letter written to his 
father the next evening, reported, probably with some exaggeration, that 20,000 were 
present at the meeting in Leicester on 17 August. At the meeting on the evening of 18 
August in Nottingham 10,000 were present including men from the surrounding 
industrial villages. At the meeting in Loughborough on 15 August 4-5000 were present 
including numbers from Shepshead, Hathem and other north Leicestershire framework 
knitting villages.18
The decision to strike for the Charter in the East Midlands was confirmed by a Chartist 
delegate meeting on 18 August. There were constant communications between the 
Chartist activists, sometimes travelling by train, in the East Midlands towns in order to 
co-ordinate their activities.19 The delegate meeting, the idea of which appears to have 
originated with the Nottingham Chartists on or before 16 August, was composed of 
twenty-one Chartist delegates from Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire and 
was held at Loughborough, as the central place for the three counties. The Chartist 
delegates confirmed that they would strike for the Charter in the three counties and 
agreed to put the resolution to strike for the Charter to public meetings in their 
constituencies that night if possible or the next day and this duly took place at the public 
meetings in the towns on 18 and 19 August which resolved unanimously to strike for
17 PRO HO 45/254, ff. 15-16, Nottingham address, 19 August 1842; PRO HO 45/250, ff. 93-94, 
Loughborough resolutions, 19 August 1842; Nottingham Mercury, 19 August 1842; Nottingham Review, 
19 August 1842; Derby Reporter, 18 August 1842; Leicestershire Mercury, 20, 27 August 1842
18 Nottingham Mercury, 19 August 1842; Leicestershire Mercury, 20, 27 August 1842
19 Derby Reporter, 18 August 1842; Northern Star, 20 August 1842
the Charter.20
When launching the strike for the Charter from the local platforms in the East Midlands 
the local Chartist activists emphasised that they were responding to the strike for the 
Charter in the Northwest. This news had been received by letter or through the 
newspapers especially the Saturday 13 August edition of the Northern Star. At 
Nottingham it was the intelligence from the Northwest which had an effect on the 
Nottingham working men from 15 August. Thomas Clark read out a letter from 
Stockport, which stated, with exaggeration, that 60,000 had declared they would not go 
to work again until the Charter was the law of the land, which was greeted with the 
cheers of the Nottingham men 21 At Derby the notice announcing the meeting for the 16 
August made it clear that the strike was to be in response to the strike in the Northwest 
stating ‘Working men, you must be aware that our fellow workmen in various parts of 
the country have commenced a National Strike; we wish you, therefore, to take such 
steps as you may deem expedient in the present crisis.’22
The main influence of events in Manchester came through newspaper reports and letters 
telling of the strike for the Charter in the Northwest and of the decision of the 
Manchester Trades Delegates to make the aim of the strike the enactment of the Charter. 
However there were also links to the Northwest strike through the Manchester NCA 
Conference members exerting direct influence, though this was limited to 
Leicestershire. John Skevington from Loughborough and Thomas Cooper from 
Leicester attended the Manchester NCA Conference and returned to Leicestershire 
afterwards. At the conference Cooper was prominent in the debates but when he came 
back to Leicester, bringing Jonathan Bairstow, a member of the NCA Executive with 
him, Cooper stayed indoors except to issue a mild address and Bairstow did nothing. 
John Skevington had called for a strike at a public meeting before he left Loughborough 
on 15 August; he supported the call for the strike to be for the Charter at the NCA 
Conference, and on his return to Loughborough led the strike there.23
20 Leicestershire Mercury, 20 August 1842
21 Nottingham Mercury, 19 August 1842
22 Derby Reporter, 18 August 1842
23 Leicestershire Mercury, 20, 27 August 1842
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Unlike in the Northwest strike there was little trade society leadership in the East 
Midlands strike. However there was one trades conference during the East Midlands 
strike. At Nottingham there was a trades delegate meeting on 24 August composed of 
delegates from the trades of Nottingham and the surrounding districts which passed 
resolutions for a strike for the Charter. However the strike had already been launched by 
the Chartist activists from the local platform before the trades delegates met and indeed 
the strike was already losing its impetus in the face of repression by the authorities by 
this time.24
The strike for the Charter in the East Midlands was physically launched on the 18 and 
19 August by the activists from the local platforms at public meetings which included 
people from the industrial villages as well as the towns. The strike commenced after a 
public meeting on Thursday in Leicester and after public meetings on Friday in 
Nottingham and Loughborough. In South Derbyshire it began on Friday when the 
framework knitters already on strike decided to change the aim of their strike from 
wages to the Charter.25 The strike for the Charter in the East Midlands lasted for around 
ten days with a general return to work on 27 August. However only the framework 
knitters in the outlying industrial villages, where the civil and military authorities could 
not concentrate their forces, remained out this long. In the large towns of Nottingham, 
Leicester, Loughborough and Derby the strike was ended a few days before this due to 
the vigorous actions of the civil and military authorities who attempted to intercept the 
turnout processions and to prevent public meetings. The strike was spread by turnout 
processions in the towns and through the surrounding country from one industrial 
village to another. The turnouts from the towns first went on procession in the towns 
themselves to end all work there and then marched off to take the strike to the industrial 
villages.26
The Chartist activists went with the crowds and gave speeches at meetings in the 
villages along the way, for example Charles Jarret spoke at Belton after the
24 Nottingham Mercury, 26 August 1842
25 Leicestershire Mercury, 20, 27 August 1842; Nottingham Mercury, 26 August 1842; PRO HO 45/244, 
ff. 42-43, Magistrates of Derby to HO, 19 August 1842; PRO HO 45/254, ff. 13-15, Mayor of 
Nottingham to HO, 19 August 1842
26 Northern Star, 27 August 1842; Leicestershire Mercury, 20, 27 August 1842; Nottingham Mercury, 19, 
26 August 1842; Nottingham Review, 2 September 1842
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Loughborough turnout procession arrived there. Crowds from the industrial villages 
also entered the large towns to meet up with the town turnouts or went to neighbouring 
industrial villages; for example in the country outside Loughborough the Shepshead 
turnouts went on procession to Hathem, Long Whatton and Diseworth to spread the 
strike there. Crowds from the industrial villages came back to the main towns in the 
evenings to hear speeches by the Chartist activists who directed the strike; for example 
on Friday 19 August the Loughborough turnouts returned in the evening attended by 
many from the villages to attend a public meeting that evening. The strike for the 
Charter continued to be directed from public meetings by the same Chartist activists 
who had drummed up support for a strike for the Charter at the public meetings which 
preceded the strike; for example a Chartist public meeting was held in Leicester before
7 7the turnouts went on procession on 20 August. The Chartist activists also continued to 
hold indoor meetings to decide on tactics; for example there was a meeting in the 
Chartist rooms in Loughborough on 22 August before a turnout procession. In South 
Derbyshire the strike took a slightly different form to that in Leicestershire and 
Nottinghamshire as the hose and glove framework knitters and nail-makers of Belper, 
Duffield, Ilkeston and Heaner had turned out for wages in an independent strike on 15 
August, and had then turned out the framework knitters at Derby, before changing the 
aim of their strike to the Charter. The strike in South Derbyshire was more concentrated 
in the industrial villages than in Derby itself because from an early stage the authorities 
were able to prevent public meetings and prevent turnout processions entering Derby 
from outside.29
Many industries were involved in the strike for the Charter. However in terms of the 
occupations of those who went on strike those belonging to the dominant industry in 
each area predominated. In the East Midlands the hand framework knitters were the 
main strike force. Of the twenty-seven tried at the Nottinghamshire Michealmas Quarter 
Sessions in October 1842 for their part in the strike for the Charter nineteen were 
framework knitters. The remainder were four lace makers who may or may not have 
been factory operatives, one labourer, one glove maker, one shoemaker and one nail 
maker.30 Indeed there was a truly general strike of framework knitters in the East
27 Leicestershire Mercury, 20 August 1842; Northern Star, 27 August 1842
28 Nottingham Mercury, 26 August 1842; Leicestershire Mercury, 27 August 1842
29 Derby Reporter, 18,25 August 1842
30 Nottinghamshire Mercury, 21 October 1842
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Midlands. In Loughborough on the first day of the strike on 19 August the strike was 
complete as far as the framework knitters and twist and warp hands were concerned. 
Scarcely a single frame or twist machine was at work. In the framework knitting 
villages of Leicestershire all the framework knitters were out by 22 August.31 Among 
the artisans, labourers and factory operatives the strike was more partial. In 
Loughborough on 18 August although all the framework knitters were out the strike was 
reported to be very partial with respect to other occupations. Workers in the worsted 
spinning factories either did not turn out in Leicester on 18 August when asked to by the 
turnout procession or went back in again after the crowds had left.32
However it would be unwise to suggest, as Church and Temple Paterson do, that the 
East Midlands strike for the Charter was merely a strike of the framework knitters. 
Artisans were among the strikers even if the strike among the artisans was only partial. 
In Nottingham at the trades conference on 24 August there were delegates from the 
artisans including the coach makers, masons, smiths, dyers, tobacconists, joiners, 
shoemakers and tailors of Nottingham. Thus artisans, some of very high status such as 
the coachbuilders, were represented in addition to the twistnet hands, silk hose hands, 
rib top hands and framework knitters. Some at least of the artisans represented at the 
conference came out on strike and on the afternoon of 25 August a procession 
consisting of masons, joiners, tailors, shoemakers, framework knitters and others, about 
seven hundred in all, paraded in Nottingham. They paraded to New Radford and asked 
the men at the factories there to join them, they then proceeded to Higson where they 
paraded, and they then went back to Nottingham. They were reputed to be orderly, 
many of them well dressed and appeared to be a superior class of operatives. The 
strike was also general among the nail makers in south Derbyshire in Belper and other 
industrial villages.
Temple Patterson suggested that the factory operatives did not strike. Certainly in 
Leicestershire the factory operatives were reluctant to turn out. However in 
Nottinghamshire factory operatives did turn out at many lace factories. In Nottingham 
itself on 19 August the operatives of at least three lace factories all turned out willingly
31 Leicestershire Mercury, 20 August 1842
32 Leicestershire Mercury, 20 August 1842
33 Nottingham Mercury, 26 August 1842
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when the framework knitters came in procession. They also turned out the workers at a 
dye house and the females at the lace dressing rooms. Thus dyers and the female 
auxiliary lace workers were also represented in the strike. On 19 August the turnout 
crowds turned out the factory hands at two lace factories in Carrington who stayed out 
until 23 August. On 22 August at New Basford the procession managed to turn out the 
operatives at all the different factories except for one lace factory. Well paid factory 
operatives did turn out; for example on 19 August at New Basford two lace factory 
operatives who agreed to turn out were receiving wages of two pounds a week or more. 
A reluctance to strike among factory operatives was not necessarily due to hostility to 
the Charter. After all the factory operatives were in reasonably well paid jobs, and so 
had more to lose from an unsuccessful political strike than had the framework knitters 
many of whom were only partially employed. Many of the factory operatives were 
reported to be willing to strike if they thought that the strike was general. For example 
at Radford in Nottinghamshire on 20 August the operatives at one lace factory did not 
turn out but implied that that they would strike if the strike was general. In Derbyshire 
at another factory the operatives stated that they did not believe the strike was the right 
way of gaining the Charter; nevertheless they would forgo their wages and so suffer 
hardship if it did seem that there was a realistic chance of the Charter being obtained by 
the strike.34
The strike was very peaceful in the East Midlands where the aim of the strike was for 
the Charter although the Chartist activists did not have complete control over the rank 
and file. There was some throwing of stones by the crowd at the police in Leicester on 
18 and 19 August after meetings. In Loughborough on 22 August when the military 
were escorting five prisoners to Leicester they were pelted with stones from a bridge on 
their way to the railway. However there were no injuries and this did not compare to the 
attack on the military outside Halifax in the previous week. In general the political 
strike in the East Midlands was noted for its peaceable nature. When turnouts visited 
factories to ask the hands to stop they sent in small deputations to confer with the 
master and men and normally left if the men did not wish to turn out. There were 
occasional threats to unplug the boilers or break windows but they were not carried out.
34 Nottingham Mercury, 26 August 1842
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The crowds normally tried to avoid rather than confront the civil and military 
authorities.35
Although the main strike in the East Midlands was for the Charter there were in fact two 
separate strike movements taking as the East Midlands miners were also striking, but 
over wages rather than for the Charter. The Leicestershire and Nottinghamshire miners 
came out for their own wage and industrial grievances. The North Leicestershire miners 
came out from 13 August and the Nottinghamshire miners came out only after the main 
Nottingham strike for the Charter had ended. Two delegates from a South Staffordshire 
miners’ meeting at Wednesbury on 11 August travelled up to the Leicestershire pits and 
encouraged the men to turn out and distributed handbills stating the demand for four 
shillings wages made by the Black Country miners on 1 August at West Bromwich. The 
East Midlands Chartist activists did make efforts to draw the miners into the strike for 
the Charter but they were not very successful. The Chartist activist Pepper from 
Normanton spoke to the Loughborough area miners when they came out but the miners 
still confined their demands to industrial grievances. The Chartist activists in 
Nottingham over the weekend 20 and 21 August hoped that the Nottinghamshire miners 
would turn out on 22 August and join up with the operatives in the strike for the Charter 
on the Monday. On the Saturday a turnout procession went from Nottingham to the Old 
Radford Coalpit to encourage the miners to strike but they refused.36 In Derbyshire John 
West hoped to bring the miners into the strike for the Charter and there was a partial 
convergence of the two strikes in Derbyshire when the miners attended the meeting 
organised by West on 22 August. A pamphlet printed in the Potteries was distributed in 
late August calling on the Derbyshire miners to strike for the Charter; but the miners’ 
strike remained mainly a wages and weight grievance strike and the Derbyshire miners 
never accepted the Charter as the aim of their strike.37 Nevertheless in the East 
Midlands the main strike was one for the Charter involving framework knitters and 
other trades and was solidly for the Charter. This contrasts with the strike in the Black 
Country and to a lesser extent the Potteries where the miners’ strike was of far greater 
significance.
35 PRO HO 45/254, ff. 13-15, Mayor of Nottingham to HO, 19 August 1842; Leicestershire Mercury, 20, 
27 August 1842
36 Nottingham Mercury, 26 August 1842
37 PRO HO 45/244, f. 56, Address to the Colliers, 31 August 1842
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The Strike in the Potteries
As in the East Midlands there were two strike movements going on in the Potteries: a 
miners’ strike and the strike for the Charter. The miners’ strike was principally aimed 
against the wage cuts made in the Potteries in June. There were four principal Chartist 
activists involved in the Potteries strike: John Richards, George Hemmings, William 
Ellis and Thomas Cooper. John Richards was seventy years old, a shoemaker and a 
radical since Peterloo and secretary of the U pper Hanley NCA branch and of the 
Potteries regional district of the NCA. George Hemmings was the miners’ leader and an 
officer of the NCA.38 William Ellis, bom in 1809, was a potter living in Shelton, and a 
leading Chartist orator at meetings in the Potteries in the first half of 1842.39 Thomas 
Cooper, Chartist journalist, organiser and preacher, at this time leader of the 
O’Connorite Shakespearean Chartists in Leicester, was lecturing in the Black Country 
and the Potteries while on his way from Leicester to Manchester.40 In June, July and 
early August John Richards, George Hemmings, and William Ellis had been organising 
the Potteries miners’ wage strike which had begun at the start of June, intensified on 11 
July, and after a return to work was renewed on 6 August. The cause of the strike had 
been wage cuts. Richards was the leading member of the Committee of Operative 
Colliers which organised the strike 41
Thomas Cooper, William Ellis, John Richards and George Hemmings took the lead in 
attempting, from the local platform, to extend the already existing strike for redress of 
miners’ grievances into a strike for the Charter including other trades. The Potteries 
Chartist activists decided in their committee meeting on Sunday 14 August to launch a 
strike for the Charter the next day after receiving a letter from Manchester. Public 
meetings announcing that a strike for the Charter would take place were held in Hanley 
on Sunday evening and Monday morning with Thomas Cooper as main speaker. A 
resolution to strike for the Charter (moved by Richards, seconded by Hemmings and put
38 R. Fyson, ‘Homage to John Richards’, in O. Ashton, R. Fyson and S. Roberts (eds), The Duty o f  
Discontent (London, 1995), 71-96
39 R. Fyson, ‘The Transported Chartist: The case of William Ellis’, in O. Ashton, R. Fyson and S. Roberts 
(eds), The Chartist Legacy (Rendlesham, 1999), 80-101
40 Thomas Cooper, Life o f  Thomas Cooper (London, 1873), 185-6; J. Bellamy and J. Saville (eds), 
Dictionary o f Labour Biography, vol. IX (London, 1993), 51-57
41 Northern Star, 16, 30 July, 6, 13 August; PRO TS 11/602, Letter from the Committee of Operative 
Colliers, 13 August 1842
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by Cooper) was passed unanimously by the 8-10,000 present at the Monday morning 
meeting. William Ellis and John Richards were the main speakers at morning and 
evening public strike meetings on 16 August in Hanley. At the morning meeting Ellis 
declared that they must get the Charter and that he was for ‘political rights to the 
working classes’ and until they obtained those rights they must not expect a ‘fair days 
wages.’ At the evening meeting on 16 August Ellis and Richards proposed another 
resolution to strike for the Charter.42
In the Potteries the turnout processions to the pottery manufactories and the collieries 
still at work took place on 15 and 16 August. The strike was general in the Potteries 
towns for these two days. After the military fired on the crowds at Burslem on Tuesday 
16 August no more turnout processions took place, however the potters and miners did 
not return to work until 22 August.43 Something approaching a general strike of all 
trades took place in the Potteries towns over 15 and 16 August. Of the 221 indicted at 
the Special Commission for their part in the Potteries disturbances 102 (46%) were 
potters, 40 (18%) were miners and 25 (11%) were labourers. Almost all the potters 
came out. Other trades apart from potters and miners were also represented among those 
convicted at the Special Commission. The next largest groups of the 221 were ten 
shoemakers, the traditional radical artisans, followed by five bricklayers, four 
brickmakers, three blacksmiths, two tailors, two joiners and two engineers.44
In the Potteries the Chartist activists did manage to change the aim of the strike and 
extend it to the potters though it degenerated immediately into some of the worst 
destruction of property of the whole strike. In the Potteries the miners were probably 
still contending for their own grievances, however they formed a minority of those 
involved in the Potteries disturbances once the strike for the Charter had been launched. 
Before this in late July some pottery works had been brought to a standstill by lack of 
coal but the potters did not actively join in the miners’ strike. However once the general
42 Reports o f State Trials 1839-43, New Series, vol. 4 (London, 1892), 1279-1304; Thomas Cooper, Life 
o f Thomas Cooper (London, 1873), 189-192; Northern Star, 20 August, 1842; North Staffordshire 
Mercury, 20 August 1842
43 PRO HO 45/260, f. 346, Major Powys to HO, 23 August 1842; Northern Star, 20 August, 1842; North 
Staffordshire Mercury, 20 August 1842
44 PRO PCOM 2/401, County Prison Staffordshire Sheriff’s Gaol Register, 1842
85
strike for the Charter was announced the potters, the largest industrial group in the area, 
were the main strike force as we have seen.45
The Potteries Chartists were acting in response to the news of the strike for the Charter 
in the Northwest when they attempted to transform the miners’ wage strike into a strike 
for the Charter. It was a letter, informing them that the ACLL had turned out the people 
by reducing wages, and that the Manchester Chartists thought it a fitting opportunity for 
getting the Charter, and asking them to bring out the potters, received from what Cooper 
described as the Chartist Committee in Manchester, and which was probably the Ashton 
or Stalybridge strike committee rather than one of the initial Manchester trades 
delegates conferences, which prompted the Potteries Chartists to launch a strike. The 
resolution which began the strike for the Charter in the Potteries also showed the 
influence of events in Manchester, declaring ‘We hereby agree to stand by the 
resolution passed by the Manchester meeting: that is, to strike and cease from labour 
until the Charter becomes the law of the land.’46
There were physical links between the strike in the Potteries and the strike in the 
Northwest with turnouts from the Northwest reaching as far as the Potteries at a crucial 
point. Earlier in July the Potteries miners had attempted to extend the miners’ turnout to 
the Poynton colliers by a strike march after having heard that coal was being brought 
from there into the Potteries. Of far more significance was the entry of turnouts from 
Macclesfield and further north via Leek into Burslem in the Potteries on 16 August. 
These turnouts had caused alarm to the magistrates of Derby on 15 August when it was 
rumoured they were making for Derby though this did not in fact happen. The turnouts 
had gone from Macclesfield to Leek on 15 August, and in the evening a portion left 
Leek on their way back to Manchester, but the rest attended a meeting of the 
workpeople of Leek which they had called, remained in that town and early on Tuesday 
morning set out to march to the Potteries. On 16 August the Northwest turnouts did 
enter Burslem and were among the crowd fired upon by the military in Burslem Market 
Place 47 At the subsequent Special Commission a handloom weaver and a machine
45 PRO PCOM 2/401, County Prison Staffordshire Sheriffs Gaol Register, 1842
46 Reports o f State Trials 1839-43, New Series, vol. 4 (London, 1892), 1301; Thomas Cooper, Life o f 
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maker both from Macclesfield, a silk twister from Leek and a machine maker from 
Manchester were among those tried for having been part of the crowd which entered 
Burslem from Leek and Macclesfield.48
There was more violence and destruction in the Potteries, where the strike for the 
Charter had been grafted onto the miners’ strike, than in the East Midlands. In the 
Potteries there was some personal violence during the phase of the miners’ strike similar 
to that which occurred in the Black Country miners’ strike. Once the strike for the 
Charter had been initiated in the Potteries there were two days of gutting the houses of 
unpopular men of authority in the community and the destruction of records and 
furniture of unpopular institutions. This was quite alien to the orderly and generally 
peaceful nature of strike in East Midlands and throughout the rest of the country with 
partial exceptions. On 15 August after the morning meetings the crowds brought out 
and destroyed all the furniture and books of the police stations at Hanley, Stoke, Lane 
End and Fenton injuring two policeman and leaving one of them in irons in Stoke police 
station. They destroyed the books and papers of the Collector of the Poor Rates and of 
the Court of Requests, the small debtors’ court, where they also slightly wounded the 
clerk. The houses of Bailey Rose, the Stipendary Magistrate, and of Thomas Allen, who 
was thought to have firearms, were gutted destroying all furniture and books. In the 
early hours of 16 August the houses of the unpopular parsons Rev. Dr R. E. Aitkins and 
Rev. Dr Vale and of W. Parker, the magistrate, were gutted and burned. Stones were 
thrown at the military and special constables in Burslem market place.49 This was 
traditional ritualised crowd action aimed at the property of unpopular persons with the 
damage being inflicted on property not persons in the main. In many ways the 
behaviour of the Potteries crowds was a throwback to ‘collective bargaining by riot’ and 
the type of eighteenth and early nineteenth century crowd behaviour identified by E. P. 
Thompson. This was unusual in the strike as in the rest of the country in general the 
crowds did not destroy property.50 The targets suggest that it would not be a complete 
explanation to view this spate of destruction as being the result of tension from the bitter
48 PRO PCOM 2/401, County Prison Staffordshire Sheriff’s Gaol Register, 1842
49 PRO HO 45/260, f. 271, Major Powys to HO, 16 August 1842; Northern Star, 20 August, 1842; North 
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50 E. P. Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century’, Past and 
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nature of the miners’ strike. Rather the targets were in the main those concerned with 
the administration of the New Poor Law, unpopular magistrates, the local police, the 
small debtors court, the hated records belonging to the poor law contractor, all of which 
were very unpopular and the cause of long standing grievances in the community. 
Thomas Cooper’s Sunday ‘Thou shalt do no murder’ sermon aroused a strong sense of 
outrage among the people in the Potteries, it inflamed their sense of injustice and 
brought long simmering tensions in the community to a head. In fact the burning of 
property of those connected with the administration of the New Poor Law bears some 
similarity to the Todmorden Poor Law Riots of 16 November 1838.51
The Strike in the Black Country and Surrounding Area
The miners’ strike in the Black Country and surrounding mining areas was far more 
serious than was the miners’ strike in the East Midlands. There had been long 
simmering grievances including the weighing of coal, the unfair practices of the butties 
(middlemen who leased the mine from its owner), and truck (payment by tokens which 
had to be redeemed in a mine shop often owned by the butty), but the strike was 
principally against the wages cuts made in the Black Country in July.52 The principal 
Chartist activists involved in the Black Country miners’ strike were Arthur O’Neill, 
George White, Joseph Linney, Samuel Cook and John Fussell. Arthur O’Neill, bom in 
1819 at Chelmsford of a Protestant Irish cordwainer father and an English mother, had 
studied medicine and theology at Glasgow and became Pastor of the Chartist Church at 
Birmingham in 1840. The Birmingham Christian Chartist Church, which also included 
John Collins among its leaders, was part of the ‘New Move’ Chartism, outside the NCA 
structure and particularly receptive to an alliance with middle class radicals, which was 
denounced by Feargus O’Connor as a divisive influence in Chartism.53 George White 
was leader of the Birmingham NCA Chartists and was feuding with the ‘New Move’ 
O’Neill. Bom in Ireland in 1817, White went to Leeds to work as a woolcomber 
receiving six months in prison in 1840 for his Chartist activities, and came to 
Birmingham in 1841 as Northern Star correspondent.54 Joseph Linney, a Chartist
51 Thomas Cooper, Life o f Thomas Cooper (London, 1873), 187-9; S. Weaver, John Fielden and the 
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53 J. Bellamy and J. Saville (eds), Dictionary o f Labour Biography, vol. VI (London, 1990), 192-98
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lecturer and former Manchester power loom weaver, was leader of the Bilston Chartists. 
Samuel Cook, a draper, was leader of the Dudley Chartists. John Fussell was an 
associate of White’s who had been arrested prior to the Bullring riots in 1839 and like 
White had the reputation of being a physical force Chartist.55
Arthur O’Neill, George White, Joseph Linney and Samuel Cook had been organising 
the Black Country miners’ strike since late July when a wage reduction had been 
announced for 1 August.56 The Black Country Chartist activists organised great public 
strike meetings of Black Country miners on 1 August in West Bromwich and on 11 
August at Wednesbury. 8-10,000 Black Country miners attended the West Bromwich 
meeting and 20,000 attended the Wednesbury meeting. O’Neill was the main organiser 
and speaker at the West Bromwich meeting with George Hemmings from the Potteries 
also speaking. O’Neill, Linney, White and Thomas Cooper (who was on a lecture tour 
while making his way to the Manchester NCA conference) spoke at the Wednesbury 
meeting. After the Wednesbury meeting 100 delegates met in the Chartist rooms in 
Wednesbury and delegates were appointed to go to the Shropshire, Derbyshire, 
Leicestershire, Warwickshire and Lancashire coal fields to bring about a general 
organisation of colliers to stop work. Delegates from the Wednesbury meeting soon 
turned up at the Loughborough and Shropshire coalfields and elsewhere and O’Neill 
himself went to the Warwickshire and Derbyshire collieries.57
The Chartist activists helped to ensure unity with the Potteries miners over the miners’ 
demand for four shillings pay. At the West Bromwich meeting four shillings a day was 
declared to be the aim of the miners’ strike and George Hemmings spoke at this meeting
CO
to unify the demands of the miners’ strike in both the Potteries and the Black Country. 
The published demands of the miners made at the West Bromwich meeting were also 
widely distributed in the Black Country, Potteries and East Midlands coalfields.59 
Thomas Cooper later claimed that at the Wednesbury meeting on 11 August the Black 
Country miners had resolved to strike for the Charter, but in fact the only resolution
55 J. Bellamy and J. Saville (eds), Dictionary o f Labour Biography, vol. VI (London, 1990), 64-68, 159- 
161
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passed at Wednesbury was that colliers should work a stipulated number of hours and 
the colliers carried banners demanding ‘Miners right -  4 shillings a day and eight hours 
work’ which was what the miners were contending for. The miners at Wednesbury may 
indeed have expressed support for the Charter in response to Cooper’s speeches, but 
they had not made the Charter the aim of their strike.60
The same Chartist activists who took the lead in helping the miners to organise their 
wage strike in the Black Country also attempted to change the nature and extend the 
already existing miners’ strike from the 13 August. O’Neill, White and Fussell led the 
attempt to extend and politicise the miners’ strike and to extend the strike to 
Birmingham. Joseph Linney and Samuel Cook were mainly content with keeping the 
miners’ strike over miners’ grievance going without necessarily increasing its political 
content. O’Neill, White, Fussell and their Chartist associates pursued three main 
strategies simultaneously.
The first strategy was to extend the Black Country miners’ strike in order to immobilise 
industry by lack of fuel throughout the Midlands and Birmingham to force others who 
had not struck to leave work and so leave the government with no choice but to submit. 
This strategy was mainly the work of O’Neill. This first strategy was linked to the 
second, of extending the strike to Birmingham, as O’Neill hoped that a lack of coal fuel 
would force work to stop in Birmingham, and also with the third as O’Neill constantly 
hoped to extend the interest of the miners in the Charter. O’Neill had been involved in 
organising the extension of the Black Country miners’ strike to others areas from 
Thursday 11 August when he addressed the Wednesbury meeting after which delegates 
set off to other mining districts to extend the strike and he himself went to Bedworth 
colliery with the other delegates on 12 and 13 August. But it only becomes certain that 
he was trying to use the miners’ strike to stop all other forms of industry in Birmingham 
and the other Midlands towns to force Parliament to grant the Charter from 13 August 
when news of the political nature of the strike in Manchester had arrived. O’Neill made 
his strategy explicit on 13 August, while he was bringing the Bedworth and Foleshill 
miners of Warwickshire out on strike, declaring that ‘if coals could not be had, the 
mighty machinery of society would be at a standstill from the great railroad and 
steamship speculations to the business of domestic life, all would be affected, and
60 Reports o f State Trials 1839-43, New Series, vol. 4 (London, 1892), 1277-78
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therefore the object of the strike might be accomplished.’ O’Neill also attempted to 
combine the first strategy with the third strategy, of politicising the miners’ strike. 
O’Neill realised that for the miners the object was miners’ grievances, but he also hoped 
the miners would themselves adopt the Charter as their aim along with their wages 
grievances. He advised them that ‘the only means of restoring society to a healthy and 
happy state, was to make the People’s Charter the law of the Land.’ By this stage the 
main purpose of the miners’ strike for O’Neill was as a lever for obtaining the Charter.61 
Again at this meeting in Cradely on 26 August, as at the earlier meeting on in 
Warwickshire on 13 August, O’Neill told the miners that he hoped to have a general 
miners’ strike to stop other forms of industry by reducing the coal supply, and so force 
the government to grant the Charter so normal life could resume.62
The second strategy was to launch a strike for the Charter in Birmingham among all the 
working classes. George White at a meeting in Birmingham on 15 August called 
frequently for the people of Birmingham to come out on strike for nothing less than the 
Charter. At a meeting in Birmingham on 19 August White argued that the system of 
government must be destroyed or else the people would continue in the distressed state 
in which they were. White and Fussell declared that they would hold a meeting on 23 
August in Birmingham with the aim of starting a strike for the Charter in Birmingham. 
O’Neill and the Christian Chartists had planned a public meeting for the day before to 
memorialise the Queen and take into consideration what Birmingham should do.63 The 
police stopped the Monday meeting but O’Neill announced before it dispersed that he 
had come prepared to move resolutions declaring in favour of the Charter and 
recommending that from that day the payment of all taxes should cease.64 A large 
meeting in Birmingham on 23 August organised by George White and John Fussell 
voted for the Charter, 12,000 being present, however no strike took place. White and 
Fussell held nightly meetings in Birmingham and often brought the Black Country 
miners from Bilston and the surrounding areas into Birmingham in procession to hear 
their speeches as on 23 August.65 Here the third strategy, of politicising the miners’ 
strike, was being combined with the second strategy.
61 Coventry Herald and Observer, 19 August 1842
62 Wolverhampton Chronicle, 31 August 1842
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The third strategy was to change the nature of the of the Black Country miners’ strike so 
that the miners would demand the enactment of the Charter as well as the settlement of 
their wage and industrial grievances. During the week 22 to 26 August O’Neill was 
trying to shift the aim of the Black Country miners’ strike in Oldbury and Dudley 
toward the Charter. On 26 August O’Neill addressed one of the meetings of miners at 
Cradely and was arrested afterwards. At this meeting O’Neill declared that ‘wages were 
not the main point, but the whole system was corrupt. The House of Commons was 
rotten...But the most important thing of all was that they had no voice in the 
representation of the country, and no good would be effected till they had the right of 
sending members to Parliament.’66 O’Neill supported the parallel ulterior measure of a 
refusal to pay taxes, and told the Cradely meeting that he would not pay any taxes. 
When arrested on 26 August he had fifty to sixty handbills in his pocket signed by 
himself and the Committee of the Christian Chartist Church at Birmingham, declaring 
‘.. .Passive resistance on our part is not only a right but a sacred duty. We resolve not to 
obey the government by serving them in any capacity. We resolve not to recognise them 
as our Government. We therefore refuse to pay all taxes.’67 Most attention and debate in 
the historiography has focused on the third strategy. However the Chartist activists 
themselves put most effort into the first two strategies as they knew that the miners were 
primarily interested in the settlement of their own industrial grievances.
When attempting to change the nature of the Black Country strike and create a strike for 
the Charter in Birmingham the local Chartist activists were acting in response to the 
news of the strike for the Charter in the Northwest. For example in Birmingham George 
White’s call for a strike for the Charter was made in response to the news of the strike 
for the Charter in the Northwest. White told a meeting in Birmingham on 15 August 
that ‘the people in the north were out and were determined not to work again until they 
got their rights, and why not the people of Birmingham do the same? If they would but 
be united they would soon let the government see they were determined to have their 
rights.’68
66 Wolverhampton Chronicle, 31 August 1842
61 Staffordshire Advertiser, 12, 19 August 1843; Wolverhampton Chronicle,31 August 1842
68 Wolverhampton Chronicle, 31 August 1842
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Birmingham did not strike although the large meeting in Birmingham organised by 
George White on 23 August voted for the Charter. Briggs argued that there was less 
class tension present in Birmingham than in, for example Manchester, due to the small- 
scale nature of the workshops there with no sharp distinction between master and 
journeyman. Behagg has questioned this and suggested that there was growing class 
tension in the small workshops with increased intensity of exploitation and decreasing 
opportunities for journeymen to become masters.69 But lack of class tension is irrelevant 
to explaining why the Birmingham workers did not strike, given that the strike for the 
Charter in the Midlands was aimed at the government rather than the masters (although 
the miners’ strike was aimed at the masters). Reasons other than the absence or presence 
of class tension may provide better explanations for why the Birmingham workers did 
not strike. Firstly in large cities with a wide range of trades it was more difficult to 
organise a strike due to problems of communication, as was seen in Leeds, Sheffield 
and even in Manchester where the force of the strike came from the surrounding 
industrial towns. This contrasts with towns such as Nottingham, Loughborough and 
Leicester which were smaller and more dominated by one or two industries. Secondly, 
as in Leeds, a very heavy military presence, including artillery, was stationed in 
Birmingham in order to deter a strike, and may have successfully done so.
In the Black Country the miners did not change the aim of their strike to the Charter and 
Birmingham did not strike. Bamsby and Challinor suggested that the Black Country 
miners were striking at least in part for the Charter while Griffin denied any support for 
the Charter as the aim of the strike among the miners.70 All the evidence suggests that 
the Black Country miners received support from the Chartists organising their meetings 
and unifying their four shillings wage demand, but the miners were not prepared to 
strike for the Charter itself. The strike was also too strongly associated with miners’ 
grievances in the Black Country and Shropshire for other trades to join in on any scale 
though some hardware workers were forced to stop work due to lack of coal for fuel. Of 
the fifty-five indicted at the Special Commission from the Black Country, if we exclude
69 A. Briggs, ‘The Local Background’ and ‘National Bearings’, in A. Briggs (ed.), Chartist Studies 
(London, 1959), 1-28, 288-303; C. Behagg, ‘An Alliance with the Middle Class’, in J. Epstein and D. 
Thompson (eds), The Chartist Experience (London, 1982), 59-86
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O’Neill and Linney, there were forty-seven miners, two tailors, one ropemaker, one 
puddler, and one shingler; thus a massive 85.5% were miners.71 However this should 
not be used to detract from the political nature of the strike in the East Midlands and in 
Potteries from 15 August. The Black Country miners’ strike was generally peaceful in 
nature, although more violent than in the East Midlands. In the Black Country and 
Shropshire miners occasionally used violence against strikebreakers and the police, 
though violence against persons was relatively isolated even here. The greater level of 
violence in the Black Country and Shropshire was a result of the industrial nature of the 
separate strike by miners over their own wage grievances. However George White’s 
bodyguard threw a policeman in the canal after they had escaped from the police 
breaking up his 23 August meeting and White’s friends had thrown stones at the 
police.72
The agitation for a strike for the Charter in the Black Country, Birmingham and 
surrounding areas was organised by local Chartist activists not by trade societies. Only 
in Coventry was there a trades delegate meeting, and this had no practical 
consequences. There was a meeting of trades delegates in the Chartist rooms in 
Coventry to discuss whether to turn out for the Charter, following the strike of some 
Coventry ribbon weavers over wages. Nevertheless no strike among the trades was 
decided upon by the Coventry trade delegate meeting. No strike took place in Coventry 
apart from the ribbon weavers who struck over wages; although the Bedworth miners 
did march into Coventry on at least one day and held meetings in the morning and 
evening which were addressed by Coventry Chartist leaders including William Taunton 
the Congregationalist Sunday school preacher and manager of the co-operative store 
who cautioned them to be peaceable. The miners on strike outside Coventry at
T\Bedworth were organised by a local Chartist orator named Holmes.
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Middle Class R&drCAfc zncf the. Strike In the Mfdl&fids
In the Midlands there was a significant level of sympathy for the strike for the Charter 
among the middle class Complete Suffrage radicals. The middle class suffrage radicals 
were wary of possible clashes with the military and civil authorities that the strike might 
and indeed did lead to, but were still able to consider co-operation by a possible tax 
revolt if full, fair and free representation was not conceded. This built on previous 
attempts at co-operation during the spring and summer of 1842. Chartists, albeit mainly 
from the ‘/lew /nove’ and middle class Leaguers and suffrage radicals had come 
together at the Complete Suffrage Conference at Birmingham in April 1842. In July at 
the ACLL London conference some Leaguers hoped that the Black Country miners’ 
strike could be used to exact both repeal and the Charter by bringing all other forms of 
industry to a halt for lack of fuel. One group which included the Ridgeways of the 
Potteries and the Rev. William Stokes of West Bromwich hoped for a new movement 
with an alliance of Joseph Hume, Feargus O’Connor and Joseph Sturge and more 
vigorous tactics, perhaps associated with the call for closing the factories made at the 
conference by one of the conference delegates from London. Joseph Sturge’s 
Nottingham election contest with John Walter, proprietor of The Times, at the beginning 
of August 1842 was another significant move towards greater co-operation between 
Chartists and middle class suffrage radicals. Chartist leaders including Feargus 
O’Connor, P. M. McDouall, E. P. Mead, Thomas Clark, John West and Thomas Cooper 
supported Sturge’s campaign at Nottingham only a few days before the strike began in 
Southeast Lancashire. There were also attempts at co-operation in the Potteries, based 
on joint opposition to the New Poor Law among the Chartists and the middle class 
radicals the Ridgeways, though these did not get far. However in Wolverhampton 
Leaguers and Chartists stood on the same platform to declare in favour of the six points 
in February 1842. There was a strong Complete Suffrage Association in Leicester, 
though Cooper’s disruptive influence prevented co-operation. The ACLL was in the 
doldrums at this time. A similar situation existed in the Midlands to that in Manchester 
in the first half of 1842 where prominent Leaguers were joining the Complete Suffrage 
movement in the belief that the Chartist or Complete Suffrage platforms were gaining 
public support at the expense of the League.74
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The strongest support among the middle classes came from Joseph Sturge, the Quaker 
com factor and ‘moral radical’ in Birmingham and other leaders of the NCSU.75 Sturge 
was acquainted with the idea of a general strike as he and Baptist minister William 
Knibb had encouraged reports that a general strike of Negro apprentices would take 
place in Jamaica in 1838 while engaged in the aftermath of the abolition of slavery 
movement.76 Nevertheless the general strike did not appear to Sturge to be the best 
tactic in 1842 entailing as it already had the risk of clashes with the military and police 
and the spilling of blood. Sturgite co-operation with the strike took the form of a call for 
the parallel ‘ulterior measure’ of a tax revolt unless the Queen dismissed her ministers 
and installed those who would enact the six points.
The NCSU leadership met in their Birmingham rooms daily between 20 August and 25 
August apart from Sunday, with two more meetings on 29 and 30 August. Those 
present at some or all of the NCSU meetings were Joseph Sturge, his brother Charles 
Sturge, Henry Vincent the former Chartist orator, the middle class Nottingham radical 
Thomas Beggs, and John Collins the ‘new move’ Chartist friend of Lovett who was 
now running the Birmingham Christian Chartist Church with O’Neill. Sturge, Vincent 
and others also tried to attend O’Neill’s public meeting in Birmingham on 22 August. 
Sturge had concerted measures with the Christian Chartists in the tradition, identified by 
Briggs but doubted by Behagg, of co-operation between the middle and working class 
radicals in Birmingham. O’Neill’s placard advertising his public meeting had hinted 
that Sturge and Henry Vincent would appear.77
The main contribution of the Complete Suffragists was to attempt, not very 
successfully, to drum up middle class support for a ‘full, fair and free representation’, to 
put pressure on the government, and to moderate the strikers’ actions, by issuing 
addresses to the middle and working classes, a Alemorial to the Queen and a circular 
advertising a conference of reformers of all shades of opinion which was to take place
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on 7 September in Birmingham. These addresses were widely inserted in the liberal 
press in the Midlands. The Memorial called on the Queen to dismiss her ministers and 
appoint those who would obtain for the people a full, fair and free representation. The 
Memorial stated that if this was long withheld the result would be a complete union of 
the middle and working classes who would then after meetings and discussion by their 
representatives renounce their allegiance to the government and then would resolve not 
to obey, would refuse to serve as officials of the government, in the army, navy or 
police, and would abstain from articles of consumption which yielded a revenue to the 
state. Most importantly they would withhold taxes in a campaign of passive resistance. 
The Memorial did not suggest this would be done immediately, rather it would be the 
result if the right to a full, fair and free representation of the people continued to be 
withheld much longer, and presumably was intended to be decided on at the Conference 
called for 7 September.78
The NCSU address ‘to the middle and franchised classes’ called on them to support a 
full fair and free representation and to give a peaceable expression of their sentiments in 
favour of the political enfranchisement of the working classes.79 The address to the 
‘working and unenfranchised classes’ called on them to support the conference called 
for 7 September, and further to follow peaceful conduct to win over the middle classes, 
who could constitutionally help them as they were the enfranchised classes, and so 
capable of controlling the parliament. Alone it would be impossible for the working 
classes to gain their ends, but associated with the middle classes, the government could 
not long resist their moral, peaceful agitation. The NCSU address went on to request the 
working classes to join the Sturgites in establishing universal suffrage and the other 
points of parliamentary reform in the minds of the middle classes, by ‘resigning all
O A
hopeless contests, engaging in every peaceful effort, urging all moral means’. Despite 
co-operation with O’Neill and the Christian Chartists, this final wording in the address 
to the working classes suggests that Sturge and the middle class Complete Suffrage 
leaders were actually hinting that the workers should end the strike, at least where 
violence was likely to break out, evidence of an important difference between the 
middle and working class radicals, as O’Neill was fully in support of the strike. The
78 NCSU, To Victoria, Queen o f Great Britain (Birmingham, 1842), 1-21
79 NCSU, Address o f the Council to the Middle and Franchised Classes (Birmingham, 1842), 1-11
80 NCSU, Address o f the Council to the Working and Unenfranchised Classes (Birmingham, 1842), 1-9
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circular was forwarded to all local correspondents of the NCSU calling upon them to 
hold public meetings in their towns and localities for electing delegates to a conference 
of the middle and working classes to be held in Birmingham on 7 September, ‘for the 
purpose of devising a specific course of conduct in accordance with the principles and 
rules of the union to be pursued by the friends of the people’s rights under the peculiar 
crisis in which the country is now placed’. It was intended to sit for just one or two days 
to decide on united strategy and presumably to decide on whether to initiate the tax 
revolt.81
The most active support outside Birmingham came from the Nottingham Sturgites. Co­
operation in Nottingham between Chartists and middle class suffrage radicals continued 
with a joint meeting of the Nottingham Chartists and Sturgites on 26 August to elect 
delegates to the 7 September conference. But the proposed conference was cancelled 
on 30 August by a meeting of the council of the NCSU. Sturge, Vincent, Collins and 
Beggs were ahead of other members of complete suffrage party. Three members of the 
Council had resigned because they thought the Council was acting precipitately. 
Edward Miall, editor of The Nonconformist, the usual mouth piece of the NCSU, 
considered the conference unwise, the strike had clearly failed by the 30 August, the 
government was seen to remain unshaken, and mass arrests had taken place. On the 
previous Friday Arthur O’Neill, who had been associated with the Sturgites during the 
strike, was arrested, acting as a warning to the Council that they were at risk of getting 
their fingers burnt.83 Signs of middle class co-operation had also been present in 
Leicestershire and the Potteries. The Leicestershire middle classes gave provisions to 
the strikers. The Leaguers John and William Ridgeway in the Potteries mounted the 
platform with the Chartists on 16 August in favour of a revision of the New Poor Law. 
Among the middle classes more generally liberal newspaper editorials revealed 
sympathy over the distress but not for the strike itself. There was far more sympathy for 
the miners’ strike than for the strike for the Charter. Many among the middle classes felt
81 Nonconformist, 24 August 1842
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that the miners had real grievances over butty and truck.84
Ideology and Concept of the General Strike in the Midlands
The Midlands miners’ strike was a strike to force the masters to rescind wage 
reductions, and also to limit work hours and get rid of various oppressive injustices such 
as truck and the fraudulent weighing of coal. As such it was aimed at the masters not at 
the government, and remained aimed at the masters despite the efforts of the Chartist 
activists to try to turn the miners’ strike into a strike against the government. But the 
strike for the Charter in the Midlands, in contrast to the miners’ strike, was clearly 
aimed at the government and Parliament which had been corrupted by the aristocracy 
and its parasites. It was to bring pressure on the government to enact the Charter. The 
government was blamed for the distress, which had made a strike for the Charter 
necessary, as class legislation had emanated from a government in which the people 
were not represented so producing the New Poor Law, no repeal of the Com Laws, no 
factory legislation, no wages regulations, no laws against frame rents, high taxes, and 
unjust expensive wars in China and Afghanistan. Thus the address of the Nottingham 
Chartists presented to the magistrates on 19 August could claim that the strike had been 
provoked by ‘a departure of the government from the principles of justice and morality, 
that instead of our laws promoting peace and being respected as based upon justice, they 
have emanated from the most corrupt, arrogant and selfish principles by which mankind 
have ever been governed.’85
The enactment of the Charter would remove distress by bringing good laws, equal 
justice and a part in government for the people. Wages were low because workingmen’s 
property, their labour, was not protected by the law. A Parliament elected under the 
Charter would remedy distress by providing minimum wages legislation, ending the 
New Poor Law, continuing outdoor relief whenever necessary, legally abolishing frame 
rents, providing fixed wages scales, factory legislation, taxing machinery, and 
legislating to maintain the quality of goods being produced to end cut ups and shoddy 
work. Taxes would be reduced and there would be an end to expensive, aggressive
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foreign wars. The strategy behind the strike was that a united public opinion as 
expressed in the strike would force Parliament to enact the Six Points and then under the 
Charter an honest government would be elected. Thus the Chartist address published in 
Hanley and distributed around the Derbyshire collieries in late August argued ‘You say 
you wish for good laws, equal justice, and a part in the government; this you will never 
get, till you get the People’s Charter...Coal must not be got any more till you get the 
Charter, and the Charter has got an honest government...a good government chosen by 
the whole people, for the good of the whole. A government that will give labour 
protection, and make honest industry happy.. ,’86
The traditional enemies of the people were criticised in the strike for the Charter in the 
Midlands. The corrupt government, the aristocracy, the army, the established Church 
were all criticised, as was the corruption of the House of Commons by the aristocracy. 
The traditional language of radicalism was present in the strike. The aristocracy had 
taken over and corrupted the people’s House of Commons, so it no longer represented 
the people.87 Thus Arthur O’Neill could ask at the meeting near Dudley on 26 August 
‘What was the House of Commons composed of? Lawyers, did they care for the 
people? Of cut-throat gentlemen, the paid military, did they care for the people? Of fox 
hunting gentleman, did they care for the people?’ O’Neill considered the ‘government 
and the governed as in one large room with an air pump. When the pump was first 
applied the inconvenience was not generally felt. At last someone near the window felt 
a want of air, but on going to the window he found the Duke of Wellington with his 
great sword, ready to prevent him from opening it. He then went to another window and 
found the Archbishop of Canterbury keeping out the air with his surplice. He went to 
another window and a lawyer stopped it with this wig.’88 It was the ‘rotten House of 
Commons by which they were oppressed. All those interests which were represented in 
the government were well off: the army, the navy, the clergy, the East India Company, 
the landed interest were all represented in the government, and therefore they were well 
off, but the working classes were not represented in the Government, and therefore they 
were badly off.’89 The large capitalists, the ‘Cotton Lord’ Manchester mill owners
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whom the Midlands Chartists believed had started the strike, could be added to these 
older enemies of the people.
Some hostility to manufacturers was present in strike for the Charter in the Midlands 
but not hostility to the middle classes in general. Hostility was shown towards the large 
Southeast Lancashire capitalist mill owners. They were criticised by Chartist activists in 
the Midlands, but this criticism was based not on their role in production but rather on 
political, legal and moral grounds. The Lancashire manufacturers, particularly the 
Bayley Brothers, the League members whom the Chartist activists argued had started 
the strike, were attacked in moral terms. Firstly because their wage reductions took 
place at a time when trade was improving. Secondly they were criticised in moral terms 
because the Bayleys’ wages reductions were seen as part of a League plot to use the 
working classes for their own purposes. Clark in Nottingham on 15 August attacked the 
ACLL which he accused of starting the strike. But he said that now the people should 
strike and stay out for political power. The masters had, in one definition, left the people 
in 1832 when they were enfranchised, so they were now benefiting from class 
legislation. The problem was rooted in law and political power, the working man was at 
a disadvantage but that was to be remedied by enfranchisement so that they could also 
obtain legal protection for their property, their labour. Clark speaking at Nottingham 
declared that all the people wanted, and what they were determined to have, was 
political power, and until the labour of the working man was protected by the laws, he 
was completely at the mercy of the manufacturers.90
The masters were also criticised for lowering wages in consequence of the income tax 
forcing the working classes to pay the income tax through wage reductions. Barber and 
Clark in Nottingham on 15 August and O’Neill in Warwickshire on 13 August 
attributed the strike to the recently introduced income tax. Yet in this criticism it was 
really the government rather than the masters who were seen as the original source of 
the problem. Barber in Nottingham describing the income tax as oppressive, and now 
that the strike had been started they should stay out until they got the Charter.91 
Similarly in Leicester the unnamed Chartist delegate from South Staffordshire who 
spoke on 17 August attributed the intended reduction of wages to an attempt on the part
90 Nottingham Mercury, 19 August 1842
91 Nottingham Mercury, 19 August 1842
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of the middle class to throw the income tax from their own shoulders onto the working 
class. Yet he went on to advise the assembly that if they made a strike at all they should 
not make it against their masters but make it ‘a general strike for their rights and 
liberties.’ They saw the income tax not as a pay-off for getting rid of tariff duties in 
Peel’s budget, but rather as a means of paying for unjust foreign wars against the 
Chinese and Afghans, thus the government not the masters was ultimately to blame 
although the masters were greedily getting workmen to pay for the income tax through 
reductions. For O’Neill ‘Sir Robert Peel was a man of the most callous heart, and he 
with the Duke of Wellington, for the purpose of butchering the poor Chinese and 
Indians, must levy an income tax. Was this tax paid by the workmen? Not directly, it 
was put on the masters, and as they had to pay seven pence in the pound for income tax, 
they took six pence a day off the wages of the workmen, and so made a large profit by 
it.’93
Despite this moral criticism of the larger capitalists and distrust of the Leaguers’ 
motives most of the Midlands Chartist activists did hope for co-operation with the 
portion of the middle classes attached to suffrage reform. The strike was not aimed 
against the middle classes. The Chartist activists hoped that the middle classes would 
contribute provisions and that the manufacturers would themselves shut their factories 
and warehouses without the need for a turnout. The fourth and sixth resolutions passed 
at Loughborough on 19 August, requesting the ‘wealthy classes’ to form a committee to 
advise on the best means of supplying the wants of the people, calling for a deputation 
to be appointed to wait upon the manufacturers and masters to request them to cease to 
give out any more work, and requesting their co-operation in devising the means of 
supplying the wants of the people, a/g evidence of the desire for middle class co­
operation.94 The Nottingham Chartists’ address to the ‘magistrates, gentleman and 
tradesman of Nottingham’ demonstrated the desire of the Chartists for the co-operation 
of the middle classes, declaring that they hoped that ‘you, as men, as citizens, as 
philanthropists and Christians, will assist us in our glorious and patriotic 
undertaking.. .to render your assistance, by example and influence and help those who 
are suffering every privation in these endeavours to obtain permanent peace and
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prosperity - master manufacturers, we earnestly hope that you will close your mills and 
warehouses...with your assistance success is certain.’95 Even Thomas Cooper in his 
poster issued on his return to Leicester after the Manchester NCA Conference called for 
middle class support of the strike urging the shopkeepers to provide credit to the strikers 
following recent union of efforts when the Chartists supported Joseph Sturge at the 
Nottingham election.96 The force of Cooper’s message may have been somewhat 
reduced by the fact that earlier in the summer Cooper and his Shakespearean Chartists 
had disrupted an important Leicester Complete Suffrage Association meeting at which 
Henry Vincent was speaking. The Chartist activists made clear their belief that the 
enactment of the Charter through the strike was not a class measure intended to benefit 
only the working classes. Rather it would be in the interests of the whole people. The 
Nottingham address supported its call for the middle classes to help them carry out the 
strike with the argument that ‘as it is for the good of all, it should be supported by all.’97
The traditional radical argument that no allegiance was owed to the Government as 
Parliament had become corrupted by the aristocracy was present in the strike for the
QO
Charter. The government was a usurped government as the people were no longer 
represented by the Commons which had become dominated by the aristocracy and its 
parasites. The peaceful general strike of the whole people was a renunciation of 
allegiance to unnerve the government and Parliament and force it by a united display of 
public opinion to enact the Charter. For O’Neill the people ‘had no voice in the 
representation of the country, and no good would be effected till they had the right of 
sending members to Parliament. For his part he had declared, and now declared again, 
that he owed no allegiance to the government, for it was a usurped government.’99
In the East Midlands the Chartist strike leaders were not hoping to manoeuvre the 
government into repression to justify defensive violence. Their strategy was to make a 
moral pressure display of united public opinion through the strike which would bring 
about a loss of confidence on the part of the government and Parliament who would
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then accept the Charter, much as they believed had happened in 1832. We can see this 
idea of united public opinion being essential in Barber’s speech at Nottingham on 15 
August, ‘If the horse knew its own strength it would not suffer itself to be rode by a lad; 
so if the people knew their strength and would but unite, they would not be kept out of 
their rights, they could obtain them without having recourse to violence.’100 They 
stressed that there must be a united public opinion which the government could not 
withstand, in the words of the Staffordshire Chartist delegate at Leicester on 17 August, 
‘to show their tyrants that they could act well and decorously, that they had gained 
knowledge, and knowing that knowledge was power, they were determined to use it.’101
Almost all the Chartist activists in the East Midlands declared from the platforms that 
the strike was to be a peaceful, legal, constitutional move. There were very few threats 
of violence and the language of menace was largely absent. There were almost no calls 
to arm to resist the authorities in case of repression. The third resolution passed at 
Loughborough on 19 August recommended all persons to keep within the law and 
declared that all persons failing to do so would be considered ‘enemies of the holy 
cause.’ Likewise the Nottingham address declared that the strikers should not only 
refrain from any appeal to physical force and violence, but also maintain the public
i mpeace and hold inviolable the rights of property. At the Derby meeting on 16 August 
Moss exhorted the people to adhere to the motto of the Chartists ‘peace, law and order’ 
and pointed to a general cessation from work as a ‘safe, peaceable and practical mode’ 
of obtaining the Charter. At the same meeting West exhorted the people to be firm but 
peaceable in their determination to obtain the Charter.103 Barber at Nottingham on 15 
August when urging the people not to go to work until the Charter was the law of the 
land discountenanced any attempt at physical force.104 Duffey at the Leicester meeting 
on 17 August warned that there were to be no outbreaks or riots, it was of no advantage 
to them to destroy property, ‘they had a right legally, constitutionally and peaceably to 
destroy their own slavery, and to strike the rivets from the chains which bound them.’105 
This call for the strike to be completely peaceful was not completely universal even in
100 Nottingham Mercury, 19 August 1842
101 Leicestershire Mercury, 20 August 1842
102 PRO HO 45/254, ff. 15-16, Nottingham address, 19 August 1842
103 Derby Reporter, 18 August 1842
104 Nottingham Mercury, 19 August 1842
105 Leicestershire Mercury, 20 August 1842
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the East Midlands. The constitutional stance of calling for arming in self-defence 
against tyranny in case the police or military attacked them was talked of at the meeting 
in Leicester on 19 August after an attack by the police. Nevertheless the Chartist 
activists in the East Midlands were generally consistent in declaring that the strike was 
to be peaceful. This was true not only of those with a long term commitment to peaceful 
measures, but also those who in 1839 and 1840 had used the constitutional language of 
menace, talked of defensive violence against tyranny, asserted the right to bear arms in 
self defence, or even prepared to use violence, as in the case of Duffey who had been 
jailed for his part in the attempted Sheffield armed uprising in 1840.
In the Potteries and Black Country not all the Chartist activists were so equally 
committed to a completely peaceful strike though the majority were. Thomas Cooper 
was certainly ambivalent in his speeches in the Potteries providing an inflammatory 
sermon on the text ‘Thou shalt do no murder’ on Sunday 14 August which enflamed the 
crowd. Even so the next day he reproved the crowd for demolishing houses and while in 
the Potteries did not actually call on the people to fight, made use of the slogan ‘peace, 
law and order’, and ended with cautions against violence, keeping just within the law if 
possible. However at the Manchester NCA Conference Cooper had been far less 
ambivalent and was one of most violent delegates, expressing the idea that a general 
strike must provoke a physical contest with the authorities and declared that in the 
Potteries they were ready to fight. However from the report of the trial rather than 
Cooper’s own account it appears that Cooper placed the stress on putting on a bold front 
to show that they were prepared to fight, the essence of constitutional forcible 
intimidation. Certainly Cooper did not approve of the destruction of property whatever 
may have been his feelings about a possible confrontation with the troops.106 John 
Richards however was firmly committed to a peaceful strike for the Charter in the 
Potteries. In the Black Country George White took a hard line, with threats at meetings 
to beat the police. However O’Neill in the Black Country insisted that the strike was to 
be entirely peaceful declaring himself to be a Christian and a man of peace. O’Neill 
constantly urged peaceful behaviour, even urging the 22 August meeting to disperse 
when it was clear that the police would otherwise break it up and it would lead to a 
clash. The Black Country Chartist activists Joseph Linney and Samuel Cook who were
106 Reports o f State Trials 1839-43, New Series, vol. 4 (London, 1892), 954; Thomas Cooper, Life o f 
Thomas Cooper (London, 1873), 189-192
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concerned mainly in maintaining the miners’ wage strike also exhorted the men to be 
peaceable and the generally peaceful nature of the miners’ strike in the Black Country 
was considered by the middle class press to be due to the influence of O’Neill, Linney 
and Cook.107
In the strike the justification of the right to take part in government and the justification 
of universal suffrage was derived from a number of sources. There was a strong 
religious emphasis on Christian equity and the unchristian actions of the present 
government in contrast to the Christian government that would replace it after the 
Charter had been enacted. We can see this Christian element not only in the Christian 
Chartist O’Neill’s speeches. The Nottingham address called for the support of the 
middle classes as Christians and philanthropists. The third Loughborough resolution 
described the strike as ‘the holy cause’. An address to the colliers calling on them to 
strike for the Charter distributed throughout the Derbyshire and other mining districts in 
the second half of August in attempt to turn the East Midlands miners’ strike into a 
strike for the Charter had a strong religious emphasis. It was pitched at miners, many of 
whom were Methodists, arguing that the unchristian government was destroying the 
Chinese and that the Charter would produce a Christian government.108 In addition the 
justification from natural right was articulated in the strike in the language of a nation 
willing itself to be free.109 Thus the poster issued by the Birmingham Christian Chartist 
Church calling on the people of Birmingham to attend the 22 August meeting stated that 
‘the nation’s voice declares, in the loudest tones, the noble struggle must now be made. 
The days of tyranny are numbered...’ The French Revolution principle, derived from 
natural rights, that a nation can be free simply by declaring itself to be free was present 
in the words ‘stand forward in the nation’s moral battle and declare that our country 
shall now be free.’110
Most powerful however was the historical justification from the ancient constitution and 
constitutional rights derived from England’s past.111 There was a strong patriotic
107 Wolverhampton Chronicle, 31 August 1842
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109 E. P. Thompson, The Making o f the English Working Class (London, 1968), 84-110
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emphasis on the rights of ffeebom Englishmen. These different justifications were 
blended in an eclectic way in the strike. But when in dire need it was the argument from 
the historical English constitution which prevailed. After the 22 August meeting had 
been declared illegal and disrupted, O’Neill issued another placard declaring that they 
no longer owed allegiance due to the unconstitutional actions of the government 
banning the meeting to memorialise the Queen. In this extreme situation the resort was 
to the constitution and the historical rights of Englishmen to discuss their grievances in 
public meetings and to complain. The government in contravention of the constitution 
had prevented the meeting, through the magistrates, using the threat of physical force 
from the police to enforce its unconstitutional proceedings. O’Neill went on to declare 
that ‘if such an encroachment on the rights of Englishmen is submitted to, there will be 
no freedom for any class. The ruling power has taken away the just and constitutional 
rights of the people, and circumstances have now arisen in which the government has no 
rightful claim to our allegiance.’112
The language of class was articulated in the strike in the Midlands. There was a working 
class identity present in the Midlands strike which was the result of a mixture of 
political, economic, and social exploitation. An economically class based identity was 
present in the strike in the shared experience of low wages and deprivation. There was a 
sense of unity of manual work present in the strike. These shared experiences could 
constitute the basis of class-consciousness. However this does not need to imply that 
class conflict was present. This working class identity present was not only 
economically based but also politically based on exclusion from the elective franchise. 
However class was not the only identity expressed in the Midlands strike. Other 
collective identities articulated in speeches and resolutions during the strike in the East 
Midlands, Potteries and Black Country were those of the people, the nation and religion. 
Nevertheless other identities such as the people, nation and religion were often used in a 
way more or less reducible to a working class identity; ‘the people’ or ‘the nation’ were
Radical Memory in the Age of Revolution’, in J. Vernon, Re-reading the Constitution (Cambridge, 1996), 
22-51
112 Birmingham Journal, 27 August 1842; PRO HO 45/261, f. 65, Placard issued by the Committee of the 
Christian Chartist Church, 22 August 1842
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often equated in the same speech or resolution with the ‘working classes’ or contrasted 
with the ‘middle classes’.113
Defeat of the Strike in the Midlands
The strike for the Charter in the East Midlands was defeated by the local authorities 
making use of the special constables with assistance from the military. In accordance 
with the Royal Proclamation against unlawful assemblages the magistrates banned 
Chartist pubic meetings, essential for the organisation of the strike, and special 
constables and military were used to disperse them.114 For example the Derby 
magistrates prevented a public meeting at Holbrook Moor on 22 August, which was to 
precede a turnout procession into Derby, by occupying the field with hundreds of 
special constables, yeomanry and dragoons.115 In Leicester on 19 August at the ‘Battle 
of Mowmaker Hill’ the magistrates and police dispersed 1500 persons at Belgrave who 
were attempting to hold a public meeting and in the evening a meeting of 12,000 people 
was dispersed.116 Arrests often accompanied the dispersal of meetings. For example at 
the ‘Battle of Mapperly Plains’ outside Nottingham on 23 August 375 turnouts mainly 
from the industrial villages were arrested by the county police assisted by the military 
and although most were released over the next few days the mass arrest took the heart 
out of the strike with the men first in Nottingham and then in the industrial villages
117gradually returning to work. No more public meetings took place in Leicester after 
prisoners were brought over from Loughborough on the night of 22 August although 
many remained on strike especially in the surrounding industrial villages until August 
27.118
The turnout processions in the East Midlands, without which the strike could not 
maintain itself, were also declared illegal and the military and special constables were
113 Nottingham Mercury, 19, 26 August 1842; Wolverhampton Chronicle, 31 August 1842; Birmingham 
Journal, 27 August 1842; North Staffordshire Mercury, 20 August 1842; Northern Star, 20, 27 August, 
1842
114 Leicestershire Mercury, 20,27 August 1842
115 PRO HO 45/244, ff. 44-45, Mayor of Derby to HO, 20 August 1842; Northern Star, 27 August 1842
116 Leicestershire Mercury, 20 August 1842; Northern Star, 27 August 1842; PRO HO 45/250, ff. 108- 
109, Mayor of Leicester to HO, 22 August 1842
117 PRO HO 45/254, ff. 36-37, Mayor of Nottingham to HO, 24 August 1842; Nottingham Review, 2 
September 1842; Nottingham Mercury, 19,26 August 1842
118 PRO HO 45/250, ff. 108-109, Mayor of Leicester to HO, 22 August 1842; Northern Star, 27 August 
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used to break them up. For example on 22 August special constables dispersed a
procession in Loughborough itself and one which tried to go from Loughborough to
Mountsorrel to turn out the framework knitters there with five men being arrested.119
These tactics led on 25 August to the whole of the working men in Loughborough with
few exceptions returning to their labour though the men in the villages surrounding
Loughborough stayed out until 27 August.120 On 22 August the Derby magistrates
prevented the turnout procession to Derby by ordering the cavalry to gallop among the
people forcing them to retreat. The defeat of this crucial procession into Derby crippled
1 1the strike in South Derbyshire. In Nottingham patrols of police under the direction of 
the magistrates attempted to interrupt the progress of the turnout processions.122 In the 
East Midlands, with the help of troops, the local authorities never completely lost 
control of the situation, partly because the strike for the Charter appeared later there so 
the authorities were better prepared and partly because it was far more peaceful in 
nature than the strike in the Potteries and Black Country.
In the Potteries, which was the first district in the Midlands to experience the strike for
the Charter, the local authorities at first lost control. Home Secretary Sir James Graham
10^was very concerned about the Potteries outbreak. It was only the intervention of the 
regular military which enabled a reassertion of authority. The military had been 
withdrawn in early August allowing the miners’ strike in the Potteries to restart. The 
forces available on 15 August were completely inadequate to disperse the crowds. 
Bailey Rose, the stipendary magistrate, virtually abandoned the district to the crowds on 
the night of 15 August. The authorities reasserted control on 16 August when the 
military under Major Powys fired into a crowd of over 8000 people in Burslem Market 
Place, killing at least one person, and the cavalry roughly cleared the Market Place and 
streets. This effectively put an end to the strike for the Charter and the presence of large 
numbers of military in the district deterred any more turnout processions or meetings
119 Leicestershire Mercury, 27 August 1842; Nottingham Mercury, 26 August 1842
120 Nottingham Review, 2 September 1842
121 Northern Star, 27 August 1842
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from taking place after Tuesday 16 August although the return to work did not take 
place until the following Monday or later.124
Sir James Graham felt more reassured from 19 August although the planned 
Birmingham meetings called by O’Neill and White for 22 and 23 August were causes of 
concern nationally.125 The Birmingham Police Commissioner’s force was increased in 
size; the Mayor and magistrates of Birmingham banned public meetings; the Dragoon 
Guards were reinforced with extra infantry, cavalry and two cannons; the military 
pensioners and special constables were called out; and the grounds where the meetings 
of O’Neill and White were to take place were occupied with police in advance.126 
O’Neill called on his meeting to disperse when it became clear that otherwise the police 
would be used to break it up and over the following week the special constables 
dispersed a number of meetings called by George White and made great efforts to arrest 
him.127 In the Black Country the police and yeomanry were used to protect miners who 
wanted to work, to prevent forcible intimidation and in the later stages of the strike to 
disperse large assemblies. However the authorities showed some sympathy to the 
miners. Sir James Graham and Sir Robert Peel both held the masters responsible for the 
strike to some extent for reducing wages at a time of improvement in trade. Peel and 
Graham were both especially sympathetic to the miners’ grievances and realised that 
they suffered from real injustices. While the strike was still in progress Peel suggested 
to Graham that a commission should be set up to enquire into the miners’ grievances 
which resulted in the Midland Mining Commission report condemning the truck and 
butty systems and other injustices. Lord Powis in Shropshire was privately 
sympathetic to the miners’ grievances and exerted pressure on the coed masters to 
remedy them. In the Black Country a number of the middle classes tried to arrange a 
mediating conference between the coal masters and men in September although the coal 
masters proved reluctant to compromise.129
124 Old Potter (Charles Shaw), When I  was a Child (Stoke, 1903), 169-171; PRO HO 45/260, f. 271, 
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The magistrates further defeated the strike by arresting the Chartist activists who were 
leading it thus removing the strike leadership. At Loughborough John Skevington was 
arrested and tried on 20 August for his part in the Friday evening meeting and bound 
over with recognisances and sureties. A warrant was also put out for Charles Jarret of 
Loughborough and he gave himself up on 25 August and was tried next day.130 In the 
Potteries John Richards was arrested. William Ellis was arrested in Glasgow, where he 
had escaped following the shootings in Burslem Market Place, having been marked 
down for a charge of High Treason. Thomas Cooper was arrested after his return to 
Leicester. In Birmingham and the Black Country Arthur O’Neill was arrested on 26 
August. George White was also arrested the same day after having evaded the police for 
a week. Joseph Linney of Bilston and Samuel Cook of Dudley, who had continued to 
help organise the strike over miners’ grievances, were also arrested. Where warrants 
were issued but the activists escaped this was just as effective in removing the Chartist 
leaders of the strike. In Nottingham warrants were out for the arrest of Thomas Clark 
and E. P. Mead, who both escaped, thus removing two of the main strike leaders.131
This was followed up by the magistrates making difficulties over accepting Chartist 
sympathisers as sureties for bail thus keeping the activists in prison for some time 
although they had not been tried so that they could not take any further part in the strike. 
The magistrates made difficulties over accepting John Skevington’s recognisances and 
he was taken in custody to Leicester until Monday when his sureties were finally 
accepted, thus taking him out of action over a crucial weekend. In the Black County the 
magistrates refused to accept radicals as sureties for bail for White and O’Neill who 
were thus kept in prison for a number of weeks until the Black Country miners’ strike 
had collapsed.132
In conclusion the strike for the People’s Charter in the Midlands was an attempt by local 
Chartist activists to revive the ‘ulterior measures’ of the Chartist mass platform 
agitation in the face of the generally cautious policy of the national leadership, 
following the news of the strike in Manchester. It was the putting into practice of the
130 PRO HO 45/250, ff. 91-100, W. M. Philips to HO, 20 August 1842; Leicestershire Mercury, 27 
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abandoned 1839 general strike or ‘sacred month’, but this time by the activists in the 
localities rather than by the national leadership. In 1839 the localities had been 
unprepared for the ‘sacred month’ and the National Convention had thus cancelled it. 
However in August 1842 local Chartist activists themselves attempted the National 
Holiday after hearing the news of the strike in the Northwest. In the Midlands the 
strikes were not simply a spontaneous reaction to the news of the strike in Manchester. 
The strike for the People’s Charter in these places was announced and organised at 
public meetings by Chartist activists. The example of the strike in the Northwest had 
shown it was possible to get a widespread general strike overcoming the obvious 
reluctance to leave off work if it seemed likely others would not follow. The strike for 
the Charter in the Midlands was organised by local Chartist activists not by trade 
societies. The highly political and organised nature of the strike outside the Northwest 
has been obscured to some extent because the miners’ strike over wage grievances was 
going on earlier and simultaneously in the Midlands with Chartists helping to organise 
it. The strike in the East Midlands was from the start a strike for the Charter. It was in 
no way spontaneous, being launched by the local Chartist activists in response to the 
news from Manchester, with co-ordination from the Chartist delegates meeting at 
Loughborough. East Midlands Chartist activists proposed, built up support for, and then 
launched the strike for the Charter from the local platforms at the public meetings in the 
towns between 15 August and 19 August. The speakers at these public meetings were 
all Chartist activists. From the earliest of these meetings resolutions were passed stating 
that a strike would take place at the end of the week and that the aim would be the 
Charter. The resolutions put by the Chartist activists from the platforms at the public 
meetings in the East Midlands were for a strike for the People’s Charter. This contrasts 
with the strike in the Black Country and Potteries where the miners’ strike was of far 
greater significance than the miners’ wage strike in the East Midlands.
As we have seen, there were two strike movements going on in the Black Country and 
Potteries. Firstly the miners’ strike which began over miners’ wage reductions and 
secondly the strike for the Charter which was launched in the Potteries but failed to take 
place in the Black Country. In the Black Country and the Potteries Chartist activists had 
helped to organise the miners’ wage strike in June and July. In the Potteries and the 
Black Country these Chartist activists attempted to change the nature and extend the 
already existing miners’ industrial strike in response to the news of the Chartist strike in
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Manchester. In the Potteries the Chartist activists did change the aim of strike and 
extended it to the potters though the strike atypically degenerated immediately into 
serious destruction of property. This was unsuccessful in the Black Country and 
Birmingham. In the Black Country Chartist activists pursued three strategies. Firstly to 
continue the Black Country miners’ strike in order to immobilise industry by lack of 
fuel throughout the Midlands to force other trades to leave work. Secondly to launch a 
strike for the Charter in Birmingham among all the working classes. Thirdly to 
transform the Black Country miners’ strike into a strike for the Charter as well as for 
wages. Debate in the historiography has focused on the third strategy but the Chartist 
activists concentrated on the first two strategies as they realised that the miners were 
among the least receptive of the working classes to the Chartist argument. Birmingham 
did not strike and the Black Country miners never changed their aim to the Charter. The 
strike was too associated with miners’ grievances in the Black Country, Warwickshire, 
Shropshire and Worcestershire for other trades to join in.
While the Midlands miners’ wage strike was aimed at the masters, the strike for the 
Charter in the Midlands was designed to bring pressure on the government to enact the 
Charter. The government was blamed for distress, which had made a strike for the 
Charter necessary as class legislation had emanated from a government in which the 
people were not represented. The Charter would remove distress by providing fair laws, 
equal justice, a role in government for the people, and would protect their property, that 
is their labour, like all other forms of property. The strategy behind the strike was that a 
united public opinion as expressed in the strike would force Parliament to enact the 
Charter and then an honest government would be elected. The traditional enemies of the 
people were criticised in the strike for the Charter. The corrupt government, the 
aristocracy, the army, the established Church, and the corruption of the House of 
Commons by the aristocracy were all criticised. The master manufacturers were 
criticised for lowering wages in consequence of the income tax and for provoking a 
strike in the Northwest to secure the repeal of the Com Laws at the expense of the 
workers. But the Chartist activists in the Midlands hoped for the co-operation of the 
industrious middle classes in the strike. The Chartist activists believed that the 
enactment of the Charter through the strike was not a class measure intended to benefit 
only the working classes. The traditional radical argument that no allegiance was owed 
to the Government as the aristocracy had corrupted Parliament was used. In general the
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Chartist strike leaders were not hoping to manoeuvre the government into repression to 
justify defensive violence. They hoped that the united moral pressure of public opinion 
as demonstrated in the strike would destroy the nerve of the government and Parliament 
who would then have to agree to the Charter. Almost all the Chartist activists in the East 
Midlands declared that the strike was to be a peaceful, legal, and constitutional move. In 
the Black Country and Potteries not all the Chartist activists were committed to a 
peaceful strike but the majority were. The strike was generally peaceful in the East 
Midlands where the aim of the strike was clearly for the Charter though the activists had 
not got complete control over the rank and file. But this contrasts with the serious 
destruction of property and violence in the Potteries where the strike for the Charter had 
less firm roots. The strike for the Charter in the Midlands was successfully defeated by 
the magistrates banning and dispersing public strike meetings and turnout processions 
with the help of the special constables, yeomanry and regular military. There was 
therefore no failure of nerve which might have helped perpetuate strike action.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE STRIKE FOR THE CHARTER IN YORKSHIRE
In Yorkshire the 1842 strike for the Charter took place throughout the West Riding 
textile district stretching from the borders of Lancashire in the west to Leeds in the east, 
and from the Huddersfield neighbourhood in the south to the Skipton neighbourhood in 
the north. In addition there were meetings at Barnsley and Sheffield further south in the 
West Riding. The strike in the West Riding was organised and led by local Chartist 
activists from the local platforms after receiving the news of the strike for the Charter in 
the Northwest. Operatives from Lancashire went on procession to Todmorden and 
Huddersfield on Friday 12 and Saturday 13 August. Organisation by the local Yorkshire 
Chartist activists began on 12 August, the strike was launched from local platforms in 
Bradford, Halifax and Dewsbury from Monday 15 August, and the enactment of the 
Charter was the aim from the start. Turnout processions pulled the boiler plugs and cut 
the dams of mills and brought out both hand and mill workers, artisans and labourers in 
Bradford, Halifax, Dewsbury, the outskirts of Leeds, Skipton, Keighley and the 
industrial villages surrounding the towns. The return to work took place from Thursday 
18 August in the large towns with the surrounding districts on strike for about one week 
longer. The Charter remained the aim of the strike throughout.
The strike in Yorkshire has been curiously neglected in the historiography. It has 
received far less attention from historians than has the strike in the Northwest. Brief 
narrative accounts of the strike in Bradford, Halifax and Leeds have been provided by 
Wright, Dalby and Webster, and Harrison. When examining the strike in the Leeds 
neighbourhood Harrison ignored the political demands of the strikers and attributed the 
strike to hunger. Webster suggested that the strike in Halifax was merely over wages 
rather than for the Charter. However Wright was more willing to recognise Chartist 
leadership and Chartist aims in the strike in Bradford. In general monographs on 
popular radicalism and Chartism the strike in Yorkshire is normally neglected and often 
cursorily portrayed as being simply spread by the turnouts from the Northwest. Personal 
recollections of the strike are also available in the nineteenth century autobiographies 
and oral histories of Francis Grundy, Benjamin Wilson, Joseph Lawson and Frank Peel.
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In these personal recollections the intimate connection made by the strikers between 
political rights and protection for the labour, between the Charter and wages, was more 
widely recognised than has been the case in the historiography.1
No previous attempt has been made to look at the strike in the West Riding as a whole 
rather than in individual towns in isolation. The political nature of the strike and 
whether its aim was the Charter has been largely ignored for most of the West Riding. 
The role which the local Chartist activists played in organising the strike and their links 
with the strike in the Northwest have been similarly neglected. No attention has been 
given to the popular conception of the strike in Yorkshire and the ideology that was 
articulated by the Yorkshire strikers. The chapter will examine these issues amongst 
others. The importance of the strike for the Charter in Yorkshire will be emphasised 
furthering the argument that the 1842 strike was the highpoint, in terms of its threat to 
the state, of the Chartist movement.
Industrial and Political Background
Textiles, including factory and domestic production, was the dominant industry in the 
West Riding. In 1841 at least 40% of all males over twenty-years in Halifax parish and 
51% in the Horton area near Bradford were factory operatives or domestic hand- 
workers. In Leeds 37% of the entire workforce were employed in textiles in 1841. 
Halifax parish and town was an area of mixed industries with seventy-one cotton mills, 
sixty-three woollen mills, eighty worsted mills, and seven silk mills, employing at least
■j
13579 hands. It was a market for wool and worsteds. Bradford parish and town was the 
centre of the worsted industry with 153 mills in 1838 of which 142 were worsted mills. 
In Bradford parish at least 11,675 were employed in textile factories in 1838. Bradford
1 G. R. Dalby, ‘The Chartist Movement in Halifax and District’, Transactions o f the Halifax Antiquarian 
Society (1956), 99-101; E. Webster, ‘Chartism in the Calder Valley’, Transactions o f the Halifax 
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(Bradford, 1987), 27-37; J. F. C. Harrison, ‘Chartism in Leeds’, in A. Briggs (ed.), Chartist Studies 
(London, 1959), 90-91; D. Wright, Popular Radicalism (London, 1988), 128; Joseph Lawson, Progress in 
Pudsey (Stanningley, 1887); F. H. Grundy, Pictures o f the Past (London, 1879), 95-105; Frank Peel, The 
Risings o f the Luddites, Chartists and Plug Drawers (Heckmondwike, 1895), 329-345; Frank Peel, Spen 
Valley, Past and Present (Heckmondwike, 1893), 324-5; Benjamin Wilson, ‘The Struggles of an Old 
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was the chief market for worsteds. Huddersfield parish and township specialised in 
woollens with 106 mills in 1838, of which 100 were woollen mills, employing at least 
3428 hands. Huddersfield was the market for fancy woollens. Leeds was the 
commercial centre and market for the wool trade although Leeds town and parish had 
106 woollen mills, thirteen worsted mills, forty-four flax mills and two silk mills in 
1838 employing 18,432 hands. Dewsbury parish and town specialised in woollen 
manufacture with twenty-nine mills in 1838, including twenty-five woollen mills, with 
1527 hands. Dewsbury was the market for blankets. Keighley and Bingley parishes 
concentrated mainly in worsted mills although each had some cotton mills. There were 
in Keighley forty-three mills employing 2323 hands and twenty-three mills in Bingley 
employing 1777 hands. Batley, Birstal and Calverley parishes concentrated mainly on 
woollen mills although there were also some worsted mills in Calverley and Birstal. 
Batley Parish had twenty-one woollen mills with 1332 hands, Birstal had forty-four 
mills with 2213 hands and Calverley had twenty-five mills with 2109 hands.4 The 
number of mills can be taken as approximately accurate.5 In 1838 the average sizes of 
woollen and worsted steam-powered factories and water-powered mills were far smaller 
than the size of Lancashire cotton factories. In 1841 57% of Lancashire cotton factories 
employed more than one hundred hands and 13% employed more than four hundred 
hands.6 In contrast Yorkshire woollen mills employed an average of only forty-eight 
hands, worsted mills an average of only seventy-six hands and Yorkshire cotton mills an 
average of eighty-two hands. Briggs argued that in towns with smaller units of 
production there was less class conflict between masters and men than in towns with 
larger units of production. This might suggest that there would be less class conflict in 
the West Riding towns than in the Southeast Lancashire cotton towns. West Riding 
woollen and worsted mills and factories were certainly on average far smaller in size 
than cotton mills in Lancashire. However Behagg has disputed Briggs’ postulate 
arguing persuasively instead that there was a significant amount of class conflict in the
4 ‘Returns Relating to Factories’, PP (1839), XLII, 274-288; ‘Reports From Assistant Handloom 
Commissioners’, PP (1840), XXIII, 527
5 D. T. Jenkins, ‘The Validity of the Factory Returns 1833-50’, Textile History, IV (1973)
6 V. A. C. Gatrell, ‘Labour, Power and Size of Firms in the Lancashire Cotton Industry’, Economic 
History Review, XXX (1977), 98, Table lb
7 ‘Returns Relating to Factories’, PP (1839), XLII, 293
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small units of production. The increased intensity of work and declining opportunities 
of journeymen workers to become masters produced tension between masters and men.8
In the West Riding adult male workers were a small minority in the factories 
particularly in worsteds. In 1838 in the worsted mills only 6.9% of the hands were adult 
males. 17.8% were adult females, 19.3% were males under twenty-one years and a 
massive 56% were females under twenty-one years. Adult male workers were also a 
small minority in the West Riding cotton mills where only 17.2% of the hands were 
adult males. 19.3% were adult females, 25.3% were males under twenty-one years and 
38.2% were females under twenty-one years. In West Riding woollen mills in 1838 of 
the hands employed: 32.6% were adult males, 7.6% were adult females, 35.5% were 
males under twenty-one years, and 24.3% were females under twenty-one years.9 The 
potential for militancy among factory workers was limited, in for example Leeds, where 
the proportion of women and child workers was high.
In 1842 there were still large numbers of impoverished hand-workers in the woollen, 
worsted and flax industries of the West Riding. Power loom weaving had made very 
little advance in woollens and although it had progressed further in the worsted industry 
there were still large numbers of hand worsted weavers in 1842. Wool combing in the 
worsted sectors was still largely unmechanised.10 These impoverished textile hand­
workers formed a very large proportion of the working populations in the industrial 
villages and out townships of the West Riding. In 1839 there were about 1800 
handlooms in Keighley, about 1600 in Bingley, about 1200 handlooms in Haworth, and 
1768 handlooms in Horton in 1840. There were at least 1^844 worsted handlooms in a 
ten-mile radius of Bradford.11 In the clothing district around Leeds, that is the borough 
and the clothing villages in a ten-mile radius, there were at least 1029 woollen
17handlooms in 1839. The great number of remaining hand textile workers and the 
relatively lower proportion of factory workers than in Lancashire was of significance. It
8 A, Briggs (ed.), Chartist Studies (London, 1959), 1-7; C. Behagg, ‘An Alliance with the Middle Class’, 
in J. Epstein and D. Thompson (eds.), The Chartist Experience (London, 1982), 59-86
9 ‘Returns Relating to Factories’, PP (1839), XLII, 275
10 M. T. Wild, ‘The Yorkshire Wool Textile Industry’ in G. J. Jenkins (ed.), The Wool Textile Industry in 
Britain (London, 1972), 185-234; P. Hudsoa The Genesis o f Industrial Capital: A Study o f  the West 
Riding Wool Textile Industry (Cambridge, 1986), 41-45; T. Koditschek, Class Formation and Urban 
Industrial Society: Bradford 1750-1850 (Cambridge, 1990), 351-365
11 ‘Reports From Assistant Handloom Commissioners’, PP (1840), XXIII, 558, 587
12 ‘Reports From Assistant Handloom Commissioners’, PP (1840), XXIII, 528
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meant there were thousands of hand workers with no hope of future improvement from 
mechanisation, whose only hope of a better future lay in legislation and political 
change, and so the Charter. In comparison factory workers might look forward to 
increased prosperity resulting from further mechanisation.
The heavy dependence of the West Riding on textiles meant that the general depression 
in all branches of the industry in 1842 caused widespread suffering. In the opinion of R. 
J. Saunders, the Factory Inspector, the distress of the ‘labouring classes’ in the 
manufacturing districts in the first half of 1842 was ‘great and unprecedented’ though 
until recently it had not been as bad in the West Riding as in Lancashire or Glasgow. In 
the West Riding there was a general depression in all branches of manufacture, only 
flax had been exempt, but by Autumn 1842 flax was also suffering in the general 
depression. Cotton was the worst affected branch of trade.13 The wool industry was also 
in a very bad condition. The worsted industry was suffering badly though not as badly 
as wool or cotton. In the worsted trade at Bradford wages were falling and several 
worsted manufactures were working short time or only using part of their machinery. 
Hand woolcombers and handloom weavers in Bradford were suffering from very 
serious unemployment. The wool trade in Leeds was bad and this had a knock on effect 
on other trades. Distress was severe in Halifax with 8531 persons receiving outdoor 
relief in the quarter ending 25 June compared to 3704 in 1838. Unemployment and 
partial employment was affecting, amongst others, the hand loom weavers, with the 
Riponden Chartist Association blaming this in their district on Ackroyd’s introduction 
of power looms.14
The West Riding artisans had first become involved in radicalism under the impetus of 
the French Revolution with the forming of the Sheffield Constitutional Society in 1791, 
composed in the main of small masters and journeymen artisans, calling for universal 
suffrage, annual Parliaments and equal electoral districts. The ‘Black Lamp’ agitation 
came to light in 1801 and in 1811/12 the West Riding was one of the centres of 
Luddism, mixing industrial and political grievances. After the end of the Napoleonic 
Wars the West Riding was a centre of the revived constitutional mass platform agitation 
under the leadership of Henry ‘Orator’ Hunt, committed to universal suffrage, vote by
13 ‘Factory Inspectors Reports’, PP (1842), XII, 473; Bradford Observer, 4 August 1842
14 Bradford Observer, 7 July, 4 August 1842; Northern Star, 6 August 1842
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ballot, and annual elections. Attempted armed risings had taken place near Huddersfield 
at Folly Hall in 1817 to coincide with the Pentridge uprising and at Grange Moor near 
Barnsley in 1820 to coincide with the strike and uprising in Glasgow. The towns of the 
West Riding had provided strong support for the Reform Bill agitation, with the 
working class radicals of Yorkshire being gravely disappointed by the failure of the 
middle classes to help them gain their political rights. In 1830s the West Riding was a 
centre of the War of the Unstamped, the Ten Hour movement and then of the Anti-Poor 
Law agitation. Many of the Chartist activists had been active in the Factory and Anti- 
Poor Law movements before these merged into the Chartist movement. The West 
Riding was a stronghold of Feargus O’Connor, the most important national leader of 
Chartism, and until at least 1840 it had a strong tradition of physical force Chartism. 
After the failure of the attempted armed risings in Yorkshire in January 1840 at 
Bradford, Sheffield, Barnsley and Dewsbury, following Parliament’s rejection in 1839 
of the first national petition, West Riding Chartists concentrated on organisation in the 
shape of the National Charter Association (NCA). After Lancashire the West Riding 
towns were the strongest centres of support for the Anti-Corn Law League (ACLL) and 
by the summer of 1842 Joseph Sturge’s National Complete Suffrage Union (NCSU) 
was building up support. There were always radicals ready to make a cross class 
alliance such as the flax mill owner William Garth Marshall at Leeds and Henry 
Hodgson, a Chartist activist and leader of the strike in Bradford, who gravitated towards 
the Complete Suffrage movement.15
Chartism was flourishing in the West Riding in early August 1842 despite Parliament’s 
rejection of the second Nation Petition in May. There were frequent meetings of NCA 
localities and districts, Chartist camp meetings, other public meetings, Chartist sermons 
and Chartist lectures. The NCA organisation of districts and localities had grown strong 
in the West Riding by August 1842.16 The town Chartist associations were strong and
15 E. P. Thompson, The Making o f the English Working Class (London, 1968), 163-4; J. T. Ward, The 
Factory Movement (London, 1962), 1-253; S. Weaver, John Fielden and the Politics o f Popular 
Radicalism (Oxford, 1987), 1-320; John Knott, Popular Opposition to the 1834 Poor Law (London, 
1985), 1-276; N. Edsall, The Anti-Poor Law Movement 1834-44 (Manchester, 1971), 45-231; D. 
Thompson, The Chartists (London, 1986), 1-119; J. Epstein, The Lion o f  Freedom (London, 1984), 138- 
262; M. I. Thomis and P. Holt, Threats o f Revolution in Britain, 1789-1848 (London, 1977), 1-99; A. 
Peacock, Bradford Chartism 1838-40 (York, 1969), 9-46; D. G. Wright, The Chartist Risings in Bradford 
(Bradford, 1987), 4-11; G. R. Dalby, ‘The Chartist Movement in Halifax and District’, Transactions o f 
the Halifax Antiquarian Society (1956), 99
16 G. R. Dalby, ‘The Chartist Movement in Halifax and District’, Transactions o f the Halifax Antiquarian 
Society (1956), 99
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active in Halifax, Bradford, Huddersfield, Sheffield and Leeds. Meetings of the town 
associations were held at least once a week. NCA branches were strong in the 
surrounding industrial villages of the West Riding such as Horton. The large towns such 
as Halifax formed the centres of NCA districts which were vigorous and holding at last 
monthly meetings with delegates from the Chartist Associations in the surrounding
1 7industrial villages. Chartist lecturers were busy in the West Riding in June, July and 
early August 1842. Chartist camp meetings were a weekly occurrence throughout the 
West Riding. Many open-air public meetings were held each week, particularly on 
Sundays, in the large towns and surrounding industrial villages when activists explained 
Chartist principles. Chartist sermons for Samuel Holberry, who had been imprisoned for 
his part in the Sheffield rising of 1840 and had died in June 1842 due to the harshness of 
his imprisonment, were popular in July and early August. The local NCA localities in 
the West Riding maintained communications with each other by correspondence and in 
person.18
Local support for Chartism is demonstrated by the enthusiastic response to Feargus 
O’Connor’s lecture tour in the West Riding in July.19 The large number of Yorkshire 
people who signed the second National Petition for the Charter in early 1842 suggests 
strong support for Chartism. There were 36,000 signatures from the Halifax area and
26,000 from the Bradford area.20 The numbers who supported Chartism were far greater 
than the formal membership of the NCA however new members were being enrolled in 
the NCA at this time.21 The Chartists were providing leadership for the working classes 
in their communities in the summer of 1842. For example at Halifax in June a meeting 
of the unemployed was held in the Chartist Rooms to consider how to relieve distress
77and of course to insist that the Charter was the remedy. The chapter will show that the 
Chartist activists continued to provide this leadership during the strike.
17 Northern Star, 18 June, 6 August 1842
18 Northern Star, 18 June, 6 August 1842
19 Bradford Observer, 14,28 July 1842
20 E. Webster, ‘Chartism in the Calder Valley’, Transactions o f the Halifax Antiquarian Society, vol. 2., 
new series, (1994), 61; D. G. Wright, The Chartist Risings in Bradford (Bradford, 1987), 28
21 Northern Star, 6 August 1842
22 Northern Star, 18 June 1842
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Origins, Aims and Leadership
There was no long-term plan for a strike in Yorkshire. The manufacturer and Leaguer 
Edward Ackroyd warned Sir Robert Peel in late July that the purpose of a Chartist 
meeting on Blackstone Edge on 17 July with 15,000 Chartists present from both 
Lancashire and Yorkshire and banners displayed bearing words such as ‘bread or blood’ 
was to consider whether to resort to violent measures for the gaining of the Charter.23 
However in fact this was merely a joint Lancashire and Yorkshire Chartist camp
OAmeeting. Nevertheless there was shorter term advance planning of the strike in 
Yorkshire by local West Riding Chartist activists. The West Riding activists, following 
the success of the Southeast Lancashire Chartist activists in bringing large numbers out 
on strike for the Charter, attempted from local platforms to revive the general strike or 
‘sacred month’ ulterior measure. Local Chartists and others were well aware of strikes 
and demonstrations in other parts of the country due to the extensive reporting which 
the strikes received in the local press and delegates were sent to the Yorkshire towns 
from turnout meetings at Rochdale and Todmorden on 12 August. Yorkshire Chartists 
can be seen to have planned a strike in the West Riding from the time they knew of the 
strike for the Charter in Lancashire. They were involved in the Manchester trades 
conferences on 12 August before the Lancashire turnouts had gone further than to turn 
out Todmorden on the borders of Yorkshire and Lancashire. The Chartists of Bradford 
had been holding regular meetings from 10 August onwards after hearing the news of 
the strike in Lancashire and they sent Henry Hodgson, a leading local Chartist and 
woolcomber, on a deputation to Manchester.25 Hodgson was present in Manchester at 
the conference of the ‘various trades and mill-hands’ on the morning of 12 August, 
which described itself as being composed of ‘delegates representing various trades of 
Manchester and its vicinity, with delegates from various parts of Lancashire and 
Yorkshire’, and which passed two resolutions, the first attacking class legislation and 
declaring the Charter to be the remedy, and the second calling for a general strike for 
the Charter. Hodgson was also present at the conference of the ‘mechanics, engineers, 
millwrights, moulders and smiths’, held on the afternoon of 12 August in Manchester,
23 Bradford Observer, 28 July 1842
24 Northern Star, 6 August 1842
23 Bradford Observer, 18 August 1842; Northern Star, 20 August 1842
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where Hodgson declared that, ‘the people of Bradford will not strike for wages’ but 
‘they are quite willing to strike for the Charter.’
The organising of the strike by local Chartist activists as an ulterior measure of the 
constitutional mass platform agitation from local platforms was carried out between 12 
and 15 August. On 13 August at Bradford and Halifax and on 15 August at Dewsbury 
placards were posted up and the bellmen announced Chartist public meetings to take 
into consideration what steps should be taken. The local Chartist leaders met privately 
to organise the public meetings.27 Six important public meetings were held at which the 
strike for the Charter was advocated: two meetings in Bradford on Sunday 14 August 
followed by one the next morning, one in Halifax on the morning of 15 August, and two 
in Dewsbury on the evening of 15 August and the morning of 16 August.28 The strike 
was actually launched by the speakers from the meetings at Bradford and Halifax on the 
morning of the 15 August and at Dewsbury on the morning of the 16 August. The 
Bradford operatives struck and marched to Halifax turning out the mills on the way. 
They were met at Halifax by the Halifax people and by the turnouts from Todmorden 
and Hebden Bridge who had marched to Halifax, which was turned out.29
The eight named speakers at the six meetings were all local Chartist leaders. At 
Bradford the five speakers were James Ibbotson, cap maker, John W. Smyth, 
shoemaker, George Fletcher, woolcomber, John Arran, newsagent, and Henry Hodgson, 
woolcomber. All were present or past officers of the Bradford NCA locality. At 
Halifax the speaker was Benjamin Rushton of Ovenden, a fancy hand-loom weaver and 
former Methodist New Connection preacher, who had been involved in radicalism since 
1816, was active in the Anti-Poor Law and Factory movements, and was a strong 
O’Connorite. At Dewsbury the two speakers were the Chartist activist James Henry 
Dewhirst of Bradford, and Harland Coultas from York, who was engaged as a Chartist
26 Northern Star, 13 August 1842
27 Leeds Mercury, 20 August 1842; Halifax Guardian, 20 August 1842; Bradford Observer, 18 August 
1842
28 Halifax Guardian, 20 August 1842; Northern Star, 15 January 1842; Wakefield Journal, 19 August 
1842
29 Halifax Guardian, 20 August 1842; Northern Star, 15 January 1842
30 Halifax Guardian, 20 August 1842; Northern Star, 15 January 1842
123
lecturer at Dewsbury.31
In the Northwest strike Mather and Sykes had argued firstly that local Chartists 
provided leadership for the strike at its inception but did not try to impose the aim of the 
Charter, and secondly that the aim for the Charter came from the grassroots strikers a 
few days after the strike had begun rather than from the local Chartist leaders who were 
supposedly more concerned with a wage strike.32 This situation did not arise in the West 
Riding because the strike in Yorkshire was for the Charter from the start without the 
few days hiatus which Mather believed occurred in Lancashire and all the local Chartist 
strike leaders in Yorkshire were firmly for the Charter as the aim of the strike from the 
start. The eight named Yorkshire Chartist speakers all advocated the Charter as the aim 
of the strike at the six meetings in Bradford, Halifax and Dewsbury; and the resolutions 
they proposed were all for a strike with the principal aim of the Charter. Indeed the 
placards announcing the meeting at Bradford also contained the two resolutions passed 
at the conferences in Manchester on 12 August. The resolutions proposed by the 
Chartists activists at the public meetings at Bradford on 14 August and on the morning 
of 15 August were for a strike for the Charter. The resolutions proposed by Rushton at 
the Halifax meeting on the morning of 15 August were for a strike with the principal 
aim of the Charter and also the wages of 1840.34
It is therefore misguided to view the strike in Yorkshire simply as spread by turnout 
processions from Lancashire. The Yorkshire Chartists were themselves crucial for 
starting the strike in Yorkshire. It was the news of the strike for the Charter in 
Lancashire rather than the actual presence of turnouts from Lancashire which was of 
most importance. It is true that there was a deliberate attempt to spread the strike from 
Lancashire into the West Riding with the Lancashire turnouts taking the strike from 
Rochdale to adjacent parts of the West Riding on 12 August and delegates were sent to 
the Yorkshire towns to get support for the strike. However it was only in Todmorden
31 Wakefield Journal, 19 August 1842; Halifax Guardian, 20 August 1842
32 F. C. Mather, ‘The General Strike of 1842’, in R. Quinault and J. Stevenson (eds.), Popular Protest and 
Public Order (London, 1974), 121; R. Fyson, ‘The Crisis of 1842’, in J. Epstein and D. Thompson (eds.), 
The Chartist Experience (London, 1982), 195-217
33 Leeds Mercury, 20 August 1842; Halifax Guardian, 20 August 1842; Bradford Observer, 18 August 
1842
34 Bradford Observer, 18 August 1842; Halifax Guardian, 20 August 1842; Leeds Mercury, 20 August 
1842
35 Sheffield Iris, 16 August 1842; Halifax Guardian, 20 August 1842
124
and Huddersfield that the arrival of the Lancashire turnouts, rather than the activities of 
local Chartist activists, started the strike. Turnout processions entered Todmorden on 12 
August from Lancashire and the mills turned out to welcome them, many of them 
having already stopped work beforehand having heard news that the Lancashire 
turnouts were going to arrive. Nevertheless the Todmorden people themselves quickly 
took up the strike. After the Lancashire turnouts had left on Friday the Todmorden 
people themselves held a meeting in the evening and passed a resolution to meet on 
Saturday morning to turn out the mills at Hebden Bridge, Cragg and Mytholmroyd. The 
local Chartist leader Robert Brooke took over the leadership of the strike later in the 
week.36 In Huddersfield the strike was brought in by the turnouts from Lancashire 
though the turnouts had also picked up people from Yorkshire as the procession went 
along.37
The demand by the leaders for the Charter to be the aim of the strike continued 
throughout the strike. For example the Bradford activists who marched to Keighley with 
the turnouts insisted on the Charter being the aim when they spoke to the turnouts on 16 
August.38 After the mills at Dewholme were turned out on the same day, Joshua Shaw, a 
Chartist activist and a woolcomber from Thornton, declared that there must be no more 
work done and it was now a political movement for the attainment of the Charter.39 It is 
true that there was some division among the local Chartist leaders in Yorkshire. But this 
was not division over whether the aim of the strike should be for wages or the Charter. 
Rather it was division over whether there should be a strike at all. The only towns in 
which the Chartist activists did not support the strike were Sheffield, Leeds and 
Huddersfield. In Huddersfield this was probably due to the presence of two delegates 
from Ashton who came with the Lancashire turnouts and were committed to the strike 
being merely for wages. The delegates to the NCA Manchester Conference from Leeds 
and Huddersfield also failed to support the strike at the Conference. On 17 August the 
Chartist delegate from Huddersfield told the Manchester NCA Conference that 
Huddersfield was in a state of confusion and the local Chartists did not wish to connect 
themselves with the strike. The Leeds Chartist delegate told the Conference that he
36 Northern Star, 20 August 1842
37 Northern Star, 20 August 1842
38 Halifax Guardian, 20 August 1842
39 PRO ASSI45/66, Deposition of Henry Foster of Dewholme, 22 August 1842
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represented 80,000 people at Leeds and the feelings would be against the strike.40 Large 
public meetings were held by the Chartists in Sheffield from 15 August onwards 
however the local Chartist activists were divided over whether to call a strike. George 
Julian Harney, who was based in Sheffield as Northern Star correspondent and 
newsagent and was leader of the Sheffield O’Connorite Chartists at the time, Samuel 
Parkes, and Richard Otley of Sheffield had attended the NCA National Conference 
Manchester. But on their return to Sheffield they used their influence to oppose a strike 
in Sheffield 41 The absence of turnouts from other areas proved a disincentive to strike 
in Sheffield. At a meeting on 19 August Harney advised against a strike for the Charter 
but agreed that the question should be decided at the public meeting which was to be 
held on 22 August. By that time the strike was already almost over in Yorkshire and 
those local Chartist activists in Sheffield who still thought ‘that the most rational way to 
obtain the Charter was by an universal cessation from labour’ were defeated by 
Harney.42 He argued that he was for a strike for the Charter if it could be general, but it 
clearly was not general in the country or even in Yorkshire, and he also argued it could 
not be peaceful when many did not want to be turned out.
There was strong support for the Charter as well as better wages as the aim of the strike 
among the rank and file strikers not just among the activists. Certainly the Huddersfield 
magistrates were not aware of any disputes between masters and men as to wages.43 For 
example on 16 August when 5000 men from Bradford stopped the mills at Keighley the 
turnouts told all the masters that they could never start their mills again till the Charter 
becomes the law of the land.44 The grassroots support for the Charter as well as wages 
can be seen at Bradford on 16 August during the attack on Horsfall’s mill when several 
of the crowd rushed up to the magistrate present and declared ‘the question was not 
about wages, it was about the Charter, the Charter they wanted and the Charter they 
would have.’45 On 16 August the Bradford Magistrates reported that the streets were 
filled with large masses of people who declared that they would never return home until
40 British Statesman, 8 October 1842; Northern Star, 5 February 1842, 30 April 1842
41 Sheffield Iris, 23 August 1842; A. R. Schoyen, The Chartist Challenge: George Julian Harney 
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42 Northern Star, 27 August 1842; Sheffield Iris, 23 August 1842
43 PRO HO 45/264, ff. 161-3, Huddersfield magistrates to HO, 17 August 1842
44 Halifax Guardian, 20 August 1842
45 Halifax Guardian, 10 September 1842
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the People’s Charter was obtained.46 At Haigh’s mill in Halifax John Hodgson was one 
of those who drew the plugs and when asked by the mill-owner whether he was satisfied 
he replied ‘No, we will have the People’s Charter before we are satisfied.’47 Certainly in 
the Factory Inspector R. J. Saunders’ opinion wage rates were not a pressing matter of 
dispute between masters and men though there had been reductions in several places. 
However unemployment and short time had been a cause of suffering.48 There was also 
strong support for the Charter as well as wages to be aim of a potential strike among the 
rank and file in Barnsley. At a meeting near Barnsley on the evening of Sunday 14 
August reports of the strike were read out from the third edition of the Northern Star of 
Saturday 13 August.49 The crowd cheered and applauded vigorously when the reports 
were read which named the Charter as the aim of the strikers in Lancashire.50
The votes in favour of resolutions calling for the Charter to be the aim of the strike and 
the large attendances at meetings also suggests that there was strong support for the 
Charter to be the aim among the rank and file strikers. At Bradford on 14 August the
20,000 present at the afternoon meeting passed the resolution in favour of a strike for 
the Charter. The resolutions for a strike for the Charter at Bradford on the morning of 15 
August were adopted unanimously by the 8000 to 10,000 present and it was the people 
at this meeting who formed into a procession to march to Halifax. Thus the strikers 
themselves as well as their leaders were supporting the Charter as the aim of the strike.51 
The morning meeting in Halifax on 15 August was interrupted by the magistrates before 
resolutions were put; however at a reconvened meeting in the early afternoon on 
Skircoat Moor in Halifax the 10,000 to 15,000 present unanimously passed resolutions 
not to return to work until the People’s Charter became the law of the land and until 
wages were advanced to their 1840 standard.
The miners’ activity in the West Riding as in the Midlands was to a large extent 
separate from the rest of the general strike. By 16 August the Sheffield Iris editor 
thought that there were arrangements in the mining districts for a ‘general strike’ of
46 PRO HO 45/264, ff, 89-92, Bradford magistrates to HO, 16 August 1842
47 Halifax Guardian, 20 August 1842
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miners throughout England.53 Certainly as early as 1 August between 500 and 800 
colliers from Halifax and the neighbouring towns and mining districts met in Halifax. 
The discussion centred on miners’ wage grievances. They resolved to form a miners 
general union throughout England and raise a fund for a general strike of miners so as to 
bring all machinery requiring coal to a standstill, and they also passed a resolution in 
favour of the Charter though not linking this explicitly with the call for a general strike. 
However a later meeting of colliers at Wakefield on 15 August resolved not to go on 
strike. Handbills for this meeting given out on the Saturday and Sunday did not mention 
a strike and stated the purpose of the meeting was to consider ways of amending the 
distressed state of the miners. A power struggle took place in the meeting between those 
who wanted to confine the discussion to ways of improving miners wages without resort 
to a general strike or bringing up political questions, and those who wanted political 
discussion about a strike, but the latter lost. Nevertheless at the end of the Wakefield 
meeting there was an attempt to begin a miners’ strike, perhaps for the Charter, though 
the strike did not in fact begin in Wakefield until later in the week.54
The miners who struck were more concerned with their own wage grievances. Yet the 
third resolution passed by the Halifax miners on 1 August declared that ‘not only is it 
needful for us to unite as fellow workmen, but as fellow men, not only to protect our 
own interests as labourers but to gain our rights as freemen by causing the People’s 
Charter to be made the law of the land.’55 At the Wakefield colliers’ meeting on 15 
August many miners wanted to raise political questions and there was a power struggle 
at the start over who was to be chairman; an ‘Old Radical’, John Autey, was narrowly 
defeated. The majority wanted to confine the meeting to wages and not call a strike and 
instead persuade the masters to give the miners better wages. However even they 
claimed that they wanted equal rights like the Chartists and that colliers’ issues were 
just a particular part of equal rights.56 A minority of miners remained in favour of a 
strike for the Charter and when the meeting ended three or four men addressed those
53 Sheffield Iris, 16 August 1842
54 Northern Star, 6 August 1842; Halifax Guardian, 6 August 1842; Wakefield Journal, 19 August 1842
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who remained and a resolution was passed that ‘the persons present at the meeting 
should not work any more until the Charter becomes the law of the land.’57
The only serious ambiguity over whether the strike was to be for the Charter, apart from 
among the miners, was in the border area of Yorkshire before the strike had extended 
far into Yorkshire and here it was the local Lancashire strike leaders who brought in this 
element of ambiguity over aims. The strike in Todmorden had a wages appearance to 
start with but this was due to the influence of the Lancashire turnouts and their leaders. 
The resolutions passed by the Lancashire turnouts on 12 August when they arrived in 
Todmorden were for the wages of 1840, that females having children should cease to 
use machinery, and for the ten hours bill. Later on when the Todmorden local Chartist 
leader Robert Brooke took charge the strike became clearly for the Charter in 
Todmorden. The mixed Lancashire and Yorkshire turnouts who arrived in Huddersfield 
on the afternoon of 13 August held a meeting and the speakers, who were from 
Lancashire, wanted to confine the strike to wages, and some of the Lancashire speakers 
even complained ‘of the men of Huddersfield, because they would not assist them for 
anything less than the Charter, from a conviction that it was useless to go for better 
wages, whilst labour was unprotected.’ This was the influence of two of the delegates 
who had been dispatched from Ashton, who were committed to a strike merely for 
wages, and who had arrived with the Lancashire turnouts. However the Huddersfield 
people present and perhaps the rank and file Lancashire turnouts at the meeting made it 
clear that their aim was to be the Charter. When one of the crowd put the question of the 
Charter to the meeting instantly everyone voted in favour of the Charter being the aim 
of the strike.58
Unlike their role in Lancashire the trade societies in the West Riding failed to provide 
any leadership for the strike. This is not surprising as unions were far weaker in 
Yorkshire than Lancashire and while individual trade unionists were often radicals there 
had been no general movement of the trades, such as they were, in the West Riding 
towns forming themselves into localities of the NCA as had happened in Manchester. 
There were attempts by the operatives and local Chartist activists to encourage the trade 
societies of Leeds and Sheffield to convene delegates meetings in parallel with the trade
57 Northern Star, 6 August 1842; Halifax Guardian, 6 August 1842; Wakefield Journal, 19 August 1842
58 Northern Star, 20 August 1842
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delegates meeting in Lancashire but the trades proved unwilling to provide any 
leadership. A meeting of 4000 operatives at Hunslet Moor near Leeds on 16 August 
passed resolutions to support the agitation for the People’s Charter and a committee was 
appointed to ask the trade societies of Leeds to call a trades delegate meeting for 
Thursday in the Chartists’ room in Leeds to decide what steps ought to be taken.59 
However the Leeds trade societies did not convene a delegate meeting. In Sheffield on 
15 August a meeting in Paradise Square made a public request to the trade societies of 
Sheffield to convene a trades delegate meeting to call for a strike. But the individual 
trades were unenthusiastic. Only the pocket blade forgers, shoemakers, spring knife 
cutters, table blade forgers and table knife cutters showed any enthusiasm; but they did 
not call for a strike, and merely held a meeting on 17 August which issued a placard 
announcing a public meeting for 22 August to ‘take into consideration the present state 
of the country’. However the secretaries of the Sheffield Trade Unions issued a counter 
placard denying their Unions’ involvement in the calling of the meeting and when the 
meeting took place as already described the trade societies failed to take any part in it.60 
Nevertheless in Leeds and Sheffield the lukewarmness of the Chartist activists, together 
with the dominance of woman and children in the Leeds factories, would seem to be an 
important reason for the relative failure of the strike to take hold in both towns.
There is no evidence for an ACLL plot to provoke a strike in Yorkshire by wage 
reductions. There were no sudden wage reductions immediately pending the strike 
though wage reductions had taken place gradually.61 The Manufacturer Cowling 
Ackroyd in Great Horton near Bradford did make a wage reduction on Monday 15 
August but the local Chartist leaders had already decided to initiate a strike by then and 
Cowling Ackroyd was a prominent Tory.62 There was however a feeling among the 
Yorkshire Chartist local leaders that the ACLL masters had deliberately provoked the 
strike in Lancashire by their reductions. Henry Hodgson at Bradford on 15 August 
claimed that he thought the League ‘was not displeased with the movement.’ Benjamin 
Rushton at Halifax on the same day also made it clear that he thought the League
59 Northern Star, 20 August 1842
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masters in Lancashire had deliberately reduced the wages of their workmen in the hope 
that the workmen would strike in order to scare the government into repealing the Com 
Laws. Rushton also reminded his audience that the ACLL lecturer James Acland had 
told O’Connor at a meeting in Halifax in July that the League intended to lock out their 
men. The Sheffield Iris editor reported on 16 August that his correspondents had told 
him that at every meeting it was said ‘the Anti-Corn law League have caused us to make 
this movement, but it is our own fault if we do not get more than they think, we will 
have the Charter, and not be deceived by the middle classes in this question as on the 
Reform Bill*.64 The Yorkshire Chartist activists agreed with the Ashton activists that the 
wage reductions in the Ashton area had been a deliberate attempt to start the strike for 
the repeal of the Com Laws, and were determined that the strike should be for the 
Charter rather than to gain Com Law repeal.
Extent, Duration, Participation and Organisation of the Strike
The timing of the strike in Yorkshire was different from the strike in Lancashire in that 
it was only from 15 August that the strike really got underway. In contrast the strike in 
Lancashire began on 8 August. This was of significance for the authorities’ response as 
will be seen later. The strike in the West Riding was of a far shorter duration than the 
strike in Lancashire or the Midlands. The opinion of R. J. Saunders, the West Riding 
Factory Inspector, was that individual mills in individual towns were closed for only 
three and half days at most and this appears to be a roughly correct estimate at least for 
the Bradford, Halifax and the Leeds districts. The strike can be said to have been 
‘general’ in the West Riding textile area in that it affected to some extent all the 
significant townships and industrial villages. Agricultural workers (although one farmer 
was listed in the prisoners from Cleckheaton), transport workers, and servants were the 
only significant groups of the working people to be unaffected. In many areas shops 
were closed or partially closed due to the disturbances for periods of time. In Bradford 
town itself the strike lasted four days from 15 August with most of the mills in the town 
reopening on 19 August. In Halifax the strike lasted for three days in the town itself 
from 15 to 17 August with most of the mills in the town reopening on 18 August. The 
strike never became fully general in Bradford or Halifax although the vast majority of
63 Bradford Observer, 18 August 1842
64 Sheffield Iris, 16 August 1842
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factories and businesses were closed in Halifax on 15 August and in both towns on 16 
and 17 August. The strike in Huddersfield lasted for five days from 13 August with the 
mills in the town reopening on 18 August and all the town’s mills were closed during 
this period. Many of the mills and factories in the industrial villages in the 
neighbourhoods of Bradford, Halifax and Huddersfield remained closed for some days 
after the factories in the towns themselves had reopened. The strike in the 
neighbourhood of Leeds lasted for three days from 16 to 18 August.65 The strike in 
Dewsbury lasted a total of five days beginning on 16 August and ending with the 
reopening of the mills on 22 August. At Keighley the strike lasted for three days from 
16 August. Several mills in Keighley reopened on 19 August and almost all were at 
work on 20 August. However the strike in Keighley had been almost completely general 
with all business being ended and the whole population wandering the streets. In 
Dewsbury the strike was general with the exception of the agricultural workers and com 
mills. On 18 August the magistrates of Dewsbury reported to the Home Office that there 
was ‘a stoppage of trade and business of every kind except for the operations of the 
harvest which are permitted to proceed as usual.’66
In the West Riding the strike was not confined merely to the mills where people used 
water or steam driven machines. Workshops and collieries as well as mills were turned 
out. Textile handworkers, colliers and artisans took part in the strike as well as factory 
workers. A sample composed of one-hundred and fifty-nine prisoners arrested during 
the strike in Halifax, Bradford, and Leeds has been analysed (Prisoners arrested at 
Halifax on 15 August; prisoners arrested in Bradford and the surrounding district and 
examined at Bradford on 24 August; and prisoners arrested for their part in the strike in 
the Leeds borough and surrounding villages on 17 August).67 By far the largest 
occupational group were hand-combers followed by weavers. Handcombers made up 
25.6% of the sample of those arrested and 17.5% were weavers who did not say whether 
they were hand or power loom weavers. Most appear to have been handloom weavers 
from the industrial villages around Halifax, Leeds and Bradford. This suggests that the
65 ‘Factory Inspectors Reports’, PP (1842), XII; Northern Star, 20, 27 August 1842; PRO HO 45/264, IF. 
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impoverished hand workers played a crucial role in the strike. Nevertheless many of the 
better-paid factory operatives were clearly also involved as they often enthusiastically 
joined the turnouts. We cannot be sure that all the weavers were handloom weavers as 
they did not give details. At least some of those arrested definitely were factory 
workers, including two spinners, two piecers and three mill-hands arrested. It was 
shown at the start of this chapter that women and children formed the vast majority of 
the factory workforce, particularly in worsteds, and so it is not surprising that male hand 
workers should take the lead in spreading the strike. In fact the occupations of those 
arrested in the strike seems typical of the membership of the NCA in the West Riding. 
For example the Great Horton NCA locality membership book lists one hundred and 
eleven recruits between 1840 and 1842 of whom forty-nine were weavers and thirty-six
Aftwere woolcombers. The third largest occupational group was colliers making up 
13.8% of the samples, though fifteen of these came from the small Leeds sample. The 
fourth largest group in the sample were labourers making up 6.3%, followed by tailors 
making up 3.1%. Nationally artisans were of importance in popular radicalism. The 
large numbers of impoverished proletarianised hand workers involved in the strike 
might suggest that distress and the desire for better wages was an important motivation. 
However hand weavers and hand woolcombers formed a very large part of the 
occupational groups in the industrial villages around Halifax and Bradford so it is not 
surprising that they form so many of those arrested and does not mean that the strike 
should be seen simply as a blind result of distress. Although their distress was an 
important element in the strike this in itself is not evidence that the strike was simply a 
wages issue as they could still see political reasons for their problems which the Charter 
would solve. In fact artisans were also present in the sample of those arrested. For 
example the sample from Halifax, Bradford and Leeds included five tailors, two 
mechanics, two smiths, a shoemaker, a joiner, a wire drawer, a sawyer, a moulder and a 
cooper. It is also clear that many well-paid workers were enthusiastic as well as 
impoverished handworkers. For example at Sowerby Bridge on 15 August very highly 
paid skilled workers enforced the turn out of the men in the Navigation Warehouse on 
Rochdale canal. These were skilled highly paid workers from Bates’ Foundry and 
mechanics from Walton’s firm in Sowerby Bridge. The workers at Bates’ earned 30 
shillings a weckan.6. had no reduction in wages for two years.69
68 D. G. Wright, Popular Radicalism (London, 1986), 145
69 Halifax Guardian, 20 August 1842
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There was enthusiastic support for the strike in most of the townships and industrial 
villages of the West Riding textile area. Relatively large numbers were involved in the 
meetings and turnout processions, although the figures cannot be relied upon as 
completely accurate and different newspaper reports disagreed as to the size of 
meetings. At the meeting at Bradford Moor on 14 August up to 20,000 were present and 
from about 6000 to 10,000 were present at the 15 August morning meeting outside the 
Oddfellows Hall. 4000 to 5000 locals were present at the meeting in Halifax early in the 
morning on 15 August and in the afternoon meeting on Skircoat Moor about 15,000 
people were present. At the meeting at Dewsbury on Tuesday evening between 20,000 
and 30,000 were present. At Huddersfield on 15 August early in the morning about 
8000 to 10,000 were present. At Leeds on the afternoon of 16 August about 3000 to 
4000 were present at a meeting on Hunslet Moor. About 25,000 people entered Halifax 
on the morning of 15 August from Bradford and Todmorden. These included a 
procession of about 4000 from Bradford with an additional 1000 Bradford people in 
groups, a procession of 6000 men and 4000 women in the procession from Todmorden, 
and an additional 10,000 people from Todmorden in groups. 5000 Bradford people 
entered Keighley on 16 August, and 10,000 to 12,000 people had previously split off to 
go back to Bradford. On 16 August 4000 to 5000 turnouts came from Huddersfield on 
the way to Dewsbury.
Some towns and villages did not come out on strike unless turned out by men from 
other towns. But in most cases they seem to have come out willingly when turned out. 
At Huddersfield for example the postmaster at first thought that the Huddersfield 
operatives did not want to go on strike when the Lancashire strikers arrived. However 
he quickly realised that the Huddersfield operatives did give their blessing to the strike 
although they were not active in joining the actual processions to begin with.71 
Nevertheless there was some opposition to the strike by the working classes and much 
of this seems to have been due to the belief that the strike was a League ploy either to 
gain Com Law repeal or to discredit the Chartists. Many also feared to commit 
themselves unless the strike was fully national. The strong military presence in many
70 Northern Star, 20 August 1842; Leeds Mercury, 20 August 1842; Halifax Guardian, 20 August 1842; 
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towns also inhibited action. In some cases there was a more active hostility to the strike 
among the workers. On 13 August there was reported to be hostility to the strike among 
the people of Hebden Bridge and Cragg Dale. This seems to have been partly due to the 
fact that the turnouts had made forcible requisitions from working peoples homes. There 
may also have been regional resentment at being told what to do by Lancashire people
77present among the turnouts. It is clear that some factory operatives at least were 
against the strike. On 17 August the Huddersfield magistrates reported that some 
workmen in the mills had voluntarily enrolled themselves as special constables. The 
‘well disposed’ operatives were sworn in as special constables by the Dewsbury 
magistrates.74 A few employers enrolled their operatives en-masse as special constables. 
There may well have been an element of coercion in at least some of these cases 
because it was often the masters who were also magistrates who swore in their 
workmen. Although many of the factory operatives who were turned out came out 
willingly there were instances where the factory operatives resisted the turn out, were 
turned out unwillingly or refused to join the processions after they had been turned out. 
For example on Monday morning when the Halifax men turned out the mills on their 
way to meet the Todmorden turnouts the men among the turned out mill operatives 
refused to join the procession and the female factory workers were coerced into joining 
the march. There were cases of workmen defending their mills against attack. In many 
of these cases there was a Magistrate, special constables or military on the scene which 
may have made the workpeople hesitant to show their true loyalties. For example at 
Horsfall’s in Bradford the operatives only closed the gates after a magistrate had 
arrived.75 At Dewsbury the magistrates reported to the Home Office that the operatives 
were turned out ‘generally against their will’, though they qualified this by suggesting 
that the presence of outsiders and the example of the strike in Lancashire had
7Asubsequently influenced the men of Dewsbury to favour the strike. The reluctance of 
some of the factory workers, who had employment and were relatively well paid, to join 
in a movement to help all the working classes including the impoverished handloom 
weavers and hand-combers might seem to suggest that the strike was not a display of
72 Halifax Guardian, 20 August 1842
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working class-consciousness; however this is not the case because when considering the 
reluctance of some factory operatives to turn out it must be remembered that the 
majority of factory workers were women and children. In worsted factories in particular 
adult males were a very small fraction of the factory workforce.
The residential details of prisoners arrested suggest that it was local West Riding people 
rather than turnouts from Lancashire who composed the bulk of the turnout processions 
in Yorkshire. Of the seventeen men arrested in Halifax on 15 August none came from 
outside Yorkshire and all came from the Halifax neighbourhood, the Calder Valley area 
or from the Bradford neighbourhood. This suggests that the so called ‘Lancashire 
turnouts’ who visited Halifax on 15 August in fact had swelled to their huge size by the 
addition of Yorkshire people in the Calder Valley area before they arrived in Halifax, 
and in fact many of the Lancashire people who had marched to Todmorden had no 
doubt retired back to Lancashire. All twenty-seven arrested at Huddersfield were local 
people.77 All the twenty-four men arrested for their part in the strike in the Leeds 
borough and the surrounding villages on 17 August came from the Leeds 
neighbourhood. It was reported from Todmorden at the start of the strike in Yorkshire 
that the Lancashire turnouts hoped to carry the strike to Leeds. However when the strike
*yo
in the Leeds neighbourhood did take place it was the work of local people.
Middle class support for the strike appears to have been small. However at least some 
members of the radical middle classes were sympathetic to the strike. The Todmorden 
radical manufacturer and Oldham MP John Fielden, a prominent figure in the Anti-Poor 
Law and Factory movements, expressed sympathy for a strike for a fair day’s wage for a 
fair day’s work, and although he did not provide any active leadership, he closed his 
mills when the crowds approached, refused the magistrates’ offer of protection for his 
mills, and kept his mills closed until 29 August.79 The editorials of some liberal radical 
newspapers such as the Bradford Observer, which had been supporting Complete 
Suffrage in the months prior to the strike, also showed some sympathy with the strikers 
blaming the strike on economic distress caused by the government’s refusal to repeal
77 Halifax Guardian, 20 August 1842; Leeds Mercury, 20 August 1842; Northern Star, 20, 27 August 
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the Com laws. However Edward Baines’ Whig Leeds Mercury strongly condemned the 
strikers and called on the government to put them down with force if necessary.80 The 
samples of those arrested include only two shopkeepers and one fanner from the middle 
classes. Shopkeepers often closed their shops but this was normally due to the disturbed 
state of towns and villages rather than sympathetic action. For example at Sowerby 
Bridge on 15 August the shops immediately closed as the turnouts passed through the
01
town. Shopkeepers were enrolled as special constables. For example in Halifax on 14 
August the magistrates enrolled shopkeepers while they were attending Church and 
chapel. There are numerous reports of manufactures closing their mills when news of 
the turnouts arrived but before they actually came, for example at Sowerby Bridge, 
however this normally appears to have been done to avoid potential damage. The 
marchers were often given bread from shops and small sums of money from both shops 
and manufacturers but this seems often to have been given from the fear of something 
worse though there does appear to have been some sympathy with the distressed 
condition of many of the strikers. Some middle class people attended the meetings 
which preceded the strike, for example on Sunday at Bradford Moor, however they 
appear to have been there out of curiosity.
Dorothy Thompson and Jutta Schwarzkopf have stressed the important part women 
played in the strikes.82 The evidence from the West Riding suggests that Thompson was 
correct to stress the importance of woman due to the nature of the strike as a community 
based movement. Women played an active part in the strike in Yorkshire in the 
processions, crowds and clashes with the military. There were thousands of women and 
girls among the turnouts who entered Halifax on 15 August, marching four abreast in 
the centre of the procession from the Todmorden, Hebden Bridge, Sowerby Bridge and 
Luddenden foot. On 15 August at Halifax when the procession was confronted by the 
military as it tried to enter town the women tried to shame the soldiers into letting them 
pass by going right up to their horses and saying such things as ‘You would not hurt a 
woman, would you?’ and ‘We didn’t come here for bayonets, we came here for
O'!
bread.’ It was the women who appear to have been important on the night of 15
80 Bradford Observer, 18 August 1842; Leeds Mercury, 20 August 1842
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August in persuading the men to attempt a rescue of the prisoners when the military 
were due to escort them through Salterhebble to Elland railway station on 16 August. 
Women took part in the attack itself by carrying stones to the place of ambush and 
throwing them along with the men.84 At least one woman was arrested in Bradford 
though in general the authorities appear to have targeted men for arrest. Adult males 
were in a minority in the woollen and worsted mills and factories of the West Riding as 
has been shown. Women and children were necessarily turned out of the mills along 
with the male workers when the processions visited. Some of these women joined the 
processions. In other cases, for example at Keighley, the women and children stayed 
behind in the turned out towns and villages crowding the streets while their men joined 
the marchers.85 They were available to crowd into the public meetings held and at many 
meetings woman and children were present. The strike was a community-based action 
where women could take part as known members of the local community and as fellow 
workers in the mills. The strike concerned distress as well as the Charter, the Charter 
would bring better wages and food, and so it was easy for women to make a role for 
themselves in this type of action which concerned the family’s living standard as well as 
its political rights. Nevertheless determined factory masters may have found it 
physically easier to prevent woman and children factory operatives, in contrast to male 
factory operatives, from joining the turnouts, especially if they were reassured by the 
presence of the military.86
Chartist leadership of the strike was not confined to its start. The Chartist activists acted 
as leaders throughout the strike in Yorkshire. For example the three Halifax Chartist 
activists Isaac Clisset, a frequent lecturer on Chartism at Cleckheaton, John Snowden, a 
woolcomber, and William Jackson Cockcroft, a weaver, acted as leaders of the crowds 
and even personally supervised the tapping of the boilers.87 The Shipley Chartist activist 
and blacksmith, Joseph North, personally led the turnouts in Fulneck and Bankhouse.88 
Joseph Holmes, a Bradford Chartist activist, led turnout crowds.89 Throughout the strike 
it was local Chartist activists who addressed the meetings of the strikers and told them
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where to go on turnout marches. For example at Dewsbury on 16,17 and 18 August the 
Chartist activists James Henry Dewhirst from Bradford, William Sheldrake, a 
shoemaker, Gliss, and Coultas addressed early morning meetings of the turnouts, then 
led the turnouts on their march, and held evening meetings on their return.90
The organisation of the strike in the West Riding was relatively sophisticated. The 
meetings between strike leaders and turnouts which took place throughout the strike in 
Yorkshire before the strikers set off on their marches, after mills had been turned out, 
and on their return to their own towns were an essential part of the strike organisation. 
At these meetings the leaders briefed the turnouts on which villages and townships they 
would march to in order to turn out the mills and when they would next meet.91 For 
example at Keighley after the mills had been turned out by the Bradford marchers on 16 
August the local Chartist strike leaders held a meeting to decide where to march to next. 
The strike organisation itself was based on democratic principles with resolutions and 
amendments at these meetings being adopted. The leaders gave out instructions at 
meetings on the routes the turnouts would take. However these were not simply orders 
and would be confirmed by votes for resolutions. For example at the meeting at 
Keighley an amendment ‘that the procession move to Haworth and remain there during 
the night and proceed to Bradford in the morning’ was proposed against the original 
resolution ‘that the whole now move by way of Collingworth and Wilsden to Bradford’ 
though the original resolution was carried. Meetings continued to be held at Halifax for 
example on the morning of 16 August when it was resolved to turn out the neighbouring 
areas and then meet again in the afternoon when the turnouts from other towns were 
expected to arrive.92
The strikers in the different towns and villages in Yorkshire were in communication 
with each other, and with the turnouts from Lancashire who had entered Yorkshire, and 
were thus able to co-ordinate their activities to some extent. Emissaries, scouts, 
messengers and carrier pigeons were sent by the strikers from one town to another in 
order to communicate news and co-ordinate activities.93 The magistrates at Skipton
90 Wakefield Journal, 19 August 1842; PRO HO 45/264, ff. 204-207, Dewsbury magistrate to HO, 18 
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reported on Thursday 18 August that the strikers had friends in every village to report 
the movements of the military.94 Messengers were used to try to provide co-ordination 
between different areas as can be seen at Halifax. On the morning of Tuesday 16 August 
the leaders held a meeting early in the morning on Skircoat Moor. At this meeting it was 
resolved that emissaries would be sent to Huddersfield, Todmorden and Bradford to ask 
the people there to come over to Halifax to help strengthen the turnouts. And it was 
resolved that another meeting would be held on Skircoat Moor in the afternoon. These 
messengers were sent off during the meeting. Carrier pigeon expresses were in use by 
the strikers in Halifax on 15 August in order to communicate with other towns.95 The 
speed at which the strikers were able to communicate by these means is demonstrated 
by the fact that the news of the attack on the military at Salterhebble on Tuesday 
reached Barnsley within hours.
There was a direct link between the trades delegate conferences in Manchester and the 
strike in the West Riding. As we have seen, Henry Hodgson from Bradford had attended 
the trades conferences held on 12 August at Manchester and had assisted in passing the 
resolutions to strike for the Charter. At least three of the local Chartists involved in the 
Yorkshire strike, John Arran, George Fletcher and Robert Brooke, also attended the 
NCA National Conference in Manchester, having been elected as delegates before the 
strike began. Henry Hodgson had been elected but does not seem to have attended. They 
described the opinion in their localities as being strongly in favour of the strike being 
connected with the Charter.’96 John Arran was secretary of the NCA Conference and in 
this role was one of the signers of the NCA Conference Address which approved of the 
general strike for the Charter while denying that the Chartists had originated it. 
However Arran had to escape from arrest and could do nothing to further the strike after 
17 August. Robert Brooke did however go back to Todmorden and addressed a meeting 
there on 18 August where he read out the strongly worded NCA Executive address. The 
mills in Todmorden had been due to go back to work however the reading of the NCA 
address together with Brooke’s talk of support from other areas prolonged the strike in 
Todmorden.97
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Local newspapers played a very important part in the organisation of the strike in 
Yorkshire. The local Yorkshire newspapers carried reports of the strike in Lancashire, 
the Midlands and Scotland. The third edition of the Northern Star published on 
Saturday 13 August was very important in spreading information on the strike in other 
areas and in emphasising that in Lancashire it had become a political strike for the 
Charter. Importantly the Northern Star of Saturday 13 August carried reports of the 
trades delegates meetings in Manchester which had called for a general strike for the 
Charter.98
The actual manner of spreading and enforcing the strike was similar to Lancashire. 
People from the neighbouring villages would often meet up at the town centre, for 
example at Dewsbury. Groups of turnouts went on processions from towns or meetings 
held outside towns, they stopped the mills and factories on their route and then entered 
other towns. In the West Riding there were many mills scattered along the valleys 
between towns, such as along the Calder Valley between Todmorden and Halifax, and 
these valley mills were closed by the turnout marchers as well as the mills in or near 
towns. Collieries and workshops were also often stopped. As the turnouts proceeded on 
their march they increased in numbers as they added people from the turned out mills. 
For example in the turn out between Leeds and Bradford on the morning of Tuesday 16 
August the size of the procession increased from at least 6000 at Stanningley to between 
8000 and 10,000 at Pudsey due to the numbers the procession had picked up." The 
strikers would often say they would come back next day to ensure that the factories 
remained closed. In Yorkshire there were more water-powered mills than in the 
Lancashire strike area. This affected the ways the mills had to be stopped. The turnouts 
drew the boiler plugs and raked out the boiler fires at steam powered factories. At water 
powered mills they normally cut the milldams or disengaged the gearing mechanism of 
the waterwheel. In a number of cases mill owners stopped the mills on request or had 
stopped already when they received news that the strikers were approaching for 
example at Todmorden.
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The turnout processions were relatively well organised. A good example is the turnout 
procession that visited the towns and villages to the north and west of Bradford on 
Tuesday 16 August turning out Shipley, Bingley and Keighley as well as smaller towns 
and industrial villages on their route. They had enough organisation not to become 
disorganised when blocked by the military as they left Bradford going towards 
Manningham, they were able to switch directions and head in the direction of 
Frizinghall. On two occasions when the turnouts were at Shipley and Bingley 
detachments split off from the main body to extend the areas that could be covered by 
the turnouts. Their good co-ordination is shown by the fact that the detachments were 
able to meet up with the main body at prearranged places. A third large detachment was 
sent off from Bingley to go back to Bradford turning out the mills. This third 
detachment itself split into two parties on one occasion and then regrouped. While the 
third detachment was going back to Bradford the main body went to Keighley to turn 
out the mills there and later returned to Bradford by a different route to the third 
detachment.100 The strikers were careful to maximise the areas covered by their 
marches. These tactics were sophisticated considering the large numbers of people 
involved. Similar good organisation can be seen in Halifax on 15 August when the 
turnouts managed to unplug the boilers of many mills in the town despite the presence 
of the military and special constables. The strikers congregated in small parties 
dispersed throughout the town and when the military and special constables were busy 
they rapidly rushed into the particular factory they aimed to close and drew the boiler 
plugs.101
The strike got a firm hold in towns which did not have adequate military forces. In 
towns without adequate military forces there was a tendency to panic among the 
magistrates; and these magistrates did not take active measures against the strikers in 
the first few days of the strike. For example the Huddersfield magistrates on 17 August 
believed that the mills would start the next day if they could have sufficient military 
protection and that nothing but the presence of a large military force could ‘strike terror
i noamong the misguided populace.’ Similarly the magistrates acting at Holmfirth felt 
that ‘if the mills decide to start work they will be compelled to give up unless the
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magistrates have military power.’103 In general the magistrates did not attempt to read 
the Riot Act proclamation at the beginning of the strike in those places without military 
power. At Dewsbury the magistrates informed the Home Office that because they had 
no civil or military force they could not do anything to stop the turnouts. The 
magistrates made great use of swearing in special constables. For example over 2000 
special constables were sworn in at Halifax during the course of the strike and 1500 
special constables were sworn in at Leeds on 15 August alone. However special 
constables were only really effective when used jointly with the military. In general the 
magistrates were very reluctant to make use of the specials when not backed up by the 
military. For example 400 special constables were sworn in at Keighley before the 
turnouts arrived on 16 August but the magistrates did not think it prudent to use them 
without military backup.104 Only strong use of the military could put down the strike.
Ideology in the Strike for the Charter
Stedman Jones in his essays in The Chartist Experience and Languages o f Class in 1982 
and 1983 emphasised the political in contrast to the social nature of Chartism. Stedman 
Jones argued that, at least in terms of the public language used by the Chartists in print, 
Chartism was only a class based movement in a limited sense. He argued that the 
Chartists, like earlier radicals, continued to view political monopoly and the state as the 
source of social evils. According to Stedman Jones there was no move to a socialist 
ideology identifying the capitalist economic system itself as the source of social evils. 
Economic unfairness was seen in terms of unfair exchange rather than the result of the 
relation to the means of production and unfair exchange was rooted in political 
monopoly. Stedman Jones argued that the Chartists believed in a labour theory of value 
based on natural rights, that is the natural right to ones property, which precluded 
socialism. The Chartist ideology remained that of ‘the people’ against the aristocracy 
and of the productive against the idle. There was hostility to the middle classes but this 
was due to their new influence on government due to their enfranchisement in 1832 
rather than to their role as capitalists. In practical terms the working classes had now 
become ‘the people.’ Although there was now a very close fit between ‘the people’ and 
the working classes after 1832 the Chartists’ public ideology remained the traditional
103 PRO HO 45/264, ff. 139-41, Holmfirth magistrates to HO, 17 August 1842
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radical ideology of ‘Old Corruption’, that is that the aristocracy and their placemen had 
corrupted the House of Commons and lived off taxes, rather than a new class based 
ideology. He suggested that the Chartists still believed in the political origin of 
oppression even though big capitalists as well as landowners had become targets of 
abuse. Stedman Jones argued that the Chartists had a notion of political oppression by 
the state with the state using legislation such as the 1834 New Poor Law to create a 
tyranny to enslave the producers. He suggested that radical ideology was the language 
of a class after 1832 but it was not itself a class language. However, a point which has 
sometimes been missed, he did not deny the possibility of class-consciousness existing 
outside of the public printed language of the Chartists.105 Joyce in Visions o f the People 
argued that class was not the dominant identity and that other discourses such as that of 
‘the people’ or the nation were more important. Joyce made the point that there were 
overlapping and competing discourses rather than a single discourse in the language of 
the Chartists and workers. Joyce admitted with Stedman Jones that there was an overlap 
between class and people in 1840s when workers saw themselves as the true people and 
the notion of ‘the people’ may have took on class meanings. Both Joyce and Vemon 
emphasised popular constitutionalism as the master narrative in nineteenth century 
England. In Democratic Subjects Joyce went so far as almost to deny the existence of 
the ‘real’ beyond language. However Joyce allowed for the existence of working class- 
consciousness as an imagined identity based on political exclusion after 1832 while 
putting most emphasis on a melodramatic narrative of the people.106
While not denying the existence of a working class consciousness based, as Hewitt 
suggests in the case of Manchester, on the shared economic experiences of low wage 
levels, cyclical unemployment, insecurity and a common egalitarian value system, it 
will be shown that the strike in Yorkshire does support many of Stedman Jones’ ideas 
about the nature of Chartism and working class radicalism.107 It will be demonstrated 
that the strikers did see social evils as rooted in political oppression. Where economic 
oppression was identified by the strikers its cause was seen to be the corruption of the 
political system. In the strike in Yorkshire when the middle classes were criticised it
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was largely due to their role in the political system rather than in the economic system 
and the strikers overwhelmingly hoped for the support of the middle classes. The 
dominant discourse employed in the strike in Yorkshire was that of ‘the people’ and the 
traditional radical attack on ‘Old Corruption.’
The strike leaders made use in their speeches of the traditional radical ideology of the 
people against the aristocracy and their hangers on though ‘the people’ were being 
defined more or less as the working classes. The idea of the freebom Englishman and 
the popular English constitution was strong in the local strike leaders’ speeches. For 
example John Arran identified their oppressors as ‘the aristocracy...the priesthood...the 
money-mongers.’ John Arran elaborated further, ‘they felt the power of the aristocracy, 
also the power of the priesthood, whose professions were one thing and its practice 
another. After all came the money mongers, who take what the others had left; all these 
things had brought them together; all these things oppressed them; but he hoped they 
had met to put an end to all these things. It now remained to the meeting to say if such 
things shall be.’ Here we see the traditional radical attack on the aristocracy and their 
dependants and partners. George Fletcher made the traditional radical attack on the 
aristocracy who had corrupted Parliament by patronage and jobbery. Fletcher claimed 
‘we have no House of Commons, we have two Houses of Lords and a Queen.’ So the 
aristocracy had corrupted the political system. Henry Hodgson warned that ‘in 
Lancashire the workmen had declared that before they toil any more they must have 
their rights as men. They had toiled enough for the aristocracy, it was now that they 
toiled for themselves.’ Again it was the aristocracy who were pointed out as the
109enemy.
In George Fletcher’s speech we can see a natural rights view of the role of Parliament 
deriving from Paine or Locke. Fletcher argued that ‘Parliament had separated without 
doing anything for the relief of the people. Parliament exists for the good of the people, 
and when it ceases to act for their good the people are absolved from all allegiance to 
it.’ The belief that Parliament was unconstitutional if it did not represent the will and 
interests of the people is present in John W. Smyth’s speech when he declared that 
‘Parliament had broken up and the members had gone home to their game, leaving the
108 Bradford Observer, 18 August 1842
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country in such a state, but if Parliament had resolved not to do anything for the good of 
the people, the people ought to take redress of their grievances into their own hands.’110
The local strike leaders attributed all social evils ultimately to the corruption of the 
political system. For George Fletcher ‘class legislation’ was ‘the fruitful source of all 
the evils that affect society.’ Social ills were being attributed to a political cause. For 
example the first resolution moved by George Fletcher at Bradford on 15 August and 
carried unanimously by the large crowd was ‘that it is the opinion of the meeting that 
until class legislation is entirely destroyed, and the principle of united labour is 
established, the labourer will not be in a position to enjoy the fruits of his own industry.’ 
Here the more inclusive term ‘labourer’ rather than ‘working class’ was used. Social ills 
were attributed to the corrupt political system. The reason why the labourer did not 
‘enjoy the fruits of his own industry’ was due to ‘class legislation’ not to the economic 
system itself. The ‘principle of united labour’ mentioned here is not a reference to trade 
unions but rather to the unity of all the productive against the unproductive, the aim of 
those who hoped for success from the constitutional mass platform agitation. Henry 
Hodgson proposed the resolution, which was unanimously voted for ‘that it is the 
opinion of this meeting that the People’s Charter ought to become the law of the land, as 
it contains the elements of justice and prosperity, and we pledge ourselves never to 
relinquish our demands until that document becomes a legislative enactment.’ Thus the 
strikers thought justice and prosperity would come through political change rather than 
a change in the capitalist system. The strike was to end social ills by removing political 
corruption. For example George Fletcher declared ‘It was to effect a change in this 
system that they had now met. They had met for the purpose of stopping the tears of 
mothers, the cries of children, and the curses of fathers.’ Social ills were the result of 
political corruption and social ills would be removed by the enactment of the Charter.111
Anger against oppression was strong in the speeches of the local strike leaders. This 
oppression was political, social, and economic, but the strike leaders attributed this 
oppression to the corrupt political system and the solution was the gaining of their 
political rights. James Ibbotson commented on the theme of Thomas Cooper’s hymn 
that God never made a slave, this was the work of man. John W. Smyth spoke in terms
110 Bradford Observer, 18 August 1842
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of the freebom Englishman. Smyth proclaimed ‘we had been told that Britons never 
shall be slaves, and that slavery cannot exist in Great Britain. Is that true?’ The crowd 
then shouted No!’, Smyth continued, ‘then it is a mockery, and those who present it 
from being true are mockers.’ The speakers at Bradford Moor commented upon ‘the 
oppression under which the labouring classes had so long been labouring’ and that ‘the 
present time was thought to be a favourable time for throwing off the burden.’ One 
speaker pointed to the nearby barracks and commented that the horses there had been 
saddled for the last eight days, but ‘the working classes had been saddled upwards of 
twenty years’ but now they were ‘resolved to throw off the saddle.’ This oppression was 
political, social and economic but the solution was clearly political because in order that 
the saddle ‘might remain off they had resolved to keep it down in the ditch by placing 
over it the People’s Charter.’112
It is by no means evident that the wage demand was directed primarily against the 
middle classes in their role as employers despite Henry Hodgson’s claim that ‘had the 
many reductions which had been effected of late years been attempted at one fell 
swoop, the crisis would have come and gone long ere now, but they knew better. But no 
resistance to such a system had ever been got up so effacious as this one.’ The local 
Chartist leaders of the strike made it clear that only the possession of political power 
could guarantee wage rises that would not be reduced again. For Henry Hodgson ‘a 
strike for higher wages merely, was a shortsighted policy, for though this object might 
be obtained, another few weeks and the reduction would again be made. The strike 
should not be for a rise only, but for a guarantee that the rise should not again be 
reduced, and nothing could guarantee that but the possession of political power by the 
workmen.’ So the wages issue did not necessarily imply a high presence of 
economically based class conflict. The strike leaders saw the cause of low wages as 
being the corrupt political system rather than being inherent in the economic system. All 
forms of property were protected by law apart from the working man’s labour. The 
Charter would bring fair laws which would protect the working people’s labour as well 
as other forms of property. The Charter would bring regulation with the revival of fixed 
wages rates, a Ten Hour bill to limit the time machinery could be worked, and taxes on 
machinery to reduce the unfairness of men competing with machinery. Because the 
local strike leaders held this belief George Fletcher was able to link the corruption of the
112 Bradford Observer, 18 August 1842
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Commons by the aristocracy with social ills when he explained ‘The consequence (of 
the corruption of the Commons by the Lords) is that those who produce all the wealth of 
the country were living in wretchedness, for by the most unceasing labour it was 
impossible in many instances to supply the simplest wants of nature.’113 So the presence 
of the wage demand in the strike does not necessarily mean that the strike was an 
expression of strong economically based class conflict.
It is true that the workers were in wretched economic circumstances and that these bad 
economic conditions provided much of the impetus for the strike. For example 
according to Fletcher ‘those who make England what it is, the richest of all countries, 
are clothed in rags and sinking into the grave under the pressure of the severest toil.’ 
There is a sense of exploitation present in anger over low wages and the New Poor Law 
that forms part of class-consciousness. John Smith considered that ‘It was certainly the 
right of every Englishman to have a fair day’s wages for a fair days work, but it was too 
true that hundreds in Bradford could not obtain such a right’. Smith went on to claim 
‘when the New Poor Law was first brought into the house of Lords, one reason assigned 
for its necessity was that the poor might be prevented from eating the rich. The rich had 
for along time been eating up the poor, but let the rich take care that the poor, in this 
respect, do not become their imitators and eat up the rich.’ Yet even here the terms used 
are the ‘Englishman, and the ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ which are not clearly class conscious 
distinctions. It was the House of Lords rather than the middle classes who are pointed to 
as the originators of the New Poor Law.114
There were criticisms of the middle classes made by the local strike leaders. For 
example Benjamin Rushton calculated that ‘every working man made two pounds six 
shillings per week whilst many were paid with ^ shillings’. Those who received the rest 
were ‘the aristocracy, the Parsons, the shopocracy and the millocrats.’115 Here the 
traditional enemies of the people were being joined by the shopocrats and millocrats. So 
Benjamin Rushton was extending the traditional radical ideology by extending the range 
of enemies of the people rather than articulating a wholly new class-conscious ideology 
although he was extending it to take account of economic exploitation. The influence of
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‘popular political economy’ and Thomas Hodgskin mediated through the radical press 
was certainly felt here.116 However crucially the ‘millocrats’ and ‘shopocrats’ were 
being criticised for their role in exchange rather than production. Although the local 
strike leaders did criticise the manufacturers they did this in moral terms rather than by 
actually attacking the capitalist economic system itself. For example Benjamin Rushton 
described the Leaguers as ‘grasping avaricious tyrants, whose counting house was their 
church, their desk their altar, their ready reckoner their prayer book, and money their 
god.’ Even here Rushton used moral language to criticise the middle class Leaguers. 
Certainly Rushton’s speech does not show opposition to the repeal of the Com Laws in 
itself as Rushton describes himself as a Com Law repealer but ‘he was something 
more,’ because ‘he wanted other reforms along with it, or else the repeal of the Com 
Laws would be of no benefit to them. If the Com Law repealers would come out for the 
Charter, they would go with them.’ Henry Hodgson attacked the manufacturers as well 
as the aristocracy, ‘One reduction after another had taken place in wages, but rather than 
reduce wages to the starvation point, the manufacturer or whatever he might be, ought 
to give up his business. It certainly was an anomaly that so much starvation should exist 
in the midst of so much abundance.’ Again here the criticism of the manufacturer seems 
to be in moral terms rather than an attack on the capitalist economic system itself.117 
Benjamin Rushton at Halifax spoke of the distress of the operatives and called the 
masters cruel because in Lancashire they had reduced the men’s wages at a time when 
trade seemed to be improving at last, and that this reduction had been made by the 
masters in an attempt to obtain the repeal of the Com Laws.118 Again moral criticism 
was made use of rather than criticism of the capitalist system itself.
This analysis of the speeches concentrates on the ideological beliefs of the leaders of the 
strike. The unanimous votes for the resolutions and cheers by the large crowds who 
attended the meetings however suggests assent among the rank and file with the 
ideological views expressed by the strike leaders. Nevertheless a more distinctly class­
conscious attitude is present in the reports we have of what the crowds were talking 
about after the meetings. For example after the Bradford Moor meeting on 14 August 
there was much talk among the people who had attended the meeting of machinery. The
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reporter of the Bradford Observer stated ‘nothing was more common in the assembled
groups than the remark, that machinery has compelled the man to wander in idleness,
and has harnessed the woman and child to incessant labour; and that the heaviest orders
a manufacturer could secure were executed in a few days by the application of
machinery.’119 This certainly suggests class-consciousness and even class conflict
between the working classes and the manufacturer. Nevertheless the solution to this
could still be seen as political and so this limited the amount of class conflict involved
and meant that that conflict was primarily political due to the manufacturers’ role in
supporting the corrupt political system. The solution to the problem of machinery for
many working people, for example supported by the Bradford people at meetings in
July, was not a change in the economic system but rather the enactment of the Charter
which would enable the implementation of reformist changes such as taxes on
1machinery, regulation of wages and short-time to limit competition.
A class identity was present in the strike in Yorkshire. It was the result of a mixture of 
political, economic, and social exploitation. An economic class based identity derived 
from the shared experience of low wages and deprivation. There was a sense of unity of 
manual work present in the strike. These shared experiences could constitute the basis 
of class-consciousness. However this does not need to imply that class conflict was 
present. We do not need to subscribe to the Marxist view that sees class conflict as 
necessarily being present where class conciseness exists. There was hostility to the 
middle classes expressed in the strike, but this was derived to a very great extent from 
the moral or political rather than the economic role of the middle classes, in supporting 
the corrupt political system which oppressed the people. For example in Bradford 
Observer in July ‘Rational Chartist’ argued that there was a ‘spirit of distrust between 
the working and middle classes which often amounts to deep hatred,’ and that it is ‘well 
known that in the manufacturing districts and to some extent in the agricultural districts 
a spirit of jealousy exists between the middle and working classes.’ However ‘Rational 
Chartist’ attributed this to political not economic causes, arguing that it was due to the 
fact that the working classes had helped the middle classes gain the franchise in 1832 
but in 1839 the middle classes had refused to support the working classes in their
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101struggle to gain universal suffrage. Undoubtedly conflict over wages did produce 
some class tension. But the fact that ultimately the reason for low wages was the 
political disenfranchisement of the workers meant that the local leaders of the strike 
could still hope for co-operation with the industrious middle classes. Class was not the 
only identity articulated in the strike in Yorkshire. Other collective identities of ‘the 
people’, ‘the nation’ and religion were articulated in speeches and resolutions during the 
strike in Yorkshire. However in the speeches and resolutions the people or the nation 
were often equated in the same with the ‘working classes’ or contrasted with the 
‘middle classes’.122
Concept of the General Strike
Prothero in his article on William Benbow has argued that in 1831 Benbow conceived 
of the general strike as a popular radical tactic of the mass platform agitation to pressure 
the government into enacting universal suffrage rather than as a proto-syndicalist 
venture. The strike was to use force of numbers to intimidate the government. However 
Prothero suggested that the 1842 strike was no longer a popular radical strategy but 
rather it was an industrial proto-syndicalist venture.123 Here it will be argued that 
Prothero is wrong to suggest that the concept of the general strike held by the Yorkshire 
Chartists in 1842 differed from Benbow’s concept of the strike in 1831. It will be 
argued that the concept of the general strike which Prothero attributed to William 
Benbow was still shared by the Yorkshire Chartist strike leaders in 1842. The Yorkshire 
strike leaders in 1842 do not appear to have mentioned Benbow by name. But in fact in 
Yorkshire the general strike, as envisioned by the local Yorkshire leaders, had a lot in 
common with William Benbow’s 1831 plan for a ‘Grand National Holiday’. The 1842 
strike in Yorkshire was not a proto-syndicalist plan and was not based on trade unions. 
Rather it was a radical mobilisation with the hope that the middle classes would take 
part as well. It was still viewed as a popular political action even if only the working 
classes were involved because the working classes were now the excluded people due to
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the enfranchisement of the middle classes in 1832.124 It was much more a classic radical
move than in Lancashire where the trade society involvement in the strike was more
important. This trade society involvement did not take place in Yorkshire. The workers
were involved in the Yorkshire strike as local communities rather than trade societies.
Formal trade unionism was far weaker in Yorkshire than in Lancashire with the
woolcombers, weavers and spinners finding it impossible to maintain continuous formal 
• 1unions. The Sheffield and Leeds trade societies refused to play a similar part in 
Yorkshire to the trades delegates in Lancashire. In this the concept and practice of the 
general strike in Yorkshire fits in closely with William Benbow’s conception of the 
strike as a traditional popular radical agitation rather than as a move by trade unions.
The Yorkshire strike leaders insisted that the strike was to be peaceful. For Henry 
Hodgson, ‘This was not a foolish movement as some heretofore had been. It was not a 
foolish physical force attempt.’126 Here the strike was distanced from the openly 
insurrectionary physical force risings in 1839 and 1840. The term revolutionary or near 
revolutionary has often been applied to the general strike but the term ‘revolution’ is 
often left undefined. The enactment of the People’s Charter would have constituted a 
political revolution and in this sense the general strike can be said to have been seen as a 
revolutionary move. However if we equate ‘revolutionary’ with physical force then the 
general strike is far more ambiguous. The Yorkshire leaders viewed the general strike as 
a peaceful, constitutional and lawful tactic. At Bradford Moor on 14 August all the 
speakers explained that the strike would be a ‘moral force’ move and that they must be 
peaceable. The speakers told the people ‘to be peaceable, to discard every idea of 
physical force, for it was a moral warfare in which they were engaged, and if they used 
moral force alone they could not fail to be victorious.’127 The leaders of the general 
strike were relying on the unity and sheer numbers of the people to pressure the 
government into enacting the Charter without the need for physical force. Only by 
achieving this unity would the government see that it was hopeless to resist and would 
have to give in and allow the Charter to become law. For example on 15 August John
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Arran declared that ‘if they were all to stand firmly up to their point, they could not fail 
to carry it. Such a spectacle had never been seen in this country before.’128
The division between moral and physical force during the Chartist period were not 
clear-cut. An important feature of the mass platform strategy was to threaten the use of 
physical force whether or not it was actually intended to use force.129 However as they 
were in the end relying on sheer numbers to show the government that resistance was 
useless this pressure of numbers can itself be seen to be straddling the line between 
moral and physical force. The strike was very close to forcible intimidation which was 
the traditional strategy of the constitutionalist platform agitation. Nevertheless unless 
we equate moral force solely with educational tactics it does seem fair to describe the 
strike, a tactic of unarmed resistance, as a moral force move. Importantly it seems that 
the ‘language of menace’, the threat to use violence if peaceful measures did not work, 
was largely absent from the 1842 strike leaders’ speeches. Indeed Prothero may be at 
fault to suggest that in 1831 Benbow thought that the strike might lead to the necessity 
of the use of armed resistance by the strikers. In the Poor Man’s Guardian in 1831 
Benbow himself claimed that the ‘National Holiday’ would lead to the government 
surrendering ‘without resort to anarchy, confusion, revolution or blood’ simply by the 
force of united numbers.130 The fact that the leaders in 1842 did not make public appeals 
to arm suggests that they either saw the strike as a confrontation in which the authorities 
would not dare to resist the power of public opinion or if the authorities did resist to 
begin with they would have to give in when middle class public opinion came down on 
the side of the people in horror at government repression. Popular protest often took the 
form of a battle for public opinion with the protesters hoping to win over public opinion 
by showing the authorities to be committing unprovoked act of excessive violence or 
repression. For example John Arran insisted ‘it was the hope of their enemies that 
they would step beyond the law, but he exhorted them to keep within it...their motto 
was “peace, law and order” and they should let their enemies be the first to violate that 
motto...in such times every man ought to be activated with the spirit of a martyr.’ 
Benjamin Rushton at Halifax on 15 entreated the people to be ‘peaceable, for the
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bloodhounds were abroad, and nothing would please their enemies better than to see 
them commit themselves. Then they could use their arguments, indeed their only 
argument, lead and steal.’132
Clearly the public opinion that the strike leaders wanted to win over was that of the 
industrious middle classes. The 1842 strike, like Benbow’s concept of the strike in 
1831, was not seen as merely a venture of the working classes. It was to be a popular 
protest of all the industrious classes against the idle.133 John W. Smyth on 15 August 
asserted ‘It was now the accepted time for the middle classes.’ Henry Hodgson also 
concluded his speech with the words ‘now was the accepted time for the middle 
classes.’ It would be wrong to interpret this phrase as a threat to the middle classes. 
Hodgson himself had in the previous few weeks enrolled in the local branch of Sturge’s 
NCSU which aimed for unity between the middle and working classes based on 
‘Complete Suffrage.’ Hodgson’s words are best interpreted as an invitation to the 
middle classes to support the working classes in their move to gain the Charter. The 
general strike was here viewed not as being the preserve of the working classes, but 
rather as a traditional radical move by the whole people, including the industrious 
middles classes as well as the working classes. This appeal to public opinion, to the 
whole of the industrious nation, both middle and working classes, to resist aristocratic 
government tyranny can be seen in John Arran’s words ‘if military law be declared, will 
England submit to it? Will England submit to be governed by a faction?’134
However as will be shown later the concept of the strike as a moral force venture which 
was held by most of the local leaders was not fulfilled in practice. There was some 
division among the local Chartist strike leaders. A minority element among the 
leadership did view the strike in insurrectionary terms. The local Chartist strike leader 
Isaac Clisset led the strikers at Cleckheaton on 18 August in an advance against the 
cavalry when projectiles were thrown knocking some of the military off their horses. 
William Jackson Cockcroft, a leading ‘physical force’ Chartist at Halifax, was active as
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a leader of the Halifax crowds.135 Among the rank and file there was a more physical 
force concept of the strike than among the majority of the strike leaders.
Religious elements were important in the concept of the 1842 general strike in 
Yorkshire. This again fits with William Benbow’s concept of the ‘National Holiday’ as 
a religious event. This can be seen when James Ibbotson asserted on 14 August that 
‘they had been denounced very unjustly as infidels.’ The meeting then sung Thomas 
Cooper’s hymn ‘God made everything, but He never made a slave, that was the work of 
man’.136 The morality of the 1842 strike was also emphasised by linking it with 
teetotalism. G. Bishop the chairman of the Bradford Moor meeting on 14 August 
insisted that ‘the people should abstain from alcohol and not exceed the bounds of 
Peace, Law and Order’. The call to abstain from alcohol was partly practical to make 
the movement more effective and prevent unnecessary violence so as to win public 
opinion over. But it was also to mark out the movement as a deeply moral
177undertaking. The religious and moral justification of the strike which was present in 
the speeches by the leaders at the start continued throughout the strike. The strikers who 
came from the Todmorden and Hebden Bridge area to Halifax on 15 August sang the 
One-Hundredth Psalm as they entered Halifax. At the meeting at Halifax on Tuesday 
morning there was a prayer asking for God to protect the strike and the hymn ‘Praise 
God from whom all blessings flow’ was sung.138 The presence of women in the marches 
and meetings contributed to the feeling of the strikers that the strike was a highly moral 
movement.
The Bradford strike leaders also concurred with Benbow over the need to requisition 
supplies to support themselves during the strike. For example one speaker at the 
meeting on Bradford Moor explained ‘if it were asked, how were they to subsist? It 
might be answered that there was plenty in the county, all produced by the working 
classes. Heaven had sent a plentiful harvest, the world was full of plenty, the 
warehouses of the country were full of goods of all descriptions, there was no want,
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only the working classes were miserable, they were in want, but...if they allowed 
themselves to perish in the midst of such abundance, they would be guilty of suicide.’ 
Henry Hodgson asserted that ‘while working out this experiment, they must not starve, 
that would be suicide.’139
Violence in the Strike
In terms of the extent of violence the Chartist leaders’ concept of the general strike as a 
moral force tactic was not completely fulfilled in practice. The Chartist strike leaders 
who gave the speeches at the start, advocating a peaceful strike, seem not to have had 
full control over the turnout crowds, and in general did not actually lead the crowds on 
the turnout processions.140 Rather those Chartist activists who tended to actually head 
the crowd on their marchers were often more inclined to advocate force in defence 
against the authorities. These were the Chartist activists such as Isaac Clisset and 
William Jackson Cockcroft. Where there was resistance by mill-owners physical force 
was used. The strikers were prepared to use force when mills were defended, especially 
on those defended with special constables, though normally only the minimum 
necessary to gain entry, and there does not seem to have been any serious retaliation 
against the defenders. For example attacks were made on the Shade mill at Haley Hill in 
Halifax and on Rouse’s mill in Bradford. There were some minor incidents of personal 
violence during the turning out of the mills. For example one master was pushed to the 
ground when he tried to resist and another had his fingers broken with a cudgel. Threats 
were made on occasions, for example, the threat to bum done the mill if it was started 
again before the order was given. In general the strikers were relying on their strength in 
numbers, though of course this itself was a form of intimidation, and many of the turned 
out workers did not have a choice about whether to join the procession or not, for 
example at Castlefield’s mill near Bingley. There was also requisitioning of provisions. 
For example food and a £40 contribution was levied at Mytholmroyd.141 Near Bradford 
the strikers asked for food and money from houses. Although force was not used people 
probably did not have any choice over whether to give or not.
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Many of the turnouts were armed with bludgeons and sticks though very rarely with old 
blunderbusses.142 Violence was not indiscriminate. Where there was violence it was 
defensive. This suggests that the strike was not a mere hunger question even when the 
wages of 1840 were demanded. There were numerous incidents of stones being thrown 
at the military or special constables when they tried to halt the turnouts or took prisoners 
as at Bowling and Holme Lane End near Bradford on 17 August. Where acts of violence 
occurred they were normally provoked by the military or special constables. The 
presence of the military when the strike was being conducted peaceably and lawfully, in 
the eyes of the strikers, produced exasperation. The taking of prisoners produced similar 
exasperation among the strikers. The throwing of stones or attempts to release prisoners 
were normally a result of this exasperation. The worst incident of violence perpetrated 
by the crowd was the attack on the troops at Salterhebble near Halifax on 16 August. 
However this attack on the troops who had conveyed the prisoners to Elland railway 
station was viewed as a justifiable resistance to tyranny and was not the work of a 
mindless mob. The strikers clearly felt that the strike was constitutional and the 
authorities had no right to make arrests. On the previous day at the meeting at Skircoat 
Moor in the afternoon a deputation had been sent from the meeting to the magistrates to 
request the release of the prisoners that night and it was only after this request had been 
refused that the attack on the troops who had escorted the prisoners took place. Indeed 
initially the aim had been to rescue the prisoners but the military had passed to the 
station before the crowd were prepared for the rescue attempt.143
Nevertheless no violence was offered where mills did not put up a resistance. The 
generally peaceful nature of the strike can be seen very clearly in Huddersfield. The 
postmaster of Huddersfield described the strike in Huddersfield as an ‘insurrection’ yet 
the town was ‘without a single act of known violence’ and there did not appear to be 
any likelihood of violence. The town was completely peaceful despite the fact that 
thousands were standing in the streets and ‘no fears of injury to property or persons are 
entertained so long as no opposition is offered.’144 In many ways the behaviour of the 
crowd was a significant advance on the type of eighteenth century and early nineteenth 
century crowd behaviour identified by E. P. Thompson, Rude and Stevenson. It was not
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‘collective bargaining by riot’, because in general the Plug Plot crowds did not destroy 
property, they simply unplugged the steam boilers which powered the factories or cut 
the mill dams of water powered mills.145 In general there was little damage to either 
property or persons compared to older forms of crowd behaviour which safeguarded 
persons but not property. Neither were the crowds aiming their protest simply at the 
masters but rather they were aiming at the government. Thompson when looking at food 
riots identified them as political in the sense of being outraged at unfairness but stressed 
that they aimed at the restoration of reciprocities and lost rights rather than directly 
political aims. The call for the Charter by the rank and file strikers means that the strike 
must be seen as an advance on the type of behaviour identified by Thompson. Although 
the strikers probably believed that there had been universal suffrage under the ancient 
Anglo-Saxon constitution this had supposedly been lost so far back in time as to 
constitute something more than the restoration of a threatened popular right.
Defeat of the Strike
The strike in Yorkshire did collapse very quickly. By far the most important reason for 
the rapid collapse of the movement in Yorkshire was the response of the authorities in 
Bradford, Halifax and Leeds. Bradford and Halifax were the powerhouses of the 
Yorkshire strike and the early regaining of control of the large towns by the magistrates 
using the military was a decisive blow to the strike. The strong military presence 
inhibited action in Leeds. The Bradford, Halifax and Leeds magistrates were active 
from the start; after hearing of the strike in Lancashire they were able to prepare for a 
strike in Yorkshire while it was still being planned with magistrates meetings in 
Bradford and Halifax over the weekend 13 and 14 August to swear in special constables 
and request extra military support from Leeds and Burnley while the Leeds magistrates 
called out the Yorkshire Hussars yeomanry. The Bradford and Halifax magistrates were 
sitting on Monday morning before the start of the meetings that began the strike in their 
towns. From the start the magistrates intervened though relatively ineffectively to begin 
with before extra military resources were available. At Halifax the magistrates with 
special constables interrupted the early morning meetings on Monday. A Bradford
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magistrate headed the military who followed the Bradford turnouts to Halifax and 
unsuccessfully tried to prevent them entering Halifax.146 In Halifax, Bradford and Leeds 
the strike was fairly rapidly overcome once extra military resources were in place. In 
Halifax the crowds were fired on by the infantry, charged by the hussars, and arrests 
were made by the special constables on 15 and 16 August effectively regaining control 
of Halifax.147 At Bradford on 16 August the military were used to protect the mills, 
twenty-eight arrests were made by the special constables and in the evening the Lancers 
were ordered to clear the street which they did violently. On Wednesday the military 
force inside the town was increased and the yeomanry and mounted specials under the 
command of a magistrate chased the turnouts away at Bowling after stones had been 
thrown at the mounted specials. Once the military were in place in the towns the 
magistrates, especially at Bradford and Halifax, continued to take firm measures to get 
the mill owners to start work again. For example on Wednesday evening the Bradford 
magistrates held a meeting with the master spinners to ask them to start working again 
in the morning. All agreed except for those on Bradford Moor.148 On 19 August the 
magistrates of Halifax issued a placard advising the mill-owners to arm themselves and 
their workmen and shoot anyone who tried to draw the plugs of their mills if they did 
not desist.149
The constant passage of troops through Leeds, the presence of large numbers of troops 
there, and the large numbers of special constables prevented the strike getting seriously 
underway in Leeds although the operatives expressed their sympathy with the turnouts 
in neighbouring industrial villages to the east of Leeds and had held meetings on 
Hunslet Moor supporting the Charter.150 The magistrates in Leeds acted very firmly and 
were determined to prevent the strikers from entering the town itself. Leeds formed a 
military stronghold throughout the strike with Prince George of Cambridge 
commanding the regular troops until the arrival of Major General Brotherton from 
London. On 17 August the Riot Act proclamation was read, artillery pieces were 
brought into Holbeck and arrests were made. On 18 August the troops and special
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constables at Leeds dispersed a meeting at Hunslet Moor, made more arrests and 
effectively ended the strike in Leeds. More troops were also sent to Leeds on 18 August 
with Major General Brotherton who had been put in command of the West Riding 
forces.151
By 18 and 19 August the troops in the towns had recovered control of them for the local
authorities. Troops had been brought into the towns as soon as they could be spared.
The magistrates in their letters to the Home Office made it clear that it was only the
presence of the military which had allowed them to regain control of the towns and that
the military needed to stay for some time for them to retain control. For example on 17
August, after the arrival of Hussars from York and infantry from Hull, the Bradford
magistrates felt that the town was in a much more satisfactory state owing to the
presence of additional military force which they hoped was now strong enough to 
1protect the town. And indeed there was no attempt to stop the mills in Bradford itself 
on the Wednesday due to this increased military presence. On 19 August Major General 
Brotherton entered Bradford. At Huddersfield it was the increasing of the strength of the 
military force in the town by the arrival of cavalry and yeomanry on Thursday 18 
August that led the magistrates to ‘now feel there is sufficient strength to resist if 
necessary.’153
Although the military were able to regain control of the towns and so defeat the strike in 
the towns very early, the turnouts were still able to operate in the outlying villages and 
neighbourhoods for a longer period.154 The magistrates were very reluctant to split up 
the troops to protect individual mills or to allow the troops to leave town to aid mills in 
outlying places and villages because this would leave the towns itself unprotected and 
the turnouts might return.155 However the heart had gone out of the strike when the 
towns were back under the control of the authorities and the most of the mills in the 
country and villages were returning to work early in the week after the strike had broken
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out in Yorkshire. By 23 August a great number of the mills in the villages around 
Bradford as well as the town of Bradford were again at work.
The timing of the strike, the outbreak being a week later than in Lancashire, meant that 
the Home Office was intervening from the start of the strike with Home Secretary Sir 
James Graham already aware that there was a serious public order problem in the 
country. The Cabinet had met and decided upon the Royal Proclamation against 
unlawful assemblages on Saturday 13 August before the strike had affected much of the 
West Riding.156 Graham offered advice and encouragement to the magistrates in the 
affected towns who were writing to the Home Office daily. Graham urged the 
magistrates to act to with energy to suppress disorder, preserve the public peace and to 
protect those who wished to work. He urged them to use their full powers for example 
by preventing the entry of the marchers into their towns. He advised them to strengthen 
the civil force as far as possible by swearing in special constables. The civil forces 
should do their utmost to repress disorder and only request troops or more troops if it 
was necessary.157 The military were to be actually used in assistance of the civil forces 
only if ‘absolutely necessary’, but then they should be used ‘without parley.’158 From 
the 17 August Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Arbuthnot was given command of the 
whole of the disturbed districts in the North and Midlands (replacing Sir William Warre 
who had formally been commander of the whole Northern District) and Brotherton took 
charge of Yorkshire under Arbuthnot.159
There were other reasons for the early defeat of the strike. The concept of the general 
strike as a display of unity, which was held by the local Yorkshire strike leaders, was 
never tested in practice. There was never united support for the strike among the 
working people in the West Riding. This meant that the concept of the general strike 
entertained by the strike leaders in the West Riding was never fulfilled in practice. The 
people never presented the united front which the Chartist strike leaders had hoped for 
in order to overwhelm the authorities. The Yorkshire strike leaders had hoped to present
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such a united and overwhelming front that the authorities would not dare to resist. The 
strikers seem to have felt confident that the military would not fire on the people and 
probably hoped that the military would join the people against the authorities. When the 
military did fire the strikers were shocked and dismayed and normally retired in 
confusion. They had hoped to bring on a confrontation with the authorities but thought 
that the authorities would back down without the need for fighting. When it became 
clear that this was not the case they had neither the arms nor the desire to make a truly 
insurrectionary uprising.
In many areas people were reluctant to commit themselves to the strike unless it was to 
be fully national. This feeling stemmed in part from the memories of the 1839 and 1840 
risings in Yorkshire. In 1839 and 1840 Sheffield and Bradford Chartists had attempted 
to stage armed risings and had hoped for support from other parts of Britain, however 
instead they had risen alone apart from Newport in South Wales. Similarly the 
Huddersfield and Barnsley men had risen in 1820 at the time of the Radical War in 
Glasgow but had not received support from other areas. The fear of acting unless the 
strike was fully general in England clearly inhibited many of the working people. For 
example at Barnsley the Chartist leader and weaver Frank Mirfield asked the people if 
they were prepared to give up working if the strike became general and received an 
affirmative response The local Barnsley leaders were reluctant to rise alone as they had 
done in the isolated Grange Moor rising of 1820 and would only strike if they felt the 
strike was already general. However news arrived on Tuesday that either the strike was 
not general or turnouts were not going to arrive so there was no strike.160 The feeling 
that the strike was not general inhibited action and by 18 August it had become clear 
that the strike was not general throughout the country with people in Birstal calling the 
strike ‘inconsiderate and sectional.’161
A second important reason for the less than united response to the strike was fear of 
entrapment in an ACLL plot. From the start of the strike in Yorkshire there was a belief 
that the strike had been started in Lancashire by the Leaguers for their own ends. This 
inhibited support for the strike. At the start of the strike the Lancashire strikers said the 
Huddersfield people were ‘unwilling to be made instruments in the hands of designing
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1 A*)knaves for bad purposes.’ This fear seems to have built up over the week and clearly 
decreased the enthusiasm for continuing the strike. On 18 August it was reported from 
Birstal that ‘the general opinion here is that this...strike is really a Com Law League 
Plot to serve the designs of the Masters, and to throw the Charter cause as much back as 
possible’. On the same day from Heckmondwike it was reported that the 
Heckmondwike people were ‘opposed to the continuation of the strike as they consider 
it only a plot of the League.’ From Mill Bridge it was reported that the Mill Bridge 
people said the League was to blame for the strike and the strike could do no good. At 
Cooper Bridge the people thought that the strike was a ‘trick of the League and not 
calculated to aid the Charter.’163All these places were still on strike on the Thursday 
though under compulsion from turnouts from other towns. There was material to fuel 
the suspicions of the Yorkshire people. Many of the local Yorkshire papers carried the 
opinion that the strike in Lancashire was a League plot. In Yorkshire itself a number of 
masters had closed their factories just before the turnouts arrived, for example at 
Keighley, and many or most masters did not resist when the turnouts arrived for 
example in Bradford There ^ /yumours that the Leaguers had provided money, for 
example at Hebden Bridge on 13 August, though in fact this money seems to have come 
from requisitions.
An important element in the explanation for the rapid collapse of the strike was a side 
effect of the strike being far more political right from the start in Yorkshire and the lack 
of a clear matter of pending wages reductions. When it became clear that the authorities 
would not just give in and that the troops would fire, it was obviously going to be 
impossible to use the strike to gain the Charter. The fact that there were no immediate 
reductions in wages to combat and that the Charter had always been the primary aim of 
the strike in Yorkshire, though of course people expected the Charter to bring better 
social conditions, meant there was not the underlying wages grievance to continue the 
strike after the Charter clearly was not going to be obtained. This was in contrast to 
Lancashire where the power-loom weavers in particular continued a strike for wages 
into September.
162 Northern Star, 20 August 1842
163 Northern Star, 20 August 1842
163
The failure of the Trades Delegates Conference in Manchester and the NCA national 
leadership to provide leadership for the strike in Yorkshire was also important for the 
failure of the strike. The fact that no follow up came from the NCA Executive Meeting 
or the NCA National Conference which had both been sitting in Manchester on 16 and 
17 August was a demoralising blow. A strong address in favour of the strike was 
published in the name of the NCA Executive on 17 August and a milder address in 
favour of the strike was issued by the NCA National Conference but the national 
leadership did nothing active to support the strike due to divisions and the fact that they 
were in imminent danger of arrest or were actually arrested after the Executive address 
had been issued. The hostility of the Northern Star to the strike on Saturday 20 August 
killed off any hopes over the weekend that O’Connor, despite his strong following in 
Yorkshire, would lead the strike.164
The failure of the strike to be a truly united action meant that the aspirations on which it 
was based could not be fulfilled. The strike was not followed by serious repression, 
although troops remained in the towns. There was not the imposition of tyranny and 
middle class opinion was not brought over to the side of the people as hoped for by 
some of the Chartist strike leaders. The failure of the general strike for the Charter in the 
West Riding, together with its failure in the Northwest and the Midlands, helps explain 
why Chartism went into sharp decline after 1842. The failure of the strike showed that 
the ultimate ulterior measure of the popular radical platform agitation had failed.
In conclusion the strike in the West Riding of Yorkshire was neither a spontaneous 
outbreak nor simply spread by the turnouts from the Northwest. Instead this chapter has 
demonstrated that the strike was planned by local Yorkshire Chartist activists after 
receiving news of the strike in the Northwest. The Chartists activists organised and 
began the strike from the local platforms in the Yorkshire towns and made its aim the 
enactment of the People’s Charter from the start. The local Chartist activists in the West 
Riding of Yorkshire, as in the Midlands, attempted from local platforms particularly in 
Bradford, Halifax and Dewsbury to revive the general strike ‘ulterior measure’ of the 
mass platform agitation following the success of the Lancashire Chartist activists in 
bringing large numbers out on strike for the Charter in the context of the reluctance of 
the national Chartist leadership to propose decisive ‘ulterior measures’ from the national
164 Northern Star, 20 August 1842
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platform after the rejection of the 1842 National Petition. Once the local Yorkshire 
Chartist activists knew of the strike in Lancashire they deliberately attempted to work 
up a strike in Yorkshire and they provided the leadership and organised the strike. At 
the public meetings before the strike broke out the local Chartists called for a strike 
which in many towns began immediately after these meetings. In Yorkshire, unlike in 
Lancashire, trade societies did not provide any leadership for the strike. The strike was 
not simply brought over from Lancashire by the Lancashire strikers except at 
Todmorden and Huddersfield. The enactment of the People’s Charter was the primary 
aim of the strike in Yorkshire. Yorkshire Chartists were present at the early Manchester 
trades meetings insisting that the aim of the national strike should be the Charter. The 
strike in Yorkshire did not share that hiatus identified by Mather and Sykes in 
Lancashire when wages were supposed to be the main aim at the start of the strike. 
Sykes’ and Mather’s suggestion that the demand for the Charter came from the grass 
roots strikers rather than from the local Chartist activists does not apply to Yorkshire. 
The local Chartist activists in Yorkshire made the Charter the aim of the strike at 
meetings before the strike broke out. Unlike in Lancashire, there was no division 
between the Chartist activists over whether the strike was to be for the Charter or higher 
wages. Where there was division among the Chartist activists it was over whether or not 
to strike. But all were agreed that if there was to be a strike it should be for the Charter 
rather than wages. There was very strong support for the Charter among the grass roots 
strikers. The strike was of far shorter duration than in Lancashire and the Midlands. 
While artisans and factory workers themselves took part in the strike it was domestic 
hand-weavers and hand-combers who formed the largest occupational groups among the 
active strikers.
The strike in Yorkshire does support many of Stedman Jones’ ideas about the nature of 
Chartism and working class radicalism. The strikers did see social evils as rooted in 
political oppression. Where economic oppression was identified by the strikers its cause 
was seen to be the corruption of the political system. During the strike when the middle 
classes were criticised it was largely due to their role in the political system rather than 
in the economic system and the strikers overwhelmingly hoped for the support of the 
middle classes. The dominant discourse employed in the strike was popular 
constitutionalism and the traditional radical ideology of attacking ‘Old Corruption.’ In 
Yorkshire the strike was not seen as a proto-syndicalist strategy involving trade unions.
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Most of the leaders of the general strike in Yorkshire viewed it as a popular radical 
strategy of the mass platform agitation. They intended the strike to be a peaceful display 
of public opinion. They believed the government would have to give way to the 
peaceful resistance of a united people. But in practice this peaceful concept of the strike 
held by the leaders was not shared by all of the rank and file. The strike was very 
extensive in the West Riding and as far as the West Riding is concerned Sykes was 
unsound in his judgement that the strike in the Northwest failed because it did not 
receive an adequate response outside the Northwest. The strike in the West Riding could 
not however be sustained in the face of the vigorous use of the military and civil forces, 
the failure to gain a complete and simultaneous turnout, internal weaknesses including 
the widespread belief that the strike was an ACLL ploy to discredit Chartism, and the 
disillusionment resulting from the failure of the strike for the Charter in the Northwest.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SCOTLAND AND THE STRIKE FOR THE CHARTER
The Dunfermline Chartists described the cessation from labour for the People’s Charter 
in Dunfermline as the ‘grand scheme for political regeneration.’1 This is an appropriate 
description for the strike for the Charter in the east of Scotland in 1842. In Scotland, as 
in the English Midlands, a miners’ strike over industrial grievances began first followed 
by the strike for the Charter. The strike among the miners was almost general affecting 
Lanarkshire, Ayrshire, the Lothians, Stirlingshire, Dumbartonshire, West Fife and 
Clackmannanshire. The Lanarkshire coal and iron miners at Glasgow, Coatbridge and 
Airdrie struck on August 1 followed shortly afterwards by colliers and miners in other 
districts. The miners did not return to work until November in some cases. The miners’ 
struck over their own wage and industrial grievances although there was some 
convergence with the strike for the Charter at times. The strike for the Charter itself was 
confined to the eastern woollen and flax-linen textile districts of Scotland including 
West Fife, Clackmannanshire and Forfarshire lasting for only a few days in the second 
half of August. The aim of the strike in these areas, as expressed in resolutions, 
addresses and speeches, was the enactment of the People’s Charter. In addition there 
were resolutions at meetings in favour of a strike for the Charter in Aberdeen in the 
northeast and Greenock in the west, though no strike took place. In West Fife, 
Clackmannanshire and Dundee the originators of the strike for the Charter were Chartist 
activists, as were the leaders in the attempted strikes at Aberdeen and Greenock. 
Important Chartist public meetings also took place in Edinburgh and Glasgow although 
the Chartist activists in these two cities decided against advocating a strike on tactical 
grounds.
The most recent overview of the 1842 strikes as they affected Scotland is Young’s in 
The Rousing o f the Scottish Working Class. Young presents three arguments about the 
strike in Scotland. Firstly he sees the strike for the Charter as originating with and led 
by the trades. Even in Dundee Young goes only so far as to admit that the Chartists 
created a climate of opinion in which the trades then decided to take action. Secondly 
Young minimises the role of local Chartist activists in bringing forward the Charter as
1 Fifeshire Journal, 8 December 1842
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aim and argues that Chartist activists actually used their weight to prevent a strike or 
prevent existing strikes from being given the aim of the Charter. Young’s view of 
cautious Chartist leaders holding back and moderating a trade union movement eager to 
strike has been supported in the case of Aberdeen by Duncan. The meeting of the 
Dundee trades conference was highlighted by Young to stress the importance of the 
trades in the Scottish strike. Thus a picture of the Scottish strike has emerged bearing 
some similarities to that presented for Lancashire with a strong leadership role coming 
from the trades. Thirdly the miners’ strike and the strike for the Charter in Scotland 
were collapsed into each other by Young and Duncan partly because of the increasingly 
apparent role of Chartist led trade unionism among the Lanarkshire miners.2 The 
chapter will contest Young’s and Duncan’s version of the strike in Scotland. The 
chapter will examine the origins, leadership, aims, organisation, concept and ideology 
of the strike in Scotland.
Political and Industrial Background
The labouring classes and middle classes in Scotland had first become involved in 
political radicalism under the impetus of the French Revolution in the early 1790s. The 
Scottish radical society ‘The Friends of the People’ had a much lower entry subscription 
and more radical demands than its English namesake. Conventions or anti-Parliaments 
were held in Edinburgh in 1792 and 1793 followed by the trial and transportation of the 
leading Scottish radicals Thomas Muir and Thomas Fyshe Palmer and of the London 
Corresponding Society delegates Joseph Gerrald and Maurice Margarot. However 
repression and loyalist reaction destroyed the radical societies. Despite the failed 
conspiracy by a former government spy to capture Edinburgh castle in 1794 and the 
activities of republican United Scotsmen in the late 1790s the movement 
overwhelmingly took a constitutional and peaceful form. After the end of the 
Napoleonic wars the constitutional mass platform agitation was initiated with the setting 
up of Hampden societies following Major John Cartwright’s tours. This was largely a
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British movement in Scotland and was committed to universal suffrage, vote by ballot, 
and annual elections rather than to any form of Scottish independence. The working 
classes took a more prominent part in the post war agitation than in that of the 1790s. 
The constitutional mass platform rather than insurrection typified post war radical 
activity. An outstanding exception was the Glasgow ‘Radical War’ and ‘Battle of 
Bonnymuir’ in 1820 involving a general strike of 60,000 textile workers in Glasgow 
and isolated armed uprisings which were planned to coincide with insurrections in 
England. The treason trials which followed ended this phase of the post-war radical 
movement however those executed, including Baird and Hardie, became martyrs for the 
Scottish Chartists. The revived radical societies in Scotland provided strong support for 
the Reform Bill agitation in 1831 and 1832 and the working class radicals in Scotland in 
the 1830s were increasingly disappointed by the failure of the middle classes to help 
them gain their political rights and by the failure of the Whigs to introduce further 
reforms.3
This disappointment, together with the failure of the factory movement to gain a ten 
hours bill and the failure of trade unions to protect workers, led to the birth of the 
Chartist movement. In 1838 the trial and transportation of the leaders of the Glasgow 
cotton spinners following the cotton spinners’ strike was an important element in the 
creation of the Chartist movement further demonstrating to the working classes that 
only the gaining of political power would bring them justice. In contrast to England the 
New Poor Law was not an issue in Scotland, as the able-bodied unemployed had not 
previously been allowed relief, however the gross inadequacy of poor relief was a major 
source of radical discontent in the 1830s. The Chartist movement was officially 
launched at a monster public meeting in Glasgow on 21 May 1838, organised by the 
Glasgow trades, where the National Petition and the People’s Charter were formally 
introduced by delegates from the Birmingham Political Union and the London Working 
Men’s Association. The possibility of a peaceful general strike by both working and 
middle classes to force the government to enact the Charter was raised by Thomas 
Attwood at the meeting. Chartism rapidly spread among the working classes throughout
3 A. Goodwin, The Friends o f Liberty (Harvard, 1979), 282-315; P. B. Ellis and S. Mac A’Ghobhainn, 
The Scottish Insurrection o f 1820 (London, 1970), 1-374; F. K. Donnelly, ‘The Scottish Rising of 1820: 
A Reinterpretation’, Scottish Tradition, VI (1976), 24-7; J. Belchem, ‘Republicanism, Popular 
Constitutionalism and the Radical Platform in Early Nineteenth Century England’, Social History, 6
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the English speaking Lowlands however it never penetrated the Gaelic speaking 
Highlands. The Scottish Chartist societies did not join the National Charter Association 
(NCA) before 1842 and instead had their own national organisation with the Universal 
Suffrage Central Committee based in Glasgow which in early 1842 was changed to a 
regional federation. Feargus O’Connor’s Northern Star was the main Chartist 
newspaper in Scotland, but there was also a number of Scottish Chartist newspapers, 
most of which collapsed during the depression in the first half of 1842. Scottish 
Chartism has traditionally been viewed as particularly ‘moral force’ in nature largely 
due to the strength of the Christian Chartist Churches in Scotland, to a gross 
exaggeration of the influence of Rev. Patrick Brewster the ‘unconditional obedience’ 
Chartist leader in Paisley, and to the fact that there was no rising in Scotland in 1839, 
though of course there were no risings in most parts of England either. However it has 
become increasing clear that Scottish Chartism was in the mainstream with the 
movement in England with similar support for Feargus O’Connor and similar attitudes 
to ‘moral force’ and ‘physical force’. Feeling against the Com Laws was widespread 
among both the working and middle classes in Scotland. Scotland was the Anti-Corn 
Law League’s (ACLL) greatest region of support outside Lancashire, Cheshire and 
Yorkshire. The Scottish working classes radicals were almost universally committed to 
the repeal of the Com Laws though this did not necessarily translate into support for the 
League. With the deepening economic recession in the first half of 1842 a large 
proportion of the radical middle classes in Scotland became increasingly receptive to the 
Complete Suffrage movement believing that free trade would only be granted by 
Parliament following organic constitutional reform. Indeed Edinburgh, Glasgow, 
Aberdeen and Paisley were some of the strongest centres of support for the Complete 
Suffrage movement.4
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The main districts of Chartist strength in Scotland were also centres of the textile 
industry. The district around Glasgow was the centre of Scotland’s cotton industry. 
Clackmannanshire was an important region of the woollen industry. Dundee, West Fife 
and Aberdeen were centres of the flax-linen industry. Handloom weaving continued to 
dominate in the Clackmannanshire woollen manufacturing, and also in the linen 
industry, particularly in West Fife, with thousands of handloom weavers who could 
hope for improvement only from political change rather than industrial advances. By 
1842 power loom weaving however had progressed rapidly in the cotton industry 
around Glasgow; with the employment of women and children in the powerloom 
factories creating a more docile workforce who were less likely to actively begin a 
political strike. The male cotton spinners were heavily unionised and a relatively well 
paid group. However they had recently suffered the major catastrophe of the trial and 
transportation of their leaders and were fearful of further persecution by the authorities 
and Sheriff Alison. Mining was an important industry particularly in Lanarkshire, 
Ayrshire, West Fife, Clackmananshire, the Lothians, Stirlingshire and Renfrewshire. 
Although the miners were noted, along with agricultural labourers, as a group which 
was not generally receptive to Chartism, Chartist-led trade unionism had grown among 
the Lanarkshire miners by 1842. In the first half of 1842 the Scottish textile industry 
was in the throes of a serious economic depression under which the inadequate system 
of poor relief for the unemployed and partly employed came apart at the seams.5
Origins and Leadership of the Strike for the Charter
The strike for the People’s Charter in Scotland was limited in geographical extent and 
time; nevertheless it was not insignificant. The strike for the Charter was confined to the 
woollen and flax-linen textile districts of West Fife, Clackmannanshire and Forfarshire 
although there were also attempts to start a strike for the Charter in Aberdeen
and Greenock. There is no evidence for prior planning of a strike for the Charter in 
Scotland having taken place before the beginning of the strike in Lancashire. However 
planning took place among local Chartists as soon as news reached them of the strike
5 Peter Carmichal, Dundee Textile History 1790-1885 from the Papers o f  Peter Carmichael (Edinburgh, 
1969), 1-278; Peter Chalmers, Historical and Statistical Account o f Dunfermline (Edinburgh, 1844), vol.
1, 1-592; William Gibson, Reminiscences o f Dollar, Tillicoultry, and other Districts (Edinburgh, 1883), 
1-239; New Statistical Account o f Scotland (Edinburgh, 1845), vol. IX, 886-890, vol. XI, 24-29; ‘Census
171
for the Charter in England. In Forfarshire, West Fife, Clackmannanshire, Greenock and 
Aberdeen the local Chartists were deeply interested in the news of the strike in 
Lancashire and the trades delegates meetings in Manchester. At public meetings the 
NCA executive address and reports of the proceedings of the Great Trades Pelegate 
Conference at Manchester were read out.6 The news of the strike for the Charter in 
England was the stimulus for the Scottish Chartists to act, and in the intervening period 
between hearing of the outbreak of the English strike and the start of the strike in 
Scotland they prepared for a strike in their districts. Already by 20 August Lord Duncan 
in Forfarshire was reporting that if the strike succeeded in Dundee there were 
preparations for Forfar, Arbroath, Montrose, Kirriemuir in Forfarshire and nearby 
Blairgowrie in Perthshire to act in concert with Dundee.7
In Dundee in Forfarshire preparations for the strike began with a meeting of the 
Democratic Society on Thursday 16 August followed by further meetings and the strike 
itself took place from Monday 22 to Wednesday 24 August after the meeting of a trades 
conference on Friday 19 August and public meetings over the weekend. An attempt to 
get up a strike by Chartists and delegates in the Forfarshire town of Montrose was a 
failure and lasted only one day, 22 August. Despite meetings declaring for a strike for 
the Charter in Forfar itself no strike took place. The Dundee strike had ended on 24 
August with the arrest of the Chartist strike leaders and the failure of the march to 
Forfar to spread the strike throughout Forfarshire. The most sustained strike for the 
Charter took place in West Fife where the strike for the Charter began on 23 August and 
was officially declared to be at an end by votes of the inhabitants and the declaration of 
the Cessation from Labour Committee on 30 August, the date on which it had been 
planned to consider whether to continue the strike if it had become national, though a 
miners strike over miners’ grievances continued long after this. In Clackmannanshire 
resolutions for a general strike beginning in one week if information had been received 
that the rest of the country would act likewise were passed on 13, 16 and 22 August. 
Meetings of textile workers and colliers were held on 13 and 16 August at 
Coalsnaughten and a Correspondence and Strike Committee was formed by the local 
Chartists. The Clackmannanshire Chartists had found there was no national response to
Occupations Abstract’, PP (1844), vol. xxvii; R. Mitchison, ‘Scotland 1750-1850’, in F. M. L. 
Thompson, The Cambridge Social History o f Britain (Cambridge, 1993), vol. 1, 155-207
6 British Statesman, 27 August 1842
7 PRO HO 45/266, ff. 100-101, Lord Duncan to Sir J. Graham, 20 August 1842
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their final resolutions on 22 August; they had been handicapped by uncertainty over 
how far the strike was national in the rest of the country and by an unwillingness to 
commit themselves until they were sure it was national. Although the Clackmannanshire 
miners certainly did strike for six weeks no sustained general strike for the Charter 
among the other trades, apart from sporadic strikes among the handloom weavers, 
ultimately took place in Clackmannanshire. By the start of September the strike for the 
Charter in Scotland had collapsed. Chartist initiatives at Greenock and Aberdeen came 
too late after the political strike had already been defeated in England. Important 
meetings also took place in Edinburgh and Glasgow though the Chartist Associations in 
these two cities decided against advocating a strike on tactical grounds, as did Patrick 
Brewster’s ‘unconditional obedience’ Chartists in Paisley.8
The aim of the strike, in Clackmannanshire, West Fife centred on Dunfermline, and 
Forfarshire centred on Dundee, as expressed in resolutions, addresses, and speeches, 
was the enactment of the People’s Charter. In addition the resolutions at the meetings 
were in favour of a strike for the Charter in Aberdeen in the northeast and Greenock in 
the west, though no strike took place. The aim of the strike in Dundee was declared to 
be the enactment of the Charter from 19 August at the Dundee trades conference, at 
public meetings on over the weekend on 20 and 21 August, and at meetings during the 
strike itself on 22, 23, and 24 August. The resolutions passed at the Clackmannanshire 
meeting on 13 August and confirmed on 16 August were for a general strike for the 
Charter beginning within a week if the strike was to be national throughout England and 
Scotland and on 22 August the resolution passed was that a general strike for the 
Charter should begin immediately on receipt of accredited information that the other 
manufacturing districts in the Kingdom would act with the same determination. In West 
Fife in and around Dunfermline the aim of the strike was declared to be the Charter by 
resolutions passed in Dunfermline at public meetings on 23 August and at meetings 
throughout the strike.9
8 Glasgow Saturday Post, 20, 27 August, 3 September 1842; British Statesman, 27 August, 3, 10 
September 1842; Fifeshire Journal, 25, 30 August, 1 September 1842; Dundee Warder, 23, 30 August 
1842; ‘Report of the Commissioners...into the State of the Population in the Mining Districts’, PP 
(1844), vol. 16,49
9 Glasgow Saturday Post, 20, 27 August 1842; British Statesman, 27 August, 3, 10 September 1842; 
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In terms of the numbers involved the strike for the Charter in Scotland was not general. 
The important industrial region around Glasgow, the artisans of Edinburgh, and 
agricultural workers did not strike. However the strike for the Charter did become truly 
general affecting all types of workers in West Fife between 23 and 30 August; with at 
least 30,000 workers on strike in the Dunfermline district. Almost all artisans and 
working master artisans as well as the weavers and miners had ceased work in 
Dunfermline itself as well as the surrounding areas. The only exceptions were the 
butchers and bakers, who had been excepted by the Cessation from Labour Committee, 
and the reapers in the fields.10 Large numbers of textile workers and colliers attended 
the meetings in Clackmannanshire, for example over 4000 were present at the meeting 
on 22 August at Devonside near Coalsnaughton. There were reports of the strike being 
general at times in mid-August in many Clackmannanshire towns, with the woollen 
hand loom weavers appearing to have struck sporadically while awaiting news of 
whether the strike was national. In Dundee 4000 attended the strike meeting on the 
morning of 23 August, and the procession around the factories started with 2000 and 
increased in size as several of the factories turned out. That the numbers were not larger 
may in part be explained by the enrolment of the most trusted workers and the 
manufacturers as special constables and the refusal of the Chartists to do more than send 
in a delegation of eight to ask the factories to turn out. Although the occupational 
composition of the strikers in Dundee is not completely clear it appears that handloom 
weavers formed the core of the Dundee strike as in the Dunfermline strike, although 
numbers of factory operatives certainly joined the strike in Dundee once it was 
underway.11
The originators and leaders of the strike for the Charter in West Fife, Clackmannanshire 
and Dundee were Chartist activists, as were the leaders in the attempted strikes at 
Aberdeen and Greenock. The local Chartist activists in eastern Scotland, like those in 
the West Riding of Yorkshire, the English Midlands, and South Wales, attempted to 
revive the‘sacred montli ulterior measure’ of the platform agitation from local platforms 
after the Lancashire Chartist activists had shown that it was possible to get large 
numbers to strike for the Charter. In Clackmannanshire it was local Chartist activists 
who called for a general strike for the Charter. Members of the West Midland District of
10 Glasgow Saturday Post, 3 September 1842
11 British Statesman, 27 August 1842; Dundee Warder, 23, 30 August 1842
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Scotland Chartist organisation centred at Coalsnaughten took the lead. Thomas Hall and
Thomas Roberts, respectively Treasurer and Secretary of the Scottish West Midland
Chartist District, were members of the correspondence and strike committee at
Coalsnaughten. John Russell, a Clackmannanshire Chartist who had welcomed
O’Connor to the region in 1841, was Chairman of the Correspondence and Strike
Committee.12 The most active leaders in the strike in West Fife and Dunfermline were
the Chartist activists Thomas Morrison, Andrew Henderson and Andrew Flemming.
Morrison, the secretary of the Dunfermline Cessation from labour Committee, was a
master shoemaker, shop owner, and the leading local Chartist as well as being a
magistrate. He was a keen Com taw  repealer and firm advocate of ‘moral force’.
Henderson, the Chairman of the Cessation from Labour Committee, was a weaver and
owner of property in Dunfermline. Flemming, who took a prominent part in the strike
meetings, was a weaver.13 At Dundee it was the Council of the Democratic Society and
other local Chartist activists who were the key figures in organising an attempted
general strike for the Charter from 16 August. Important Chartist leaders of the strike in
Dundee were John Duncan, Chartist preacher at the Chartist church and a shoemaker,
and John Mitchell who had been a delegate to the January Scottish Chartist Conference.
Hugh Ross, a tailor, acted as chairman at the strike meetings at Dundee. John Penny, a
mechanic whose father was founder of old Dundee Political Union was involved.
Thomas Anderson, a leading Chartist activist and a flax dresser, was an important figure
in pushing the Dundee trades delegates conference to declare for a strike for the Charter.
the
However two other Chartist activists, Isaac Peterkin who had been a member ofAJanuary 
conference but was going over to Sturgites, and Alexander Sime, a former Chartist 
preacher who was also going over to Sturgites, though in favour of a general strike in 
principle, were unsure of how much national support it had and were concerned about 
lack of preparation. At Forfar it was the local Chartist activists who organised a strike 
meeting on 22 August.14 At Greenock it was the members of the Chartist Church and 
the Universal Suffrage Association, especially Thomson the Chartist preacher, George 
Robertson, Robert Burrell and Joseph M’Lean, who called on the Greenock trades to
12 British Statesman, 27 August 1842; Glasgow Saturday Post, 20 August 1842; Northern Star, 6 
November, 11 December 1841,25 June 1842
13 Fifeshire Journal, 1 September 1842; Glasgow Saturday Post, 3 September 1842; Alexander Stewart, 
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meet, issued an address to the Trades of Scotland, and attempted to get support for a 
strike involving the Glasgow trades at a meeting in Glasgow. At Aberdeen it was James 
M’Pherson, Alexander Henry, John Troup, James Shirron and David Wright, all 
activists of the Aberdeen Northern District Charter Union, who organised public 
meetings and issued addresses in favour of a potential strike for the Charter.15
In Scotland’s two largest cities, Glasgow and Edinburgh, the Chartist activists made a 
tactical decision not to call for a strike based on the opinion that the violence that had 
arisen in the English strikes and in the miners’ strike would lose rather than gain public 
opinion for the Chartists. Most were not against a general strike for the Charter on 
principle but decided that it was not a good means of mobilising public opinion in the 
circumstances because the people, being unprepared in not having stored up provisions 
or saved money, would have to steal to get food, which would lead to violence and so 
result in the loss of public opinion for their cause. Important public meetings called by 
the local Chartist leaders took place at Edinburgh on 22 August and at Glasgow on 27 
August. The Edinburgh Chartist leaders had met before the meeting and agreed on the 
resolutions beforehand. They blamed the strike on the ACLL for reductions which put 
the workmen in terrible want, made worse by the fact that they knew there was a 
political cause to their distress. They also put the blame on the government for refusing 
relief. They argued that the ACLL masters started the strike but then hid, the Chartists 
did not start the strike, but once on strike they admitted that the Chartists put forward 
the Charter as the aim. They were against a strike in the present circumstances as the 
people were not prepared materially, though they were not against a strike in principle. 
Robert Lowery declared that he would support a strike if the people prepared by 
building up resources in terms of money and food which they might easily do by 
refraining from whiskey and tobacco for three months. But in the present circumstances 
they would have to either steal or starve, and stealing would bring them into 
confrontation with military, which would lose them the public opinion they felt they had 
built up in the first half of 1842.16
The Glasgow Chartist leaders, who provided the nearest equivalent to a national 
leadership for the Chartist movement in Scotland, also advised against a strike on
15 British Statesman, 6 August, 3,10 September 1842
16 British Statesman, 27 August 1842
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grounds of lack of preparations though some of them declared that they were 
disappointed that no strike for the Charter had taken place in Glasgow. Since the 
Glasgow trades union leaders had set their faces against a strike and the strike was 
already virtually over in England, the Glasgow Chartists were not in a position to advise 
in favour of a strike in Glasgow despite urgings by delegates from the Manchester NCA 
conference including William Beesley.17 However the meetings in Glasgow and 
Edinburgh did endorse the alternative ulterior measure advocated in May by the General 
Convention held in London following Parliament’s refusal to consider the second 
National Petition of memorialising the Queen to dismiss her ministers and appoint those 
who would enact the Charter as called for by the signatures to the National Petition. 
They also protested at the unconstitutional interference with the right to public meeting 
which had occurred in England.18
There was no strike in Paisley near Glasgow, a cotton-weaving district suffering 
particularly severely from the industrial depression, apart from a strike for wages by a 
few female power loom weavers. Clarke suggested that the absence of strong unionism 
in Paisley and the presence of large numbers of impoverished handloom weavers may 
be explanations for the failure to strike in Paisley.19 However neither was formal 
unionism in the West Fife linen industry strong, and handloom weavers were the 
mainstay of the political strike in, for example, West Fife and Yorkshire. Clarke 
mistakenly believed that political radicalism was the preserve of factory operatives and 
that traditional hand workers were conservative. Rather it seems that the absolute state 
of degradation of the Paisley weavers, far worse than the condition of the weavers in 
West Fife or Yorkshire, may have made them too abject to strike. Those who have 
completely given up hope of improvement rarely take part in ‘revolutionary’ action, in 
contrast to those who may be impoverished but still have hope for change. The division 
within the Paisley Chartists between O’Connorites and the Rev. Patrick Brewster’s 
‘unconditional obedience’ party who were strongly in favour of a middle class alliance 
and against any use or threat of force was also significant in inhibiting a Chartist call for 
a strike. The simple fact that Brewster favoured a middle class alliance and was against 
force did not in itself prevent a call for a strike for the Charter as, after all, Thomas
17 British Statesman, 3 September 1842
18 British Statesman, 27 August 1842
19 T. Clarke and T. Dickson, ‘Class and Class-Consciousness, Paisley 1770-1850’, in T. Dickson (ed.), 
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Morrison in Dunfermline belonged to the same party as Brewster. However the 
Brewster party in Paisley did use its influence to caution against a strike at public 
meetings arguing that the violence which had arisen in the strike in England would 
make a middle and working class radical alliance more difficult to obtain.20
The Miners* Strike in Scotland
In August 1842 there were in fact two separate strike movements taking place in 
Scotland. As in the English Midlands, a miners’ strike over miners’ industrial 
grievances began first, followed by the strike for the Charter. The miners’ strike lasted 
far longer than did the strike for the Charter in Scotland and was far more extensive. 
The Lanarkshire coal and iron miners at Glasgow, Coatbridge and Airdrie struck on 1 
August. Colliers and miners in the rest of Lanarkshire, Mid-Lothian, East Lothian, Ayr, 
Stevenston, Kilmarnock and Kilwinning in Ayrshire, Campsie and Falkirk in 
Stirlingshire, Kirkintilloch in Dumbartonshire and Johnstone in Renfrewshire came out 
on strike between 15 August and the beginning of September often at the prompting of 
miner’s delegates from Coatbridge and Airdrie. In addition the colliers and miners in 
West Fife and Clackmannanshire who had come out with the strike for the Charter
ftrifCt  th e .
continued out as part of the minersMafter*strike for the Charter had failed. The Glasgow
area miners were the first to return to work in September following settlement of their
grievances by the masters. Elsewhere the colliers and miners remained out until
October, November and early December. In some cases the miners were ejected from
their tied houses and Irish labourers from Glasgow brought in to replace them. However
many, including the Airdrie and Coatbridge colliers who returned to work in the first
two weeks of October, were granted their demands by the masters, although these were
 ^1
m many cases rescinded in December leading to fresh strikes.
The miners’ strike did become general among the miners of Scotland in terms of almost 
all miners being on strike. Almost all the 10,000 or so colliers and miners in 
Lanarkshire, the 2500 or so colliers and miners in Ayrshire, the 750 or so colliers and
20 Paisley Advertiser, 10 September 1842; Glasgow Saturday Post, 1 October 1842
21 Glasgow Saturday Post, 6, 13, 20 August, 17 September 1842; Northern Star, 13 August, 8 October, 5, 
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21 September 1842; British Statesman, 1,22 October 1842; ‘Report of the Commissioners... into the State
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miners in Clackmannanshire, the 2000 or so coal miners in Fife, the 900 or so coal
00miners in Renfrewshire, and the 1800 or so miners in the Lothians were on strike. In 
addition the colliers of Campsie and Falkirk in Stirlingshire and Kirkintilloch in 
Dumbartonshire had struck. In many areas, such as the Lanarkshire coal area around 
Hilltown, Airdrie and Coatbridge, the numerical dominance of the colliers and their 
families meant that the strike did approach being a general strike. Contemporaries were 
fully aware of the large number of women and children dependent on the colliers.
The miners’ strike in Scotland, in contrast to the Chartist strike, was largely for redress 
of industrial grievances. The main exceptions were the colliers of West Fife and 
Clackmannanshire who came out for the Charter with the Chartist strike in their areas; 
but they too continued the strike for redress of miners’ industrial grievances once the 
strike for the Charter had failed. The miners came out for their own particular 
grievances over wages paid per day, the truck shop system, the unfair weighing of the 
coal they dug up, and various unfair practices by the coal masters rather than for the 
Charter. The common demand was four shillings wages per day and fair weighing and 
this demand was maintained by the miners throughout the strike. But some support for 
the Charter was also present in the miners’ strike from the start. The miners in 
Lanarkshire gave support for the Charter in their resolutions at the start of the strike 
although this was not made the aim of the strike. At one of the initial meetings in 
Airdrie in early August where the demands were for the redress of the miners’ wages 
and weight grievances there was also a resolution passed to agitate for the Charter. 
Archibald Alison, the Sheriff of Lanarkshire, thought that there was a strong Chartist 
nature to the miners strike early in August. This was due to the leadership of the strike 
by leaders of the Coal Miners Chartist Association.23 For a time around August 17, the 
time when the political strike in England was at its height, the miners’ strike in Scotland 
did begin to temporarily take on the aim of the Charter as the call for a strike for the 
Charter spread from Clackmannanshire. At a meeting of 3000 miners at Airdrie on 
August 17 the Chartist activist Thomas Roberts came as delegate from the 
Clackmannanshire Chartists and successfully recommended that they make their strike
of the Population in the Mining Districts’, PP (1844), vol. 16, 49; Times, 25 October, 8 November 1842; 
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for a higher end than merely wages and adopt the resolutions adopted at the meetings in 
Clackmannanshire. A fourth resolution was also passed declaring that they would strike 
until the Charter became the law of land if the other trades in Lanarkshire and other 
parts of Great Britain did likewise and that they would send notice to all towns and 
villages in Great Britain. Some of the local Airdrie Chartists together with John M’Lay, 
a Chartist activist and miner, and Roberts, on the same day held a meeting of the 
inhabitants and trades of Airdrie with 4500 present who passed the same resolutions and 
formed a committee to put them into effect agreeing to send notices to the Northern Star 
and the British Statesman embodying the fourth resolution and to communicate with 
Glasgow and other places in the vicinity. The same resolutions were passed at a meeting 
at Coatbridge. Resolutions for the Charter were also passed by the Campsie and area 
miners at Dugaldstone Wood near Milngrave in Lanarkshire on Wednesday 17 August 
though this was merely to agitate for the Charter and the aim of their strike was four 
shillings wages per day. A general meeting of the Glasgow district colliers held at 
Dalmamock on Friday 19 August unanimously agreed to the Coalsnaughten 
resolutions.24 However these resolutions to make the aim of the miners’ strike the 
Charter were dropped by the end of August and the miners’ strike in Lanarkshire, 
Renfrewshire, Ayrshire, Mid-Lothian, East Lothian, Stirlingshire, Dumbartonshire, Fife 
and Clackmannanshire was continued for redress of their own industrial grievances.
The leadership of the miners’ strike in Scotland came from within the miners 
themselves and, apart from in Lanarkshire, did not include known Chartist activists. 
West Fife and Clackmannanshire were special exceptions as here the miners and colliers 
joined the strike for the Charter under Chartist leadership; but then continued the strike 
for miners’ wages under their own leadership. However in Lanarkshire it was the 
leaders of the Coal Miners Chartist Association (which after being founded at the very 
start of 1842 had developed eastern and western districts and was fulfilling a trade union 
as well as political role and had briefly run a Miners and Colliers Journal which had 
made the miners aware of their common grievances), particularly John M’Lay, secretary 
of the Airdrie and Coatbridge miners, who organised the miners’ strike in Lanarkshire 
from 1 August. By Monday 15 and Tuesday 16 August delegates from Airdrie had
24 British Statesman, 27 August 1842; Glasgow Saturday Post, 20 August 1842; Northern Star, 27 August 
1842
25 Northern Star, 29 January, 12, 19 February, 12 March, 16 July, 6, 13 August 1842; British Statesman, 
13 August 1842
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managed to extend the strike over miners’ grievances or at least the threat to strike to all 
the Scottish mining areas by sending delegates to the miners in Mid-Lothian, East- 
Lothian, Stirlingshire, Renfrewshire, Fife and Ayrshire. Given that the Lanarkshire 
miners at that point then began to pass resolutions calling for a general strike for the 
Charter if it was to be national it might seem that there was a plan from the start by the 
Airdrie and Coatbridge miners to create a strike for the Charter among the whole of the 
miners of Scotland. However this appears not to have been the case because the impetus 
for the Lanarkshire miners to pass resolutions for the Charter as the aim on August 17 
came from the Clackmannanshire Chartists.26 Despite the involvement of the Coal 
Miners Chartist Association leaders and the calls for the Charter around the August 17 it 
seems best to view the Scottish miners’ strike as part of a national strike movement 
among the miners of Britain.
Organisation of the Strike for the Charter
The guiding role in the Scottish strike for the Charter came from Chartist Cessation 
from Labour Committees rather than from a trades delegate conference. In Scotland the 
nearest equivalents to the Manchester £reat Trades delegate Conference were not trades 
conferences; but rather were the Chartist led Cessation from Labour and 
Correspondence Committees in Clackmannanshire and West Fife, which directed the 
strike once it had started as well as issuing addresses and receiving communications. 
They were a crucial organisational feature of the Scottish strike. For example in 
Dunfermline during the week of the general strike the district was divided into quarters 
by Morrison with a committee member for each who received subscriptions and 
dispersed relief. The most active members of the Dunfermline committee were the local 
Chartist leaders Morrison and Henderson. Most of these activities by the Chartists to 
begin, extend, and maintain the strike also involved public meetings. Public meetings 
which took a democratic form with resolutions were essential for all the forms of 
activity and organisation. For example public meetings continued in Dunfermline 
throughout the strike with the Chartist strike leaders reporting on the progress of the 
strike 27
26 British Statesman, 27 August 1842
27 Glasgow Saturday Post, 3 September 1842; Fifeshire Journal, 1 September 1842
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The local Chartist activists attempted to begin, extend and maintain the strike for the 
Charter by the passing of resolutions and addresses at public meetings calling for a 
general strike for the Charter and sending them around the country. Addresses calling 
for a general strike for the Charter were sent to Scottish and some English towns from 
Alva, Alloa, Coalsnaughten and Dunfermline. The Clackmannanshire resolutions of 13 
and 16 August for a general strike for the Charter throughout Britain were sent to 
different parts of the country with Glasgow receiving a copy from Alloa by 20 August.28 
On 22 August when the Clackmannanshire weavers and miners agreed to make a 
general strike for the Charter immediately on receipt of information that the other 
manufacturing districts in Britain would do the same the Clackmannanshire strike 
committee agreed to issue an address to all other towns especially the large 
manufacturing towns of Scotland calling on them to communicate their decisions to the
•  9Qcommittee. The Clackmannanshire Chartists even sent their address and an appeal to 
the Northumberland and Durham miners to Newcastle-upon-Tyne however the pits in 
County Durham turned out for merely one day over wages and a strike by shipwrights 
from Shields was also over wages.30 From Dunfermline the Chartist strike leaders sent 
letters containing their resolutions to all the towns of Scotland and many in England 
including Dundee, Glasgow, Manchester, and to Ebenezer Elliot the Com Law Rhymer 
in Sheffield, who belatedly replied after the strike was well over. At a public meeting on 
Thursday 25 August at Dunfermline the Chartist leaders read replies from Tillicoultry, 
Airdrie and quite a few places in Fife including Kirkcaldy. However the fact that the 
strike was over in England limited the response. Correspondence committees were also 
set up at Aberdeen on 3 September by the Chartists and at Kirkcaldy on 27 August by 
the Chartist activists Hunter and Todd though these were inactive as the strike had 
already collapsed nationally.31
The leaders of the strike for the Charter also tried to spread the strike in their local areas 
by sending out delegates. The Dundee Chartist activists made use of delegates to 
attempt to spread the strike for the Charter throughout Forfarshire including Montrose,
28 Glasgow Saturday Post, 20 August 1842
29 British Statesman, 27 August 1842; Newcastle Chronicle, 27 August, 3 September 1842
30 British Statesman, 27 August 1842; Newcastle Chronicle, 27 August, 3 September 1842; Northern 
Star; The Times, 1 September 1842; D. J. Rowe, ‘Some Aspects of Chartism on Tyneside’, International 
Review o f Social History, XVI, 1 (1971), 17-39; W. H. Maehl, ‘Chartist Disturbances in Northeastern 
England’, International Review o f Social History, VIII, 3 (1963), 389-414
31 Fifeshire Journal, 25 August, 1 September 1842; British Statesman, 29 October 1842
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Forfar and Kirriemuir. For example John Mitchell, the Dundee Chartist, went as 
delegate to Forfar and Kirriemuir on Sunday 21 and Monday 22 August to encourage 
support for a strike for the Charter.32 The Dunfermline Chartist activists went as 
delegates to other localities in West Fife to spread the political strike. For example the 
Dunfermline strike leaders Morrison and Flemming went as delegates to Chartist public 
meetings in Kirkcaldy on 25 and 27 August to ask the Kirkcaldy Chartists to join the 
Dunfermline people in a cessation from labour for the Charter and the meeting on 27 
August unanimously resolved to strike if the movement had become national by 30 
August. The Clackmannanshire Chartists sent activist Thomas Roberts to Airdrie on 
August 17 to spread the aim of the Charter; refuting Young’s argument that the 
Chartists tried to prevent the miners’ strike from becoming a strike for the Charter.33 
The deliberate planning and spreading of the strike for the Charter by the local 
Chartists, rather than by the trades, can be seen in the activity of Chartist delegates.
Turnout processions were a less significant feature of the strike for the Charter in 
Scotland than in England. In the strike for the Charter in West Fife and Forfarshire 
processions took place but these differed in some respects from those in England. 
Although there were processions in Dunfermline to meetings the turnout was largely 
voluntary and only small parties visited the workshops. In Dundee on 22 and 23 August 
processions of Chartists paraded around Dundee after morning public meetings; 
however they only sent small delegations of eight into the factories to ask them to turn 
out. The most significant procession of the strike in Scotland was the march by the 
Dundee Chartists to Forfar on 22 August; known locally as the ‘Pilgrimage of Folly’. 
The Dundee Chartists hoped to emulate Manchester and before the Pilgrimage of Folly 
to Forfar they declared that Dundee bore exactly the same relation to Scotland as 
Manchester did to England. Their intention in going on procession to Forfar was to give 
the Forfar people the confidence to turn out, to increase their numbers, and then visit the 
landholders to demand relief. The march to Forfar was a failure for several reasons. The 
Dundee Chartists only finally decided to go to Forfar at a meeting on Tuesday afternoon 
after the authorities had prevented their turnout procession to works outside the town 
returning to Dundee. The Forfar people were only told by messenger on Tuesday night
32 Dundee Warder 23, 30 August 1842; Aberdeen Journal, 31 August 1842; PRO HO 45/266, ff. 98-99, 
Earl of Airlie to Sir J. Graham, 23 August 1842; PRO HO 45/266, ff. 100-101, Lord Duncan to Sir J. 
Graham, 20 August 1842
33 Fifeshire Journal, 25 August, 1 September 1842
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that the Dundee Chartists were coming and the procession only arrived at three in the 
morning; by which time the 1200 who had set out had been reduced in number after the 
marchers ignored the Dundee leaders’ admonitions not to take food from the fields. The 
Forfar people had been reluctant to start a strike unless Dundee gave the lead and the 
small size and disorganised state of the procession failed to give heart to the Forfar 
Chartists. At the public meeting held in Forfar on Wednesday morning the Forfar 
Chartist activists decided that Dundee had not given the firm lead they had asked for on 
Monday if they were to strike, resulting in the return home of the Dundee marchers.34
Young argued for a strong trade union basis to the strike in Scotland as in Manchester.35 
But the evidence shows that the initiative to strike and to strike for the Charter came 
from local Chartists rather than the trades unions in Scotland. Delegate meetings of the 
trades, on the pattern of those held in the townships outside Manchester rather than in 
imitation of the Manchester £reat7rades Delegate meeting itself, to come to a decision 
on whether to hold a strike for the Charter in the locality, were held at Dundee, 
Aberdeen and Greenock. In all these areas local Chartists had been actively involved in 
leading the unemployed trades in their attempts to get better and less humiliating poor 
relief from the magistrates. By far the most significant trades delegate meeting was that 
held in Dundee on 19 August. The calling and the role of the Dundee trades conference 
is evidence that the Chartists rather than the trades were beginning and directing the 
strike and encouraging those involved to make the aim the Charter. It was called by the 
Chartists who at a public meeting ordered by the Council of the Dundee Democratic 
Society passed a resolution that a meeting of delegates should take place from the 
different works and this met on the evening of 19 August. Most were delegates from 
individual flax linen manufactories, shops and mills though delegates from the 
engineers connected with the mills, and tailors, shoemakers, confectioners and the 
unemployed were also present. However it may have been more representative than the 
Manchester Great Trades Delegate Conference because the vast majority of delegates 
were from individual mills and manufactories in contrast to the overrepresentation of 
artisans at the Manchester conference. Despite the sitting of this convention there was 
not a strong trades organisational basis to the Scottish strike. The Dundee convention’s
34 Dundee Warder, 23, 30 August 1842; Fifeshire Journal, 25 August, 1 September 1842
35 J. D. Young, The Rousing o f the Scottish Working Class (London, 1979), 90-94
36 PRO HO 45/266, ff. 89-90, Provost of Dundee to Sir J. Graham, 18 August 1842
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decision was ratified by a popular meeting of the town people the next day, thus the 
decision to strike was ultimately made on a popular rather than trades basis. This 
Dundee convention did not try to imitate the Manchester conference by continuous 
sitting or by providing a directing role to the strike, and indeed it sat only once. The 
Dundee Chartist leaders did hope that Dundee would set an example to the rest of 
Scotland as Manchester had done, but a continuously sitting trade conference played no 
part in their plans. It was merely called to make an initial decision on whether to strike 
or not. Thus the Dundee convention cannot be seen as the Scottish counterpart of the 
Manchester 6reat Trades Delegate Conference. The Dundee convention bore more 
resemblance to the many local trade conferences which met in the townships of 
Southeast Lancashire with Chartist organisers.37
At Aberdeen and Greenock Duncan’s and Young’s view of an insurgent trades 
movement being held back by cautious Chartists leaders is also inaccurate. The 
evidence shows that it was the local Chartist activists who were pressing most eagerly, 
though at the same time attempting to make realistic preparations, for a strike. The 
Greenock trades met at the suggestion of the Greenock Chartists on 29 August, a 
meeting which also included members of the public, when the Greenock Chartists 
issued an address to the trades of Scotland declaring that many of the trades of 
Greenock had expressed a willingness to strike for political rights if the rest of Britain 
agreed to it. Here the initiative was coming from the Chartists rather than the trades and 
the Chartists seem to have been in advance of the trades in their desire for the strike. 
The Aberdeen Chartist activists, after holding a public meeting on 22 August at which 
they passed a resolution of thanks to the trades of Manchester for declaring for the 
Charter, arranged a meeting of delegates from the trades, workshops and manufactories 
of Aberdeen on 26 August in the Chartists’ hall. The Chartists were in advance of the 
trades in their desire for a strike for the Charter with the delegates voting sixteen to 
twelve against a strike. Despite this the Chartists continued to unsuccessfully push for a 
strike; at a public meeting on 27 August the Aberdeen Chartist David Wright proposed a 
resolution ‘that this meeting considers a cessation from labour an effectual means of 
carrying the People’s Charter into law, provided it be generally acted upon’ and the 
Aberdeen Chartist activists organised a public meeting on 3 September with the Chartist 
John Troup in the chair to consider the propriety of a future cessation of labour and joint
37 Dundee Warder, 23 August 1842
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abstinence from articles of consumption on which taxes were paid, as a means of 
gaining the Charter. The meeting was to be merely a preliminary step to see if there was 
national support for a strike for the Charter and abstinence and there were plans that an 
address should be issued and sent all round Britain asking people to sign a paper saying 
if they were prepared to strike, how long they could support themselves, and for others 
to say if they were willing to support a strike financially. A committee was actually set 
up comprising the leading Chartists in Aberdeen to sit in the Chartists’ hall for an hour 
every evening to issue and receive the sheets of paper with the names of those 
nationally who would strike, could support themselves and others who would 
contribute. This initiative had come too late after the political strike had collapsed 
everywhere throughout Britain. Nevertheless the initiative to strike and to strike for the 
Charter was clearly coming from the Chartists rather than the trades in Scotland.
The failure of the Glasgow trades to take part in the strike, despite efforts by the 
Greenock Chartist activists and by delegates from the Manchester NCA Conference to 
involve the Glasgow trades, also weakens the argument that the strike was a trades 
movement. There was no attempt to emulate the Manchester example on the part of the 
Glasgow trades unions. Apart from the miners, whose union activity in Lanarkshire was 
largely Chartist led, the Scottish trades did not enter the strike as such. The Greenock 
Chartists belonging to the Greenock Chartist Church and the Universal Suffrage 
Association attempted to rouse the Scottish trades into action. The Greenock Chartist 
Joseph M’Lean had attended the public meeting organised by the Glasgow Chartists on 
Glasgow Green on 27 August and had called at that meeting for the trades to carry the 
Charter as they had carried the Reform Bill in 1832 but he was stopped from speaking 
by the Glasgow Chartist leaders. At the meeting held in Greenock on 29 August 
M’Lean, Robert Burrell and other Greenock Chartists criticised the Glasgow trades for 
not showing their moral power against tyranny, and criticised the Chartist meeting 
recently held in Glasgow for not calling on the Glasgow trades to copy the example of 
Manchester. The Greenock Chartists issued an address to the Trades of Scotland chiding 
the trades, particularly the Glasgow trades, for not becoming actively involved and 
calling on the trades of Scotland to take on a leadership role in the strike.39
38 Northern Star, 27 August 1842; British Statesman, 27 August, 3, 10 September 1842; Aberdeen 
Herald, 10 September 1842
39 British Statesman, 3 September 1842
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However the Glasgow trades failed to take on this leadership role. Meetings of many of 
the trades of Glasgow did take place at the very end of August or beginning of 
September but no active leadership was forthcoming. The Glasgow cotton spinners met 
at the beginning of September and agreed to demand the wages of 1840. They sent 
delegates to the masters in September to ask for the wages of 1840, however no strike 
took place when their demand was refused. The cotton spinners at a firm in the St 
Rollox district of Glasgow did go on strike over wages at the end of September. 
However there were only twelve cotton spinners employed by the firm. There were 
rumours that the cotton spinners’ meeting at the beginning of September had decided on 
striking at the firms one by one to gain the wages of 1840, with the St Rollox firm being 
the first. However in fact no such plan appears to have existed and the strike at St 
Rollox was for an equalisation of wages with the other firms and not for the wages of 
1840. The Glasgow dandyloom weavers struck in August. However there were only 
nine dandyloom firms in Glasgow, five of which rapidly came to terms with the men, 
and the dandyloom weavers’ strike was merely for wages. The unwillingness of the 
trade union leaders to strike seems to have been the main reason for the absence of a 
serious strike in Glasgow. Delegates from the NCA Conference in Manchester, 
including William Beesley who then travelled on to Newcastle-upon-Tyne in an 
unsuccessful attempt to initiate a strike there, were present in Glasgow by August 20 to 
encourage the trade union leaders in the Glasgow area to strike; but the trades leaders 
refused to call for a strike in Glasgow.40 This was certainly not due to lack of support 
for Chartism among the trades. It had been the trades of Glasgow who had organised the 
reception for Thomas Attwood and other delegates from the Birmingham Political 
Union in 1838. The Glasgow trades had continued to be involved in Chartist activity in 
Glasgow. The Greenock Chartists attributed the unwillingness of the trades to give a 
lead to the strike to their relatively comfortable condition compared to less fortunate 
working men. However more significantly the defeat of the cotton spinners’ strike in 
1838, and the trial and transportation of it leaders, may have made the Glasgow trades 
reluctant to embark on an all out strike aimed at the government, especially as Sheriff 
Alison, the trades’ avowed enemy, was still at the helm in Glasgow.41 The miners in the
40 Glasgow Saturday Post, 20 August, 1 October 1842
41 J. Marshall, The Trial o f Thomas Hunter, Peter Hacket, Richard M ’Niel, James Gibson and William 
M ’Lean, the Glasgow Cotton Spinners, before the High Court o f Justiciary, at Edinburgh, on Charges o f
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immediate vicinity of Glasgow were on strike however these were among the first to 
gain settlements from the masters. It is clear therefore that Young was wrong to identify 
the trades as the guiding force within the strike.
The role of the local Chartist activists in organising the strike demonstrates that the 
strike cannot be seen simply as the work of the local trades. In trying to explain why it 
was these areas that struck for the Charter the desire of the local Chartist activists to try 
to set an example for other parts of Scotland to follow was certainly important. In 
Dundee, Dunfermline and Clackmannanshire the local Chartist activists all declared that 
they were consciously acting as pace setters in the hope that other areas would follow 
their example and strike. In addition to this the areas of the strike for the Charter shared 
a numbers of characteristics. All had been strongly in favour of having a month long 
general strike for the Charter, the ‘sacred month’, in 1839. At the meeting of Scottish 
delegates held in August 1839 to discuss the'ulterior measures’ the delegate for 
Dunfermline told the meeting that his constituents thought the ‘sacred month’ the best 
measure that could have been proposed. Dundee, Forfar and Kirriemuir, all in 
Forfarshire, were reported to be strongly in favour of the ‘sacred month’ and Aberdeen 
was reported to support any measure which the National Convention thought would 
gain the Charter. The general strike or ‘sacred month’ proposals of 1839 seem to have 
been in the minds of the leaders of the political strike in 1842, with the difference that 
there was no question of arming in 1842 unlike 1839.42
In the areas of the strike for the Charter the local Chartists had built up support among 
the trades, whether formally organised or unorganised. At Aberdeen there was strong 
support for Chartism among the trades. The town’s trades had formed a procession in 
honour of one of Feargus O’Connor’s visits to Scotland. In the Summer of 1842 the 
Aberdeen trades were formally joining the Aberdeen Northern Charter Union in a 
similar way to which the Manchester trades were forming themselves into NCA 
localities, for example the Aberdeen handloom weavers joined as a body in late July and 
the ships carpenters joined in August 1842. In Dundee Bakers and Confectioners 
Universal Suffrage Associations had existed until merged into the Democratic Council.
Murder (Edinburgh, 1838), 1-382; Sir Archibald Alison, Some Account o f my Life and Writings 
(Edinburgh, 1883), 367-402,486-499
42 Northern Star, 27 August 1839; T. Clarke, ‘Early Chartism in Scotland’ in T. M. Devine (ed.), Conflict 
and Stability in Scottish Society, 1700-1850 (Edinburgh, 1990), 106-121
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The Dundee trades had provided an enthusiastic demonstration on George White’s and 
John Collins’ entry to Dundee in 1840 following their release from prison.43 However 
the most important characteristic of the strike for the Charter areas was the support for 
Chartism among workers in the flax-linen and woollen industries.
All the districts where the strike for the Charter took place were centres of the flax-linen 
or woollen industries where the Chartists found great support among the textile workers, 
particularly among the hand workers. The flax-linen industry was the single most 
important industry in West Fife centred on Dunfermline and in the Forfarshire towns of 
Dundee, Forfar and Kirriemuir. Woollen manufacture was important in 
Clackmannanshire. About one third of males above twenty years of age worked in the 
flax-linen industry in Dundee burgh and parish, about one third in Dunfermline burgh 
and parish, and about one half in Forfar. Dunfermline specialised in manufacturing table 
linen, which was still largely unmechanised as although there were five working 
spinning mills they employed only 160 men and 160 girls. The powerloom had not yet 
been introduced and around 3500 men and boys were handloom weavers, out of a total 
burgh and parish population of just over 20,000. In addition women worked in auxiliary 
roles to their husband weavers. Handloom weavers also worked in the surrounding 
parishes of West Fife. Dundee was also dominated by the linen trade. There were thirty 
flax spinning mills employing 3000 hands, though over half were children and the 
remainder partly women. Many Dundee weavers were based in factories, the first power 
loom factory had been set up by the Baxters in 1836, but domestic handloom weaving 
still continued in Dundee. There were 3000 weavers in each of the Forfarshire towns of 
Forfar and Kirriemuir. In Clackmannanshire there were woollen spinning mills in 
Tillicoultry and other towns but the powerloom had not yet been introduced and 
handloom waving continued.44
The flax-linen and woollen workers in the region of the strike for the Charter had a 
strong tradition of radicalism on which the Chartists were able to draw. The radical 
tradition was particularly strong, though not confined to, the weavers and flaxdressers.
43 Northern Star, 14 November 1840, 30 July, 6, 27 August 1842
44 Peter Carmichael, Dundee Textile History 1790-1885from the Papers o f  Peter Carmichael (Edinburgh, 
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In both Forfarshire and West Fife a number of Chartist leaders came from the weavers 
and flaxdressers. These included at Dunfermline Alexander Fleming and Alexander 
Henderson, who were leaders in the strike, as well as Alexander Hailey and William 
Carnegie. Both Flemming and Carnegie had been office holders in the Dunfermline 
Working Men’s Association in 1839. At Dundee Thomas Anderson, who played a very 
prominent part in the strike in influencing the Dundee trades conference to vote in 
favour of a strike for the Charter, was a flax dresser and James Graham was a weaver. 
The Dunfermline and West Fife weavers had taken a prominent part in the Town’s 
Reform procession in 1832 together with the spinning mill workers. The West Fife 
weavers were active Chartists. Niffler societies to supply the weavers with a tool used in 
their looms existed in Dunfermline and at meetings of the Niffler societies the weavers 
discussed the latest Chartists speeches and compared them to the speeches given by 
Collins and other national leaders on their visits to Dunfermline. Chartists provided 
leadership for the weavers. In 1837 a weavers’ strike committee was set up with two 
future prominent Chartists, Alexander Hailey, member for the first National 
Convention, and William Carnegie, as members, and this continued in existence as the 
operative weavers committee at least up to 1840.45 The flaxdressers also had a strong 
tradition of radicalism. The Dunfermline flaxdressers had provided subscriptions to 
support Lovett and Collins during their imprisonment and the flaxdressers organised a 
social event for Collins and McDouall on their visit to Dunfermline on their release 
from prison. The support for the strike for the Charter among workers in the flax-linen 
and woollen industries, especially but not only among the handloom weavers and 
flaxdressers, can be explained by their long radical traditions.
The West Fife and Clackmannanshire district was unusual in the 1830s and early 1840s 
in that the miners showed more interest in Chartism than was usual. The West Fife 
miners had taken part in Dunfermline Reform Procession in 1832. In 1840 when P. M. 
McDouall visited Dunfermline the colliers sent three bands with 100 miners to represent 
them suggesting an unusual interest in Chartism, in comparison for example with the 
Ayrshire miners who were widely regarded as among the least interested in Chartism
1, 1-592; New Statistical Account o f Scotland (Edinburgh, 1845), vol. IX, 886-890, vol. XI, 24-29; 
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out of the entire working classes of Scotland. The Halbeith miners in West Fife had 
been particularly prominent in the 1840 demonstration for McDouall. By Saturday 20 
August 1842, before the strike for the Charter had begun in Dunfermline, Lord Duncan 
thought that the miners in West Fife would be prepared to act with Dundee in a strike 
for the Charter. Indeed there had already been links between John Duncan in Dundee 
and the West Fife miners as on the occasion of McDouall’s visit it was John Duncan 
who had led the miners’ demonstration.46 Before the strike for the Charter in 
Dunfermline the weavers had struck over wages in early August and burned the 
factories of those masters who had reduced wages; the weavers had enlisted the support 
of the miners in this, but after the Provost and Sheriff had prevailed on the masters to 
reinstate the old wages the weavers had been detached from the colliers. The colliers 
had received visits from the Airdrie miners and were planning to come out on strike in 
late August once their warnings were worked out over wages and weights and in co­
operation with the miners of Scotland.47 The prior politicisation of the West Fife miners 
helps explain why Thomas Morrison and the other Dunfermline Chartist leaders were 
able to step in and bring the miners into the strike for the Charter in West Fife. Likewise 
the West Fife weavers had not been prepared to continue to act in concert with the 
miners in a strike merely over miners’ grievances once their own wages claims had been 
met, but once the local Chartists had put forwards the aim of the Charter for the strike 
the weavers joined in the strike impelled by their tradition of support for Chartism.
Ideology and Concept of the General Strike for the Charter
The ideology articulated during the strike for the Charter in Scotland was shared with 
the strike in England. Chartism was a British movement in Scotland, and despite certain 
peculiarities, shared essentially the same ideology. Political monopoly rather than the 
relation to the means of production was identified in the strike for the Charter in 
Scotland as the source of society’s ills. For example at the meeting at Dunfermline on 
23 August the first resolution declared ‘that this meeting is of the opinion that class 
legislation is the sole cause of their severe and long continued sufferings’.48 At the 
Dundee trade delegates meeting on 19 August Thomas Anderson argued that class
46 E. Henderson, Annals o f Dunfermline (Edinburgh, 1878), 632; True Scotsman, 17 October, 28 
November 1840; PRO HO 45/266, ff. 100-101, Lord Duncan, Dundee, to Sir J. Graham, 20 August 1842
47 PRO HO 45/266, ff. 19-30, A. Alison to Sir J. Graham, 10,11,12 August 1842
48 Scotsman, 27 August 1842
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legislation was the cause of all their evils.49 Class legislation and monopoly prevented 
the property of the people, their labour, from being protected.
The critique of ‘Old Corruption’ was the predominant ideology articulated in the 
Scottish strike for the Charter as in the strike in England. The poor were taxed by the 
government and this went to the parasitic placemen, pensioners and office holders. 
Fundholders of the national debt were receiving the interest from government stock and 
money for this came from taxes. The Com Laws benefited the aristocrats at the expense 
of the productive. The State Church was oppressive.50 In the Scottish strike for the 
Charter it was the aristocracy, state, government and established Church of Scotland 
that were identified as the targets of the strike by the local leaders. At speeches in 
Edinburgh, Aberdeen and Dundee the government due to its unjust and oppressive laws 
was identified as the enemy. For example the first Dunfermline resolution on 23 August 
declared that the reason class legislation was the cause of their suffering was that ‘it 
enables the landed aristocracy, who posses a predominance in both Houses of 
Parliament, to enact laws for their own exclusive benefit, at the expense of the 
community at large.’51 In Dundee at the public meeting on 20 August John Duncan 
urged that they had met ‘to relieve the country of the heaviest load she ever bore, the 
most bloody designing ministry that ever cursed the country.’52 At the Aberdeen 
meeting on 3 September the Chartist Alexander Henry argued that a system existed 
which ‘forced the industrious and virtuous working population to pine in hunger, 
destitution and misery, for the benefit of a debauched and profligate aristocracy, a 
bloated and avaricious state Church, and an unmeasurable host of fund holding, money 
grabbing millionaires.’ The aristocracy, as landlords, were also attacked for their 
failure to provide poor relief, and the Dundee and Forfar Chartists planned to march en 
masse around the landholders requesting relief after the march on Forfar. The 
established Church of Scotland was attacked by Scottish Chartists during strike. This 
was criticism of the established Church rather than Christianity as such, with Chartist 
preachers at Dundee and Greenock the most forward in criticising the established
49 Dundee Warder, 23 August 1842
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Church. In the strike the ministers of the established Church of Scotland were seen as 
hangers on of the aristocracy. All they cared about was money and they would change 
their opinions and even their skin to get money according to Alexander Henry of 
Aberdeen. This was also linked with the attack on the aristocracy as lay proprietors 
could appoint ministers instead of the congregation. It was also linked with the failure to 
give adequate poor relief as the ministers were responsible for relief in rural areas.54
A constitutional discourse on the British constitution was present in the Scottish strike. 
This was based on the English constitution and its history shared through what Linda 
Colley shows to be the Scots’ dual identity as Britons; the English constitution had 
become the British constitution. The Forfar address of 22 August referred to ‘British 
Liberties’. Alexander Henry at Aberdeen had justified a right to relief from the 
commentaries of the English jurist William Blackstone as well as from the law of 
Scotland. Throughout the strike at Chartist meetings it was argued that a constitutional 
right to discuss grievances at public meetings existed, based on the constitutional rights 
of Britons, for example the Greenock Chartists condemned the arrest of John Mason for 
attempting to speak at a public meeting in Staffordshire. The Dundee marchers to Forfar 
on 23 August carried a white flag, this was mainly a symbol of peace, but it also carried 
constitutionalist implications, referring to the popular constitutionalist platform via 
Hunt’s white hat.55 Some natural rights imagery was present in the Scottish strike and 
mixed with popular constitutionalism in an eclectic manner. At Forfar on 22 August the 
people had a cap of liberty on a pole at the public meeting which agreed on a general 
strike; the cap of liberty carried both British constitutional and natural rights meanings. 
At Dundee in March 1842 the unemployed had carried a flag inscribed with the call for 
the Charter and topped with a tricolour flag with a hatchet, symbolic of French 
republican principles and of the French Revolution.56 However the Scottish tradition of 
the Scottish Martyrs of the early 1790s was also an important ideological justification 
for universal suffrage in the strike for the Charter. It was approaching the anniversary of
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the trial and deportation of Muir, Palmer, Gerrald and the other Martyrs of the trials of 
early 1790s after the holding of the Conventions in Edinburgh. The Dunfermline 
Chartists issued an appeal for funds for Morrison and Henderson when it seemed they 
would be tried for sedition, and compared them directly to Scottish Martyrs, their 
‘cause’ and ‘crime’ being the same.57
In Scotland the strike for the People’s Charter was not aimed against the middle classes. 
The strike was to be a traditional radical tactic involving all the industrious people. 
Where the Chartists leading the strike for the Charter showed hostility to the middle 
classes it was due to their refusing to help the working men gain their rights or 
supporting and benefiting from the tyranny of class legislation. There was talk at 
Greenock about the ‘monopolisers of capital.’ However in their resolutions the 
Greenock Chartists went on to accept more orthodox political economy arguing that 
workmen had a right to an adequate remuneration for their labour and to sell it in the 
best market, and that they may withdraw it if not adequately remunerated. They were 
not calling for the whole price of their labour apart from what the capitalist took as his 
wages for supervision. The argument that labour is the source of all wealth was also 
made use of in the meetings at Aberdeen, but it was not an Hodgskinite theory aimed at 
capitalists even in their role in exchange. Instead during the strike the Aberdeen 
Chartists argued that it was the landlords, aristocracy and Church who took the 
labourers’ wealth and did not mention the capitalist. At the meeting convened by the 
Edinburgh Chartists it was argued that the masters in Lancashire had reduced wages and 
so provoked the strike, yet even here this was attributed to a desire to pressure the 
government for relief from taxes and commercial restrictions. Thus the working and 
middle classes’ interests were seen as being in harmony and were only upset by the lack 
of the franchise for the working men and consequent bad legislation. Where attacks 
were made on the middle classes it was for their political role as electors in upholding 
the government. For example at the Glasgow Chartist public meeting Samuel Kidd 
blamed the middle classes and ‘all other electors’ for the distress because they
eo
supported a government which passed bad laws.
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The betterment of society was expected to come through the gaining of the Charter. The 
Greenock address to the trades of Scotland argued that ‘we are fully convinced that as 
we can have no safeguard for the protection of the proper reward of labour, so long as 
the legislative power of this country is fully invested in the hands of those who produce 
nothing.’ The address went on to argue that one class cannot legislate for the benefit of 
others so there would not be redress of their grievances until they were fully, fairly and 
freely represented in the House of Commons.59 One important way in which the 
obtaining of the Charter in the strike was to bring betterment was through just poor law 
relief. The right to relief had been a constant issue among the Chartists in the strike 
districts in the months leading up to the strike and during August itself. Poor relief was 
an issue in Scotland though in different terms from England. The Poor Law Amendment 
Act did not apply to Scotland but the Scottish courts did not recognise a right of relief 
for the able bodied unemployed. The Chartists in the summer of 1842, for example at 
Greenock, Aberdeen and Dundee, argued that the Scottish law gave the able bodied 
unemployed a right to food and subsistence and that courts, magistrates and clergy were 
misrepresenting the law of Scotland by denying relief to the able bodied unemployed. 
The enactment of the Charter would bring a fair administration of the law which would 
in the Chartist’s view in Scotland restore the supposed right under the laws to relief for 
the able bodied unemployed.60
The obtaining of the Charter by the strike would also better society by leading to the 
repeal of the Com Laws. There was strong support for Com Law repeal among the 
Scottish Chartist strike leaders, as being in the interest of both the working and 
mercantile classes. At Dunfermline the Chartist strike leader Thomas Morrison was a 
strong free trader believing that repeal would increase the demand for labour rather than 
reduce wages and denying that there was any connection between the price of 
provisions and wages levels.61 Morrison argued that the Com Laws benefited only the 
aristocracy and that the manufacturing interest, both employers and employees, would 
benefit from its repeal. The rejection by the House of Lords of Lord Radnor’s motion to 
repeal the Com Laws and all restrictions on trade was an important issue at the Chartist 
public meetings during the strike at Edinburgh and Glasgow. In July John Duncan of
59 British Statesman, 3 September 1842
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Dundee had argued strongly for the Charter in order to get rid of bad legislation 
particularly the restrictions on commerce. The third resolution adopted in the strike at 
Dundee on 20 August argued that the employers could not give higher wages under the 
present legislation, ‘After hearing the statements of the employers in reference to their 
inability to raise wages, it is the opinion of this meeting that the only means that can be 
adopted to enable employers to give a fair remuneration to the employed is to strike for 
the People’s Charter.’62 A Parliament and government elected under universal suffrage 
and no property qualifications would repeal the Com Laws. Cheaper food prices and the 
end of indirect taxation would increase the home demand for manufactured goods and 
so boost the manufacturers’ productivity without them having to cut wages, and this 
increased home demand would create more employment. However the Scottish Chartist 
strike leaders’ arguments were not solely based on home consumption. For example the 
Dundee linen trade had the USA as an important market and John Duncan argued for 
repeal of the Com Laws in order to boost foreign trade and so increase the demand for
f\Xemployment leading to higher wages.
Many of those taking part in the strike for the Charter undoubtedly were unhappy with 
wages, unemployment and poor relief. It is true that wages and unemployment were an 
issue in Dundee before and during the strike and that the reports the delegates made 
from the mills and manufactories in Dundee at the trades convention on 19 August were 
less unambiguously for the aim of the Charter in a strike than the final vote of the 
delegates suggested. It is also true that weavers’ and colliers’ wages were an issue in 
Dunfermline before the political strike began on 23 August. But this does not detract 
from the aim of the strike being the Charter. It was not simply a case that people could 
want both the Charter and better wages; the link was more intimate than this. The 
strikers attributed low wages and lack of poor relief to bad legislation. Thomas 
Anderson’s opinion at the Dundee trade conference was that ‘there was an undercurrent 
working in the minds of the people that enabled them to perceive the real cause of their 
distress (class legislation), that if they once turned out on the plea of wages in Dundee, 
the question would soon merge, as it had already done at Manchester, into a political 
question, and that they would not return to work until they had obtained their rights, the
62 Dundee Warder, 23 August 1842
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Charter.’64 It was poverty as well as a desire for political freedom for its own sake that 
had brought them out on strike; but this poverty was attributed to political causes. The 
strikers wanted both political liberty for its own sake and for the benefits in terms of 
prosperity that it would bring.65
The general strike for the Charter in Scotland must be seen as a traditional radical tactic 
such as that outlined by Thomas Attwood on his visit to Glasgow in 1838. In 
Dunfermline the strike was linked with a run on the Savings Bank; echoing the ‘Go for 
Gold’ of the Reform Bill agitation. Likewise in Dundee John Duncan recommended a 
run on the Savings Banks during the strike and the setting up of people’s banks on a 
mutual understanding between the working and middle classes to ruin the bankers and 
thus force them to call for the Charter. In Aberdeen proposals for a strike were coupled 
with abstention from consumable goods which carried excise so that the government’s 
resources would be destroyed. The general strike for the Charter in Scotland was the 
carrying out, three years late, of the 1839 general strike or ‘sacred month’.66 By the 
early summer of 1842 the Chartists in the Dundee, Clackmannanshire and Dunfermline 
districts believed that they had the edge in public opinion over the ACLL and emerging 
Complete Suffragists. They believed that they had built up a public opinion, that once 
directed, the government could not withstand; as was suggested by the supposed 
example of 1832. Thus the general strike for the Charter was to be a way of directing 
this public opinion and presenting it in a unified form which the government could not 
withstand. The result would be the resignation of the government, once it had lost its 
nerve and felt it had lost the complete confidence of the country, and the appointment 
by the Queen of ministers who would enact the Charter.67
The general strike for the Charter in Scotland was particularly peaceful in nature 
compared not only to the Scottish miners’ strike and to the weavers’ and colliers’ 
outbreak in Dunfermline earlier in August, but also to the strike in parts of England. The 
peaceful, and in the view of the Chartist leaders, constitutional and legal, nature of the
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strike movement was insisted upon in many of the speeches and resolution during the 
strike for the Charter in Scotland with frequent appeals not to harm persons or property 
and no mention of arming. The first Dunfermline resolution on 23 August stated that 
they ‘voluntarily resolve to abstain from labour as a legal, peaceful and efficient means 
for putting to an end these intolerable evils.’ The peaceful nature of the general strike 
was again emphasised in the second resolution at Dunfermline which declared their 
deep conviction that ‘unless the people scrupulously abstain from all violence and 
outrage, and inviolably maintain the existing laws, they cannot succeed in wresting their 
rights from their oppressors.’ They pledged themselves to ‘act strictly in accordance 
with the laws, and to prevent or repress all violations of them to the utmost of our power
Afton the part of others.’ Similarly at Dundee on 20 August John Duncan warned that ‘we 
have no wars to wage against the rich or against property.. .1 hope wisdom and prudence 
will govern you.. .we wish to do no harm to any human being.’ The strike was not to be 
an excuse for a physical confrontation with the authorities. He had been warned that the 
magistrates were determined to act with rigour and the military were to be called out on 
the first day ‘that the final crash may come,’ but he did not want a battle; instead he 
advised them ‘to be forewarned is to be forearmed. I advise you to keep the peace, be 
not seduced to break the law, for at present it is stronger than you, it would be to make it 
your master.’69
The processions in West Fife and Forfarshire were meant as shows of passive resistance 
rather than of revolutionary violence (though of course they were ‘revolutionary’ if that 
term is defined as hoping to seek political change by peaceful means); they were 
displays of ‘moral power’ in the words of the Dunfermline committee. This was the 
basis of the grand demonstration of Dunfermline turnouts on 25 August when between 
8000 and 20,000 met at Crossgates, of the meeting at Devonside in Clackmannanshire 
on 22 August, and partly of the ‘Pilgrimage of Folly’. The ‘Pilgrimage of Folly’ was 
viewed by the Tory press as the nearest thing to revolutionary action in the strike; 
though its leaders’ motives were not revolutionary if that term be defined as seeking 
change through violence. There was no use of force on the march, a white flag was
70carried, and the marchers once in Forfar merely held a public meeting. The peaceful
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nature of the strike in some instances extended to a taking over of the governing role 
which frightened the authorities so much in Lancashire. At Dunfermline the masons, 
bakers and butchers applied to Morrison for permission to continue essential work and 
this was granted. At the Clackmannanshire meeting on 22 August at Devonside the 
assembled people pledged themselves as special constables for the occasion at the 
request of the Chartist speakers.71
In sharp contrast there was a high amount of violence in the Scottish miners’ strike with 
assat'/tson the police, intimidation and violence against strikebreakers, theft of food from 
fields, and finally the murder by pistol shot of a strikebreaker.72 Wright and Wilson 
assumed that the peaceful nature of the Scottish strike for the Charter did not need any 
explaining as they were writing within a tradition that viewed Chartism in Scotland as 
peculiarly devoted to rational, sober, moral activity. Clarke has challenged this view of 
Scottish Chartism at least for 1839 and has shown that Scottish Chartism was in the 
mainstream with the English movement in 1839 in its support for ulterior measures 
including arming against tyranny, in support for the General Convention, and in support 
for Feargus O’Connor.73 Clarke can be criticised for exaggerating the extent to which 
Scottish Chartists were prepared to use force in 1839; declaring in favour of holding 
arms or even actually possessing arms was quite different from being prepared to use 
them. In fact Wilson had already admitted that the majority of Scottish Chartists held 
similar views on moral and physical force to those in England. By 1842 there was less 
willingness to use the language of menace in England after the failure of the Newport 
rising of November 1839 and the Yorkshire risings in early 1840, and this was also true 
in Scotland. However in Scotland as in England the constitutional right to resist tyranny 
with force was maintained with a motion by Patrick Brewster for unconditional 
obedience to the authorities being decisively rejected at a Scottish Convention in 
Glasgow in January 1842 when a resolution was passed to use ‘legal and constitutional 
means’; the Scottish Chartists did not repudiate the right to use defensive force if the 
state attacked them and thus in 1842 as well as in 1839 Scottish Chartism was in the
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mainstream with the English Chartist movement. Of course individuals varied in their 
attitudes. Morrison and a significant number of Dunfermline Chartists sided with 
Patrick Brewster of Paisley in their rejection of violence or the threat of violence in any 
circumstance; although in the West Fife region outside Dunfermline the majority of 
Chartists were O’Connorites. In the other areas of the strike for the Charter the vast 
majority of Chartists were strong O’Connorites particularly in Dundee and 
Clackmannanshire. Nevertheless all acted in unison in 1842 to ensure that the strike 
for the Charter was strictly peaceful without any desire to force the government to use 
repression which would be the occasion for an armed insurrection or even to use any 
language of menace. In the light of Clarke’s reinterpretation of the nature of Scottish 
Chartism in 1839/40 it remains to be explained why the strike for the Charter in 
Scotland was so peaceful.
The peaceful nature of the strike for the Charter was due in part to the local Chartist 
activists’ belief that they had a chance, however uncertain, of winning the support of the 
reform-minded middle classes so long as the strike remained strictly peaceful and did 
not threaten property. The Scottish Chartist strike leaders felt that middle class support 
was a realistic proposition given joint support for Com Law repeal and increasing 
support for Complete Suffrage in Scotland among the radical portion of the middle 
classes. John Duncan had outlined this strategy in July when he told a meeting that 
‘Agitation and a thorough union with the honest portion of the middle class’ were 
necessary for them to gain their rights and that ‘that union may be effected, it was such 
a union that carried the Reform Bill.’75 There was a crisis in the country and the 
working classes and productive middle classes all felt something must be done. In 
Dundee in early August the Chartists felt that the trade depression was bringing over the 
middle classes and shop keepers. Dunfermline had a number of radicals on the town 
council and the Provost, Morris, a manufacturer, had shown strong sympathy to the 
Chartists. In Dundee the prominent Leaguers the Baxter brothers and Alexander Easson, 
among the manufacturers, had come out in support of Complete Suffrage. Scottish 
Chartist support for repeal of the Com Laws made an alliance between middle and
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77working class radicals more easily achievable than in England. It was to attract middle 
class support in the circumstances of 1842 that the Scottish strike for the Charter was 
characterised by what Morrison and the Dunfermline cessation from labour committee 
described as ‘passive resistance’. The people were ‘showing the power of passive 
resistance’ and this was specifically linked to the hope that the people will ‘now receive
70
the support of all the middle class professing opinions in favour of equality.’
This desire for middle class support was evinced by the Scottish Chartists throughout 
the strike for the People’s Charter. At the Dundee meeting on Saturday 20 August the 
second resolution declared that ‘the mercantile and working classes’ were in many 
points closely connected in their interests, and therefore appealed to the employers to 
‘cast aside all doubts as to our objects and at once to come forward and join with us 
their exertions to put an end to all unjust power, and by the establishment of justice to 
secure the good of all.’ The second resolution went on to offer to the employers the 
‘right hand of fellowship in the earnest hope that they will accept it, and offer theirs to 
us, and thus by a union of sympathy and action cut off all the curses that lead to tumult 
and discord and build upon a lasting basis the peace and prosperity of our country.’ At 
the same meeting the Chartist leader Robert Mitchell was able to declare that they had 
not come there to advocate for wages, but for the ‘sacred principles of justice and 
humanity. All classes were declaring for a change, the middle classes were crying for it, 
though they stood aloof. But many of them were on the eve of bankruptcy, and would 
come forward and strike the blow, if they were certain that the blow would be followed 
up.’79 The aim of the Aberdeen Chartists’ proposals for providing supplies during a 
strike was to avoid collisions with the authorities caused by the stealing of food and thus 
allay middle class fears over public order and the safety of property so as to enable the 
middle classes to support a general strike; they claimed that many of the middle classes, 
particularly shopkeepers, had already pledged their support if their proposal was carried 
out and would continue to supply customers on credit.80
The Chartists did not receive the middle class support they had hoped for. Even in 
Dunfermline and Dundee there was distrust of the middle classes in their political role.
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In Dunfermline at least there seems to have been fair contributions made to the strike 
funds by the middle classes though it is difficult to know how far these were given in 
order to buy a quiet life. However in fact there seems to have been more middle class 
sympathy for the miners’ strike than for the strike for the Charter, judging by the press, 
due to the publicity given to the many blatantly unfair practices the masters or 
contractors practised over the weighing of coal and reductions for small amounts of 
stone unavoidably brought up with the coal. There was particularly strong support for 
the miners among shopkeepers who in areas such as Airdrie and Coatbridge were 
dependent on miners’ custom for their income. The Ayrshire miners were also able to 
rely on charity at least until the outrages in November.
Another important reason for the peaceful nature of the Scottish strike for the Charter 
was that the Chartist activists had direct control over the rank and file strikers during the 
processions. The attitude of the Scottish strike leaders was not all that peculiar when 
compared with for example the speeches made by leaders of the strike in Yorkshire and 
the English East Midlands. The Chartist strike leaders in both Yorkshire and Scotland in 
their speeches stressed that the strike must be peaceful; but in Yorkshire there was quite 
a lot of violence among the rank and file despite these warnings. In Scotland the strike 
was on a smaller scale so the leaders were normally present on the scene to restrain the 
men. For example the procession which went around Dundee on 23 August was 
attended by the main Chartist leaders and did not go wholesale into the factories but 
instead sent a deputation of eight inside to ask the workers to turn out and did not use 
force or intimidation. Even when confronted by the police when parading around 
Dundee, although they refused to disperse when the^iot Act was read, the strikers 
followed John Duncan’s advice and simply tried to evade the police. They did not 
attempt to stone the police which was the common response in Yorkshire. In contrast in 
Yorkshire the Chartist activists who initiated the strike were mainly present at public 
meetings, but the turnout crowds were very large, marched over a wide area and 
constantly split up to visit as many places as possible. When the turnout crowds actually 
went into the mills in Yorkshire to pull the plugs or were confronted by the military they 
were directed either by men from a lower tier of command coming from among the 
turnout crowds themselves who were less fussy about not using force, or by those 
Chartist activists who were more ready to use force than were the main Chartist leaders 
who had initiated the strike at public meetings. Of course the Scottish leaders could not
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always keep control. The Dundee Chartist strike leaders lost partial control over the 
marchers to Forfar when they stole turnips against the advice of the leaders and the 
march then became sadly disorganised.81
The unwillingness of the local authorities in the areas of the strike for the Charter to use 
more force than was absolutely necessary also contributed to the peaceable nature of the 
strike for the Charter in Scotland. Initially the authorities in Forfarshire and West Fife 
were alarmed by the strike for the Charter. This was particularly the case in Forfarshire 
where the Earl of Airlie, Lord Duncan and the Provost of Dundee believed that all the 
towns in Forfarshire would strike if the strike in Dundee was successful. From 
Forfarshire the Earl of Airlie reported that ‘there can be no doubt that a very bad spirit 
exists among the lower orders in all the towns’ and that he did not believe there was ‘a 
town or village...where Chartism does not prevail to a very great extent.’ The 
authorities in Arbroath were in a great state of alarm.82 Whether a situation became 
violent or not was largely at the discretion of the authorities in how they chose to 
respond. It would seem that the impression that the Chartists were not intending 
violence influenced the authorities on the scene to act with restraint. For example the 
magistrates at Forfar allowed the Dundee marchers to stay in the town, once they were 
convinced they were peaceable, to be fed by the inhabitants. The magistrates did act 
firmly. Public meetings organised by the Chartist leaders of the strike, such as one in 
West Fife on 29 August, were declared illegal. The Queen’s Proclamation was issued, 
as were separate proclamations by the magistrates against unlawful assemblages. The 
Magistrates enrolled special constables in the Forfarshire and Clackmannanshire towns 
and in West Fife, and in Dundee the most loyal workers in the factories were enrolled as 
special constables. The Chartist leaders of the strike in Dunfermline and Dundee were 
arrested. However, unlike in the strikes in England, no use was made of the military, 
and the magistrates felt able to make do with the special constables and rural police. 
This was despite the fact that the military were already stationed in Dunfermline 
following an earlier outbreak at the start of August, 160 foot were already stationed in 
Dundee, and the military had also been brought into Clackmannan at the request of the
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magistrates. The failure of the Dundee magistrates to use the military was even made a 
matter of enquiry by the Home Secretary.84 Undoubtedly it was the patently peaceful 
nature of the strike for the Charter in Scotland which influenced the magistrates not to 
call on military assistance, although available, and this in turn prevented the escalation 
of violence which took place in the strikes in England, for example at Halifax.
In conclusion the local Chartist activists in eastern Scotland as in the West Riding of 
Yorkshire and the English Midlands had attempted from the local platform to revive the 
general strike or ‘sacred month’'ulterior measure’ of the platform agitation after the 
rejection of the 1842 National Petition and the tardiness of the national Chartist 
leadership to propose firm ulterior measures from the national platform and following 
the success of the Lancashire Chartist activists in bringing large numbers out on strike 
for the Charter. The strike in Scotland bears great similarity to the strike in the English 
Midlands in that there were really two separate strike movements in 1842. The first was 
a miners’ strike associated largely with miners’ industrial grievances with little Chartist 
leadership. The second was the strike for the Charter. The two were not completely 
discrete as the West Fife and Clackmannanshire miners were part of the strike for 
Charter before remaining out over miners’ grievances, a Chartist Miners’ Association 
had been in existence since at least January 1842 in Lanarkshire which provided some 
of the leaders of the Lanarkshire miner’s strike, and resolutions for the Charter were not 
completely absent from the miners’ strike in mid-August. Overall Young’s and 
Duncan’s assessment of the strike for the Charter in Scotland is found unconvincing. In 
its lack of trade society involvement the strike for the Charter in Scotland shared more 
similarity with the strike in the West Riding of Yorkshire and the English Midlands, 
than with the strike in Lancashire. It was the local Chartists who began the strike for the 
Charter and pushed for the Charter as aim. The Chartists organised the trades 
conferences which met at Greenock, Dundee and Aberdeen suggesting that Young’s and 
Duncan’s view of an insurgent trade union movement being held back by a cautious 
Chartist leadership is inaccurate. The Dundee trades conference highlighted by Young 
was in no way the equivalent of the Manchester Great Trades delegate Conference. 
Likewise the failure of the Glasgow trades to become involved in the strike, despite 
efforts to involve them by the Greenock Chartists and delegates from the Manchester
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NCA Conference, underlines the Chartist rather than trades leadership of the strike for 
the Charter. Prior planning was undertaken during the intervening period between the 
arrival of the news of the strike in Lancashire and the start of the strike for the Charter 
in Scotland. The Chartists maintained and tried to spread the strike for the Charter by 
public meetings, addresses, resolutions and delegates. Most importantly the Chartists set 
up Cessation from Labour and Correspondence Committees to direct and spread the 
strike. It was these Chartist created and led committees rather than trades conferences 
which provided the nearest equivalent to the leadership role of the Manchester fteat 
Trades Pelegate Conference in Lancashire, again highlighting the Chartist rather than 
trades leadership of the strike for the Charter in Scotland. Prior support for the 1839 
general strike or ‘sacred month’ among the local Chartists and a desire by the local 
Chartists in West Fife, Clackmannanshire and Forfarshire to set an example for the rest 
of Scotland goes some way to explain why the strike for the Charter occurred in these 
areas. However equally important was the strong radical tradition among the woollen 
and linen textile workers in Forfarshire, West Fife and Clackmannanshire, particularly 
but not only among the handloom weavers and flax dressers. Handworkers such as these 
could not hope for improvement from further mechanisation and instead could only 
hope for improvement by legislation in their favour, for example minimum wage 
legislation, following organic reform of the constitution. In addition there was a level of 
prior support for Chartism among the miners of the West Fife and Clackmannanshire 
coal field which was unusual among the Scottish miners and helps explain why they 
gave support to strike for the Charter rather than merely supporting a strike over miners’ 
grievances.
The ideology expressed in the Scottish strike for the Charter, as in the strike in the 
Northwest England, the West Riding of Yorkshire and the English Midlands, was that 
of William Cobbett’s criticism of ‘Old Corruption’. Political monopoly rather than the 
relation to the means of production was identified in the strike in Scotland as the source 
of society’s evils. In the Scottish strikes for the Charter it was the aristocracy and the 
state that were identified as the targets of the strike by the local leaders. In Scotland the 
strike for the People’s Charter was not aimed at the middle classes. The strike was to be 
a traditional radical tactic involving all the industrious people. The Scottish Chartist 
strike leaders hoped that the strike would force the government to resign or the Queen to 
dismiss her ministers and appoint those who would enact the Charter. In the strike for
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the Charter the betterment of society was expected to come through the gaining of the 
Charter in the strike. It was to be a peaceful means of achieving political change. The 
attempt to collapse into one another the miners’ strike and the strike for the Charter and 
to exaggerate trades influence in starting and spreading the strike in Scotland also fails 
to account for the peaceable nature of the strike for the Charter in Scotland. A contrast 
emerges between the miners’ strike and the strike for the Charter in that there was little, 
in fact almost no, violence in the strike for the Charter compared to considerable 
violence in the miners’ strike. This peaceful nature would also be hard to explain if 
there really had been trades society leadership of the strike as the Scottish trades were 
noted for the violence they brought to their trade disputes. The strike for the Charter’s 
peaceful nature was due to the strong Chartist, rather than trade union, leadership and to 
the tactical decisions made by the Chartist leaders of the strike. Given strong support for 
repeal of the Com Laws among the Scottish Chartists as well as the radical middle 
classes and given the increasing tendency during the depression of 1842 for the radical 
element of the middle classes to move towards Complete Suffrage the local Chartist 
leaders of the strike felt that they had a realistic chance of winning middle class support 
for the strike so long they could guarantee that the strike would remain peaceable. 
However this support was not forthcoming and the Scottish Chartist activists themselves 
allowed the strike to peter out at the end of August once it was clear that the strike for 
the Charter in England had failed.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
WALES AND THE STRIKE FOR THE CHARTER
The strike for the Charter in Wales in August 1842, while exciting considerable 
attention in the London and provincial newspapers due to memories of the Newport 
Rising of 1839, was far less significant in extent than the strike for the Charter in the 
Northwest, the West Riding of Yorkshire, the English Midlands and parts of Scotland. 
The strike was confined to the Merthyr district of South Wales, a centre of iron 
production and coal mining, and Wales’ premier industrial district. Local Chartist 
activists organised and led the strike from Wednesday 17 August in response to the 
news of the strike for the Charter in England and called the strike off on Wednesday 24 
August after news had arrived of the disintegration of the strike for the Charter in 
Manchester.
The most significant contributions to the historiography on the strike in Merthyr are 
those of Morgan and Jordan. Morgan characterised the strike in the Merthyr district as 
being merely a matter of a wage dispute and as unconnected with the Merthyr 
Chartists.1 Jordan recognised the political nature of the strike but asserted, without 
presenting any evidence, that the strike in the Merthyr district was part of a 
longstanding national plan by the Chartists for a general strike.2 The chapter will 
suggest that a better understanding of the strike in Wales can be reached if we position 
ourselves between these two arguments. The strike was a political strike for the Charter 
organised by local Chartist activists from the local platform but it was not the result of a 
long-term plan and rather was a response by local Chartist activists to the news of the 
strike for the Charter in Manchester. The strike in Merthyr differed significantly from 
the strike in most of England because in Merthyr the miners were committed to a strike 
for the Charter rather than for miners’ wage grievances.
Merthyr Tydfil had a long nonconformist radical tradition stretching back beyond the 
Merthyr Reform Bill riot of June 1831. There is evidence of radical underground
1 W. Morgan, ‘Chartism and Industrial Unrest in South Wales in the 1840s’, National Library o f  Wales 
Journal, X (1957), 8-16
2 H. Jordan, The 1842 General Strike in South Wales (London, 1983), 1-22
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activity in Merthyr in 1800 and Merthyr shared briefly in the post-war radical revival.3 
That the strike for the Charter should take place in the Merthyr district was a reflection 
of the region’s importance as the main stronghold of organised Chartism in Wales after 
the failure of the Newport insurrection of 1839 when miners under the leadership of the 
Chartist John Frost had been dispersed by troops when they marched on Newport 
perhaps as a first step in the creation of a Chartist republic. The Merthyr colliers and 
ironworkers had not taken part in the Newport insurrection. The view that the rank and 
file in Merthyr were more committed to moral force than the Monmouthshire Chartists 
does not seem entirely convincing. The failure of the Merthyr district Chartists to take 
part in the Newport Rising may have been due in part at least to their being kept in the 
dark by their Chartist leaders such as Morgan Williams who were committed to non­
violent agitation. However it may also have been due to John Frost’s changes of plan. 
Merthyr delegates had been present at the initial meetings when it was decided that the 
Merthyr men should march to Breconshire, however Frost later revised his plans and 
Merthyr delegates did not attend the later meetings. Certainly some coal and 
ironworkers in the Merthyr region stopped work on the Saturday night before the rising 
and were thought to be acting suspiciously.4 By the summer of 1842 Chartist 
associations were reviving in Monmouthshire and other parts of Wales. However none 
could match the strength of the Merthyr district where the National Charter Association 
(NCA) took very firm root. The district had eight or nine lecturers of its own. Morgan 
Williams, the Merthyr Chartist leader, was able to bring over 23,000 signatures to the 
National Petition from Merthyr and Aberdare to the National Convention in April 1842 
and more signatures were sent up to London later in April. A crowd of 10,000 
accompanied him when he left for the National Convention in April 1842.5
Much of the support for Chartism came from the miners and ironworkers. However 
support also came from the artisans and shopkeepers of Merthyr. The Chief Constable 
of the Glamorgan police, Captain C. J. Napier, believed every other shopkeeper in 
Merthyr was a Chartist at heart. The leaders of Merthyr Chartism were linked, in many
3 G. A. Williams, The Merthyr Rising (London, 1978); D. J. V. Jones, Before Rebecca: Popular Protests 
in Wales, 1793-1835 (London, 1973), 28, 135
4 D. J. V. Jones, The Last Rising: the Newport Insurrection o f1839 (Oxford, 1985), 85-229; D. Williams, 
John Frost (Cardiff, 1939), 195-239; D. Wiliams, ‘Chartism in Wales’, in A. Briggs (ed.), Chartist 
Studies (London, 1959), 220-248
5 Northern Star, 23 April 1842
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cases, by shared Protestant nonconformity and a commitment to educational 
improvement. Activists included miners such as William Miles, Evan Rees, David Rees, 
and William James, all officers of the Merthyr Tydfil Chartist Association. However 
artisans and small masters also figured prominently, such as the blacksmiths Matthew 
John, David John senior and David John junior, the cooper Henry Thomas, and the 
weaver David Ellis. A number of Nonconformist ministers such as David John senior, 
Unitarian Minster and publisher of the Chartist newspaper Udgorn Cymru, were 
prominent activists, as were shopkeepers such as William Gould, a grocer, and John 
Balis, a confectioner. Morgan Williams, clothier and former publisher of the Chartist 
newspaper the Advocate and Merthyr Free Press, was the leading activist not only in 
Merthyr but in South Wales as a whole and indeed was elected to the NCA Executive in 
June 1842. He was committed to peaceful agitation and moral improvement, but was 
also a firm supporter of Feargus O’Connor who had dropped the language of menace 
after his release from prison in 1841.6
That the strike for the Charter in Wales was confined to the large Merthyr Tydfil and 
Aberdare district of Glamorgan in South Wales was a reflection partly of the district 
being, along with the neighbouring iron and colliery district of Monmouthshire, the 
premier industrial region in Wales. In 1841 at least 12,800 persons were employed in 
the iron works and collieries in the Merthyr Tydfil district. This included around 5190 at 
Dowlais works, owned by Sir John Guest, about 1900 at Pendarran, 3000 at Cyfarthfa, 
owned by William Crawshay, and 2400 at Plymouth works, owned by the Magistrate 
Anthony Hill. The town of Merthyr also included numbers of artisans and shopkeepers. 
At this time the total population of the Merthyr Tydfil parish was around 35,500. In fact 
Merthyr was the largest town in Wales.7
The strike in Merthyr was organised and led by the local Chartist activists. They 
organised the meetings and proposed the resolutions which began and maintained the
6 Northern Star, 11 June 1842; D. J. V. Jones, ‘Chartism in Welsh Communities’, Welsh Historical 
Review, VI, 3 (1973), 243-261; A. V. John, ‘The Chartist Endurance, Industrial South Wales 1840-68’, 
Morgannwg, XV (1971), 23-49; D. J. V. Jones, Chartism and the Chartists (London, 1973); D. Smith 
(ed.), A People and a Proletariat: Essays in the History o f Wales (London, 1980); D. J. V. Jones, 
‘Chartism at Merthyr’, Bulletin o f Celtic Studies, XXIV (1972), 230-245
7 Sir Thomas Phillips, The Language, Social Condition, Moral Character and Religious Opinions o f the 
People o f Wales (London, 1849), 1-55; ‘Report of the Commissioners for Inquiring into the Employment 
and Condition of Children in Mines and Manufactories’, PP (1842), 634, 635; ‘Census Occupations 
Abstract’, PP (1844), vol. xxvii
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strike and finally, admitting its failure, proposed the return to work. Morgan, in his 
article on the strike, was unwise in his conclusion that the local Chartists did not 
instigate and lead the strike.8 The speakers and chairman at the meeting which began the 
strike on the afternoon of 17 August, which had been called by a handbill put up on 15 
August advertising a meeting to memorialise the Queen to recall Parliament in the 
present crisis, were local Chartist activists. The chairman was either David Morgan, a 
shoemaker, or David Jones, a cordwainer, both of whom were Chartist activists. The 
speakers, who proposed and seconded the resolutions, were Chartist activists. These 
included William Miles, miner and officer of the Merthyr Chartist Association, David 
Ellis, weaver and officer of the Chartist Association, Thomas Evans, a miner and 
Chartist activist, Evan Rees, a collier and officer of the Chartist Association, and David 
Davies, a smith and secretary of the Merthyr Chartist Association.9 At a strike meeting 
early in the morning on 18 August the main speaker was William Miles.10 It was the 
local Chartist activists who on 19 August organised a procession to Dowlais to make a 
show of strength and to seek support from the Monmouthshire miners.11 At a large 
meeting on the morning of 22 August in the Chartist room at Caedraw, to decide 
whether to continue the strike, the chairman was the Chartist activist Thomas Pugh.12
William Miles was the main speaker at most of the meetings. There were complaints
among the Chartists that their leading orators, such as the Unitarian Minster David John
senior and the Unitarian school master David Evans, did not speak. Neither did Morgan
Williams speak at any of the meetings. However at several meetings held by the
Chartists on the evening of 19 August and the morning of 20 August Morgan Williams
attended and during the strike agitation he was, according to Chief Constable Napier
and the Marquis of Bute, receiving letters from the North of England and issuing orders
to the men under him as to what subjects they should discuss to keep up the agitation
11and how they were to proceed.
8 W. Morgan, ‘Chartism and Industrial Unrest in South Wales in the 1840s’, National Library o f Wales 
Journal, X (1957), 13-16
9 Glamorgan, Monmouth and Brecon Gazette, 20 August 1842; Monmouthshire Merlin, 20 August 1842
10 Glamorgan, Monmouth and Brecon Gazette, 20 August 1842
11 PRO HO 45/265, ff. 56-57, C. J. Napier to HO, Bridgend, 6 September 1842
12 Glamorgan, Monmouth and Brecon Gazette, 27 August 1842
13 PRO HO 45/265, ff. 56-57, C. J. Napier to HO, Bridgend, 6 September 1842
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The Merthyr Chartists activists not only deliberately started the strike but also gave it 
the aim of the enactment of the People’s Charter; although the aim of the strike to 
pressure the government into enacting the Charter was obscured at the beginning of the 
strike by the tactics of the Chartist activists. Morgan, in his article on the strike at 
Merthyr, was misled when he characterised the strike as a dispute over wages.14 The 
Chartist activists began the strike on 17 and 18 August by calling for a strike for the 
wages of 1840. The initial call for the wages of 1840 was a tactical device. Once 
enthusiasm for a strike had been generated they intended to show the men that it was 
impossible for the masters to raise wages, and that as class legislation was the cause of 
oppression and distress, the strike must be for the People’s Charter. The Chartists 
proceeded to convince the men on 18 August that it was impossible for the iron masters 
to raise wages due to the state of the iron trade. On 19 August the Chartist activists put 
forwards the true aim of the strike, the enactment by Parliament of the People’s Charter 
in order to remove class legislation as the only solution to oppression and distress. The 
Merthyr magistrates, Chief Constable Napier, and the Marquis of Bute were all clear 
that the true aim of the strike was the Charter, that ‘the real object of these assemblies is 
to obtain the Charter, and the attempt to induce the great body of workmen to strike 
under the hope of obtaining the same rate of wages as was paid in the year 1840 is but a 
means to the end.’15
At the meeting which started the strike on the afternoon of 17 August it was proposed 
that at the next days meeting they should consider the resolution ‘to form a deputation 
to meet their masters to propose to them that unless the wages of the workmen are 
immediately raised to the standard of 1840, a strike at all the establishments in the 
district will be the consequence.’16 Four resolutions were also passed at the meeting. 
The first three resolutions stated that it was absolutely necessary to enquire into the 
unparalleled distress prevailing in Merthyr and its vicinity, that workmen could not 
possibly support themselves and families unless they had the same wages for their 
labour as they had two years previously, and that it was much better for the workmen to 
be idle without sufficient quantity of provisions than to be toiling by working without 
the common necessities of life. However the fourth resolution, moved and seconded by
14 Walter Morgan, ‘Chartism and Industrial Unrest in South Wales in the 1840s’, National Library o f 
Wales Journal, X (1957), 13-16
15 PRO HO 45/265, f. 36, A. Hill to HO, Merthyr, 21 August 1842
16 PRO HO 45/265, ff. 34-35, A. Hill and E. L. Richards to HO, Merthyr, 17 August 1842
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the Chartist activists William Miles and David Ellis, revealed the activists’ tactics, of 
showing the cause of distress to be class legislation which could only be solved by the 
obtaining of the People’s Charter. They resolved that ‘it is almost impossible for the 
ironmasters to make any advance of wages to their men at this present low price of 
iron.’17 The Marquis of Bute was quite correct in his appraisal of the Chartist activists’ 
aims when he wrote that ‘the state of wages is a mere pretext, as indeed is evident from 
the contradictory speeches of the local agitators.’18
This tactic was followed through on 18 August. At the meeting very early in the 
morning on 18 August the Chartist activists William Miles and Evan Rees moved the 
resolution that they should send a deputation to the masters of the iron works to ask 
them to increase wages, and if they should fail they would stand out and ask the 
shopkeepers to support them. The resolution was passed. Atameeting early in the 
afternoon of 18 August Evan Rees put the resolution that no more work should be 
performed until the wages of 1840 be had. The meeting formed into a procession to the 
Cyfarthfa works, and a deputation met the iron master Henry Crawshay. Crawshay told 
them that he could not raise wages due to the low price of iron, and the deputation 
reported this to the men after the procession had marched to the Market Square.19
The intention of the Chartists activists all along had been to set off the strike for the 
Charter, and to convince the men that the Charter was the only solution to distress. This 
was made clear by one of the speeches at the early morning meeting on 18 August. One 
of the Chartist activists had told the meeting that he did not blame the masters, who had 
been kind to them, and did not blame the tradesmen of Merthyr, who were a very 
industrious body. The speaker attributed their miseries principally to class legislation. 
After the Chartist activists had shown the men that the masters could not raise their 
wages they were free to make the aim of the strike the Charter. This was done at a 
meeting at Dowlais Pond on the morning of 19 August. The meeting was attended by 
1200 men and the Chartist activists were again the speakers. A resolution was 
unanimously passed by the 1200 present that they should not return to work until the 
People’s Charter became the law of the land and the Chartist activists exhorted the men
17 Monmouthshire Merlin, 20 August 1842
18 PRO HO 45/265B, f. 5 Bute to HO, Cardiff Castle, 23 August 1842
19 Monmouthshire Merlin, 27 August; Glamorgan, Monmouth and Brecon Gazette, 27 August 1842
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to remain firm to the resolution. On 19 August another meeting was held on the side of 
a mountain at Penrheolgerig early in the evening and again the meeting agreed not to go 
to work until the Charter was obtained.20 At several other meetings held on the evening 
of 19 August and the morning of 20 August, with Morgan Williams attending but not 
speaking, the avowed object of the strike was the People’s Charter.21
The links between the Merthyr Chartist strike leaders and the strike leaders in other 
parts of the country on strike were close. The initial success of the Lancashire Chartists 
in bringing out large numbers for the Charter gave the Merthyr activists the hope that 
the national holiday could also be implemented in Merthyr and they kept in close touch 
by letter with activists in other strike areas to gauge the progress of the strike in other 
parts. Chief Constable Napier certainly believed the strike agitation to be ‘a shadow of 
the Manchester affair.’ While the strike was at its height in England Morgan Williams 
was receiving the latest news from the Chartist activists in Manchester, Birmingham 
and Leeds as to the success or otherwise of the strike there.22 The Merthyr Chartists 
were waiting for news of the continued success of the strike for the Charter in Abrthem 
England before they attempted to do more. The meeting early in the evening on 22 
August was adjourned waiting further news from the North: Chief Constable Napier and 
the Marquis of Bute were certain that what was to take place in Merthyr would depend 
upon further reports from the North. The intention of the meeting to be held on 23 
August was to receive news from the Abrth, and if the news was that the trades delegate 
meeting in Manchester had in fact failed, there would be an end to the strike agitation in 
Merthyr. The resolutions passed at the indoor meeting on 23 August were for 
continuing work until the receipt of the next Northern Star for its news of the strike 
elsewhere. Anthony Hill had no doubt that the Chartists at Merthyr had letters of the 
latest intelligence from Manchester and other places, and so knew that the strike for the 
Charter had failed in Lancashire and the West Riding, and that the decision to await the 
next issue of the Northern Star was a cover to hide their disappointment. Napier and
20 Glamorgan, Monmouth and Brecon Gazette, 27 August 1842
21 PRO HO 45/265, ff. 56-57, C. J. Napier to HO, Bridgend, 6 September 1842
22 PRO HO 45/265B, f. 2, C. J. Napier to HO, Merthyr, 23 August 1842; PRO HO 45/265, ff. 56-57, C. J. 
Napier to HO, Bridgend, 6 September 1842
23 PRO HO 45/265, f. 46, C. J. Napier to HO, Merthyr, 23 August 1842; PRO HO 45/265B, f. 5, Bute to 
Graham, Cardiff Castle, 23 August 1842
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Bute were certain that when the colliers resumed their work on the morning of 24 
August it was due to the news of the failure of the strike in/Northern England.24
In terms of duration and extent the strike agitation in the Merthyr district lasted seven 
days beginning with the meeting on 17 August and ending on 24 August. However the 
feeling among the local authorities was that the workmen were prepared to strike for far 
longer if the Chartist activists had not called off the strike on hearing of the depressing 
reports from Manchester. The works principally affected were those at the Aberdare, 
Cyfarthfa Pendarren and Gydlas works. There was no strike at the Dowlais works 
perhaps due to Sir John Guest’s popularity among his work people.25 By 23 August 
those on strike included most of the colliers and miners at the Cyfarthfa works and 
Pendarran works and many of the miners and colliers in the Aberdare valley. It also 
appears that workmen in other trades gave over work to some extent with the 
Nottingham Mercury correspondent going so far as to state that ‘business may be said to 
be at a standstill; indeed, commercial travellers now here say that they have thrown 
away their journey, as they are actually doing nothing in the way of business.’26 
Outdoor meetings ended after the Queen’s proclamation was published though indoor 
meetings continued. The threats to compel a strike were continuing on 22 and 23 
August but there was no turn out procession to the works and collieries either then or 
earlier. The miners and colliers resumed their work on the morning of 24 August. In all 
a few thousand colliers and miners had left off work between 18 and 23 August.27 
However the numbers who attended the strike meetings was far larger. Upwards of
9ft10,000 attended the meeting on 17 August which began the strike agitation. Over the 
weekend the magistrate Anthony Hill believed the bulk of the workmen would offer 
only faint resistance to any direct attempt to prevent them from working. If the Chartists 
had attempted a turnout procession as in the other strike it seems likely the numbers that 
would have struck would have been far greater.
24 PRO HO 45/265, f. 42, C. J. Napier to HO, Merthyr, 24 August 1842; PRO HO 45/265, f. 54, Bute to 
HO, Cardiff Castle, 25 August 1842
25 Morning Chronicle, 23 August 1842
26 Nottingham Mercury, 26 August 1842
27 PRO HO 45/265, f. 44, A. Hill to HO, Merthyr, 23 August 1842; PRO HO 45/265, f. 50, A. Hill to HO, 
Merthyr, 24 August 1842; PRO HO 45/265, f. 42, C. J. Napier to HO, Merthyr, 24 August 1842; PRO 
HO 45/265B, f. 5, Bute to HO, Cardiff Castle, 23 August 1842
28 Monmouthshire Merlin, 20 August 1842
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No strike took place in Wales beyond the important Merthyr district. The Merthyr 
Chartist activists attempted to bring the Monmouthshire workers from the Ebbw Valley 
and Tredegar into strike for the Charter, but failed. On 19 August the Merthyr Chartist 
activists led a procession of seven hundred, mainly colliers, to Dowlais Pond to show 
their strength and receive the reply to the messages they had sent asking the 
Monmouthshire men to join them. However the colliers of the Ebbw Valley returned the 
reply ‘You left us in the lurch at Newport, and now you may go to the devil your own 
way.’29 A Chartist delegate from Leeds was reported to have passed through Newport 
on 20 August and was, according to the Marquis of Bute, endeavouring to ‘make 
mischief in the Monmouthshire works on 22 August. However the delegate was not 
caught, and his attempt to start a strike at Samuel Homfray’s Tredegar works in 
Monmouthshire did not succeed, with the military being immediately sent down from 
Cardiff to protect the Tredegar works. There were rumours of a strike in the 
Montgomeryshire flannel factory town of Newton in mid Wales. On 23 August the 
Chief Constable of the Montgomeryshire rural police reported that the operatives of 
Newton were expected to turn out for an increase in wages the next day, and there had 
been rumours in the London newspapers since 19 August that delegates from 
Manchester were in Newton and that a disturbance had taken place. However the 
rumours were false and no strike or disturbance occurred, and no delegates were
^ I
discovered.
The dominant ideology expounded in the strike in South Wales was the traditional 
radical analysis of the state and the criticism of ‘Old Corruption’. The aristocracy, 
sinecurists and placemen were criticised. At the meeting on the morning of 18 August in 
Merthyr the speakers did not blame the iron masters or tradesmen. Instead they 
attributed their miseries to class legislation and were decidedly of the opinion that 
things would not improve until they had a voice in the forming of the laws of the 
country. At the meeting at Dowlais Pond on the morning of 19 August the speakers 
wanted to hold out until the Charter became the law of the land because it would ‘incur 
incalculable blessings on the sons of labour, then would.. .people have their just rights,
29 PRO HO 45/265, ff. 56-57, C. J. Napier to HO, Bridgend, 6 September 1842
30 PRO HO 45/265, f. 40, Bute to HO, near Cardiff, 22 August 1842; PRO HO 45/265, f. 44, A. Hill to 
HO, Merthyr, 23 August 1842
31 Shrewsbury Chronicle, 26 August 1842; PRO HO 45/265, f. 49, Chief Constable Montgomeryshire 
rural police to HO, Newton, 23 August 1842
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tyranny and oppression would not be known in great Britain.’ Radical A/.onconformity 
was also evident in the strike. It was not only placemen and sinecurists who were 
singled out for criticism, but also the Church of England priests, who were opposed to 
the people. At the meeting on the morning of 18 August the speakers called on the 
Nonconformist ministers, such as David John senior, to aid them. The middle classes 
were not criticised during the strike in Merthyr. At the meeting on the morning of 18 
August the Chartist speakers acknowledged their obligations to the tradesmen and were 
sorry they could not discharge them. They called on the tradesmen, as well as the 
Nonconformist ministers, to assist them in their present struggle for their just rights.32 In 
the immediate aftermath of the strike the Merthyr Chartists had no aversion whatsoever 
to working with the middle class suffrage radicals, describing the Sturgites as no other 
than Chartists as they claimed the six points but were just named after Sturge.33 Chief 
Constable Napier believed that not only every other tradesman in the town but also 
several of the mine agents, or contractors, at the pits in Aberdare held Chartist 
principles. Certainly some support for the strike from the middle classes was 
forthcoming. In at least one pit the levels master colluded in the strike by refusing to 
send any more hands down. Many of the Merthyr shopkeepers responded to the strike 
by supplying the strikers with food. Chief Constable Napier even felt himself to be 
watched by other respectable citizens of Merthyr, Morgan Williams being connected 
with several of the leading citizens including the postmaster and High Constable.34
There appears to have been a much closer relationship between the miners and Chartist 
activists in South Wales than in, for example, the Midlands where the activists provided 
leadership for the miners but never received full commitment to their political goals. In 
South Wales the miners do appear to have had a greater commitment to Chartism as 
seen by their role in the Newport rising and their willingness to strike in 1842 if the 
local activists had met with good new from England. In most other strike regions the 
miners were out for miners’ wages grievances and the miners’ strike in other areas was 
really a separate strike movement from strike for the Charter, but in Merthyr the miners 
provided the men who struck for the Charter and they only lost interest in the strike 
because the local Chartist activists decided to call it off. This closeness between
32 Monmouthshire Merlin, 27 August 1842
33 PRO HO 45/265, f. 60-61, Spy’s report of a Chartist meeting held at Caedraw on 29 August 1842
34 PRO HO 45/265, ff. 56-57, C. J. Napier to HO, Bridgend, 6 September 1842
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activists and miners may have been due to a large extent to a shared Protestant 
Nonconformity. The miners looked up to local Nonconformist ministers, mainly Baptist 
and Independent, as community leaders and at least six such ministers in Merthyr were 
active in Chartism. In addition the use of the Welsh languages by activists may have 
been a binding factor, William Miles and other activists had Welsh as their first 
language and spoke from the local platform in Welsh during the strike, Miles also 
providing a translation in his poor English for the English speakers. The miners were 
prepared to accept that higher wages could not be offered by the masters due to the state 
of the iron trade and were committed to the Charter as the aim of the strike in order to 
bring betterment by reducing taxes, Church of England tithes and the rest of the 
traditional radical panacea against old corruption.
The strike in Merthyr witnessed no violence whatsoever despite reports that the Merthyr 
Chartists had been arming in February 1842 when George Black of Nottingham and one 
of the John family were supposed to have been selling guns.35 The strike movement in 
Merthyr was a completely peaceful agitation. There was not even any attempt to make a 
turnout procession to the collieries, though it is likely this would have occurred if news 
of the continued success of the strike for the Charter had been received from the north. 
The only attempt at intimidation was the placing of threatening letters in the Cyfarthfa 
iron works threatening the furnace men, upon whom the continued running of the 
ironworks depended, with vengeance by the turnouts if they continued to work. At all 
the strike meetings the Chartist strike leaders exhorted the men to be peaceable and 
avoid the snares of the police. At the meeting on 17 August the Chartist activists gave 
strict orders to preserve the peace. At the meeting on the morning of Thursday 18 
August William Miles begged the workmen to be peaceable and orderly and not to 
insult or molest anyone. The men were advised to remain firm but not use any violence. 
At the meeting on the morning of 22 August indoors at Caedraw the Chartist chairman 
Thomas Pugh begged the men to keep themselves out of the power of the police and 
military as they were thirsting for their blood.36 The completely peaceful nature of the 
strike in Merthyr meant that there was no excuse for arrests. No illegal acts took place
35 PRO HO 45/265, f. 9, C. J. Napier to HO, Bridgend, 5 February 1842
36 Monmouthshire Merlin, 20, 27 August 1842; Glamorgan, Monmouth and Brecon Gazette, 20, 27 
August 1842
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as the Chartists stopped holding outdoor strike meetings after the Queen’s Proclamation 
against unlawful assemblies was posted up, and held their meetings indoors instead.
The strike agitation was defeated by a combination of the news from Northern England 
of the failure of the strike for the Charter and the firm action of the local authorities. On 
the evening of 20 August the magistrates sent dispatches to Colonel Bishop the 
commander of the Southern District, to make the necessary military arrangements, the 
police force was strengthened from other districts and was patrolling Merthyr, and by 
Sunday 21 August the military were ready in the barracks at Dowlais if required.37 Sir 
John Guest, MP for Merthyr and owner of the Dowlais iron works, came down on 
Saturday night. Chief Constable Napier came down to Merthyr on 19 August after 
hearing that the Chartists would form a procession that day. Napier stayed at Merthyr in 
constant communication with his police force. The Marquis of Bute, Lord Lieutenant of 
the county of Glamorgan, came down to Cardiff on the evening of 22 August to keep in 
touch with the magistrates and Napier in Merthyr.38 The active work of Napier and the 
ironmaster magistrate Anthony Hill was crucial in the defeat of the strike. Napier 
attended a meeting of the magistrates on 19 August and urged them to issue the Royal 
Proclamation in Welsh and English together with a caution against attending the 
procession due for that day. However the town magistrates were reluctant to act as no 
outbreak had actually taken place. But at the meeting of the magistrates next morning, 
on 20 August, Anthony Hill was in the chair. With the influence of Hill and the county 
magistrates Napier induced the magistrates’ meeting to agree to issue the Royal 
Proclamation.39
The posting up on 21 August of the Royal Proclamation against unlawful assemblages 
was a severe blow to the strike agitation. The Chartist activists had relied upon being 
able to hold public meetings in order to begin and maintain the strike for the Charter. 
However after the evening of 20 August they were no longer able to hold open air 
meetings, and though meetings continued, they were now held indoors in the Chartist 
room at Caedraw or on the mountain side at Aberdare. The Chartists activists were
37 PRO HO 45/265, ff. 34-35, Anthony Hill and E. L. Richards to HO, Merthyr, 17 August 1842; PRO 
HO 45/265, ff. 56-57, C. J. Napier to HO, Merthyr 22 August 1842; Glamorgan, Monmouth and Brecon 
Gazette, 27 August 1842
38 PRO HO 45/265, ff. 46, Captain of Royal Glamorgan Militia to HO, Merthyr, 23 August 1842
39 PRO HO 45/265, ff. 56-57, C. J. Napier to HO, Bridgend, 6 September 1842
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determined not to give the authorities and police an excuse for arresting them and so 
remained within the law by ending their open air meetings, however this made it 
impossible to gather the masses they had been doing earlier in the week.40
The reason the Chartists remained so cautious after the issuing of the proclamation was 
the unfavourable news that came from the north. Napier was certain that the twin 
issuing of the Proclamation and the news from the north had an immediate effect. Many 
who had taken an active part in the proceedings of 19 August absconded and from 20 
August the ardour of the Chartists began to decline. The magistrates scored a further 
success on 21 August when notices of the relatively quiet state of Manchester and a list 
of the mills and factories in Manchester which had returned to work were posted up in 
the town and on the line of the road leading to the spot where the next strike meeting 
was to be held on Monday morning. When on the morning of 22 August the turnouts 
attempted to intimidate the furnace men at the iron works to stop work and not light the 
furnace fires, which would have closed down the iron works, the iron masters acted 
promptly to protect the furnace men from intimidation 41
Six days after the strike in Merthyr had ended, but while there were still lingering hopes 
that it could be revived, the Merthyr Chartists at an indoor meeting held in Caedraw 
were eager to take part in Joseph Sturge’s ‘Grand Conference on the 7 September’, 
hoping that every place would send a delegate so as to settle how they were to act to 
obtain the Charter for the law of the land, and hoping that after the Conference they 
should have a ‘grand general move’. William Miles was elected delegate, but the 
conference was cancelled, putting a final stop to any hopes of reviving the strike 
movement.42 The authorities followed up the strike with victimisation. In the few days 
after the strike had ended on 24 August Napier sent his superintendent to the agents of 
the iron works with the names of the men who had rendered themselves conspicuous at 
Chartist meetings and to suggest their immediate discharge. This met with the instant 
attention from the proprietors who even dismissed men who had attended the procession 
on 19 August. William Miles, the most active Chartist during the strike agitation, was 
one of those dismissed. The names were also circulated to the leading works in
40 PRO HO 45/265, A. Hill to HO, Merthyr, 23 August 1842
41 PRO HO 45/265, ff. 38-39, C. J. Napier to HO, Merthyr 22 August 1842; PRO HO 45/265, ff. 56-57, 
C. J. Napier to HO, Bridgend, 6 September 1842
42 PRO HO 45/265, ff. 60-61, Report of a Chartist meeting held at Caedraw on 29 August 1842
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Glamorganshire as well as to Manchester, Birmingham and Nottingham. William Miles 
and Morgan Williams were being watched night and day by Napier’s agents so nothing 
could take place without his knowledge.43 Despite reports from a spy in late November 
that the Merthyr Chartists were establishing clubs for the distribution of arms there was 
no attempt to revive the strike in response to a letter received from the Ayrshire 
Chartists, or more likely colliers, who were still on strike, urging them to co-operate 
with them and at once commence active measures.44
In conclusion the strike in South Wales showed a number of peculiarities. The most 
significant was the close relationship of the miners to the Chartist activists. The strike in 
Wales also differed significantly from the strike for the Charter in England and Scotland 
in that whereas two separate strike movements of miners and other trades can be seen 
elsewhere, in the Merthyr district the miners provided the rank and file for the strike for 
the Charter. Morgan, in his article on the strike, was certainly inaccurate in 
characterising the strike in the Merthyr district as merely a matter of a wage dispute and 
as unconnected with the Merthyr Chartists. Jordan was incorrect to suggest that the 
strike in the Merthyr district was part of a longstanding national plan by the Chartists 
for a general strike. In fact the attempt to start a strike for the Charter in the Merthyr 
district was the response of local Chartist activists to news of the strike for the Charter 
in Northern England. The example of the strike for the Charter in Lancashire had shown 
that it was possible to create a widespread general strike for the Charter overcoming the 
obvious reluctance to leave off work if others would not. The strike for the Charter took 
place in South Wales, as England and Scotland, after the Northwest strike had clearly 
become for the Charter and the Trades Delegate Conference in Manchester had declared 
the aim of the strike to be the enactment of the Charter. In South Wales, as in England 
and Scotland, the strike was deliberately launched from local platforms at public 
meetings by Chartist activists who from the first made the aim of the strike the 
enactment of the Charter. However the strike for the Charter in Wales was limited to the 
Merthyr district of South Wales and so was less significant in extent than the strike in 
England or Scotland. The strike in South Wales illustrated the crucial importance of 
news of the failure of the strike for the Charter in Manchester in undermining the strike
43 PRO HO 45/265, ff. 56-57, C. J. Napier to HO, Bridgend, 6 September 1842; PRO HO 45/265, ff. 71, 
C. J. Napier to Bute, Bridgend, 12 September 1842
44 PRO HO 45/265, ff. 73-74, C. J. Napier to HO, Bridgend, 30 November 1842
220
for the Charter outside the Northwest. It had been the news that there was a strike for 
the Charter in Manchester which had encouraged the activists in other districts to agitate 
for a strike for the Charter in their own district. However the news that the Manchester 
Trades Delegate Conference had dissolved produced a debilitating effect on the strike in 
Merthyr as it did in other regions.
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE RESPONSE TO THE STRIKE IN LONDON
No strike for the Charter took place in London. However there were important 
demonstrations and public meetings. Mass demonstrations took place at the Euston 
Railway Station on Saturday 13 and Sunday 14 August in protest against troops being 
sent to the manufacturing districts. More significantly mass public meetings with 
processions, to demonstrate support for the strike in the manufacturing districts, were 
organised by the London Chartists between Tuesday 16 and Monday 22 August, 
culminating in large simultaneous meetings at Paddington railway terminus, 
Kennington Common and Clarkenwell Green on Monday 22 August. The government 
was seriously alarmed by the meetings and processions in London but were 
successfully, and somewhat brutally, put down by the Metropolitan Police.
In his study of London Chartism Goodway concluded that it was not in 1842 or 1848 
but rather only in 1838-9 that London failed the Chartist movement by its feeble support 
for the national movement.1 While London was certainly the most important district of 
Chartist activity in 1848 it will be suggested here that Goodway’s judgement requires 
revision so far as 1842 is concerned, and that the failure of London to move on a larger 
scale in August 1842 seriously weakened the strike for the Charter nationally. As it was, 
the nightly public meetings in London caused the Government almost as much alarm as 
did the strike in the rest of the country. If a strike had taken place in London or if the 
disturbances in London had been on a larger scale it would have been more likely that 
the Government would have lost confidence in itself. Goodway did not examine who 
were the London Chartists who organised the public meetings during the period of the 
strike, what their strategy was, how they hoped to support the efforts of the strikers in 
the manufacturing districts, and what ideology they articulated. These are issues which 
will be examined in this chapter.
London was by far the largest city in Britain with a population approaching 1.9 million 
in 1841. London lacked the heavy industry and mechanised large-scale textile industry
1 D. Goodway, London Chartism (Cambridge, 1982), 221
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which is associated with the industrial revolution in the provinces. Nevertheless London 
remained the greatest centre of manufacture based on small-scale workshops with a 
huge range of different occupations and a highly developed service sector to cater for 
the massive London market at both luxury and mass ends. Although London artisans 
did not suffer proletarianisation through the introduction of mechanisation in large 
factories they were exploited through slop production for the mass market by the 
lowering of wages and expansion of the workforce. The London trades had not suffered 
as severely in the 1838/9 depression as those in the northern manufacturing districts; but 
in 1842 the renewed depression had a greater impact on the London trades prompting 
increased participation in Chartism. London’s great size, its huge population, and the 
lack of contact between its different districts and between different trades made it an 
ideal place for crowd actions such as the Wilkes and Liberty demonstrations in the 
1760s and the anti-Catholic Gordon Riots in 1780 but was less conducive to the 
maintenance of a large scale organised radical movement; a point we will return to.2
In the 1790s London had been at the forefront of popular radicalism. Thomas Hardy had 
founded the London Corresponding Society (LCS) in 1792 with the programme of 
universal suffrage, vote by ballot and annual elections. Although many of its leading 
figures were professional men its rank and file was composed largely of London 
artisans. The London based Society for Constitutional Information, revived in the 1790s 
with Home Tooke as a leading figure and link with the LCS, also came out in support of 
universal suffrage. The popular radicals supported a constitutional peaceful movement 
for parliamentary reform. The loyalist reaction and government repression broke the 
popular radical movement and forced what remained underground with advocates of 
insurrection emerging in the republican United Britons and the Despard Conspiracy. In 
the years of the Napoleonic Wars radicalism as a public movement was quiescent 
however a radical underworld culture thrived in the London taverns. After 1815 London 
lost its supremacy as the great centre of radicalism to the growing manufacturing 
districts in the Northwest, Yorkshire and the Midlands. The most convincing 
explanation for this shift from London to the north lies in the huge size of the capital, 
the isolation from each other of its component districts, and divisions between the 
London trades, rather than to an absolute decline in radical activity relative to other
2 P. L. Garside, ‘London and the Home Counties’, in F. M. L. Thompson (ed.), The Cambridge Social 
History o f England (Cambridge, 1993), vol. 1,471-507
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regions. London radicalism, apart from mass crowd actions such as the Wilkes and 
Liberty crowds of the 1760s and the mass meetings organised by the LCS in the mid 
1790s, had always involved merely a minority of skilled artisans together with a small 
section of the discontented middling classes. The growing textile manufacturing 
districts of the North and the Midlands, dominated by one or two industries, provided a 
more conducive atmosphere for working class involvement in popular politics and these 
districts naturally superseded London as the main centres of radicalism as they grew in 
size with further industrialisation after 1815. Nevertheless London radicalism revived in 
the post war years with support for Henry ‘Orator’ Hunt’s constitutional mass platform 
agitation. London was also the base for Arthur Thistlewood and the Society of 
Spencean Philanthropists, inheritors both of Spence’s land scheme and the 
insurrectionary and republican traditions of Colonel Despard. Middle class London 
radicals, disciples of Bentham, including James Mill and Francis Place, advocated 
universal suffrage on utilitarian grounds. Following the agitation in favour of Queen 
Caroline economic prosperity took the wind out of the sails of the radical movement. 
But in the 1830s London artisans supported the first Reform Bill, the War of the 
Unstamped to obtain an untaxed press, co-operative trading and the Grand National 
Consolidated Trades Union. The National Union of the Working Classes (NUWC) was 
formed, including among its members William Lovett and also William Benbow who 
popularised the idea of a political general strike in his Grand National Holiday and 
Congress o f the Productive Classes of 1831, many of its members going on to form the 
London Working Man’s Association (LWMA) which was responsible for drawing up 
the People’s Charter in conjunction with radical MPs and Francis Place. Organised 
support for Chartism in London in 1838 and 1839 had been notoriously weak and the 
failure of Chartism to become a mass movement in the metropolis had contributed 
significantly to the failure of the initial Chartist challenge. The first General Convention 
which had sat in London in 1839 had been largely ignored by working class 
Londoners.3
3 A. Goodwin, The Friends o f Liberty (Cambridge, 1979), 209-499; I. Prothero, Artisans and Politics in 
Early Nineteenth-Century London (Folkstone, 1979), 73-327; J. Stevenson, Popular Disturbances In 
England 1700-1870 (London, 1979), 163-180; J. A. Hone, For the Cause o f Truth: Radicalism in London 
1796-1821 (Oxford, 1982), 1-156; E. P. Thompson, The Making o f the English Working Class (London, 
1968), 84-203,491-514, 660-780; P. Hollis, The Pauper Press (London, 1970), 95-258
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However from the second half of 1841, when the National Charter Association (NCA) 
took firm root in the capital, organised London Chartism grew rapidly. By early 1842 
London had become a leading stronghold of Chartism with forty-three NCA localities 
by April. 100,000 to 150,000 took part in the procession to present the second National 
Petition to Parliament on 2 May 1842. In July 1842 the Metropolitan Delegates had 
been created as a permanent body to co-ordinate the NCA localities in London. Many of 
the London trades had formed themselves into NCA localities as was happening in 
Manchester. The depression of 1841-2, unlike that of 1837-9, seriously affected the 
London trades, and the trades which joined the NCA were experiencing economic 
difficulties. The tailors and the bootmakers, who were suffering particular hardships at 
this time, were the most numerous NCA trade localities in the metropolis. A new 
O’Connorite leadership had also emerged in London by 1842. William Lovett and most 
of the other LWMA leaders had been marginalised. The new leading activists such as 
Edmund Stallwood, Philip McGrath and Thomas Martin Wheeler were strong 
supporters of Feargus O’Connor and committed to London Chartism being a mass 
movement rather than confined to an elite of working men. Lovett’s new National 
Association and the Complete Suffragists had very little rank and file support among the 
working classes in London, although they did gain support among many London 
shopkeepers. From late 1841 the London Chartists were strong enough to carry hostile 
votes at public Metropolitan Anti-Corn Law Association meetings in the capital. The 
great growth in strength of London Chartism was reflected in the new membership of 
the Executive of the NCA. Following the arrest of Leech, Campbell and Bairstow and 
McDouall’s flight to France after the strike, members of the Metropolitan Delegates 
formed a provisional Executive. When the new Executive was elected in 1843 McGrath 
was elected President and Wheeler was elected Secretary.4
There is no evidence whatsoever either of the strike for the People’s Charter nationally 
being part of a national pre-planned Chartist conspiracy or of the London Chartists
4 D. Goodway, London Chartism (Cambridge, 1982), 38-50; I. Prothero, Artisans and Politics in Early 
Nineteenth-Century London (Folkstone, 1979), 319-327; I. Prothero, ‘Chartism in London’, Past and 
Present, 44 (1969), 76-105; I. Prothero, ‘London Chartism and the Trades’, Economic History Review, 2nd 
Series, XXIV (1971), 202-219; D. J. Rowe, ‘The Failure of London Chartism’, Historical Journal, XI, 3 
(1968), 472-487; D. J. Rowe, ‘Class and Political Radicalism in London’, Historical Journal, 13, 1 
(1970), 31-47; D. J. Rowe, ‘Chartism and the Spitalfields Silk-weavers’, Economic History Review, 2nd 
Series, XX (1967), 482-493; D. J. Rowe, ‘The London Working Men’s Association and the “People’s 
Charter”’, Past and Present, 36 (1967), 73-85; I. Prothero, ‘Debates: The London Working Men’s
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being part of any such conspiracy. But once news had reached London that a strike for 
the Charter was taking place in the North the London Chartist activists organised a 
number of large public meetings and demonstrations in support. The first crowd actions 
in London connected with the strike in the Northern and Midland manufacturing 
districts took place outside Euston Station on the evening of 13 August and on 14 
August. Large crowds gathered, and groaned and yelled at the soldiers, as the troops 
were embarked by railway for the North. These appear to have been spontaneous 
gatherings, after news of the strike in Manchester had reached London through the 
newspapers, by letter and by eyewitness, though some Chartist activists also turned up 
and spoke to the crowds.5
Chartist activists in London organised public meetings in the evenings from 16 August. 
Connected with these Chartist public meetings were processions from one place of 
meeting to another; however these were not turn out processions as the meetings took 
place at night after work. The first Chartist organised public meeting was held on 
Stepney Green on the evening of 16 August. Next evening, on 17 August, a Chartist 
organised public meeting was held on Clerkenwell Green. Three public meetings were 
organised by Chartist activists for the evening of 18 August with processions from one 
place of meeting to the next. The first took place at Islington Green at 7 p.m. After the 
meeting at Islington Green a procession went from there to Clerkenwell Green where 
the next meeting took place. After the Clerkenwell Green meeting a procession went to 
Lincoln’s Inn Fields at 10 p.m. where the third meeting of that night was held. After the 
Lincoln’s Inn Fields a procession proceeded to the East End through the City. After the 
late night meetings and processions Sir James Graham decided to prohibit Chartist 
public meetings in the metropolis. A public meeting announced by Chartist activists to 
be held on Clerkenwell Green on the evening of 19 August was dispersed by the 
metropolitan police after three hours and fifty arrests, and the Chartist organisers were 
prevented from speaking. However some of the crowd went on procession after the 
attempted meeting proceeding to Lincoln’s Inn Fields and thence to Bow Street where 
there was a serious clash with the metropolitan police and some more arrests were 
made. The high point of the movement in London came on the evening of 22 August
Association and the “People’s Charter’” , Past and Present, 38 (1967), 169-173; D. J. Rowe, ‘Rejoinder: 
The London Working Men’s Association and the “People’s Charter”’, Past and Present, 38 (1967), 174-6
5 The Times, 15 August 1842; Northern Star, 20 August 1842
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when simultaneous public meetings were organised by Chartist activists on Kennington 
Common and near Paddington Station for 6 p.m. A third meeting was held later in the 
evening at Clerkenwell Green. The Metropolitan Police dispersed all three meetings, 
made arrests and prevented the Chartist organisers from speaking. From then on it 
became increasing difficult to hold public meetings due to police vigilance.6
The numbers who attended the demonstrations at Euston and the public meetings were 
considerable though not large relative to the size of the metropolis. The crowds who 
gathered at Euston station to demonstrate against the sending of troops to the North 
numbered perhaps 2000 on the evening of 13 August and 5000 on 14 August. About 
8000 to 10,000 attended the Stepney Green meeting on 16 August. The meeting at 
Clerkenwell Green on 17 August was described by the Times reporter as a 
‘considerable’. The meeting on Islington Green on 18 August may have numbered
20,000 persons. The number of those assembled who adjourned to the Clerkenwell 
Green meeting was about 3000 to 4000. What the Times reporter described as ‘a large 
body of Chartists marshalled in procession’ attended the Lincoln’s Inn Fields meeting. 
The police cordoned off the entrances to Clerkenwell Green on the evening of 19 
August. However perhaps 300 managed to break through into the Square and troubled 
the police for three hours. The number who then went to Lincoln’s Inn Fields and later 
to Bow Street was in the region of 500. However in terms of numbers involved the most 
impressive meetings were the simultaneous meetings held at Kennington Common and 
near Paddington Station on the evening of 22 August. Upwards of 10,000 assembled 
for the Paddington Station meeting and perhaps 40,000 assembled for the Kennington 
Common meeting. This was one of the largest public meetings of the whole strike and, 
considering that the 1842 meeting had taken place at very short notice, compares 
favourably with estimates ranging from around 15,000 to 150,000 for the famous 10 
April 1848 meeting on the same ground. However the Kennington Common meeting, 
until the Metropolitan Police charged it and dispersed it with considerable violence, had 
a carnival atmosphere and many had undoubtedly come out of curiosity. The police 
dispersed the meeting when the Chartist speakers began to address it. Upwards of 5000 
attended the indoor meeting of electors and others of Finsbury at the White Conduit
6 The Times, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24 August 1842; Northern Star, 27 August 1842; Illustrated London 
News, 27 August 1842; Evening Star, 20,22,23,24 August; PRO MEPO 7/8, Metropolitan Police, Police 
Orders, ff. 244-8, 19, 20, 21 August 1842; PRO MEPO 1/43, Metropolitan Police, letter books, letter 
91722, R. Mayne to HO, 20 August 1842, letter 92043, R. Mayne to HO, 31 August 1842
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House. Although many of the meetings in London were of a respectable size and 
compared favourably to the size of the meetings in the North and Midlands they were 
not large in relation to the size of the population of the metropolis. However this was 
the proverbial problem of popular movements in London. London was really a number 
of separate towns with great distances separating one part from another. The various 
meetings, considered as meetings of the parishes in which they took place rather than of 
the whole metropolis, were not so unimpressive in size.
The ‘Committee for getting up Public Meetings’, a committee of the NCA Metropolitan 
Delegates, organised the Chartist public meetings in London to support the strike in the 
manufacturing districts. The Committee for getting up Public Meetings was increased in 
size by seven members once news of the strike in the North reached London. Its leading 
member was Henry Dron, a dyer who was one of the Metropolitan Delegates and an 
officer of the Lambeth Chartist Youths NCA locality, and who was to be chosen a 
member of the provisional NCA Executive following the arrest or escape of the old 
Executive members after the strike. The speakers at the public meetings were 
recognised Chartist activists and lecturers. Henry Dron was chairman of the Stepney 
Green public meeting on 16 August. John Parker, a tailor, former member of the 
London Democratic Association and a leading NCA Chartist in the 1840s who was to 
be secretary of the United Tailors’ trade union from 1844, was a speaker at the Islington 
Green public meeting on 18 August. Dr R. T. Webb, a founder member of the NUWC 
and of Feargus O’Connor’s Marylebone Great Radical Association, also spoke at the 
Islington Green meeting. Anderson, a regular Chartist lecturer in London, spoke at the 
Islington Green meeting and was reading out the first resolution at the Kennington 
Common meeting when the police charged. The regular Chartist lecturers Ferguson and 
Soars both spoke at the Islington Green meeting. Nodder, a shoemaker and officer of 
the Walworth NCA locality, was the chairman at the Kennington Common meeting. 
Edward Blackmore, a baker and officer of the Lambeth NCA locality, was a speaker at 
the Stepney Green meeting. Mantz, a regular Chartist lecturer in London, was a speaker 
at the Stepney Green and Islington Green meetings. Charles Bolwell, a bootmaker and 
Chartist activist from Bath who was lecturing in London in 1842 and 1843, was a 
speaker at the Islington Green meeting. Feargus O’Connor was back in London after the
7 Northern Star, 27 August 1842; Illustrated London News, 27 August 1842; Evening Star, 23, 24 August 
1842; The Times, 15,17,18,19,20,23 August 1842
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Manchester NCA Conference had dispersed but does not appear to have played any part 
in organising the public meetings in London. O’Connor did however turn up at the 
Kennington Common public meeting on 22 August and was prepared to speak. But he 
left before the speeches began as it was believed that the police intended to arrest him if 
he spoke. Nevertheless O’Connor did speak at an indoor meeting on 23 August at the 
White Conduit House when he stressed that the Chartist case still rested on the 
3,317,752 signatures to the second National Petition. John Campbell, secretary of the 
Executive of the NCA, after his return from Manchester issued addresses calling for the 
continuation of the strike in the rest of the country and continued to attend meetings of 
the London trades to encourage them to declare in favour of the Charter.8
The aim of the public meetings, as expressed in the placards which announced them, the 
speeches by the Chartist activists at the meetings, and the resolutions passed, was to 
give moral support to the strike for the Charter in the manufacturing districts. The 
placards, speeches and resolutions criticised the authorities for ‘assaulting and 
massacring the people of Manchester’. There were calls for the removal of the troops 
from the north. For example Blackmore and Mantz moved and seconded a resolution at 
the Stepney Green meeting that a memorial should be presented to the Queen praying 
that she would order the troops to be withdrawn from the disturbed districts. At the 17 
August Clerkenwell Green meeting Sir Robert Peel was charged with murder for 
sending troops into the provinces ‘with instructions for them to cut down a suffering 
and unoffending class of men.’ At the Islington Green meeting on 18 August Bolwell 
referred to Sir Robert Peel’s admission before parliament was prorogued that the 
Government did not see how the distress of the country could be alleviated and 
commented that ‘under such circumstances it was the duty of a minister who made such 
an admission at once to abdicate and leave it to the people, who knew the evils under 
which they suffered, and who also knew the remedy and were in a position to apply it.’ 
The Manchester manufacturers were criticised for reducing wages. Interference with the 
constitutional right to hold public meetings, both in the North and in London itself, was 
criticised. Indeed the placards announcing the Kennington Common meeting declared
8 The Times, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24 August 1842; Northern Star, 27 August, 3 September 1842; Evening 
Star, 23,24 August 1842
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that its purpose was to protest against the interference with public meetings in London 
since 19 August.9
The strike in the manufacturing districts was above all used as an opportunity by the 
London Chartist activists to blame distress on class legislation and to call for the 
enactment of the Charter. Dron at the Stepney Green meeting stated that it was only by 
the adoption of the principles of the People’s Charter that protection would be afforded. 
The second resolution carried unanimously at the 18 August Islington Green meeting 
was ‘that this meeting are determined to demand equal rights and equal laws for the 
whole people of the three kingdoms.’ Bolwell at the Islington Green meeting ‘hoped 
that the people would take every advantage of time and circumstance, and never delay 
in their efforts until the People’s Charter by becoming the law of the land gave them a 
share in the promulgation of the laws by which they were governed.’10
Although there was no attempt to start a strike in London from the meetings the 
alternative ‘ulterior measure’ advocated in May 1842 by the General Convention in 
London following Parliament’s refusal to consider the second National Petition was 
strenuously endorsed. This was to memorialise the Queen to dismiss her ministers and 
appoint those who would enact the Charter as called for by the 3,317,752 signatures to 
the National Petition. For example the first resolution carried at the Islington Green 
meetings was ‘that this meeting...is convened to lament the awful state of distress 
which prevails in the manufacturing districts, and to memorialise the Queen to abolish 
the present system of class legislation; to amend and alter laws which now so grievously 
oppress and afflict the poor; and to pass the People’s Charter as the law of the land.’ At 
the Stepney Green meeting a resolution was passed unanimously that a memorial should 
be presented to the Queen praying that the Charter might be adopted as the law of the 
land."
The traditional radical picture of society’s ills deploying William Cobbett’s ‘Old 
Corruption’ analysis was articulated at the meetings in London during the strike by both 
the O’Connorite NCA Chartists and by Lovett’s National Association members. The
9 The Times, 17,18,19,20,23,24 August 1842; Northern Star, 27 August, 3 September 1842
10 The Times, 17, 19 August 1842; Northern Star, 27 August 1842
11 Northern Star, 27 August, 3 September 1842; The Times, 17 August 1842
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aristocracy rather than the middle classes in their economic role were singled out as the 
enemy. At the 17 August Clerkenwell Green meeting one speaker declaimed that the 
‘Aristocracy, who were rolling in wealth, and revelling in all kinds of luxury, might 
fancy themselves secure; but they might rest assured, that the words Vox Populi, Vox 
Dei would speedily convince them the contrary, and that in the end the people, who had 
manfully struggled for their rights, would, in spite of the aristocracy, gain their ends.’ 
Social evils were seen to be the result of political disenfranchisement. The first 
resolution of the National Association meeting on 25 August attacked class legislation 
declaring that ‘the distress and disorder prevailing in the manufacturing districts are 
sufficient evidence of the folly and injustice of class legislation, and that those who 
arrogate the Government of the country to themselves distinctly prove that they do not 
carry out those principles upon which Governments were founded, namely, the comfort, 
happiness, and welfare of the governed.’ The third resolution called for the enactment of 
the Charter declaring that the meeting could not ‘see any other mode of alleviating the 
disturbed state of Great Britain, than by giving to every man equal rights as set forth in 
the document called the People’s Charter.’ A symbolic reference to radical patriotism 
and the rights of freebom Englishmen was present in the Union Jack flag carried by the 
demonstrators after the Friday Clerkenwell Green meeting. Another flag bearing the 
words ‘Civil and Religious Liberty’ was topped by a cap of liberty, a symbolic 
reference not only to the rights of man but also to the ancient English constitution as 
James Epstein and John Belchem have demonstrated.12
As we have seen, in London in the second half of 1841 and the first half of 1842 trade 
societies or members of the same trade had been forming NCA localities in a similar 
process to that which had been occurring in Manchester. However the London trades 
did not call for a strike or play a parallel role to the Manchester Trades Delegates. But 
the London trades were reported to be listening anxiously to the news from the North 
and Midlands. The process of London trade societies declaring in favour of the Charter 
as necessary to protect their labour also continued throughout the strike with John 
Campbell, secretary of the NCA Executive who was back in London after the 
Manchester NCA and Executive Conference, actively encouraging London trades to
12 Northern Star, 27 August, 3 September 1842; The Times, 18, 22 August 1842; Evening Star, 20 August 
1842; J. Epstein, Radical Expression (Oxford, 1994), 70-99; J. Belchem, ‘Republicanism, Popular 
Constitutionalism and the Radical Platform in Early Nineteenth Century England’, Social History, 6 
(1981), 1-35
231
declare for the Charter. Some of the London Chartist trades also collected funds to send 
to the ‘Committee for getting up Public Meetings’ to help defray the expenses of the 
public meetings held during the strike and supported the memorial to the Queen. A 
meeting of one of the shoemakers’ Chartist trade localities was held on 21 August to 
discuss the strike in the manufacturing districts and collected money to defray the 
expenses of calling the public meetings. On 24 August upwards of 1000 members of the 
West End Boot and Shoe Makers trade society met, with John Campbell attending, and 
passed resolutions declaring that only the enactment of the Charter could protect their 
labour. There was no call for a strike but the meeting did pass a resolution to ‘.. .tender 
our heartfelt thanks to the Trades Delegates, recently assembled at Manchester, for 
adopting the People’s Charter, as the only reasonable means by which the evils of class 
legislation may be removed, and increased trade, good wages, peace, happiness, and 
prosperity once more bless our land.’ A meeting of the Spitalfields weavers, with John 
Campbell attending, passed resolutions supporting the memorial to the Queen calling 
for the dismissal of her present ministers and their replacement with men who would 
enact the Charter.13
William Lovett’s newly formed National Association demonstrated its divorce from the 
mainstream of London Chartism by not wholeheartedly endorsing the strike in the 
manufacturing districts. Nevertheless the National Association did use the strike as an 
opportunity to hold an indoors public meeting, to consider the alarming state of the 
country and call for the enactment of the Charter, in the National Association Hall in 
Holbom on 25 August. The charging of one penny for admission also distanced the 
National Association meeting from the earlier public meetings held by the NCA 
Chartists. Former activists of the NUWC, of the Unstamped Press, and of the LWMA 
including William Lovett, Henry Hetherington, James Watson and others spoke, moved 
and seconded the resolutions at this public meeting. Hetherington was in the chair and 
called upon them to unite and destroy the monopoly of class legislation. The first 
resolution attacked class legislation and the third resolution, which was seconded by 
Lovett, called for the enactment of the Charter. However the second resolution failed to 
give that strong support for the strike in the manufacturing districts which had been 
evinced at the NCA public meetings, only going so far as to declare that ‘although the 
meeting could not refrain from expressing their regret at what had taken place, they
13 Northern Star, 3 September 1842
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thought the starving population were justified in some measure, but at the same time 
they called upon the people to conciliate instead of provoke the troops, and refrain from 
all violence.’14
The Metropolitan Anti-Corn Law Association tried to make some political advantage 
out of the strike in the manufacturing districts, and counter suggestions in the Times and 
elsewhere that the Leaguers had plotted the strike, by drawing up and printing a 
representation to Sir Robert Peel which in the words of the League lecturer Sydney 
Smith ‘was to tell Peel that he, and not they, were the cause of the present state of the 
country’. An address to their fellow citizens blaming the crisis on the government’s 
failure to repeal the Com Laws was also drawn up by Colonel Thomas Perronet 
Thompson, author of the Catechism on the Corn Laws, P. A. Taylor and Francis Place. 
When the Metropolitan Anti-Corn Law Association met indoors on 24 August only one 
speaker denounced Feargus O’Connor for ‘leading the people astray’. Colonel T. P. 
Thompson, P. A. Taylor and other leading London Leaguers attributed the strike to the 
government’s refusal to repeal the Com Laws and the League’s responsibility was 
warmly denied.15
The continued holding of Chartist public meetings and processions was defeated by the 
Metropolitan Police. No attempt was made to disperse the meetings before 19 August 
and the Chartist activists and lecturers were not prevented from speaking at the public 
meetings on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday, although the Metropolitan Police did 
arrest those found posting up the placards advertising the meetings as the placards were 
held to be seditious. However Sir James Graham ordered the Police Commissioner to 
prevent any further Chartist public meetings following the meetings and processions of 
18 August.16 This the Metropolitan Police successfully did using great brutality at 
Kennington Common where mounted police charged the crowds. An indoor meeting 
was held at the White Conduit House on the evening of 23 August under the cover of a 
meeting of the electors of Finsbury and was adjourned to outside the building while 
resolutions were passed and Feargus O’Connor spoke. During the rest of the week many
14 Northern Star, 3 September 1842
15 Anti-Bread-Tax Circular, 25 August 1842; ‘Colonel T. P. Thompson’, in Dictionary o f National 
Biography (London, 1885), vol. LVI, 224-6, ‘P. A. Taylor’ in Dictionary o f  National Biography (London, 
1885), vol. LV, 455-6; Dudley Miles, Francis Place (Brighton, 1988), 226-247
16 PRO MEPO 7/8, Metropolitan Police, Police Orders, ff. 243-8, 15, 18, 19,20,21 August 1842
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attempts were made to hold large public meetings but the vigilance of the police and Sir 
James Graham’s bans on public meetings taking place after 6 p.m., making it 
impossible for those in work to attend, prevented most from taking place. But indoor 
meetings and the occasional outdoor meeting, such as that at Lambeth held at noon on 
25 August to circumvent the 6 p.m. curfew, continued. At least 100 persons were 
arrested at the public meetings and for posting the bills which advertised the meetings.17 
Occupations of twenty-one of those arrested and tried, not including those tried merely 
for posting the bills advertising meetings, can be identified. They included five 
shoemakers, five carpenters, two tailors, one journeyman printer and one journeyman
1 ficoachmaker. This reflects the support Chartism received from artisans in London 
particularly those such as shoemakers and tailors who were facing increasing economic 
exploitation.
While no strike for the Charter took place in London in August 1842, there was a 
general strike of the coal-whippers at the end of August, yet this was entirely an 
industrial matter unconnected with the strike for the Charter. There were reports that 
600 workers of the Chartist master builder Cubitt, who himself appeared before the 
Bow Street magistrates for distributing a placard advertising a meeting at Stepney 
Green, had struck work on 22 August following rumours of a reduction in wages in the 
building trade. However this did not set an example for others to follow and if the men 
left work at all they quickly returned.19
In Southern England and East Anglia, outside London, very little activity connected 
with the strike took place. The three partial exceptions were Norwich and the West 
Country textile towns of Trowbridge and Chard. Norwich and Trowbridge both had 
radical traditions dating back to the 1790s and indeed Trowbridge had been a centre of 
Chartism in 1839. Significantly all three were declining textile towns; Norwich was a 
centre of jacquard handloom weaving, Trowbridge was a centre of woollen cloth 
handloom weaving, and Chard had lace factories. Although there were resolutions
17 The Times, 20,23,24 August 1842; Northern Star, 27 August, 3 September 1842; Evening Star, 20,23, 
24 August 1842
18 Evening Star, 24 August 1842; Sun, 22, 24 August 1842; Morning Chronicle, 24 August 1842; The 
Times, 22 August 1842; PRO HO 16/7, Old Bailey Sessions, 1842; PRO HO 26/48, Criminal Register 
Middlesex, 1842; PRO PCOM 1/46, Central Criminal Court Sessions Papers, 935-939,1016-1018, 1084
19 Northern Star, 27 August 1842
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passed, supporting the strike for the Charter elsewhere and condemning both class 
legislation and the League for provoking the strike, at public meetings in Norwich and 
Trowbridge organised by the local Chartist activists, no strike for the Charter took 
place. The lace factory hands in Chard turned out for about one week from 22 August 
but this was merely for higher wages although the London Chartist activist Ruffey 
Ridley had been lecturing in Chard on the Friday before the strike as part of a lecture 
tour in the West Country and the committee of the Working Men which helped provide 
organisation for the strike included the local radical leader Joseph Brown Woodward. 
Ridley, who had also addressed the public meetings at Trowbridge, was eventually 
arrested at the start of September after addressing the miners of the Forrest of Dean in 
Gloucestershire. The Norwich jacquard weavers did strike from 22 to 25 August. But 
again this was also merely a wages dispute and the men returned to work after the 
masters agreed to an advance of wages.20
In conclusion there is no evidence whatsoever either of the strike for the People’s 
Charter being part of a national conspiracy or of the London Chartists being part of any 
such conspiracy. However once news of the strike for the Charter in the Northwest 
reached London the London NCA Chartist activists organised a number of large public 
meetings and demonstrations. The ‘Committee for getting up Public Meetings’, a 
committee of the Metropolitan Delegates, organised the Chartist public meetings in 
London to support the strike in the manufacturing districts. The strike in the 
manufacturing districts were above all used as an opportunity by the London Chartist 
activists to blame distress on class legislation and to call for the enactment of the 
Charter. Although there was no attempt to start a strike in London from the meetings the 
alternative ulterior measure of memorialising the Queen to dismiss her ministers and 
appoint those who would enact the Charter was strenuously endorsed. The traditional 
radical analysis attacking ‘Old Corruption’ was articulated at the meetings in London 
during the strike by both the O’Connorite NCA Chartists and by William Lovett’s
20 PRO HO 45/245, f. 2, Magistrates of Axminster, Devon, to HO, 28 August 1842, f. 6, copy of letter 
from Ruffy Ridley to Joseph Brown Woodwood of Chard, Devises, 25 August 1842; PRO HO 45/259, 
f.33, placard of the Committee of the Working Men, Chard, 26 August 1842, ff. 18-9, W. Loveridge to 
HO, 26 August 1842, ff. 29-30, Mayor of Chard to Lord Lieutenant, 27 August 1842; PRO HO 45/248, 
ff. 48-9, Clerk to the Justices of Newnham Gloucestershire to HO, 3 September 1842; PRO HO 45/262, 
ff. 2-9, Magistrates of Trowbridge to HO, 23 August 1842; Northern Star, 27 August, 3 September 1842; 
Wiltshire Independent, 25 August 1842; Northern Star, 27 August 1842; Manchester Guardian, 31 
August 1842; R. B. Pugh, ‘Chartism in Somerset and Wiltshire’, in A. Briggs (ed.), Chartist Studies 
(London, 1959), 174-219
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National Association members. The London Anti-Corn Law Leaguers attributed the 
strike to the government’s refusal to repeal the Com Laws and the events in the North 
and Midlands were used by them as a stick to beat the government with. The continued 
holding of Chartist public meetings and processions in the capital was defeated by the 
Metropolitan Police. The public meetings and demonstrations organised by Chartist 
activists in the capital to express support for the strike in the North and Midlands were 
not without significance. One at least of these meetings was very large at perhaps 
40,000 persons. While this may have been small in relation to the size of London the 
processions in the capital nevertheless caused Home Secretary Sir James Graham, 
Premier Sir Robert Peel and Commander-in-Chief the Duke of Wellington a 
disproportionate amount of anxiety. Nevertheless the failure of any strike to take place 
in London and the fact that the public meetings were not, given the size of the 
population in the capital, better supported, suggests that Goodway’s verdict that it was 
not in 1842 or 1848 but rather in 1839 that London let Chartism down needs to be 
revised so far as the strike in 1842 is concerned.21 The failure of London to move on a 
larger scale during the strike was a crucial reason for the strike’s failure nationally 
because the government would have been far more likely to lose its nerve if the strike in 
the provinces had been accompanied by more and larger demonstrations and a greater 
show of public opinion in favour of the Charter in the capital. Francis Place’s comment 
to Richard Cobden in 1840 regarding the failure of the Metropolitan Anti-Corn Law 
Association, that ‘London in my time, and that is half a century, has never moved. A 
few of the people in different parts have moved, and these, whenever they come 
together, make a considerable number -  still, a very small number indeed when 
compared with the whole number’ was applicable to London Chartism in August 
1842.22
21 D. Goodway, London Chartism (Cambridge, 1982), 291
22 F. Place to R. Cobden, 4 March 1840, quoted in G. Wallas, The Life o f Francis Place (London, 1898), 
393
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE AFTERMATH
By the end of August the strike for the Charter had failed in all districts. Miners in the 
Midlands and Scotland and cotton workers in the Northwest continued on strike into 
September or even later, however their demand was now merely higher wages and no 
longer the Charter. The immediate aftermath of the failure of the strike was the trial in 
1842-43 of over 1000 of those involved. The long-term aftermath of the failure of the 
strike was the decline of Chartism as a mass movement and the transition from 
independent radicalism to popular liberalism. In the long term the failure of the strike 
marked a turning point in British working class history. There was to be no further 
political strike in nineteenth century Britain. The failure of the strike produced 
disillusionment with the strategy of forcible intimidation inherent in the mass platform 
agitation and encouraged the British working class to turn towards industrial trade 
unionism, free trade and popular liberalism. Judged by the government’s response to the 
strike, involving three Special Commissions as well as assizes and more defendants than 
in either 1839 or 1848, the 1842 strike was the high point of Chartism, in terms of the 
culmination of the Chartist threat to the state, and posed a greater perceived threat to the 
government than did the Chartist challenge of either 1839 or 1848.
Jenkins portrayed the trials which followed the strike as acts of class justice. This 
concurred with Saville’s examination of the Chartist trials in 1848 where the court 
system was portrayed as an instrument of class power.1 Fellague Ariouat, examining 
procedure in Chartist trials over the period 1839-48, argued that the Chartists received 
fairer treatment in their trials from the legal personal than either the Chartists 
themselves or historians have acknowledged and that where unfairness existed it was in 
the law itself and in legal procedure rather than from legal personnel acting with class 
bias. Epstein has demonstrated that earlier radicals used the courts as theatres in which 
to express their political faith, but against this Fellague Ariouat has suggested that the
1 M. Jenkins, The General Strike o f 1842 (London, 1980), 219-239; J. Saville, 1848 (Cambridge, 1987), 
166-199
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Chartists tended not to use the courts as arenas for airing their political beliefs.2 Jenkins 
and Foster suggested that the outcome of the government’s conspiracy show trial in 
March 1843, whereby the sentences of imprisonment were never carried out, was a 
deliberate act of ‘liberalisation’ on the part of the government.3
Whether the outcome of the 1843 ‘show trial’ really was the result of government 
liberalisation or whether it was due to the decision of the judges interpreting legal 
procedure and against the wishes of the government must be re-examined. How far 
Fellague Ariouat’s interpretations are applicable to the 1842 and 1843 trials must be 
considered. Whether Chartist defendants used their trials as platforms for expressing 
their political beliefs as did earlier radicals, and if so how these political beliefs 
compared to those of earlier radicals, will be enquired into. The failure of the strike will 
be related to the collapse of Chartism and to the decline of the Chartist constitutional 
mass platform agitation strategy. However the Government’s dealings with the Anti- 
Corn Law League (ACLL) must first be examined.
The Government and the Anti-Corn Law League
After the strike had failed the Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel and the Home Secretary 
Sir James Graham paid much attention to the activities of the ACLL. Graham arranged 
for a barrister to build up a pamphlet, based on access to the government’s papers as 
well as to journals, giving all evidence available in support of the League having 
fomented the strike in order to pressurise the government into repealing the Com Laws. 
J. W. Croker was then asked to work the pamphlet up into an article, with further 
suggestions from Graham and Peel, which was published as the ‘Anti Com Law 
Agitation’ in the Quarterly Review of December 1842.4
2 J. M. Fellague Ariouat, ‘Rethinking Partisanship in the Conduct of the Chartist Trials 1839-1848’, 
Albion, vol. 29, No. 4, Winter (1997), 596-621; J. M. Fellague Ariouat, ‘The Politics of Trial Procedure in 
the Chartist Trials in England and Wales 1839-1848’ (PhD, Birmingham, 1995), 12; J. Epstein, Radical 
Expression: Political Language, Ritual, and Symbol in England (Oxford, 1994), 39
3 J. Foster, ‘Introduction’, in M. Jenkins, The General Strike o f1842 (London, 1980), 14-19
4 Sir James Graham Papers, Cambridge University Library, Bundle 53A, Graham to Peel, 2 September 
1842; Sir Robert Peel Papers, BL Add. MS 40,447, ff. 344-7, Graham to Peel, 18 November 1842; J. W. 
Croker, ‘Anti Com Law Agitation’, Quarterly Review, VLXXI (December 1842), 244-314
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The Leaguers had certainly discussed the idea of stopping the mills; and such talk was 
especially prevalent in February and March and again in July and early August. The 
League’s lecturers, especially John Finnigan and Timothy Falvey in Manchester in late 
July, had been responsible for stirring up discontent, and talk by Leaguers at the League 
conferences at Manchester in February and London in July, and by some of the delegates 
on their return to Manchester at the very start of August, had brought the tactic of a 
political strike back into discussion. In February and March prominent Leaguers such as 
Robert Greg and the free trade supporting Stockport Advertiser were suggesting that 
unemployed operatives laid off due to lack of work because of restrictions on commerce 
should be sent to their original parish settlements in the countryside as an attack on the 
landowners and aristocracy who would have to maintain them by vastly increased poor 
rates. Ashdown, a delegate from London to the London League conference in July, had 
declared that the mills should be stopped and had been invited to discuss his ideas with 
the London Leaguers who had organised the conference, though this was no doubt to 
remove the issue from the floor of the conference. The Bayley brothers of Stalybridge, 
whose threatened wage reductions had been the immediate cause of the strike, were 
minor members of the ACLL.5 Peel and Graham did not however have access
to the highly embarrassing correspondence between John Bright and Richard Cobden of 
March 1842 where a forced lockout in Lancashire and Yorkshire was discussed but 
dismissed on the grounds of impracticality.6
Peel and Graham felt that they did not have a legal case against the League but they 
nevertheless believed that the article was convincing proof of the League’s moral 
responsibility for the strike through the language of the League leaders, lecturers and 
press. Graham’s aim was to use the article to deter people from contributing to the 
League’s £50,000 appeal fund which he suspected might be used to fund another attempt 
at a forced strike; and for this reason Graham was anxious to have the article published 
as quickly as possible before the fund appeal really got under way. In the event Graham 
and Peel were unsuccessful in damaging the appeal fund.7 Graham also reprimanded 
those free trade magistrates whom he felt had deliberately allowed the strike to gain a
5 J. W. Croker, ‘Anti Com Law Agitation’, Quarterly Review, VLXXI (December 1842), 244-314
6 Bright Papers, Add. MS 43,383, Bright to Cobden, 9 March 1842; Cobden Papers, BL Add. MS 43,649 
Cobden to Bright, 12 March 1842
7 Sir Robert Peel Papers, BL Add. MS 40,447, ff. 344-7, Graham to Peel, 18 November 1842
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foothold and consulted the government law officers on the possibility of legal action 
against them, however no legal action was ultimately taken.8
The Government and the Chartists
The main attention of the government was focused on the Chartists in the autumn and 
winter of 1842 following the strike. Sir James Graham viewed the strike as overtly 
political from as early as Monday 15 August believing that there existed a conspiracy 
between the trades and the Chartists. Graham noted that the ringleaders of the strike 
were among the better-paid workmen and that trade was improving, evidence that the 
strike was political rather than economic in nature.9
That 1842 was considered by the Government to be the highpoint of the Chartist threat 
to the state is demonstrated by the Government’s creation of no less than three Special 
Commissions and attempted creation of a fourth. This was in addition to trials before 
judges at assizes elsewhere and before magistrates in quarter and petty sessions. The 
key trials were the Special Commissions for the Cheshire, Lancashire, Potteries and 
Black Country strikes held at Chester, Liverpool and Stafford in October 1842, the 
Yorkshire 1842 summer assizes in September, and the famous conspiracy show trial of 
Feargus O’Connor and fifty-eight other Chartist leaders and activists at the Lancaster 
spring assizes in March 1843.10 More people were arrested and tried for seditious and 
public order offences following the strike than in either 1839/40 or 1848. About one 
1500 prisoners were being held in jail for their part in the strike by the end of August. 
This is an indication of the seriousness of the perceived threat to the existing political 
order and of the mass support which the Chartist challenge received in 1842. There 
were mass arrests of the rank and file as well as of the national leaders and local 
activists. Where the evidence was weak the magistrates proceeded summarily at petty 
sessions, preferring the certainty of immediate punishment for a more minor offence 
rather than committing for trial at assizes or Special Commission with the chance of
8 PRO HO 48/34, Law Officers, cases 40,42,43 and 44 respecting the conduct of magistrates, November 
1842; A. G. Rose, ‘Truckling Magistrates of 1842’, Transactions o f the Lancashire and Cheshire 
Antiquarian Society, 83 (1985), 40-70
9 Sir James Graham Papers, Bundle 52A, Graham to Sir William Warre, 15 August 1842
10 PRO HO 27/67, ff. 198-256, Criminal Register, Lancashire, 1842; PRO HO 27/66, ff. 112-6, Criminal 
Register, Cheshire, Chester Special Commission, 5 October 1842; PRO HO 27/68, Criminal Registers 
Staffordshire, Stafford Special Commission, 1 October 1842; Northern Star, 15 October 1842
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acquittal. Many were dismissed, released on recognisances, or fined at petty sessions. 
Large numbers of prisoners appeared before the magistrates at petty sessions in 
Lancashire, Cheshire, the West Riding, Cumberland, Staffordshire, Shropshire, 
Worcestershire, Warwickshire, Nottinghamshire and Leicestershire. However at least 
1045 were tried before quarter sessions, assizes and Special Commissions in England in 
1842 for their part in the strike. In comparison only 467 prisoners in England and Wales 
were tried for political offences in 1839/40 and only around 207 Chartist prisoners were 
to be tried at assizes in England and Scotland in 1848.11
At least 604 defendants from Lancashire and Cheshire appeared before quarter sessions 
or the Special Commissions in 1842 for their part in the strike.12 187 were tried at the 
Liverpool Special Commission and eighty-nine were tried at the Cheshire Special 
Commission in October 1842.13 In the Midlands at least twenty-nine defendants in 
Nottinghamshire, five in Shropshire and two in Worcestershire appeared before quarter 
sessions and assizes in 1842. 276 prisoners were indicted to appear before the Stafford 
special commission in October 1842; 274 of whom were actually tried in October. Of 
these fifty-five were indicted for offences in South Staffordshire and 221 for offences in 
the Potteries. At least a further thirty-two from the Potteries and South Staffordshire 
appeared before quarter sessions in 1842.14 No Special Commission was ultimately held 
for the East Midlands; a reflection of the strike’s peaceful nature in the East Midlands. 
The toll of those tried for their part in the strike in Yorkshire was smaller than in the 
Northwest and the Midlands. 190 defendants were indicted at the Yorkshire 1842 
summer assizes for their part in the strike.15 In Scotland the Chartist activists who lead 
the strike in Dundee, and a handful of the Clackmannanshire, Ayrshire and Lanarkshire
11 ‘Progress of Crime in the United Kingdom’, Journal o f the Statistical Society, VI (1843), 226; PRO 
PCOM 1/46, Central Criminal Court Sessions Papers, v. 16, 1842; ‘Return’, PP (1840) vol. 38, 691-750; 
L. Radinowicz, History o f the English Criminal Law (London, 1968), vol. 4, 249; C. Godfrey, ‘The 
Chartist Prisoners, 1839-41’, International Review o f Social History, 24 (1979), 191; R. G. Gammage, 
History o f the Chartist Movement (London, 1894), 335-344; Hansard, Third Series, LVIII (1841), 751-2
12 ‘Progress of Crime in the United Kingdom’, Journal o f the Statistical Society, VI (1843), 226
13 PRO HO/27/67, ff. 232-241, Criminal Register, Lancashire, 1842; PRO HO/27/66, ff. 112-6, Criminal 
Register, Cheshire, 1842; Northern Star, 15 October 1842
14 ‘Progress of Crime in the United Kingdom’, Journal o f the Statistical Society, VI (1843), 226; PRO 
ASSI6/6, Calendar of Prisoners Stafford Special Commission, October 1842; PRO PCOM 2/401, County 
Prison Stafford Sheriff’s Gaol Register, 1842
15 Northern Star, 3,10 August 1842
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miners were tried at the Court of Justiciary in Edinburgh.16 In London four prisoners 
were tried at the Old Bailey; the London equivalent of trial at assizes. The remainder of 
the hundred or so prisoners arrested at the public meetings and for posting bills 
advertising the meetings were tried summarily before the London magistrates.17
There were many more convictions and sentences of imprisonment and transportation 
for seditious and public order offences in the 1842/43 trials than in those of 1839/40 or 
1848; a further indication of the mass support the Chartist challenge received in 1842. 
Of the at least 1045 who were tried before Special Commissions, quarter sessions or 
assizes in England in 1842 for their part in the strike 923 were convicted. Seventy-five 
of them were transported. Others traversed to the 1843 assizes. In comparison only 397 
political prisoners were convicted in England and Wales in 1839-40. Only eight were 
transported for political offences in 1839 and 1840.18
The famous trial of Feargus O’Connor and fifty-eight other national and Lancashire 
leaders for seditious conspiracy took place at the Lancaster spring assize in March 1843. 
Some of the local Cheshire activists who were among the real originators of the strike in 
the Hyde near Ashton had been tried and convicted at the Chester Special Commission 
in early October 1842 in what was a test run by the Attorney General for the larger 
sedition and conspiracy trial. Peel and Graham had hoped to try O’Connor, as well as 
Thomas Cooper and William Ellis, for High Treason. But just before the October 
Special Commissions opened the law officers advised that the evidence for all three 
only amounted to a lesser charge of seditious conspiracy.19 The Attorney General Sir
16 Scotsman, 28, 31 December 1842, 4, 7, 14, 18 January 1843; A. Broun, Reports o f Cases before the 
High Courts and Circuit Courts o f Justiciary in Scotland during theYears 1842-45 (Edinburgh, 1844-46), 
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Sessions, 1842; PRO HO 26/48, Criminal Registers, Middlesex, 1842; Times, 24 August 1842
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Frederick Pollock and Solicitor General Sir William Follet instead planned to catch 
O’Connor in a monster indictment which included those Chartist activists in Ashton and 
neighbourhood who had started the strike and been prominent in its opening and all the 
delegates to the Manchester NCA and Executive conference. Pollock explained to 
Graham that he proposed ‘to charge O’Connor as a general conspirator with the others 
and not to proceed against him for libel merely, or for acting as a delegate, or taking 
part at the meeting of delegates. I propose to try him in the same indictment with the 
worst of the defendants who headed mobs, made seditious speeches, and stopped mills 
and factories. 1 shall blend in one accusation the head and the hands, the bludgeon and 
the pen, and let the jury and the public see in one case the whole crime.’20 Feargus 
O’Connor and the fifty-eight others charged in the monster indictment all traversed 
from the Liverpool Special Commission. The Law Officers, Peel and Graham then 
hoped to have the trial held before the Queen’s Bench in London, but this was decided 
against as it would have caused further delay, so the trial under the monster indictment 
took place at the Lancaster 1843 spring assizes instead.21 Here the government was 
wielding the ideological authority of the law signalling that the Chartists were lawless 
and reinforcing the aristocratic constitution which was based on the legitimising
TOideology of the majesty, as well as the justice and mercy, of the law.
The Lancaster State Trial and Government ‘Liberalisation*
The sentences of imprisonment imposed on O’Connor and other national Chartist 
leaders at the Lancaster 1843 spring assizes government ‘show trial’ were never carried 
out. However Jenkins does not present a convincing case when he argues that the 
government deliberately allowed O’Connor and the other national Chartist leaders to 
escape punishment. It would be unwise to mark out the trial of O’Connor, as Foster 
does in his introduction to Jenkin’s book, as a first deliberate step in ‘liberalisation’ on 
the part of the government. It is certainly true that the trial was conducted in a more 
conciliatory manner than were the Special Commissions in October 1842. However this
20 Sir James Graham Papers, Bundle 54A, Sir Frederick Pollock to Pollock to Graham, 9 October 1842
21 Sir James Graham Papers, Bundle 54A, Graham to Sir Frederick Pollock, 17 October 1842, Bundle 
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was a natural result of the length of time that had elapsed since the strike’s failure and 
because it was obvious that Chartism, as a mass movement, was collapsing. In March 
1843 the Attorney General, Sir Frederick Pollock, did still hope to obtain a conviction 
against Feargus O’Connor. In his addresses to the court Pollock certainly did not try to 
play down the political nature of strike as Jenkins suggests. It is true that Pollock 
declared that Chartist principles were not on trial and that the defendants were not being 
tried for their political beliefs. However he maintained that a strike to enforce those 
political beliefs was conspired at by O’Connor and the others and was illegal. In fact it 
became clear that the Attorney General was engaged in a political prosecution when he 
ordered the acquittal of one of the defendants on the grounds that the defendant was 
never mentioned in connection with the Charter. Instead of downplaying the political 
nature of the strike, as Jenkins claims, the Attorney General made it plain at the time of 
the trial itself that the government was prosecuting O’Connor and the fifty-eight others 
because they had allegedly tried to intimidate, by means of the strike, Parliament, the 
Queen and the Government into enacting the Charter.24
The Attorney General, on behalf of the government, made every effort to secure the 
conviction of O’Connor. Jenkins misinterprets a line in a letter written by of one of the 
junior counsel at the trial and northern circuit revising barrister, William Frederick 
Pollock, the Attorney General’s son. Pollock wrote to a friend just after the trial had 
closed that ‘The result, however (at present at least), is satisfactory, and the trial will 
have answered its object.’ Jenkins interprets this as evidence of a prearranged plan to let 
O’Connor and the others escape. However the letter was written on 14 March after 
O’Connor had been convicted but before the Queen’s Bench had set aside the 
conviction due to a technicality in the indictment. The result was satisfactory because 
O’Connor as well as the principal Chartist leaders had been convicted and the trial had 
answered its object because the trial had shown the Chartist leaders to have been deeply 
implicated in the strike at least after it began. The qualification in parentheses refers to 
the unwelcome possibility that the Queen’s Bench might uphold the objection over the 
drawing up of the indictment. In fact the prosecution were very disappointed at the trial 
judge Baron Rolfe’s lenient summing up. The younger Pollock believed that Rolfe’s 
‘summing up fell very short of our expectations. It was feeble, frigid and timid; he 
frittered away the whole of our case, and this I say without imputing to him any want of
24 M. Jenkins, The General Strike o f1842 (London, 1980), 219-239
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impartiality, for he was perfectly free from fault in that respect; but either he was 
fatigued by his extraordinary exertions during so many days, or else in the great pains 
he had taken to dissect the evidence -  picking out the parts which applied to each 
person, and which was a most necessary part of his duty -  he totally lost sight of the 
great features of the case.’
The written correspondence between Graham and Peel at the time of the Lancaster state 
trial also provides strong evidence against any policy on the part of the government to 
deliberately allow O’Connor and the others to escape punishment. After hearing of 
O’Connor’s not guilty verdict on the fourth count but before hearing of his conviction 
on the fifth count Graham told Peel that ‘I am afraid Feargus O’Connor has escaped; but 
we have convicted fifteen very dangerous men.’ Later that day after hearing from 
George Maule, the Treasury Solicitor, Graham wrote again to Peel that ‘Since I sent you 
the letter from Lancaster Mr Maule has forwarded to me the enclosed, in which it 
appears that Feargus O’Connor is convicted, but on a minor count.’ Graham and Peel 
obviously did hope for a conviction against O’Connor and were disappointed that he 
was only convicted on the minor count. O’Connor was also obviously their chief target. 
Graham continued, apprehensive of the legal fault in the indictment, ‘They will all 
probably move in arrest of judgement next term; but to have obtained a verdict against 
so large a portion of the most violent Chartists is a good deed done.’26
Thirty-one of the fifty-nine defendants, including O’Connor and all of the most 
prominent Chartist leaders, were convicted at the Lancaster 1843 spring assizes. A point 
of law regarding the wording of the indictment had been raised by the defence at the 
trial and as the trial had initially been planned to take place before the Queen’s Bench 
sentencing and argument over the point of law took place a the Queen’s Bench in May 
and June 1843. After gaining the conviction of O’Connor and the others the Attorney 
General and Solicitor General pressed for their sentencing. There is no convincing 
evidence at this stage of any policy by the government to allow O’Connor and the 
others to escape punishment as Jenkins and Foster suggest. The escape of O’Connor and 
the others was the result of Lord Denman’s decision at the Queen’s Bench to uphold the 
legal objection raised by the defence as to the faulty drawing up of the indictment. This
25 Sir William Frederick Pollock, Personal Remembrances (London, 1887), 204-205
26 Peel Papers, BL Add. MS 40,448, ff. 234-6, Graham to Peel, 10 March 1843
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fault in the indictment as to the location where the offences took place could have been 
an oversight in the drawing up of the indictment but was most likely a deliberate 
attempt by the Attorney General to secure conviction by having as wide a location as 
possible in order to implicate the Manchester NCA Conference members and Executive 
in whatever disturbances took place. No sentence was passed because Lord Denman 
delivered the judgement that the fifth count of the indictment, upon which O’Connor, 
George Julian Harney, William Hill the editor of the Northern Star, and twelve others 
had been convicted, failed due to the fault in the indictment. There is no suggestion 
whatever that Lord Denman was influenced to come to this decision by the wishes of 
the government. Lord Denman was a stickler for the rule of law, as shown by his earlier 
decision not to allow a Special Commission for the West Riding against the wishes of 
Sir James Graham and the Treasury Solicitor, and his later decision to overturn Daniel 
O’Connell’s conviction for seditious conspiracy.27
The fourth count of the indictment, on which sixteen others had been convicted 
including the NCA Executive members P. M. McDouall, James Leech, John Campbell 
and J. H. R. Bairstow, was also faulty though Lord Denman declared that it just passed 
as being legal. However counsel for the defendants convicted on the fourth count 
continued proceedings to have it overturned on the legal technicality and there remained 
a strong possibility of the fourth count also ultimately being overruled. O’Connor had
t  i
always been the target of the show trial for the Attorney General, Sir James Graham and 
Sir Robert Peel. It appears most likely that the law officers allowed proceedings on the 
fourth count to lapse because O’Connor had already escaped on the fifth count. Much 
had been made by the Chartists that they were being prosecuted while no prosecutions 
were laid against ACLL members and the government felt some sensitivity over this 
charge. For O’Connor to have walked free while other lesser Chartists were convicted 
would likewise have risked adverse public opinion. In any case the law officers and 
government knew that the conviction of the sixteen others on the fourth count meant 
that they had the threat hanging over them of proceedings being resumed so the 
defendants were likely to keep quiet in the future without the government having to 
continue proceedings. P. M. McDouall, another important target for the government 
who was convicted on the fourth count, had already fled into exile in France. The law 
officers had reason to think that judgement would anyway also be arrested on the fourth
27 Reports o f  State Trials 1839-43, New Series, vol. 4 (London, 1892), 1231-47
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count if proceedings were carried on with and this was bom out in Lord Denman’s 
ruling on Daniel O’Connell’s appeal against his conviction for seditious conspiracy and 
sentence of one years imprisonment in 1844 following the Irish repeal agitation and the 
Clontarf meeting of October 1843. In Daniel O’Connell’s case Lord Denman declared 
that the court had considered the fourth count at the Lancaster show trial too general and 
so it seems probable that if proceedings had continued judgement would also eventually
*%o
have been arrested on the fourth count. It also seems likely that the government let the 
proceedings lapse because by the summer of 1843 its attention was now on Daniel 
O’Connell’s repeal movement in Ireland. Graham in particular feared civil war in 
Ireland in the summer of 1843. The first of O’Connell’s monster meetings in Ireland 
had been held in April 1843 and the Clontarf meeting was attempted in October 1843. 
By the autumn of 1843 the government was also increasingly concerned with the 
Rebecca Riots in rural Wales and was considering a new Special Commission to deal 
with it. With Chartism as a mass movement now increasingly a spent force it is not 
surprising that proceedings were quietly forgotten about with the government’s 
attention now focussed on Ireland and to a much lesser extent on rural Wales.
In the spring of 1843 the Government did press home the prosecutions in the Midlands 
against Thomas Cooper, John Richards (both Stafford 1843 spring assizes), Arthur 
O’Neill (originally Stafford 1843 spring assizes but moved to the S t a f f o r d  
IS4*3 summer assizes), George White (Worcester 1843 spring assizes),
and William Jones (Leicester 1843 spring assizes for a speech at the end of the Leicester 
strike) which arose out of the strike but took place at assizes in 1843 as they had 
traversed. All the cases were conducted as government prosecutions on the orders of Sir 
James Graham and all the defendants were convicted and sentenced to between one and 
two year’s imprisonment -  a most unpleasant prospect in the goals of the time. The 
Midlands trials in the spring of 1843 suggest that it is doubtful that the Government had 
decided upon the liberalisation, in relation to its dealings with the working class leaders 
in the courts, noted by Foster and Jenkins. Sergeant Talford took O’Neill’s, Cooper’s 
and Richards’ cases for the law officers and argued that all three had tried to coerce 
Parliament, the Queen and Government into enacting the Charter through fear. When
28 Reports o f State Trials 1839-43, New Series, vol. 4 (London, 1892), 1231-47
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Cooper and Richards were sentenced to lengthy terms of imprisonment at the Queen’s 
Bench in May 1843 following their conviction at Stafford the Solicitor General Sir 
William Follett appeared at the Queen’s Bench to address the court on sentencing and 
entreated the court to pass a severe sentence on Cooper.30 These were still all crown 
prosecutions and the government was pressing for convictions and jail sentences against 
the Chartist strike leaders in the Midlands at the very time when, in the view of Jenkins 
and Foster, the government had supposedly decided on a policy of liberalisation in its 
dealing with the working class leadership.
The unexpected and unplanned outcome of the Lancaster ‘show trial’, whereby sentence 
was never carried out, occurred despite of, not because of, the actions of the 
Government and was certainly not part of a policy of deliberate liberalisation, though it 
worked in favour of the Government’s image by portraying it as merciful, bolstering the 
aristocratic constitution which was based on the legitimising ideology of the justice and 
mercy of the law which was available to all.31 Nevertheless this is not to deny an 
increased liberalisation of the state in the 1840s, which indeed had already begun earlier 
in 1842 with Peel’s first budget. However the shock of 1842 was a further incentive for 
the governments of the 1840s to continue limited liberalisation in social policy with 
free-trade, concessions over the factory acts and less harsh administration of the New 
Poor Law.
Class Justice
Fellague Ariouat’s work is an important corrective to a simple ‘class justice’ approach 
to Chartist trials but it perhaps goes too far in discounting the class bias of legal 
personnel. Fellague Ariouat suggested that historians such as Saville and the Chartists 
themselves expected legal personnel to act in a biased fashion but that the Chartists also 
wrongly believed that the law and legal procedure was unbiased. However there are 
weaknesses in this argument. Significantly the Chartists did normally expect the judges 
to act in a fair way as Epstein has pointed out. It was the prosecution team and special
30 Reports o f State Trials, new series, vol. 4 (London, 1892), 1316-1330; Thomas Cooper, The Life o f  
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juries rather than judges whom the Chartists normally accused of class bias.32 In fact 
there was bias exhibited by the legal personnel in the 1842 and 1843 trials. As we saw 
above the Attorney General requested the acquittal of one of the defendants in the show 
trial simply because the defendant had not been a Chartist. At a lower level the 
magistrates often acted in a biased way for example refusing to grant bail to Arthur 
O’Neill, George White and other defendants thus unlawfully keeping them in prison 
before their trials. At the Special Commissions the defendants were tried by special juries 
with a high property qualification rather than by a normal jury. In general the judges did 
act in a fair manner. The Chartists themselves expected this and in the trials Thomas 
Cooper praised Lord Denman and Feargus O’Connor praised Baron Rolfe. However 
Lord Abinger did make biased political speeches attacking Chartist principles to the 
grand juries at the Liverpool and Chester Special Commissions.33
The argument of Fellague Ariouat that bias lay more in legal procedure and the law 
itself rather than emanating from legal personnel but that the Chartists themselves did 
not recognise this is not entirely fair. It was obvious to the Chartists that the law was 
biased in the favour of the aristocracy and holders of real property. Certainly it is true 
that most Chartists recognised and respected the rule of law and in the 1842 strikes the 
local activists almost invariably advised the strikers to stay within the law and to 
maintain ‘peace, law and order’. However this was also almost automatically conjoined 
with the remark that they themselves had had no part in making those laws which they 
were called upon to obey. A central tenet of Chartist political belief was that a 
monopoly Parliament was producing class legislation in which working men had no say. 
Of course this would apply to statute law rather than judge made common law. 
Although legal procedure was often biased against the Chartist defendants in 1842, for 
example many were tried in batches rather than individually, there were crucial times in 
the 1842 and 1843 trials where legal procedure in conjunction with fair judges benefited 
the defendants against the wishes of the government. The government law officers had 
wished for more time to study the depositions before the creation of a Special
32 J. M. Fellague Ariouat, ‘Rethinking Partisanship in the Conduct of the Chartist Trials 1839-1848’, 
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249
Commission for the West Riding. However as the Yorkshire summer assizes was 
already sitting, and the law officers did not specify what new evidence they hoped to 
uncover, the presiding judges, Mr Justice Maule and Lord Chief Justice Denman, 
refused to grant permission for a Special Commission to be set up ruling that legal 
procedure required that the strikers be tried at the Yorkshire summer assizes.34 The 
refusal of the judges to allow a Special Commission in Yorkshire appears to have saved 
some of the local West Riding Chartist strike leaders, who had delivered strike speeches 
but not actually gone on the processions themselves, from prosecution in Yorkshire.35 
More importantly we have already seen that the outcome of the 1843 ‘show trial’, 
whereby the Chartist leaders escaped sentence, was due to legal procedure and the fair 
interpretation of that legal procedure by the judges.36
The Courts as Arenas for Expressing Chartist Beliefs
Epstein has demonstrated that popular radicals in the 1790s and in 1816-20 used the 
courts as arenas for the expression of their political beliefs. Against this Fellague 
Ariouat suggested that, in contrast to earlier radicals, few Chartists used their trials as 
opportunities for the expoundation of their political beliefs in the period 1839-48. 
However in the 1842 and 1843 trials this was far from the case. The trial defence 
speeches turned out to be the last major opportunity the Chartist activists would be 
assured of public interest in their speeches until the revival of the Chartist mass 
platform in 1848. Many of the Chartist activists used their trial defence speeches as an 
opportunity to re-affirm their belief in universal suffrage and the other points of the 
Charter and their willingness to suffer imprisonment for their political beliefs. The 
memory of past martyrs in the cause of political and religious liberty was invoked. For 
Cooper at the Staffordshire 1843 spring assizes ‘If then I am in the post of danger, it is 
not for me to shrink, but rather to remember the spirit of our forefathers, the martyrs of 
our fatherland, and attempt at a humble distance to imitate them.’38 At the end of his
34 Northern Star, 3, 10 August 1842; Sir Joseph Amould, Memoir o f Thomas First Lord Denman 
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defence speech George Julian Harney referred directly to Thomas Muir who had been 
sentenced to transpiration by Braxfield at the Scottish trials in 1793 following the 
meeting of the conventions: ‘Yes in the language of the martyred Muir, “It is a good 
cause; it shall ultimately prevail; it shall finally triumph,” - the conviction that cheered 
that patriot on the eve of his banishment from his loved land, is my consolation on the 
threshold of a dungeon.’39
At the Lancaster 1843 spring assizes show trial the defendants were successful in 
presenting themselves as nobly suffering for upholding their political faith. Remarkable 
testimony of this came from no less a person than the trial judge Baron Rolfe himself. 
Following the day occupied by the speeches of several of the defendants Rolfe 
remarked at dinner that they reminded him of seventeenth century Puritans. William 
Frederick Pollock, though considering that ‘mere selfish vanity, and the lowest ambition 
of personal notoriety, appeared to be the leading motives of the Chartists’ was forced to 
admit that ‘They all spoke well, with great propriety and power of language; and 
although this was the less remarkable, as most of them were paid orators who had been 
for two or three years in the constant habit of speaking, yet they all surprised us by their 
eloquence.’40
The trials were used as an opportunity to denounce class legislation and insist on the 
Charter as the cure for society’s ills. In his defence speech at the Lancaster spring 
assizes in 1843 George Julian Harney told the court that ‘distress is not confined to one 
part of the country... And why is this state of things? Because, as a Chartist, I believe 
that the people are not represented, and their interests are not cared for in the 
legislature...Does not the present state of things proclaim, trumpet-tongued, that the 
privileged classes of society have abused the powers they have exercised... The remedy 
for the present evils I believe will be found in investing the people with their rights.’41
The continuity of Chartist political ideas with those of eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century popular radicalism is apparent in the trial defence speeches in 1842 and 1843.42
39 Trial o f Feargus O ’Connor (London, 1843), 240
40 Sir William Frederick Pollock, Personal Remembrances (London, 1887), 200-205
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In the trial defence speeches the most commonly used argument in support of Chartist 
political beliefs was the historical justification derived from the ancient English 
constitution and the rights of freebom Englishmen. The justification from natural right 
was not completely absent in the defence speeches. The justification from natural right, 
derived from the belief that God created all men equal, was present in George Julian 
Harney’s declamation that eventually the Chartists would ‘by the force of reason and 
the march of mind oblige monarchs to acknowledge the justice of their principles, and 
compel the privileged classes to yield to the rights of man -  rights based on this glorious 
principle, “Do unto thy brother as thou wouldst thy brother should do unto thee.” 
Gentlemen, that principle is altogether violated under the present system of
A'Xlegislation.’
However overwhelmingly it was by the ancient English constitution and the rights of 
the freebom Englishman rather than by natural rights that the Chartists justified their 
political activities and beliefs at the trials. In this the defence speeches showed a great 
continuity with the political beliefs earlier radicals expressed at their trials in the 1790s 
and 1816-20.44 We can see this appeal to the historical English constitution in the 
defence speeches of Arthur O’Neill at the Stafford summer assizes in 1843, of Richard 
Otley and Thomas Storah at the Lancaster spring assizes in 1843, and of Thomas 
Cooper at the Stafford Special Commission in October 1842. Arthur O’Neill in his 
defence speech proclaimed to the court that ‘He had called the Government a usurped 
Government, and he believed that the people, according to the ancient constitution of 
England, were and ought to be a branch of the government; but, by the act of Henry VI, 
the franchise was limited, and the people were excluded from their share in the 
government, till at length those who professed to represent the people had no 
connection with them. Instead of coming in by the door of the constitution, like thieves 
and robbers they had come over the wall by force. The house of Commons, instead of 
representing the people, only represented bricks and mortar, clods, iron, ships, sugar -  
not hearts, minds, intelligence -  in short the people. Such a government could not be 
other than usurped. He was charged with bringing the House of Commons into 
contempt, but that was quite unnecessary -  they had brought themselves into
43 Trial o f Feargus O ’Connor (London, 1843), 240
44 J. Epstein, ‘“Our Real Constitution”: Trial Defence and Radical Memory in the Age of Revolution’, in 
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contempt.’45 The Ashton Chartist activist Thomas Storah, in his defence speech at the 
Lancaster 1843 spring assizes, told the court that, ‘I have advocated the right of the 
people to enjoy political freedom, because, in the ancient laws of this country -  if we 
examine the history of the country -  we find that in the reign of King Ethelred, 
universal suffrage was the law of the land.’46 At Lancaster Richard Otley, the Sheffield 
Chartist activist who had attended the Manchester NCA Conference, had prepared what 
he described to the court as ‘a defence got up with some pains, and in which I had 
drawn evidence from eminent men, and great authorities -  Blackstone, Coke, and 
Fortescue -  as well as the usages of our country in ancient times -  to demonstrate that 
what we seek is not a change of the constitution, but a reformation.’47
The appeal to the rights of freebom Englishmen and the appeal to the ancient English 
constitution was strongly present in Thomas Cooper’s defence speech at the Stafford 
special commission. Cooper declared that he ‘became attached to the legal enactments 
of my country because I believe that in the legal enactments of our glorious Alfred, and 
our other Saxon monarchs -  in the Magna Carta, and the Bill of Rights, and in all our 
judicial institutions, there were luminous traces of the broad and enlightened principles 
of freedom...the principle of the Charter were no other than the embodiment of the 
principles contained in the theory of the British Constitution.’ Cooper affirmed the 
rights of the freebom Englishman and appealed to the memory of past English men who 
had suffered in the struggle against tyranny. Cooper declared in court that ‘I am proud 
that I am an Englishman...not because the advocates of freedom are left unprotected 
and oppressed, but I am proud of my country because it has produced men of the 
highest intellect who have suffered deeply, and with dignity, in the sacred cause of 
human freedom... Since I am an Englishman, I belong to a land which has produced 
men whose independence no tyranny could crush, whose fortitude no tyranny could 
subdue.’48 The Chartist defendants in 1842 and 1843 certainly made use of the courts as 
arena in which to expound their political beliefs. However their trials were to be the last 
time the Chartists would be assured of pubic interest in their speeches for some time to 
come because Chartism had collapsed as a mass movement following the defeat of the 
strike.
45 Staffordshire Advertiser, 12, 19 August 1843
46 Trial o f Feargus O ’Connor (London, 1843), 256
47 Trial o f Feargus O ’Connor (London, 1843), 248
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The Failure of the Strike and the Decline of Chartism
Despite their eloquence at the subsequent trials the failure of the strike contributed 
significantly to the collapse of Chartism as a mass movement at least until its temporary 
revival in 1848. Certainly the trials in 1842 were as effective in breaking the Chartist 
movement as was the government repression of the 1790s and the post-war period. It is 
true that no new repressive legislation was enacted by Peel and Graham in 1842 in 
contrast to Pitt’s Two Acts of 1795, Unlawful Oaths Act of 1797 and Combination Acts 
of 1799 and 1800, and Liverpool and Sidmouth’s Six Acts of 1819; although of course 
some of this legislation remained on the statute book to impede Chartist organisation. 
Habeas Corpus was not suspended in 1842 in England in contrast to 1794, 1798 and 
1817. There were no treason trials in 1842 unlike in 1793 and 1794 and there were no 
executions for treason in 1842 unlike in 1803 following the Despard Conspiracy or in 
the post-war period following the Pentridge Rising, the Cato Street Conspiracy and the 
Scottish Uprising. Nevertheless there were only around two hundred prosecutions for 
sedition in the 1790s compared to the much higher figure for 1842. Repression was just 
as effective in 1842 as in the earlier periods. The fear created by the Two Acts and the 
Six Acts and the threat of imprisonment without trial had helped silence the earlier 
upsurges of popular radicalism without the need to actually undertake many 
prosecutions under the repressive legislation or imprison many people without trial. 
Chartism was crippled in 1842 by mass arrests, the imprisonment of supporters, and by 
fear of imprisonment.49
The trials removed many local Chartist activists and also many of those who gave 
committed support to Chartism below the level of the local activists. Those who were 
arrested but escaped trial were potentially frightened out of further active support for 
Chartism. By using the trials to deter people from further Chartist activity effective use
49 E. P. Thompson, The Making o f the English Working Class (London, 1968), 161, 700; M. T. Davies, 
‘“Good for the Public Example”: Daniel Isaac Eaton, Prosecution, Punishment and Recognition 1793- 
1812’, in M. T. Davies (ed.), Radicalism and Revolution in Britain 1775-1848 (London, 2000), 110-132; 
L. Radinowicz, History o f the English Criminal Law (London, 1968), vol. 4, 243-6; C. Emsley, 
‘Repression, “Terror” and the Rule of Law in England during the Decade of the French Revolution’, 
English Historical Review, 100 (1985), 801-25; C. Emsley, ‘An Aspect of Pitt’s “Terror”: Prosecutions 
for Sedition during the 1790s’, Social History, 6 (1981), 155-84
254
was made of the majesty of the law by the government.50 In the Potteries the Chartist 
leaders John Richards, Joseph Capper, Henry Yates and George Hemmings, as well as 
Thomas Cooper, were all imprisoned and William Ellis was transported. From the 
Black Country and Birmingham Arthur O’Neill, George White and Joseph Linney were 
imprisoned.51 In Yorkshire the Chartist leaders James Henry Dewhirst, Isaac Clisset and 
William Sheldrake were imprisoned.52 The Northwest Chartist activists William 
Moorhouse, Robert Wilde, James Wilde, Stephen Hirst, John Fairhurst and Samuel 
Lees, who all had been among the original originators of the strike at Hyde, were 
imprisoned.53 In Scotland the Dundee Chartist leaders were either removed from the 
scene by imprisonment or had gone on the run. John Duncan was effectively deterred 
from further activity when his case was deferred never to be resumed.54 In Wales no 
trials followed the strike in Merthyr. However a number of important activists such as 
William Miles were victimised and Morgan Williams appears to have been so scared by 
the threat of possible arrest that he took no further active part in the Chartist 
movement.55 The national and Lancashire Chartist leaders, together with the Chartist 
leaders from Yorkshire and the East Midlands who attended the NCA Conference in 
Manchester, who were tried together at the Lancaster 1843 spring assize, of course 
escaped imprisonment.56 However the threat of legal proceedings being resumed 
remained hanging over them.
The failure of the strike also contributed to the collapse of Chartism by the discrediting 
of the ultimate ‘ulterior measure’ of the Chartist mass platform agitation. At the General 
Convention in 1839 Feargus O’Connor and others, while abandoning the planned month 
long general strike or ‘sacred month’ due to the unprepared state of the localities, 
nevertheless stressed that only a united general strike could force the government into
50 D. Hay, ‘Property, Authority and the Criminal Law’, in D. Hay et al, Albion’s Fatal Tree (London, 
1975), 17-64
51 PRO ASSI6/6, Calendar of Prisoners Stafford Special Commission, October 1842; PRO PCOM 2/401, 
County Prison Stafford Sheriff’s Gaol Register, 1842; Reports o f State Trials, new series, vol. 4 (London, 
1892), 1249-1422; Thomas Cooper, Life (London, 1872), 235; Northern Star, 8 April, 19 August 1843
52 Northern Star, 3,10 September 1842,25 March 1843
53 PRO TS 36/26, ff. 1-326, notes of Chester and Liverpool Special Commissions, 1842, R. v. Moorhouse 
and others; PRO HO 27/66, ff. 112-6, Criminal Register, Cheshire, 1842; Northern Star, 15 October 1842
54 Scotsman, 28, 31 December 1842, 4, 7, 14, 18 January 1843; A. Broun, Reports o f Cases before the 
High Courts and Circuit Courts o f Justiciary in Scotland during the Years 1842-45 (Edinburgh, 1844-46), 
480, 512; Sir Archibald Alison, Some Account o f my Life and Writings (Edinburgh, 1883), 498
55 PRO HO 45/265, ff. 56-57, C. J. Napier to HO, Bridgend, 6 September 1842; PRO HO 45/265, ff. 71, 
C. J. Napier to Bute, Bridgend, 12 September 1842
56 Trial o f Feargus O ’Connor (London, 1843), 2
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enacting the People’s Charter. A previously organised strike as was mooted in 1839 was 
unlikely ever to take place due to caution, doubts about its likely universality, and 
government action before the strike could have a chance of taking place. In 1842 the 
general strike had been realised in the only way that was practically possible, launched 
by local activists from the local platforms, yet the general strike had failed. 1842 
permanently weakened the Chartist movement by showing that even once the ultimate 
constitutional weapon of the Chartist mass platform agitation was put into operation it 
did not succeed in destroying the nerve of the government. The defeat of the general 
strike for the Charter in the Northwest, the West Riding, the Midlands, Scotland and 
South Wales was the defeat of the Chartist mass platform agitation with its hopes of 
wringing political change from the government by the threat or implementation of 
‘ulterior measures’. The ulterior measures of the Chartist mass platform agitation had 
been discredited by the failure of the strike for the Charter in 1842 in a way that had not 
happened in 1839, because in 1839 the call for a general strike or ‘sacred month’ had 
been rescinded and so the national holiday was never put to the test at that time. The 
failure of the ultimate ulterior measure’ of the mass platform agitation in 1842 led to 
working men turning away from the discredited mass platform agitation, and this was 
reflected within what remained of the Chartist movement by the move to Feargus 
O’Connor’s Land Plan and by an increasing emphasis on cultural activity in the 
localities. It is true that the Chartist mass platform agitation was to be briefly revived in 
1848, but the Chartist mass platform agitation in 1848 never managed to give itself even 
the appearance of being a convincing threat to the state and its ultimate ‘ulterior 
measure’ had already been revealed as an empty threat.57
Chartist activity continued at a much-reduced level after the failure of the strike. The 
decline was masked to some extent until the spring of 1843 with the raising of funds for 
trial defences and victim funds and with securing the election of Chartists to Joseph 
Sturge’s Complete Suffrage Conference held at the end of December 1842. There was 
also interest in the petitions presented to Parliament condemning Lord Abinger’s highly 
political speeches to the grand juries at the Liverpool and Chester Special Commissions 
and condemning the magistrates for refusing to accept Chartist sympathisers as sureties 
for bail. However the decline in organisation and mass support became increasingly
57 J. Epstein, ‘1848: Feargus O’Connor and the Collapse of the Mass Platform’, in J. Epstein and D. 
Thompson (eds.), The Chartist Experience (London, 1982), 269-310
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apparent. For example sales of the Northern Star steadily declined from 10,000 copies a 
week in the summer of 1843 down to 7000 copies a week in the summer of 1844, 
compared with 40,000 copies a week in 1839. George Julian Harney found little or no 
Chartist activity in many of the localities while on a tour in the autumn of 1843. Among 
the activists internal recriminations came to the fore with Northern Star editor William 
Hill’s criticism of the Executive becoming increasing vitriolic. Activists were apathetic, 
the organisation was derailed with the Executive awaiting trial, and mass support was 
no longer apparent. The breakdown of the Complete Suffrage Conference ruled out the 
strategy of co-operation by the bulk of the activists with middle class radicals. Thus an 
important lesson of the strike was lost. The strike had shown that without active middle 
class support, which despite some sympathy was not forthcoming, the ultimate ‘ulterior 
measure’ of the mass platform would not be effective. The NCA Chartist activists 
decisively rejected the middle class alliance in late 1842. It was left to individual 
activists such as Henry Vincent and Robert Lowery to shift further to middle class co­
operation, while the bulk of the mainstream O’Connorite NCA Chartist activists were 
increasingly stranded without a mass following.58 The ACLL was left as the most 
powerful popular movement in Britain, although overshadowed in 1843 by O’Connell’s 
Irish repeal movement, with Chartism and the Complete Suffrage movement in decline.
In the longer term the 1842 strike marked a turning point in British working class 
history, a critical point in the transition independent radicalism to popular liberalism. 
There was never again to be a political general strike in Britain in the nineteenth 
century. Despite its peaceful nature the mass platform strategy always carried the threat 
of forcible intimidation. The failure of the strike produced disillusionment with the 
strategy of forcible intimidation inherent in the mass platform agitation and the working 
classes turned increasingly towards industrial trade unionism, friendly societies, free 
trade, and the popular liberalism of later Victorian England.59 This trend was 
encouraged by limited amounts of state liberalisation in social policy in the 1840s such 
as further limited factory legislation, repeal of the Com Laws, and tacit acceptance of 
the limited implementation of the New Poor Law in many parts of the North, and also 
by the improvement in the economy even though the benefits of this improvement were
58 Northern Star, 2 September, 10,17,24, 31 December 1842, 7,14,21 January 1843
59 M. C. Finn, After Chartism (Cambridge, 1993), 60-305; T. Tholfsen, Working Class Radicalism in 
Mid-Victorian England (New York, 1977), 156-327
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slight for most of the working classes. After the strike there was not only a growing 
segregation between industrial and political activity but also an increasing political 
segregation between the genders as working class women’s public involvement in 
politics all but ended. On the one hand politics became increasingly detached from the 
workplace and became part of the male dominated public sphere. On the other hand 
married working class females increasingly, though to a disputed extent, tended to move 
out of the workplace into the separate sphere of the home.60 The general strike, where 
work and politics were intimately bound together, was the last significant occasion in 
nineteenth century Britain when working class men and women took part together in 
political activity.
The significance of the strike is far greater than the existing historiography has allowed. 
Even recent accounts too often have in effect portrayed the strike as a coda to the 
rejection of the 1842 National Petition and as being a series of localised outbreaks. This 
has undoubtedly been due to previous studies focusing merely upon one region and so 
losing the nation-wide presence of the strike. In the Ashton-under-Lyne and 
surrounding district the strike was begun by local Chartist activists in order to pre-empt 
a feared series of three wages reductions by Christmas which the Ashton activists 
believed the ACLL manufacturers had determined upon as a means of pressurising the 
government to repeal the Com Laws. Outside the Northwest the strike was organised 
and begun by local Chartist activists from local platforms at public meetings, after 
receiving the news of the strike for the Charter in Manchester. It took the form of the 
implementation of the most decisive of ‘ulterior measures’ of the mass platform, but 
from the local activists following the failure of the national leadership to propose 
serious ‘ulterior measures’ at the time of the rejection of the National Petition in May. 
The strike for the Charter was a nation-wide movement in response to the initial 
outbreak in Ashton. It was not merely a series of unconnected risings but nor was it part 
of a national conspiracy. The strike affected all the manufacturing districts, apart from 
the Northeast and the Glasgow areas. Upon this pattern must be superimposed the 
miners’ strike, especially that in the Midlands and Scotland. Although this had begun 
before the strike for the Charter and had local Chartists as organisers it was in origin 
and aim quite separate from the strike for the Charter, though Chartist activists made 
efforts after the news arrived of the strike for the Charter in Manchester to alter the aims
60 D. Thompson, The Chartists (London, 1986), 120-51
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of the miners strike and make it too for the Charter. The underlying popular concept of 
the strike for the Charter was remarkably coherent throughout the different regions. 
Invariably there were those activists who stressed different aspects. However in general 
the strike was seen as a peaceful, moral, legal and constitutional means of delivering an 
overwhelming display of united public opinion that would break the nerve of the 
Government (and Parliament as presently constituted), leaving it with no choice but to 
enact the Charter. Rather than being a narrowly based, Leninist style conspiracy to 
create a revolution, the strike reflected an existing pattern of working class experience 
and behaviour.
Class was present as an identity in the strike but it was not a Marxist form of class- 
consciousness and remained hazy. Others identities, particularly those of the people, the 
nation and Nonconformist Christianity were also present, though in many ways these all 
meant something similar to class. Throughout the strike regions the traditional radical 
analysis was present. The aristocracy, state Church, pensioners and placemen were 
attacked along with the millocrats and cotton lords who had now joined the traditional 
enemies of the people. Appeal was made to the historical English or British constitution 
and the rights of the freebom Englishman. The working class or the people, the two 
meaning more or less the same, viewed social evils as arising from lack of political 
power. The Charter would guarantee fair wages by giving the workman as well as the 
employer a voice in the legislation and so bringing minimum wage laws, taxes on 
machinery and other reforms such as repeal of the Com Laws, repeal of the New Poor 
Law, better factory legislation and lower taxes. Inspired by these traditional rather than 
overly revolutionary goals, Chartist working men and women rallied in considerable 
numbers to the strike but as we have seen lacked the ability to turn protest into an 
effective challenge to Parliament. In the face of local authorities bolstered by the 
military and a self-confident government the strike tended to peter out. In a wider sense, 
too, the strike proved a turning point in Chartist history, for its failure to implement the 
ulterior measure undermined the morale of the movement, while its activists were 
deterred by the repressive arm of the state. The escape from punishment of Feargus 
O’Connor and the other national Chartist leaders was not part of a deliberate plan of 
liberalisation, it was the result of the decision of the Queen’s Bench on a legal 
technicality, though retrospectively the government undeservedly benefited from the 
seeming leniency. Chartism declined after the failure of the strike partly because the
259
‘ulterior measures’ of the Chartist mass platform agitation were shown to have failed 
when put into practice but also because the state remained self confident and effective in 
repression. There was to be no revival of the tactic of the general strike which 
disappeared from nineteenth century working class protest to be replaced by reformist 
politics and trade union activity.
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